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Introduction

Holger Afflerbach
What Was the Great War about?
War Aims, Military Strategies and Political Justifications  
during the First World War
From 29 July 1914, the day when Austrian troops fired the first shots into Serbia, 
until 11 November 1918, the day of the armistice in Europe, the First World War 
lasted 1,566 days. The belligerent nations fielded about 66 million soldiers, 
8.8 millions of whom died together with nearly 6 million civilians.1 This means 
that on average around 9,400 fatalities occured on every day of the war – and this 
continued for more than four years. Death was only a part of the misery. We have 
to add the millions mutilated in body or soul, the hardships of war, the sorrow of 
many and the suffering of all.
Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, an army commander on the Western Front 
during the First World War later described it as “the most stupid of all wars”.2 He 
did so, significantly enough, during the Second World War – which had, indeed, 
clear aims, being, for one side, a ruthless war of conquest and for the other an at-
tempt to stop and destroy a merciless aggressor: a terrible war indeed, but one that 
had, for both sides, a clear purpose. World War I was different. It is possible that 
the fascination this war exercises on us, one hundred years later, is its lack of a clear 
purpose. Clausewitz said that “the reason [for war] always lies in some political 
situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object”.3 This seems 
only partially true in the case of the First World War. The war aims adopted during 
the First World War were not, for the most part, the cause of the conflict, but a 
reaction to it, an attempt to give the tragedy a purpose – even if the consequence 
was to oblige the belligerents to go on fighting until victory. War aims were created 
during the war, not before. This is at least true for the states which entered the 
War in August 1914. All the Great Powers of Europe were responsible for the 
outbreak of war in 1914, albeit perhaps to different degrees; but as most historians 
1 The figures are approximate. See Rüdiger Overmans: Kriegsverluste. In: Gerhard Hirschfeld/
Gerd Krumeich/Irina Renz (eds.): Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg. Paderborn 2003, pp. 663–666, 
esp. pp. 664 f.
2 Dieter Weiß: Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern. Eine politische Biografie. Regensburg 2007, 
p. 307.
3 Carl von Clausewitz: On War. Ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton 1984, pp. 86 f.
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would say today, the conflagration in the form it actually took was planned and 
desired by none.4 Alliance considerations, fear and the feeling of the need to react 
to, or to preempt, an unprovoked attack were the main reasons behind the actions 
of governments during the July crisis.
Once at war, the belligerents went on to develop widely different agendas. 
Nearly all of them had well-defined war aims and a “lust for conquest” was unde-
niable. This was also true for most of the powers that entered the conflict later – 
witness the interventions of Italy, analysed here by John Gooch,5 and Bulgaria in 
1915, and that of Romania in 1916. The Ottoman Empire was, as Mesut Uyar 
shows, something of an exception, and entered the war very much for defensive 
reasons; but also in this case the lust of conquest came later.6
This volume focusses on a number of aspects of the development of war aims 
and strategy during the Great War. One important aspect is the development of 
coherent strategies, considered not as a purely military task, but also, indeed 
mainly, as a political one, as defined Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of poli-
tics by other means.”7 Hew Strachan provides us with an important clarification 
of what contemporaries understood by the term “strategy”, namely something we 
today would describe as “tactics”.8 The tasks of the individual contributions will 
be to show the complex interplay between political war aims, military strategy, 
morale at home and at the front, economics and war financing.9 It will be neces-
sary to specify the war aims of the particular belligerent states and to show how 
they interacted with military and political realities. In the case of France, Georges- 
Henri Soutou discerns a quite determined political approach and a military strategy 
that fitted French political aspirations.10 Keith Jeffery argues that the British war 
effort was undermining the political coherence of the empire, which nevertheless 
proved to be victorious and to have attained, at least at first sight, the peak of its 
global power in 1918. Also the Austro-Hungarian government insisted stubborn-
4 Christopher Clark: The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914. London 2012.
5 See the contribution of John Gooch in this volume.
6 See the contribution of Mesut Uyar in this volume.
7 Von Clausewitz: On War (see note 3), p. 87.
8 See the contribution of Hew Strachan in this volume.
9 Michael Howard: Grand Strategy. Vol. 4: August 1942–September 1943. London 1972, p. 1, de-
fines “grand strategy” as follows: “Grand strategy in the first half of the twentieth century con-
sisted basically in the mobilisation and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower 
and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those of allied and, when feasible, of neu-
tral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime.” Andreas Hill-
gruber: Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategie 1938–1941. In: Wolfgang Michalka (ed.): Natio-
nalsozialistische Außenpolitik. Darmstadt 1978, pp. 493–525, p. 493, defines strategy as “die Inte-
gration von Innen- und Außenpolitik, von militärischer und psychologischer Kriegsplanung und 
Kriegführung, von Wehrwirtschaft und -rüstung durch die Führungsspitze eines Staates zur Ver-
wirklichung einer ideologisch-politischen Gesamtkonzeption”/ (“the integration of domestic and 
foreign policy, of military and psychological war planning und war conduct, of defence economy 
and military build-up by the leadership of a state towards the realisation of a ideological-political 
concept”).
10 See the contribution of Georges-Henri Soutou in this volume.
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ly, up to the very end, on making gains in the Balkans, as shown here by Marvin 
Fried.11
Equally important is the question of national consensus. What did the political 
and military elites do to rally their respective nations to continue the struggle? 
How was this consensus perceived, how do we see it today?
A second point is the nature of political decision-making under the pressure of 
an enormous crisis. The First World War was not only a global war but also one 
of the most severe and complex political crisis of human history. Analysing the 
decision-making of political and military leaders involves empathising with their 
mentalités, fundamental political attitudes and priorities; but we must also take 
account of contingent factors, such as the accidents of war, the need to take deci-
sions under pressure, and the incalculability of interacting parties – all of which 
figure in this volume. War, of course, had a dynamic of its own; and war aims 
were not static, but were considered, and reconsidered, and modified countless 
times, even if there was, as in the French case, a very solid stock of unchangeable 
ideas.12 Political decision-making too was equally subject to unforeseen contin-
gencies, unpredictable interactions, military and political stopgap measures to 
postpone rather than settle insoluble problems, and above all to the need to sur-
vive.
The same dynamics lay at the root of another important development: the lon-
ger the war lasted, the more the political opposition in the belligerent countries 
looked to it to bring them internal political change. People started to talk about 
fundamental reforms as a reward for their war contribution and their suffering, 
and the war aims debate was enlarged and became a debate on internal reforms. In 
some cases – for example, those of Germany and Russia, as described by Roger 
Chickering and Boris Kolonitskii – the demand for, and the resistance to, internal 
reforms started to overshadow the classic debate about war aims.13
Moreover, as a political catastrophe, the war also pointed the way not only to 
internal reform, but to alternative structures for conducting international rela-
tions: Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about a new international order are discussed by 
Klaus Schwabe,14 and Holger Afflerbach.15
Related to these issues of political options and dynamics in wartime is the ques-
tion why governments did not try to reduce their war aims – or abandon them 
altogether – to save the lives and happiness of millions of people. Instead we see a 
picture of grim determination, a very striking example being Serbia, described by 
Dušan T. Bataković. Forced into exile by the Central Powers in late 1915, the Ser-
bian government continued the fight on Greek soil, stubbornly refusing to reduce 
11 See the contribution of Marvin Fried in this volume.
12 See the contribution of Georges-Henri Soutou in this volume.
13 See the contributions of Roger Chickering (Germany) and Boris Kolonitskii (Russia) in this 
volume.
14 See the contribution of Klaus Schwabe in this volume.
15 See my contribution in this volume.
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its political programme, let alone conclude a separate peace. Such tenacity came at 
a high price, however; and Serbia suffered, in proportion to its population, the 
highest losses of all belligerent nations.16 Serbia was perhaps an extreme case. All 
the other belligerents, however, were almost equally unyielding; and the question 
of why no political compromise was reached, and why this World War, despite 
costing more than 14 million lives, was continued until the complete defeat of one 
of the two sides is discussed here by Lothar Höbelt and Holger Afflerbach.17
The editor and the authors of this volume are well aware of the enormous com-
plexities surrounding the war aims and military strategies of the First World War, 
and have not even attempted to cover all the questions they raise – an impossible 
task when one considers that Fritz Fischer’s volume on German War aims alone 
runs to more than 900 pages and even then does not manage to cover all aspects of 
German strategy and war aims.18 We hope, nevertheless, that the present volume 
will offer an overview to our “ideal audience” of students and informed general 
readers with an interest in the First World War, and may invite them to reflect on 
the political and strategic reasons and rationales behind that catastrophe.
16 See the contribution by Dušan T. Bataković in this volume.
17 See the contribution of Lothar Höbelt and my contribution in this volume.
18 Fritz Fischer: Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 
1914–1918. Düsseldorf 1961.
Hew Strachan
Military Operations and National Policies, 1914–1918
“There is a certain book, ‘Vom Kriege’, which never grows old”, Paul von Hin-
denburg wrote in his war memoirs, published in 1920. “Its author is Clausewitz. 
He knew war, and he knew men. We had to listen to him, and whenever we fol-
lowed him it was to victory. To do otherwise meant disaster. He gave a warning 
about the encroachment of politics on the conduct of military operations.”
Hindenburg was venting the frustration which he had felt in early Septem-
ber 1914, after his victory at the Masurian Lakes over Rennenkampf’s 1st Army. 
Oberste Heeresleitung (hereafter OHL) had told him not to exploit his success by 
pursuing the retreating Russians, but to switch the axis of his attack to the south, 
so as to give “direct support” to the Austrians “on political grounds”. In the pas-
sage which followed, Hindenburg reflected as much his own experiences at OHL 
in the second half of the war, when he himself was chief of the Prussian general 
staff, as his frustrations in 1914. “The political tune is a ghastly tune! I myself 
during the war seldom heard in that tune those harmonies which would have 
struck an echo in a soldier’s heart.”1
Today “Vom Kriege” is not read as it was read by German officers of Hinden-
burg’s generation. Clausewitz’s nostrum that war is the continuation of policy by 
other means has led theorists of civil-military relations to claim that, in the words 
of Samuel Huntington, “the ends for which the military body is employed […] 
are outside its competence to judge”. Huntington concluded his consideration of 
Clausewitz’s “Vom Kriege” with the assertion that, “In formulating the first theo-
retical rationale for the military profession, Clausewitz also contributed the first 
theoretical justification for civilian control.”2 Thanks not least to Huntington, 
military subordination to civil control is the current norm and we interpret Hin-
denburg’s frustration as a classic Prussian military misreading of Clausewitz. The 
First World War was, after all, waged by recognisably modern states. Most had 
constitutions which were sufficiently progressive to mean that there was some 
level of parliamentary accountability, even in those countries which were not de-
1 Paul von Hindenburg: Out of My Life. London 1920, pp. 111 f.
2 Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Re-
lations. Cambridge, MA 1957, pp. 57 f. On the differences in the reading of Clausewitz, see Hew 
Strachan: Clausewitz and the First World War. In: Journal of Military History 75 (2011), pp. 367–
391; Hew Strachan: Clausewitz en anglais. La césure de 1976. In: Laure Bardiès/Martin Motte 
(eds.): De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique contemporaine. Paris 2008, pp. 81–122.
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mocracies. It was also a war in which armies were not on the whole commanded 
by their monarchs, even if some of those monarchs aspired to be autocrats.
There are of course significant exceptions to both those statements. Neither of 
the leading democracies among the original belligerents, Britain and France, held 
an election during the war, and as a result their populations were never given the 
opportunity to pass judgement on their governments’ conduct of it. There are 
also important caveats to be entered in the case of the autocracies. Kaiser Wilhelm 
may have spent much of the war railing at his marginalisation, but he still retained 
the crucial power to hire and fire both Germany’s chancellors and its service 
chiefs.3 Tsar Nicholas II took over the supreme command of the Russian Army in 
September 1915 and exercised it until his abdication in March 1917. By then the 
new and young Kaiser Karl was increasingly involved in the command decisions 
of the Austro-Hungarian Army. However, neither of these observations detracts 
from the general point, that civil authority was more divided from the exercise of 
military command than it had been in Clausewitz’s day. Hindenburg’s problem in 
making strategy was different from, and more complex than, that which confront-
ed Frederick the Great or Napoleon.
Hindenburg’s was one of the first of the post-war memoirs, forming part of a 
flood in which the Germans led the way: his predecessor as chief of the general 
staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, published his in 1920, and his first quartermaster 
general, Erich Ludendorff, was fast off the mark in 1919. The tensions of civ-
il-military relations set the tone for many of these books, whether written by sol-
diers or by civilians. According to the soldiers’ line of argument, they would have 
won the war sooner or – in the case of the German officers – they would simply 
have won the war, if they had been left unfettered by the politicians to fight it. 
According to the politicians, the generals were stupid and bloodthirsty, and 
should never have been given as much head as they were. As David Lloyd George, 
the British prime minister, put it in a concluding chapter of his memoirs entitled 
“Some reflections on the functions of governments and soldiers respectively in a 
war”: “There is a region where the soldier claims to be paramount and where the 
interference of the statesman seems to him to be an impertinence. One is the ques-
tion of whether a great battle which may involve enormous losses ought to be 
fought – if so, where and at what time. The second question is whether a pro-
longed attack on fortifications (practically a siege) which is causing huge loss of 
life without producing any apparent result, ought to be called off. Should Gov-
ernments intervene or leave the decision entirely to the soldiers?”4
3 Walter Görlitz (ed.): Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des 
Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, 1914–1918. Göttingen 1959, 
is full of examples of the Kaiser’s frustrations; Holger Afflerbach: Wilhelm II as Supreme War-
lord in the First World War. In: War in History 5 (1998), pp. 427–449, shows how extensive his 
power remained.
4 David Lloyd George: War Memoirs. 2 vols. London 1938, here: vol. 2, p. 2035; on the War Mem-
oirs, see Andrew Suttie: Rewriting the First World War. Lloyd George, Politics and Strategy. Bas-
ingstoke 2005.
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Lloyd George’s question was of course rhetorical, but its tone was also self-ex-
culpating. He was anxious to defend himself from the charges that in 1917 he had 
not prevented the 3rd battle of Ypres and had not subsequently intervened after its 
commencement to forestall its continuation as Haig’s Army floundered towards 
Passchendaele.
Most historians today have moved away from the tired and self-serving argu-
ments of the memoirs. There were few, if any, pure “westerners” or “easterners” 
in Britain, but probably quite a number in Germany, especially in the winter of 
1914–1915.5 Moreover, the person who espoused a particular line in strategy was 
not necessarily to be identified as either (to continue the British nomenclature for 
these categories) a “frock-coat” (i.e. a civilian) or a “brass-hat” (i.e. a soldier). One 
of the reasons for Lloyd George’s readiness both to support Robert Nivelle’s ap-
pointment as the French commander-in-chief and then to back his request that 
the British Expeditionary Force be subordinated to French command was his 
own political need for a major victory on the western front. Hence too Lloyd 
George’s ambivalence about Haig’s plans for the second half of 1917. If Haig suc-
ceeded, he would give what Lloyd George badly needed: a much more secure po-
litical platform from which to pursue his own desire to defeat Germany. Real 
wartime ambiguities underlay the apparent post-war certainties of the memoirs. 
In Germany itself, Falkenhayn was a resolute “westerner” but achieved his great-
est gains in the east, while Ludendorff – at least until he himself moved to OHL 
in 1916 – was an impassioned “easterner”.
As the memoirs have been discredited by the opening of the archives, another 
narrative has suggested a different line of historiographical attack. In 1917–1918, 
the Entente powers won the war precisely because their civilian governments 
fought back against their generals and their accretion of political influence, so 
reasserting civilian authority over military. In Britain, Lloyd George, having an-
gered the King, the Cabinet and Parliament by agreeing to place Haig under 
Nivelle without consulting any of them, a sin compounded by the failure of the 
Nivelle offensive in April 1917, amazingly recovered. He was helped by Haig’s 
dogged persistence at Ypres, which discredited the British Expeditionary Force’s 
commander in the eyes of his principal political supporters, the Conservative 
party and its press. In the winter of 1917–1918 Lloyd George managed to con-
trive the removal of Haig’s principal staff officers, including his Director of Mili-
tary Intelligence, John Charteris, and his Chief of Staff, Launcelot Kiggell. In 
February 1918 the prime minister manoeuvred Sir William Robertson out of his 
post as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and replaced him with Sir Henry Wil-
son, whom Haig disliked. And at the end of March Haig was finally brought 
5 For Britain, see the essays in Brian Bond (ed.): The First World War and British Military Histo-
ry. Oxford 1991; on the debates in Germany, see Karl-Heinz Janßen: Der Kanzler und der Gene-
ral. Die Führungskrise um Bethmann Hollweg und Falkenhayn 1914–1916. Göttingen 1967, 
which provides a lively if now somewhat dated introduction. Holger Afflerbach: Falkenhayn. 
Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. München 1994, is fundamental.
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under French command when Ferdinand Foch was appointed the Allies’ genera-
lissimo.
To represent this as the triumph of Lloyd George over Haig, of civilian control 
over military, is however as much in danger of overstatement as were the aspersions 
and categorisations popularised by the memoirs. The differences between the Brit-
ish prime minister and the army’s generals should not be exaggerated. Both were 
more united in the ends they were pursuing than it suited either party to admit in 
later life. Lloyd George’s complicity in the 3rd battle of Ypres makes the point.6 In 
the spring of 1918, with Haig’s power base clipped, the army might have been ex-
pected to kick back, and at one level it did. On 7 May, the Director of Military 
Operations at the War Office, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, wrote a letter 
to the national press in which he accused the prime minister of misleading the 
House of Commons with regard to the strength of the British Expeditionary Force 
in France as at 1 January 1918. This mattered because Haig had asked for more men 
but had not been given them, and so Lloyd George could be accused of starving the 
BEF of manpower and of contributing (at least in part) to the success of the Ger-
man offensive on 21 March 1918. Maurice’s letter was a bolt from the blue, a flash 
of anger more than a conspiracy. He had not forewarned H. H. Asquith, the former 
prime minister, the leader of the Liberal party and the most likely alternative to 
Lloyd George as premier. Neither Maurice nor Sir William Robertson could see 
Asquith as a viable wartime leader. So, willy-nilly, both were tied to a prime minis-
ter who was as unequivocal in his pursuit of victory as they were. Nor was the 
army united in support of Maurice’s stand, or at least not openly so. His quixotic 
gesture failed to produce any support from General Headquarters in France: Haig 
wrote to his wife, “No one can be both a soldier and a politician at the same time”.7
A similar pattern can be tracked across the other Entente powers. On 8 No-
vember 1917 Luigi Cadorna, who had commanded the Italian armies in eleven 
battles on the Isonzo since 1915, was dismissed after the rout at Caporetto. Sig-
nificantly it was the king, not the prime minister, who acted, and it was the king 
who chose his successor, Armando Diaz. The army’s own choice would have been 
the Duke of Aosta, and one staff officer at the supreme command exploded on 
hearing that Diaz had got the job: “We need a ‘flag’ in the army, around which 
everybody can rally […]. With Diaz, who is not well respected, most of his direct 
subordinates will begin to waver [...] this is a disaster.”8
6 Trevor Wilson: The Myriad Faces of War. Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918. Cambridge 
1986, pp. 462–468.
7 On 7 May 1918, quoted in: Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918. Ed. by Gary Shef-
field and John Bourne. London 2005, p. 411. On the Maurice affair, see Nancy Maurice (ed.): The 
Maurice Case. From the Papers of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice KCMG, CB. London 
1972; John Gooch: The Maurice Case. In: id.: The Prospect of War. Studies in British Defence 
Policy 1847–1942. London 1981; David R. Woodward: Did Lloyd George Starve the British 
Army of Men Prior to the German Offensive of 21 March 1918. In: HJ 27 (1984), pp. 241–252.
8 Mario Morselli: Caporetto 1917. Victory or Defeat? London 2001, p. 103; see also John R. Schind-
ler: Isonzo. The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War. Westport, CT 2001, pp. 261 f.
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It was not. Italy rallied. In France, Georges Clemenceau, installed as prime 
minister on 16 November 1917, similarly played off generals against themselves. 
He had inherited as his senior officers Philippe Pétain, appointed to command the 
French Army on 15 May 1917 in the wake of Nivelle’s failure, and Ferdinand 
Foch, who had been given the now separate office of chief of the general staff. He 
admired the second for his optimism, even if he rejected his Catholicism, and dis-
liked the first for his pessimism. What had weakened his political predecessors 
had been the ambivalence of their commitment to the war. By dedicating the 
French nation anew to the fight, Clemenceau reunited the government and the 
people with the army in a common objective. Between 18 January 1918 and the 
armistice on 11 November, he devoted a third of his time to visiting the front. In 
June 1918, after the successful German offensive of 27 May on the Chemin des 
Dames, Clemenceau felt able to act, replacing Pétain’s chief of staff, Anthoine, re-
moving two army commanders, and bringing back the “butcher”, Charles Mangin. 
Pétain was forced to accept changes in up to eight senior military appointments.9 
Potentially the greatest challenge to Clemenceau’s ministry was the appointment 
of Foch to be Allied generalissimo on 26 March 1918. Although a French officer, 
Foch now answered to an Allied body, the Supreme War Council, and so had the 
excuse to reject his own prime minister’s authority. Clemenceau did not give him 
the opportunity, not least by showing his own clear support for the principle of 
unified Allied command, and by his public statements backing Foch, culminating 
with his promotion to be a marshal of France.
The narrative was very different in the case of Germany. The army played the 
game of divide and rule better than the politicians. The chancellor, Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg, colluded in the isolation of Falkenhayn and 2nd OHL, 
and in August 1916 saw the populist and popular duo of Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff installed as 3rd OHL. As a minister appointed by the Kaiser, rather than a 
leader of a major political party, Bethmann Hollweg lacked his own power base in 
the Reichstag. So his value to Wilhelm II depended on his capacity to manage a 
body which owed the chancellor no loyalty. Bethmann Hollweg was in some 
ways, therefore, more prey to popular demand than were the elected heads of 
Britain and Germany. More had united him to Falkenhayn in terms of strategy 
than either appeared to recognise; what held him to Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
was the public’s faith in their military brilliance hatched by the victory of Tannen-
berg. Martin Kitchen has called what followed after they took over OHL in 
 August 1916 a “silent dictatorship”, in which the casualties were not just the 
Reichstag and nascent parliamentarianism but ultimately the monarchy itself.10 
The reform to the Prussian constitution, adumbrated before 1914, was continually 
9 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle: Clemenceau. Paris 1988, pp. 655 f., pp. 665–670.
10 Martin Kitchen: The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the German High Command under 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff 1916–1918. London 1976; see also Gerhard Ritter: Staatskunst und 
Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland. 4 vols. München 1954–1968, 
here: vols. 3 and 4.
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postponed throughout the war, and in the death throes of the conflict the generals 
– not the chancellor – told the Kaiser he had to go, and to do so because he no 
longer commanded the confidence of the army, not because the German people 
rejected him. In this narrative Germany lost because militarism prevailed. 
Therefore, according to this account, the Entente won the war because its mem-
bers were democracies. It is a narrative which can accommodate the problem of 
Tsarist Russia, because it resolved to liberalise itself in March 1917, after the first 
of the revolutions, the better to fight the war. Moreover, in the following month, 
the pre-eminent democratic power of the twentieth century, the United States, 
joined the war as an “associate” of the Entente, and so revalidated the liberal ide-
als for which it was fighting. The Entente won not just because its members were 
fighting for the rule of law, for freedom and civilisation, but because democracies 
proved better able to wage major war, by harnessing military operations to the 
pursuit of national objectives. Ironically, democracy, by militarising itself for the 
duration of the war, proved better at waging war than did militarism. In the or-
thodoxy of civil-military relations theory, as enunciated by Huntington in partic-
ular, bringing generals under the control of the government led to victory.
This interpretation has some merit but it is couched in the rhetoric of post-
Cold War triumphalism. It fits into the master narrative of the “short” twenti-
eth century, that democracy will prevail over totalitarianism. So the Allied success 
in 1918 is part of an ascending sequence which runs on to the defeat of Hitler in 
1945 and the collapse of Communism in 1989–1990. This was the Zeitgeist of 
2002–2003: democratic governments, although slow to fight, fight to win.
The emphasis on civil-military relations in this version of events misses a key 
point, the character of the First World War itself. The dynamic created by the war 
involved all sides in an interactive and escalatory spiral, and this trumped the inter-
nal, domestic debates specific to each state. For the original belligerent nations of 
1914 the First World War was what today is called an “existential” conflict, a war 
of national survival. All of them, with the exception of Britain, were directly invad-
ed in the opening moves of the conflict: Serbia by Austria-Hungary, Austria-Hun-
gary by Russia, Russia by Austria-Hungary, Germany by Russia in East Prussia 
and by France in Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium by Germany, and France by Germany. 
The imposition of martial law and the army’s intervention in other areas of do-
mestic government were therefore justified by military necessity. The 1851 Prus-
sian law of siege, which had been adopted by the empire in 1871, stated that, if 
any part of Germany was threatened, the Kaiser could declare all to be in a state 
of war. It came into effect on mobilisation and gave the deputy commanding gen-
erals of the corps districts into which Germany was divided powers which were 
independent of the civil authorities, leaving each of them answerable only to the 
Kaiser.11 In 1912, during the Balkan Wars, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had em-
11 Wilhelm Deist (ed.): Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918. 2 vols. Düsseldorf 1970, 
contains the relevant documents; Gerald D. Feldman: Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany 
1914–1918. Princeton 1966, pp. 31–33.
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ulated Germany’s law of siege by adopting a war service law. It covered not just 
the mobilisation of manpower defined in narrowly military terms but also the 
subordination of all the empire’s resources to the needs of the army. The rights of 
private citizens were potentially forfeit to legislation which in due course would 
allow the Kriegsüberwachungsamt or war surveillance office, part of the ministry 
of war and originally charged with censorship and the control of information, to 
assume responsibilities previously held by other government departments and to 
penetrate many areas of public life. After Serbia’s rejection of the Austro-Hungar-
ian ultimatum, a state of emergency declared that Austria was to be governed by 
decree until parliament was recalled; that did not happen until 1917. The army’s 
supreme command (AOK or Armeeoberkommando) stepped into the space avail-
able. Trial by jury was suspended and an increasing number of offences were 
transferred from civil to military courts. Hungary managed to resist much of this, 
particularly the intervention of the war surveillance office, but there is a good case 
for saying that Austria, at least until 1917, was – of all belligerents – the power 
most under the thumb of the army.12 In both France and Russia invasion in 1914 
and 1915 respectively resulted in large swathes of territory falling under the direct 
military administration of the Grand Quartier Général and of Stavka. On 2 Au-
gust 1914 the President decreed that all the departments of France and of Algeria 
were in a state of siege and on 3 September all France was declared to be in a state 
of war. The army’s powers to convene courts martial and its capacity to dispense 
summary justice were extended in 1914, and then gradually clawed back from 
1915 onwards.13 Britain, although not directly attacked at the outset of the war, 
was subject to raids from the sea and the air, and never entirely divested itself of 
the fear of German invasion, particularly in the winter of 1914–1915. Parliament 
passed the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) on 8 August 1914, conferring on 
the government the power to rule by decree. Originally designed to curb espio-
nage, in 1915 DORA was adapted to convert factories to munitions production, 
and by the war’s end had intruded on many civil liberties, from the regulation of 
the trade unions to the licensing of the sale of alcohol. 
For the later entrants to the war, motivated by alliance obligations and by the 
promise of territorial gain, the imperative of national survival might at first be less 
evident. The Ottoman Empire, Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania each made a con-
scious choice as to which side it would support rather than being confronted by a 
set of circumstances which left it with no choice. But the war could still become 
existential – for the Ottoman Empire through the Gallipoli landings and the inva-
sion of eastern Anatolia in 1915 and for Italy with the defeat at Caporetto and the 
retreat to the Piave in October–November 1917. As Italy’s new prime minister, 
12 Joseph Redlich: Austrian War Government. New Haven 1929, pp. 56–58, pp. 77–86; Tamara 
Scheer: Die Ringstraßenfront. Österreich-Ungarn, das Kriegsüberwachungsamt und der Ausnah-
mezustand während des Ersten Weltkriegs. Wien 2010.
13 Pierre Renouvin: The Forms of War Government in France. New Haven 1927, pp. 28–37.
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Vittorio Orlando, put it in the wake of the disaster, “The people must know that 
when the nation is in danger, we are all united”.14
The rhetoric of unity – union sacrée, Burgfrieden – was not just oratory. In 
terms of civil-military relations it highlighted the point which Clausewitz had 
drawn from his consideration of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and 
from his own experience of the defeat and occupation of Prussia in 1806–1807. As 
he put in book 8 of “Vom Kriege”, in wars which approached the absolute, policy 
and its role become less evident because policy is more fully in harmony with 
war’s true nature – which is to escalate and not to be limited or constrained. It was 
this reading of Clausewitz which underpinned the use of “Vom Kriege” in Hin-
denburg’s memoirs quoted at the beginning of this chapter. In the First World 
War, therefore, national policy and military operations should have been running 
on convergent, rather than divergent, lines. In the Entente powers in 1917–1918, 
they did. Orlando’s words were echoed in the speeches of Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau, both of them premiers who used their not inconsiderable powers of 
speech to demand national mobilisation and complete commitment to the achieve-
ment of victory. To continue the Clausewitzian refrain (in this case his develop-
ment of the idea of the “trinity” in book 1), they united the people, the army and 
the government in a common cause, the waging of war. 
Clemenceau’s speech to the French chamber in November 1917 began by prais-
ing the army: “We have great soldiers with a great history, under chiefs tempered 
in the furnace, inspired to the supreme sacrifice which made the reputations of 
their ancestors.” But having paid tribute to the army, both ordinary soldiers and 
generals, Clemenceau went on to speak of the “strength of the French soil”, which 
“inspires our people to work” as well as to fight. “These silent soldiers of the fac-
tory, deaf to pernicious suggestions, these old peasants bent over their soil, these 
sturdy women at work, these children who bring their help with a seriousness 
that belies their weakness – there are our soldiers [voilà de nos poilus].”15 It was 
France which in 1917–1918 coined the phrase “la guerre totale” – total war – to 
refer specifically to the mobilisation of the nation for a war of national survival, 
and it chimed with the patriotic calls to arms of 1793 and of revolutionary war.16
So the ends of this war were not divisive. What were divisive were the means 
to the ends, in other words the strategy. Civil-military relations in democratic 
states were also not ends in themselves; they were means to enable the effective 
formulation of strategy. And it was strategy which caused friction because there 
was more than one way to bring military operations and national policy into 
harmony.
The challenge of formulating strategy was even more fundamental than that. In 
1914–1918 strategy was not understood in the sense in which it is understood to-
day. After the First World War one of its veterans, Basil Liddell Hart, defined 
14 Schindler: Isonzo (see note 8), p. 264.
15 Georges Clemenceau: Discours de guerre. Paris 1968, p. 131.
16 See most obviously: Léon Daudet: La guerre totale. Paris 1918.
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strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends 
of policy”.17 That definition resonates today, but it was itself a product of the ex-
perience of the First World War. It was not how strategy was defined in 1914.
“The object of strategy”, Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote in “Vom heutigen Krie-
ge” in 1912, “is to bring the troops into action in the decisive direction and in the 
greatest possible strength; to bring about combat under as favourable conditions 
as possible.”18 What was at issue for Bernhardi, a retired Prussian officer recalled 
to service in 1914–1918, was the relationship between strategy and tactics, and his 
understanding of strategy was accordingly much closer to what today would be 
called operations.
The leading luminaries of other powers did not disagree. In 1902 G. F. R. Hen-
derson, who taught Haig and Robertson at the Staff College, defined strategy as 
“the operations which lead up to battle, and which follow battle”.19 Ferdinand 
Foch, lecturing at the Ecole de Guerre in 1903, told his pupils, “No strategy can 
henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring tactical results, victory by 
fighting. A strategy paving the way to tactical decisions alone: this is the end we 
come to in following a study which has produced so many learned theories”. And 
he went on: “Strategy does not exist by itself, as is it is not worth anything with-
out tactical efficiency.”20
This relationship, that between strategy and tactics, received more coverage 
from Clausewitz, than that between strategy and policy. The discussion of the 
latter, policy, is largely confined to books I and VIII of “Vom Kriege”. The for-
mer, strategy, dominated the description of Napoleonic war at the core of “Vom 
Kriege”, which provided the principal reason for reading Clausewitz before 1914. 
Clausewitz had defined strategy as the use of the battle for the purposes of the 
war. Because the task of strategy was to exploit the outcome of battle, he can and 
could be read as saying that strategy is superior to tactics. However, most pre-
1914 commentators saw strategy’s role as that of bringing about the decisive bat-
tle, and so read “Vom Kriege” in that light. For them battle was not a beginning 
but a culmination, the pay-off for strategy, and plenty in “Vom Kriege” also en-
dorses that interpretation.
With strategy defined in these terms, as an operational matter, its institutional 
home was the general staff of an army. It followed that strategy defined in more 
modern terms, as lying along the fault line between military operations and na-
tional policy, lacked not only an intellectual foundation, but also an institutional 
basis. For the autocracies, civil and military authority converged on the person of 
the monarch, but in 1914 none of the personalities – Wllhelm II of Germany, 
17 Liddell Hart used the word “strategy” to cover the full range – from grand strategy to what he 
called “pure strategy”. This definition dates from 1954, and therefore follows the experience of a 
further world war: see Peter G. Tsouras (ed.): The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations. 
London 2000, p. 453.
18 Friedrich von Bernhardi: On War of Today. 2 vols. London 1912–1913, here: vol. 2, p. 336.
19 G. F. R. Henderson: The Science of War. London 1919, p. 11.
20 Ferdinand Foch: The Principles of War. London 1918, pp. 43 f. (emphasis in original).
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Nicholas II of Russia or Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary – matched the institu-
tion or the office. In any case the scale of the war dwarfed the capacities of a sin-
gle supreme civil-military head.
In Britain, the defence needs of the empire, the requirement to combine mili-
tary and naval advice with policy direction, had prompted the formation of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence in 1902.21 And so Britain before the war began 
had already created a body in which ministers and the professional heads of the 
services met on an equal footing. It was the Committee of Imperial Defence which 
on 5 August 1914 recommended the despatch of the BEF to Europe, the most 
important British strategic decision of the First World War. However, because it 
was a sub-committee of the cabinet, it had no executive power. Given that the 
dominant business of the government was now to wage war, the cabinet itself fo-
cused on the war and so took over the Committee of Imperial Defence’s job. And 
that – by implication – makes a further point: both the Committee of Imperial 
Defence before the First World War and the British government during it were 
focused not on what was understood by strategy in 1914, but on policy. The 
Committee of Imperial Defence had been set up when Britain was at peace, in the 
aftermath of the South African War, and its key driver was not the conduct of 
major war but the need to maintain imperial defence in peacetime, and to apply 
sea power in its support. Its objective was, to use a phrase which became current 
after the First World War, the development of grand strategy.22
The character of the First World War demanded that each belligerent conducted 
its policies in such a way as to produce grand strategy. This had nothing to say 
directly about strategy as understood by staff colleges and general staffs before 
1914, about envelopment and breakthrough, about lines of operations, and about 
the interface between strategy and tactics. The focus of grand strategy was on a 
higher plane: the creation of a mass army; the implications of drawing manpower 
from industry; the need therefore to coordinate all the state’s human resources for 
the production of munitions and food as well as for the generation of fighting 
power; the establishment of the state as the principal purchaser of goods and ser-
vices; the waging of an economic war, on land but especially at sea; the coordina-
tion of war in several theatres simultaneously; and the achievement of all this at 
national level in conjunction with Allies; in sum the waging of coalition war.
Pre-1914 concepts of strategy, even when they faced up to the relationship be-
tween strategy and policy (and military theorists like Bernhardi, Henderson and 
Foch were not so pre-modern as to deny the link), had not generated any defini-
tion of strategy that was broad enough to cover all these topics. They belonged in 
21 Nicholas d’Ombrain: War Machinery and High Policy. Defence Administration in Peacetime 
Britain 1902–1914. Oxford 1973; Franklyn Arthur Johnson: Defence by Committee. The British 
Committee of Imperial Defence. London 1960.
22 Julian Corbett: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London 1911. Reprint Annapolis 1988, 
pp. 308 f., pp. 327 f., distinguished before the war between what he called “minor strategy” and 
“major strategy”, but he also occasionally used the term “grand strategy”.
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the realms not of strategy, of the use of the battle for the purposes of the war, but 
of policy and politics, and the soldiers of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries were as contemptuous of politicians as are those of today. Increas-
ingly during the war, and particularly after it, the strategic concept which would 
be used most often to embrace the war in its entirety, from tactics to policy, was 
attrition. However, in English the word lacks precision, and that ambiguity was 
reflected in other languages. In France in 1915 Joffre employed the verb grignoter, 
hence the noun grignotage, meaning to nibble. He nibbled the Germans by fight-
ing, using offensive tactics to do so. But others spoke of usure, as in la guerre 
d’usure, implying the using up or exhaustion of resources, an objective which might 
be achieved by economic warfare without mounting attacks in land operations. In 
Germany, the words were always verbs (unlike the English preference for a noun, 
attrition; “to attrite” or “to attrit” is an Americanism and its use in a military con-
text recent) or their derivatives: zermürben, reiben, ermatten, erschöpfen.
A concept of attrition had made its way into strategic theory before 1914, but 
the debate that it generated was itself indicative of the difficulties. Hans Delbrück, 
the Berlin professor who established military history as a proper academic sub-
ject, had taken Clausewitz’s prefatory note to “Vom Kriege”, dated 10 July 1827, 
as a departure point to argue that strategy had two forms. “War can be of 
two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy – to 
render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign 
whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so 
that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.”23 
Delbrück concluded that Clausewitz was proposing that strategy either aimed at 
annihilation through decisive victory, so enabling a dictated peace, or used attri-
tion, intending to wear out the enemy and forcing him to negotiate a settlement. 
The latter was the preferred method of the weaker, not the stronger, power, and 
Delbrück contended that Frederick the Great had opted to use it in the Sev-
en Years’ War. The historians of the Prussian general staff vigorously contested 
this interpretation of Frederick’s strategy, pointing out the regularity with which 
he had sought decisive battle, especially in 1757.24
The debate was symptomatic of the wider problem of whether strategy was set 
in a political or an operational context. Delbrück was doing the first. Frederick 
23 Carl von Clausewitz: On War. Ed. and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Prince-
ton 1976, p. 69; German original: Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege. In: Werner Hahlweg (ed.): 
Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals von Clausewitz. Berlin 161952, p. 77: “Diese doppelte Art des 
Krieges”, Clausewitz had written, “ist nämlich diejenige, wo der Zweck das Niederwerfen des 
Gegners ist, sei es, daß man ihn politisch vernichten oder bloß wehrlos machen und also zu jedem 
beliebigen Frieden zwingen will, und diejenige, wo man bloß an den Grenzen seines Reiches eini-
ge Eroberungen machen will, sei es, um sie zu behalten, oder um sie als nützliches Tauschmittel 
beim Frieden geltend zu machen.”
24 Sven Lange: Hans Delbrück und der “Strategiestreit”. Kriegführung und Kriegsgeschichte in 
der Kontroverse 1879–1914. Freiburg i. Br. 1995; Arden Bucholz: Hans Delbrück and the German 
Military Establishment. War Images in Conflict. Iowa City 1985.
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the Great did seek battle, but in the Seven Years’ War his inferiority in resources 
and in manpower, when confronted by a coalition of Austria, France and Russia, 
increasingly required him also to avoid it, and instead to exhaust his enemies by 
manoeuvre, using his central position between the three powers to exploit the ad-
vantages of time and space. What Delbrück understood by attrition, Ermattungs-
strategie, said little about seeking battle to exhaust the enemy and rather more 
about using events outside battle to wear him down. Attrition was not the oppo-
site of manoeuvre, as it was to become when NATO debated the lessons of the 
Vietnam War in the 1970s and 1980s, but its consequence. So in terms of the 
First World War the nearest equivalent of Delbrück’s Ermattungsstrategie was to 
be found not on the battlefield but at sea, in economic warfare waged by the Al-
lies through the blockade of the Central Powers and by Germany through unre-
stricted submarine warfare. Ermattungsstrategie also carried implications for the 
war’s length: by avoiding battle, the belligerents were postponing the decision.
A war of indeterminate length presented Germany with a conundrum. In the 
Seven Years’ War Frederick had avoided battle after 1757 and so lengthened the 
conflict out of weakness. By 1763 his conduct of a prolonged (and in some fash-
ionable interpretations global) struggle had prostrated Prussia economically, even 
if it had won the war. Clausewitz too had seen the use of defence to postpone a 
decision as favouring the weaker power: time, he argued in book VI of “Vom 
Kriege”, works to the advantage of the defence as the attack spends its energy in 
its advance, until it passes the “culminating point of victory”. Schlieffen had con-
fronted a different calculation. Germany had to attack precisely because of its 
economic weakness: time would work against Germany and in favour of any alli-
ance in which Britain was a partner. So in Schlieffen’s case grand strategic weak-
ness demanded offence, not defence. He embraced operational solutions leading 
to decisive battle to cut through a problem not dissimilar to that confronted by 
Frederick’s Prussia, its encirclement by a hostile coalition, although crucially in 
1914 Austria-Hungary would be Germany’s ally, and Britain Germany’s enemy.25
For the Prussian general staff the implications of its operational view of strate-
gy were played out in tactics. As a result its perspective was radically different 
from Delbrück’s, precisely because it was thinking about another level of war. 
Strategy’s purpose was to enable battle, not to shun it. The German wars of unifi-
cation, the most obvious model of short, sharp wars in recent European history, 
supported that set of ideas. And so too did the experience of colonial campaign-
ing. The advantages which imperial powers possessed over native populations 
were tactical, and lay in the discipline, organisation and firepower of their 
armies.26 The principal object in war was to bring the enemy to battle, whether it 
was waged in Europe or outside it.
25 Stig Förster: Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871–1914. Meta-
kritik eines Mythos. In: MGM 54 (1995), pp. 61–95; Hew Strachan: The First World War. Vol. 1: 
To Arms. Oxford 2001, pp. 1005–1014.
26 Charles Callwell: Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice. London 31906, esp. pp. 71–107.
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In 1914, the levels of war – strategic, operational and tactical – were not as 
clearly defined or demarcated in military theory, let alone in practice, as they are 
today. Pre-war plans conflated strategy and tactics, as has much of the subsequent 
analysis of those plans by historians. A decision to invade France was not inevita-
bly the same as a decision to mount an attack in a tactical sense; similarly the 
French “spirit of the offensive”, a set of ideas developed to deal with the challenge 
of crossing a fire-swept battlefield, did not in itself imply a commitment to launch 
an offensive into Alsace-Lorraine when war broke out.27 As Germany showed on 
the western front for much of the period 1915–1917, it was possible to combine 
the strategic offensive with the tactical offensive. The French response had de fac-
to to be the opposite: to launch tactical offensives to drive out the invader and to 
recover the territory that had been lost.
The problem for all parties in the First World War was that in practice the com-
plexion of the war was defined not from the top down, but from the bottom up – 
not at the political or even at the operational level, but at the tactical. Trench war-
fare was adopted for tactical reasons, to protect soldiers from the destructive ef-
fects of industrialised firepower, but it also had operational and grand strategic 
foundations. Operationally, it allowed ground to be held with fewer men, and so 
enabled units to be freed up for use elsewhere, even on other fronts in other the-
atres. Grand strategically, it defended territory, and the resources, both human 
and industrial, that the territory sustained. It was therefore vital to the economic 
war. Moreover, holding territory could determine the settlement of frontiers at 
the war’s end. However, trench warfare meant tactics dominated strategy. Opera-
tional intent became subordinated to the decisions of junior officers. The linear 
battlefield which trench warfare created caused command decisions to travel 
downwards to the front, as the corps lost out to the division, the division to the 
brigade, the brigade to the battalion, the battalion to the company, the company 
to the platoon, and even the platoon to the section or squad. Strategy as it had 
been defined by general staffs before 1914 could not deliver the decisive battle 
which it had claimed as its raison d’être.
As a result by 1915 ideas which rationalised attrition at the operational level – 
at the interface between strategy and tactics – increasingly recommended them-
selves to more reflective officers . Philippe Pétain and Henry Rawlinson, both of 
them army commanders before the year was out, were cases in point. They 
stressed the need to limit offensives and to achieve better coordination between 
artillery and infantry.28 By taking ground using the tactical offensive, but limiting 
27 In the English language, see for the origins of this sort of thinking, Basil Liddell Hart: The 
Ghost of Napoleon. London 1933, pp. 131–137; Michael Howard: Men against Fire. The Doc-
trine of the Offensive in 1914. In: Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli 
to the Nuclear Age. Oxford 1986, pp. 510–526, did not overthrow it, but Jack Snyder: The Ideol-
ogy of the Offensive. Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914. Ithaca, NY 1984, is 
the fullest and most ambitious statement of this “orthodoxy”.
28 Stephen Ryan: Pétain the Soldier. Cranbury, NJ 1969; Robin Prior/Trevor Wilson: Command 
on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–1918. Oxford 1992.
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the depth of the attack to that which could be fully supported by artillery, Raw-
linson hoped to provoke the enemy to counter-attack in order to regain what he 
had lost. In doing so, the enemy would forfeit the advantage of the tactical defen-
sive for the disadvantage of the tactical offensive, and so suffer more losses and 
deplete his reserves. As an operational concept, designed to give purpose to the 
tactical possibilities, what Rawlinson called “bite and hold” had merit. But what it 
struggled to do was to find a wider strategic context. The logical conclusion to 
this idea of attrition, which assumed that Germany’s reserves could be exhausted 
at a greater rate than those of the Entente, was that both sides would negotiate at 
the point when Berlin began to run out of men, but before German troops had 
been forced out of Belgium and north-east France. The return of the occupied 
territories was an irreducible object of the war for both France and Britain, and 
yet militarily they would still not be in a position to ensure its delivery.
“Bite and hold” was also flawed operationally, as became clear when Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff succeeded Falkenhayn at OHL in September 1916. Why 
should a German commander counter-attack to regain a few hundred yards of 
muddy trench unless the ground mattered for other reasons? Falkenhayn had in-
sisted that ground lost should be re-won, so playing into the logic of “bite and 
hold”; Hindenburg and Ludendorff did not, and in February 1917 even withdrew 
from the Somme battlefields to shorten the western front and create a stronger 
defensive position, called the Siegfried line.29 According to this logic attritional 
battles were likely to occur where a breakthrough by one side or the other would 
have strategic effect, and where it was therefore important for the defence to hold 
its positions. At Ypres, the Germans needed to hold the high ground behind 
which their main line of communications ran. The British, with their backs to the 
Channel ports through which their supplies and reinforcements passed, were in a 
comparable position. To the east the Austro-Hungarian Army fought two dogged 
defensive battles – in the Carpathians to prevent the Russians erupting into Hun-
gary and on the line of the Isonzo to forestall an Italian breakthrough to Trieste 
and Ljubljana. Major movement where the ground mattered less could occur 
without having strategic effect. The principal shifts in front in the west between 
1916 and 1918 occurred in Picardy, with both sides registering significant territo-
rial gains, the Allies in early 1917 and the Germans in 1918: neither movement 
proved decisive, however geographically impressive.
As a result when attrition was used by generals to explain their strategies to their 
political masters, to relate military operations to national policy, it was frequently 
to rationalise failure, not to anticipate success. Haig’s planning for the battles of the 
Somme and 3rd Ypres intended to achieve breakthrough; in 1916 he created a re-
serve army – commanded by a cavalryman, Hubert Gough – to exploit that mo-
ment, and in 1917 his aims had a clear strategic objective, the main German railway 
junction at Roulers. When neither battle went as well as he hoped, then he fell back 
29 Fritz von Lossberg: Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914–1918. Berlin 1939, is relevant to all 
this.
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on attrition, redefining his original objective in terms of what he had actually 
achieved. His fullest statement on attrition, relating tactics to operations to strate-
gy in a coherent way, was retrospective and written in 1919.30 Similar points can be 
made about Falkenhayn and the most notorious case in which attrition was al-
legedly applied through battle in the First World War. In his so-called Christmas 
memorandum of 1915, Falkenhayn said that his aim at Verdun was to bleed the 
French Army “white”.31 There are two objections to this interpretation of his in-
tentions. The first is that in overall terms the Central Powers had fewer men to 
lose than did the Entente: at least Haig had that degree of logic on his side.32 The 
second is the evidence. No copy of the Christmas memorandum has been found, 
outside its author’s post-war memoirs; it was not present in the Prussian archives 
even before they were destroyed by Allied bombing in 1945.33 Attritional argu-
ments to explain the battle only started to appear in German press reporting in 
April 1916, after the German attack had failed to achieve its initial objectives.34
Falkenhayn nonetheless had a greater feel than most for what would come to be 
called grand strategy. He knew that Germany lacked the resources to win against 
a coalition underpinned by Britain, and he therefore appreciated the need to un-
pick the enemy alliance, seeking a separate peace with Russia to do so. By the 
same token, a strategy of attrition, however logical it could be made in Delbrück’s 
terms, could not make sense as an operational method. Falkenhayn could see the 
value of submarine warfare against Britain, because it was a way of eroding Brit-
ish maritime and economic strength, but there was no merit in fighting an attri-
tional battle on land against a coalition superior in resources as well as in man-
power. And it was for his failings at the operational level, the interface between 
strategy and tactics for which the chief of the general staff was particularly re-
sponsible, that he was so castigated in German accounts written in the 1920s. In 
1931 Hermann Wendt took Falkenhayn’s Christmas 1915 memorandum at face 
value and deconstructed the attritional purpose on which the battle of Verdun 
purportedly rested: Wendt’s interpretation had a greater influence than is often 
acknowledged, not least on Alistair Horne when he wrote “The price of glory. 
Verdun 1916” published in 1962.35 In 1920 Friedrich von Bernhardi, now retired 
30 See Haig’s final despatch, in: J. H. Boraston (ed.): Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (Decem-
ber 1915–April 1919). 2 vols. London/Toronto 1919, here: vol. 1, pp. 311–357.
31 Erich von Falkenhayn: General Headquarters 1914–1916 and Its Critical Decisions. London 
2009, pp. 209–218.
32 David French: The Meaning of Attrition, 1914–1916. In: EHR 103 (1988), pp. 383–405, discuss-
es Kitchener’s efforts to give strategy shape.
33 Afflerbach: Falkenhayn (see note 5), pp. 543–545, discusses the authenticity of the memorandum.
34 Général Palat [Pierre Lehautcourt]: La grande guerre sur le front occidental. Vol. 10: La ruée 
sur Verdun. Paris 1925, pp. 330–333.
35 Alistair Horne: The Price of Glory. Verdun 1916. London 1016; see also: Hermann Wendt: 
Verdun 1916. Die Angriffe Falkenhayns im Maasgebiet mit Richtung auf Verdun als strategisches 
Problem. Berlin 1931. Horne specifically mentions Wendt in his notes for further reading on 
Falkenhayn’s strategy but omits the full bibliographical details as Wendt is omitted from the bibli-
ography itself.
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once more, used a brief book on future warfare to condemn attrition. Continuing 
the pre-war debate, he declared Delbrück to be wrong, because a strategy which 
avoided attacking and aimed to win solely by exhausting the enemy without bat-
tle was empty. He too saw war as possessed of a dual nature, but his understand-
ing of strategy still shunned the relationship between military action and national 
policy. One type of war was “operational”, in which the defender for numerical 
or geographical reasons found it impossible to construct a secure flank which 
could not be enveloped. The other was positional war which sought to break 
through the enemy’s front. However, in this second case, the aim remained to cre-
ate a flank which could be enveloped. For Bernhardi the First World War had 
changed little: the principle of envelopment, so forcefully advocated by Schlieffen 
before it, especially in his retirement, still dominated, and there was no need to 
abandon operational solutions to resolve the challenges of grand strategy.36 In 
1925, one of the Reichsarchiv historians, Georg Soldan, argued that “the experi-
ences of those who fought in the front-line should be the basis for the lessons 
drawn from the world war”. In so doing he acknowledged that the war had been 
changed from the bottom up, but his conclusion was an unequivocal rejection of 
Delbrück. Because Germany would always be weak, not least thanks to the treaty 
of Versailles which limited the size of the army to 100,000 men, it would have to 
embrace battle, not avoid it, in order to solve its strategic dilemmas.37
If attrition made little sense for the economically inferior alliance, it made a 
great deal more sense – whether at the levels of grand strategy or of operations – 
for the Entente. Whereas Falkenhayn’s Christmas memorandum became the basis 
for his subsequent vilification, Haig’s final despatch as the commander-in-chief of 
the BEF became the grounds for his defence. “The rapid collapse of Germany’s 
military power in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the fighting of 
the two previous years”, he wrote on 21 March 1919. “It would not have taken 
place but for that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves of the 
German armies, while the constant and growing pressures of the blockade sapped 
with more deadly insistence from year to year at the strength and resolution of 
the German people. It is in the great battles of 1916 and 1917 that we have to seek 
for the secret of our victory in 1918.” This is a perfectly logical way to understand 
the Allied victory and it has been used to good effect both to support Haig specif-
ically and to explain the war’s outcome more generally.38 However, hindsight is 
not intent. 
In order to find a new and more modern understanding of strategy emerging 
during the First World War itself we certainly need to look to Britain. This was 
36 Friedrich von Bernhardi: Vom Kriege der Zukunft. Berlin 1920; id.: Denkwürdigkeiten aus 
meinem Leben. Berlin 1927, p. 126, p. 133, p. 143, expresses Bernhardi’s continuing contempt for 
Delbrück.
37 George Soldan: Der Mensch und die Schlacht der Zukunft. Oldenburg 1925, here: pp. 16–20.
38 John Terraine: The Smoke and the Fire. Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861–1945. London 
1980, p. 58, p. 60; see also John Terraine: Douglas Haig. The Educated Soldier. London 1963; 
Gary Sheffield: Forgotten Victory. The First World War. Myths and Realities. London 2001.
Military Operations and National Policies 1914–1918 23
where economic warfare and military capacity were most obviously equal pillars, 
not only in sustaining the national war effort but also in enabling the endeavours 
of Britain’s Allies and in coordinating them across different theatres. But we should 
not therefore focus on Britain’s best known (or for many most notorious) general: 
Douglas Haig was a national theatre commander, no less and no more. His inter-
national contemporaries were often more. Joffre was both a theatre commander 
and the chief of the general staff in 1914–1915, and all chiefs of the Prussian gener-
al staff throughout the war were commanders in several theatres, of which the 
western front was only one. In some senses they too were coalition commanders, 
as Nivelle was (briefly) in 1917 and Foch in 1918. For men in such positions, op-
erations constantly vied with broader definitions of strategy and vice versa. In 
Britain theatre command was separated from the post of chief of the imperial gen-
eral staff, an office taken up by Sir William Robertson in December 1915 and 
which he held until February 1918. The fact that he had to juggle the western 
front with other fronts, even if the former was the most important, both gave him 
more leeway and enabled him to develop a perspective different from those of 
Britain’s theatre commanders, including Haig.
Robertson had negotiated an enhancement of his powers compared with those 
of his predecessor. They included the right to report directly to the government, 
bypassing the Secretary of State for War. He also realised the changes that were 
occurring within war and the need for strategy to adapt. “If you keep hammering 
away in a methodical and careful manner the Boche may yet crack”, he wrote on 
26 July 1916 to Henry Rawlinson, then commanding the 4th Army in the Somme 
battle. “The thing you have to keep your eye on is that he does not beat you in 
having the better man-power policy. We never cease here giving our attention to 
this question, and do not omit thinking about black as well as white men. The 
general situation is now better than it has ever been before and all that is needed is 
the use of common-sense, careful methods, and not to be too hide-bound by the 
books we used to study before the war. As you know better than I do each war 
has its own peculiarities, but one would think that no war was ever so peculiar as 
the present one, and Field Service Regulations [the army’s principal doctrine on 
operations, first published in 1909] will require a tremendous amount of revising 
when we have finished with the Boche”.39
By May 1917 Robertson had concluded that limited offensives using as much 
artillery as possible and resting on careful preparation were the best operational 
solution to the problems of trench warfare. Little therefore separated him from 
Pétain and Rawlinson on his point, and like them he rested his conclusions on his 
first-hand experience of 1914–1915, first as the BEF’s quartermaster general and 
then as its chief of staff. Secondly, he did not think the Allies would win the war 
before 1919, and so he was anxious to husband Britain’s resources and not to en-
gage in overly ambitious and premature offensives. Thirdly, he was able to put the 
39 David Woodward (ed.): The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir William Robert-
son, Chief of the Imperial General Staff December 1915–February 1918. London 1989, p. 72.
Hew Strachan24
western front in context. While the main British effort should continue to be in 
France and Flanders, the other fronts should be coordinated in their effects so 
that German reserves were pulled in different directions. In June 1917 he was 
even open to the idea that it might be best first to target Austria-Hungary and 
force it to make a separate peace. The Central Powers held the heart of Europe 
and so enjoyed the advantages of what Robertson’s Staff College education called 
“interior lines”. Germany and Austria-Hungary could move troops on a short 
chord from one point on their circumference to another. The Entente powers 
were condemned to operating on exterior (and longer) lines, circling around Eu-
rope’s periphery. As the Allied military planners had recognised in December 1915 
and December 1916, when they had met to produce strategic designs for 1916 and 
1917 respectively, simultaneous attacks around the circumference of the Central 
Powers were the best way to rob the enemy of these strategic advantages. When 
understood in these terms, the western front could never be considered in isola-
tion from other fronts.40
Robertson’s understanding of strategy had moved from the interface between 
operations and tactics to that between operations and policy, a point fully borne 
out in both his post-war memoirs. The challenge was to develop an institutional 
framework to give effect to this intellectual awakening. As he put it later, in 1921, 
“The real headquarters of Armies in these days are not to found in the field 
abroad, but at the seat of government at home; and plans of campaigns are, and 
must be, analyzed and criticised by civilian Ministers in a way quite unknown a 
few decades ago.”41 Through his participation in the deliberations of Lloyd 
George’s war cabinet, Robertson straddled the operational and the political, but 
he was frustrated on the one hand by Haig and on the other by the prime minister 
himself. His own determination to show a united military front to the politicians 
led him publicly to support Haig, even when he disagreed with him (as by 1917 
he increasingly did). The fact that Haig commanded the largest British Army ever 
put into the field while enjoying the support of the king gave him an independent 
political leverage of the sort that Robertson could not match. Lloyd George did 
not come to Robertson’s aid, but used the proposed creation of a strategic reserve 
and the establishment of the Supreme War Council to undermine both generals.
By 1918 the Entente had created the mechanisms for the formulation of coali-
tion strategy. It had set up the Supreme War Council and appointed Foch to be 
the Allies’ generalissimo. Both steps can be seen as late and inadequate. The Su-
preme War Council was never given the strategic reserve for which Lloyd George 
had lobbied and so struggled to shape strategy within and across the theatres of 
war. Foch was never allocated a general staff commensurate in size with his status, 
and so remained reliant on the capacities of the individual national staffs for de-
40 Ibid., p. 193 and references on p. 324; see also David Woodward: Lloyd George and the Gener-
als. East Brunswick, NJ 1983, pp. 163 f., p. 170.
41 William Robertson: From Private to Field Marshal. London 1921, as quoted by: Tsouras (ed.): 
Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations (see note 17), p. 90.
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tailed planning. However, this list of deficiencies ignores the degree of coordina-
tion that had been achieved across a broader definition of strategic effects – eco-
nomic, naval, and industrial – and which began to take effect much earlier in the 
war. In February 1915 the Allied finance ministers met in Paris to discuss how to 
share and coordinate their resources, proposals which themselves carried military 
implications, particularly for purchases of munitions. The entry of the United 
States to the war had an immediate effect on the coalescence of the Allied effort, 
for all that the United States became an associate rather than a full ally. Before 
April 1917 New York’s money market and stock exchange had forced the Allies 
to coordinate their overseas borrowing and their American purchases; afterwards 
its economic leverage prompted the United States and the Entente powers to cen-
tralise their demands for shipping space, food and raw materials.
The result was a much broader definition of strategy than anything current in 
the Central Powers, and which became a model that inspired the Allies’ direction 
of strategy in the Second World War. In 1923 a serving British officer, J. F. C. Full-
er, developed these experiences into a broader articulation of the idea of grand 
strategy. “The transmission of power in all its forms, in order to maintain policy, 
is the aim of grand strategy”, he wrote in “The reformation of war.” “While strat-
egy is more particularly concerned with the movement of armed masses, grand 
strategy, including those movements, embraces the motive forces which lie behind 
them both – material and psychological. […] The grand strategist we see is, conse-
quently, also a politician and a diplomatist.”42 This was a vision which united mil-
itary operations to national policy, but in the ambition and scope which it claimed 
for strategy it could only inflame, rather than resolve, the tensions inherent in 
civil-military relations. The ongoing challenge for democracies in the twentieth 
century was to find the institutional framework which could formulate strategy 
on Fuller’s lines. It proved hard in major wars; it has been almost impossible in 
minor ones.
42 John Frederick Charles Fuller: The Reformation of War. London 1923, p. 219.
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French War Aims and Strategy
Basically, the strategy of the French during the First World War was largely influ-
enced by their evolving war aims. The idea was not just to win the war, but to re-
alise, through and during the war, a not absolutely but largely constant set of war 
aims. It was a clearly Clausewitzian relationship, with war being indeed the con-
tinuation of politics.
It would be useful first to remind ourselves of the overall frame of mind of the 
French in 1914. After the (in the eyes of the post-1870 generations) dangerous 
experiments of Napoléon III with the “Nationalities Principle”, they generally 
supported the concept of a European balance of power, underpinned by a system 
of permanent consultations among the major Powers. At the same time they 
were convinced that when the Emperor Franz Joseph died, the cards would be 
redealt and the Dual Monarchy would disappear. Austria would join Germany. 
As compensation, in terms of the European balance, France would recover Al-
sace-Lorraine – probably through a general congress. Much the same went for 
the Ottoman Empire, where France also nourished long-term goals.1
Even so, during the years between the First Moroccan Crisis in 1905 and 
1914, the French had been divided on how the European balance could best be 
maintained. A minority recommended negotiating with Germany without try-
ing to isolate her (inclusiveness had after all been the name of the European 
game since the Congress of Vienna). But a large majority felt that the danger of 
an ever more hegemonic Reich ruled that option out: the only way a balance 
could be maintained was by strengthening the Franco-Russian alliance and the 
Anglo-French Entente as a counterweight to the German-Austrian alliance. 
This was very much the view of Raymond Poincaré, president of the Republic 
since 1913 – a fateful turning point:2 until then the alliance systems had a brak-
ing effect in a crisis, with less directly involved partners calming down their 
more militant Allies, as the Russians did with the French in 1905, the French 
with the Russians in 1908, and the Germans with the Austrians in 1912 and 
1913. With the sharp increase of tension after 1913, however, the priority be-
came to keep alliances functioning, and supporting an ally to the hilt became the 
1 Christopher M. Andrew/Alexander S. Kanya-Forstner: France Overseas. The Great War and 
the Climax of French Imperial Expansion. London 1981.
2 John F. V. Keiger: Raymond Poincaré. Cambridge 1997.
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order of the day – witness the July 1914 crisis.3 As a result, French Grand strat-
egy in the last years before 1914, while continuing to assume a basically defen-
sive or “deterrent” posture against an ever more powerful Germany) had be-
come much more offensive both at the diplomatic level (involving full support 
for the Russian ally and extensive aims if war should come) and, quite logically, 
at the strategic level, as we shall see.
To come to the heart of my topic: the system of political-military relations 
evolved during the war. Joffre was a decidedly republican commander-in-chief – 
he would not have been chosen if he had not been so – who fully respected the 
government’s prerogatives in matters of political guidance. A well-known instance 
is the meeting, on 9 January 1912 of the Conseil supérieur de la Défense nationale, 
the highest military-political body, that included the president of the Republic, 
the prime minister, the ministers for War and Foreign affairs, and Joffre. Joffre 
asked to be fully informed about the current status of French alliances, and, quite 
specifically, about Belgian neutrality in terms of international law. He asked to be 
authorised in case of war to march through Belgium, which was much more suit-
able than Lorraine for a broad offensive. The political authorities demurred, how-
ever, insisting that that would cost France the support of Great Britain (because of 
the 1839 guarantee 1839 treaty).4 One could argue, in fact, that Paris won the 
First World War on that day.
It should be noted, however, that while initially Joffre, as chief of staff and des-
ignated commander-in-chief, recognised that the overall direction of the war was 
a matter for the government, he was adamant that operational planning was strict-
ly a matter for the military.5 Indeed, this went so far that at the beginning of the 
war Joffre refused to inform the government about the events at the front, con-
tenting himself with asking them to leave Paris for Bordeaux, the usual destina-
tion of French governments in distress.6 When it became evident, contrary to ini-
tial expectations, that the war would be a long one, contrary to initial expecta-
tions, the politicians regained a modicum of control. But the full strategic freedom 
of action of the general staff did not disappear until 1916, when the bloody battles 
of Verdun and the Somme and the growing dissatisfaction of government and par-
liament about military secrecy and obfuscation by the high command moved Bri-
and, prime minister since October 1915, to reorganise and streamline the French 
war effort all along the line. The high command was reorganised on 13 December 
3 Christopher Clark: The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914. Allen Lane 2012; 
Stefan Schmidt: Frankreichs Außenpolitik in der Julikrise 1914. München 2009; Sean McMeekin: 
The Russian Origins of the First World War. Cambridge, MA 2011; Fritz Fischer: Krieg der Illu-
sionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914. Düsseldorf 1969; Günther Kronenbitter: “Krieg 
im Frieden”. Die Führung der k. u. k. Armee und die Großmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns 
1906–1914. München 2003.
4 Guy Pedroncini: Stratégie et relations internationales. La séance du 9 janvier 1912 du Conseil 
Supérieur de la Défense nationale. In: RHDipl 91 (1977), pp. 143–158.
5 Maréchal Joffre: Mémoires. 2 Vols. Paris 1932.
6 Henry Contamine: La Victoire de la Marne. Paris 1970, p. 223.
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1916. Henceforward Joffre and his successor Nivelle met the president, the prime 
minister and the ministers for War and Foreign affairs regularly at the meetings of 
the newly formed War Committee, where political-strategic but also strictly stra-
tegic matters were discussed.7
The Meaning of the “Plan XVII”: an Offensive Thrust Arising  
from Strategic and Military Considerations, or a Politically Motivated 
War Plan to Achieve Ambitious War Aims?
Was the famous “Plan XVII”, adopted in 1912 and envisaging a speedy offen-
sive against Germany, solely the result of strategic and tactical considerations? 
Or did the French general staff also have ambitious political and territorial war 
aims in mind, aiming ultimately at destroying Germany’s hegemony in Eu-
rope? That there was general agreement between Paris and St. Petersburg in the 
event of war to eliminate Germany as a dominant power, if war did come, 
through a short offensive war, seems according to recent research quite plausi-
ble.8 This does not mean that France and Russia deliberately provoked a war; 
merely that, if it came to war, they intended to solve the German problem once 
and for all.
Already the Franco-Russian alliance, formed in 1893 with the strictly defen-
sive aim of the “maintenance of peace”, had taken another direction in 1899 
when foreign minister Delcassé widened its scope to a more far-reaching “main-
tenance of the balance between European forces”. For both countries this new 
objective was designed to take into account the eventual disintegration of 
Austria-Hungary and to prevent Germany from absorbing the German-speak-
ing part of the Danube Monarchy and to expand towards the Balkans. In fact, 
Delcassé believed, (like many of his compatriots) that if Germany were to ex-
pand with the fall of the Dual Monarchy, then France would be entitled to re-
cover Alsace-Lorraine in the name of “European Balance”.9
In the last years of peace the Franco-Russian alliance was steadily strengthened. 
Raymond Poincaré, prime minister in 1912 and president of the Republic the next 
year, was convinced war might soon break out, and that anyway a reinforced Alli-
ance was the only way to deter Germany and Austria. Despite vociferous opposi-
tion the Three Years military service law was voted in 1913, both to reinforce the 
French Army if war broke out and in order to enhance France’s credibility with 
the Russians.10 It was also in order to reinforce the Alliance that Delcassé was sent 
7 For instance one may quote the February 6, 1917 sitting of the War Committee: see Raymond 
Poincaré: L’année trouble. Paris 1932, p. 59.
8 See Schmidt: Frankreichs Außenpolitik (see note 3); McMeekin: Russian Origins (see note 3), 
pp. 46–58.
9 See Georges-Henri Soutou: L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours. Paris 2007, p. 152.
10 Gerd Krumeich: Aufrüstung und Innenpolitik in Frankreich vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Die 
Einführung der dreijährigen Dienstpflicht 1913–1914. Wiesbaden 1980.
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by Poincaré as ambassador to St. Petersburg, in the course of which mission he 
also discussed with foreign minister Sazonov the peace conditions to be imposed 
to Germany after an eventual war.11
As early as 1911 the new chief of staff, general Joffre, devised a new plan for 
the event of war, “Plan XVII”, which came into force in 1912. It was actually a 
mobilisation and concentration plan for the start of war, not really an opera-
tional plan, but its thrust was evident, and proceeded seamlessly from concen-
tration to the first phase of the campaign in a way which proved that everything 
had been thought out in advance. There were to be two offensive thrusts, one 
towards Alsace, and the main one towards Lorraine, the centre of the German 
front. The strategic concept was one of a quick decisive victory, crushing the 
German centre, along the “Austerlitz paradigm” dear to the heart of French 
strategists since Napoleon. It is worth stressing that the significant word “deci-
sive” occurred frequently in Joffre’s plans and orders at the time and expressly 
alluded to the “final crushing of the foe”. Of course the offensive concept was 
partly a reflection of the current systematic “offensive dogma” of the French 
military.12 However, these ambitious plans13 had also much to do with the Rus-
sian alliance and the wish, if war were to come, to crush Germany in order to 
reorganise Europe – as is evident from the content of Franco-Russian staff talks 
in 1911, 1912 and 1913.14 We know that on 23 July, during their visit to St. Pe-
tersburg, just before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July, Poincaré told 
the Russians to remain firm. They feared that, if the Russian government were 
to let the Serbs down, the Central Powers would reinforce their position in both 
the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire; and against the background of the victory 
of the Left, less favourably inclined to the Alliance, in the recent French elec-
tions, they feared for the survival of the Alliance if Paris and St. Petersburg did 
not stand together in the crisis. Only firmness, in Poincaré’s view, could deter 
the Central Powers from declaring war; and if war came nevertheless, France 
had to support Russia, lest she find herself isolated facing a Reich that had beat-
en Russia and dominated the Continent. It should be added that most contem-
poraries had little idea of the kind of war that was impending and assumed that 
after a short campaign a new European order would be arranged around the 
negotiating table.
11 See Soutou: L’Europe (see note 9), p. 152.
12 Pierre-Yves Hénin: Le Plan Schlieffen. Un mois de guerre. Deux siècles de controverses. Paris 
2012, pp. 310 ff., esp. p. 335.
13 This point was made already by Contamine: Victoire (see note 6). See Dimitri Queloz: De la 
manœuvre napoléonienne à l’offensive à outrance. La tactique générale de l’Armée française de 
1871 à 1914. Paris 2009.
14 Joffre: Mémoires (see note 5), vol. 1, pp. 127–134.
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As Early as September 1914 Paris Decided to Seek a Complete Victory, 
not a Negotiated Peace. War Was Waged Accordingly and 
 Government and High Command Marched in Step
Shortly after the Marne victory (6 September) the Russians, fearful that the French 
might content themselves with pushing the Germans back and liberating Al-
sace-Lorraine, asked Paris about its intentions, adding that, for their part, they 
indeed intended to “create in Europe a situation which would ensure world peace 
for many years”. The French replied on 20 September that the liberation of occu-
pied territory and Alsace-Lorraine would not be enough to end the war, and that 
they were as determined as the Russians to “put an end to the hegemony of Prus-
sian militarism”. That expression, coated with a veneer of republican ideology, 
was proclaimed publicly on 22 December; and although it was vague, it was, in 
fact, very significant. Indeed, this exchange with Petrograd demonstrated that al-
most immediately, if not beforehand, the central war aim was clearly to defeat 
Germany completely and to reconstruct Europe.15
Accordingly, from the Marne victory in September 1914 until the Nivelle offen-
sive in April 1917, the French high command tried, despite German material su-
periority and despite many costly setbacks, to achieve a “break-through” by 
adopting a largely offensive strategy in harmony with France’s ambitious political, 
territorial and economic war aims. As early as the autumn of 1914 and throughout 
1915, despite the fact that the several offensives ordered by Joffre had failed, the 
French went on developing an impressive set of war aims against Germany.16 The 
recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, was, of course, taken for granted, but there was talk 
in many quarters in Paris of establishing French control of Luxembourg and sep-
arating the Saar and Rhineland from the Reich. Those territories would perhaps, 
but not necessarily, be annexed, but they would at the very least be subjected to 
French strategic, political and economic control. 
Between September and November 1914 the Russians, including the emperor 
himself, repeatedly told the French that they could establish their new frontier 
anywhere they wished between the pre-war border and the Rhine, while the 
French endorsed similar Russian aims in the East. In 1915 the French thinking 
was concentrated on the Saar region, whose coal production would be most use-
ful once Lorraine with its steel works had been restored to France. Luxembourg 
too, with its important heavy industry – in 1913 its steel production amounted to 
50 % of that of France – began to attract a good deal of attention. Nor did the 
creation of a new European international system based on the dismemberment of 
the Bismarckian Reich escape consideration. The Russians let the French know 
very early that they wanted to take the imperial title away from the House of Ho-
henzollern and to restore Hanover as an independent Kingdom. The French gov-
15 Georges-Henri Soutou: La France et les Marches de l’Est 1914–1919. In: RH 260 (1978), 
pp. 341–388.
16 Joffre: Mémoires (see note 5), vol. 1, pp. 51–94.
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ernment did not at that stage commit itself beyond vague if ominous talk of “end-
ing the hegemony of Prussian militarism”, but the language of many Paris press 
articles (passed by the censor) was already very explicit.17
1915 and the Near Eastern Conundrum
Close correlation between strategy and war aims was much less in evidence in the 
Near East. Joffre was against both the Gallipoli landing in the spring of 1915, and 
that at Salonika in the autumn. Nothing should be allowed to distract attention 
from the main, Franco-German, front. For him, unlike the British government, 
with their grandiose outflanking strategic thrusts,18 the drawing of German forces 
away from the main battlefield, was the only benefit that a peripheral strategy 
could conceivably offer. Not that the French did not have any war aims in the re-
gion. But they were divided over the issue, and did not have the means to cover 
everything anyway. Some in the government agreed with Joffre that the priority 
was on the North-Eastern front, others supported by influential circles, advocat-
ed an ambitious policy for historical, religious and economic motives eventually 
embodied in the Sykes-Picot agreements of February 1916, promising France 
Lebanon, part of Syria and a zone of influence in the North of Iraq (including the 
Mosul region). When in 1917 Great Britain reneged on those agreements, howev-
er, France, with only one regiment in the whole theatre against one million British 
soldiers, was in no position to do anything.19
On might note here a quite modern feature of the relationship between strategy 
and war aims, viz. the special staff for operations outside France (Théâtres 
d’Opérations Extérieures, TOE), which was distinct from, although collocated 
with, the general staff proper. It had been established later in the war for the Gal-
lipoli and Salonika expeditions, with reserve staff officers, who did not come from 
the regular army but from all sectors of French élites, who thought “out of the 
box” and did not rely solely on the famed “solution de l’Ecole de Guerre”. They 
were particularly innovative in bolstering French post-war influence in the region 
by using the war-time presence of French forces not only at the political and mil-
itary level (the antecedent of the post-war French alliances in the region) but also 
in the economic field. One good instance is oil: the path for the post-war expan-
sion of French companies in Romanian oil had already been prepared during the 
war by officers of the TOE, who were in civilian life active in the oil business.20
17 Georges-Henri Soutou: La France et le problème de l’unité et du statut international du Reich, 
1914–1924. In: id./Jean-Marie Valentin (eds.): Le statut international de l’Allemagne. Des traités 
de Westphalie aux accords “2+4” (= Etudes Germaniques, vol. 59,4). Paris 2004, pp. 745–793.
18 Joffre: Memoires (see note 5), vol. 1, pp. 95–140.
19 Andrew/Kanya-Forstner: France Overseas (see note 1); Marion Kent: Oil and Empire. British 
Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900–1920. London 1976.
20 Jean de Pierrefeu: GQG Secteur I. Trois ans au Grand Quartier Général. 2 Vols. Paris 1920; 
Gérard Fassy: Le commandement français en Orient (octobre 1915–novembre 1918). Paris 2003; 
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In Search of a Decisive Victory to Achieve Maximum War Aims:  
The Somme and Nivelle Offensives of July 1916 and April 1917
Briand, who in October 1915 replaced Viviani as head of the government, was a 
far more forceful war leader than his predecessor. He pleaded for unity of pur-
pose and convergence of action among Allies, and in November/December 1915 
was instrumental in creating both an Allied military and an Allied political coun-
cil.21 At the military council meeting in Chantilly in December it was decided to 
take the offensive simultaneously on all fronts (in the Anglo-French case, this was 
eventually to become the Somme offensive, which was delayed by the battle for 
Verdun until 1 July, 1916). Briand further helped to cajole Romania into entering 
the war on 28 August, with a view to compounding the problems of the Central 
Powers by getting the Salonika front moving at last.22
It is not surprising that, with the perspective of these hopefully decisive strategic 
moves, the war aims question came back to the fore. After the defensive victory at 
Verdun in June 1916, and the promising beginning of the Somme offensive in July, 
a number of French diplomats in neutral capitals noted the onset of a real political 
“disarray” in Germany.23 On 12 August President Poincaré asked Joffre to prepare 
terms for an eventual armistice. This started a process which eventually embraced 
all France’s war aims, with studies at government and general staff level leading to 
a very important meeting of the principal ministers with Poincaré on 7 October. 
After this French war aims were put in writing, with approval of the Cabinet, in a 
letter of 12 January 1917 to Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London.24
Alsace-Lorraine was, of course, to be recovered, but within its borders of 1790 
(thus including a large part of the Saar province), not those of 1815. Owing to 
differences within the government no conclusion was reached as yet over the 
three possible solutions for the Rhineland question (outright annexation, perma-
nent military occupation with the region remaining part of the Reich, and the es-
tablishment of one or two separate states closely linked to France); but Paris 
would demand from the Allies full freedom to decide the issue at the end of the 
war. Beyond this, the possibility was mooted with the Russians of ultimately dis-
cussed of signing the final peace treaty with the individual German states, thus 
Jean-Noël Grandhomme: Le Général Berthelot et l’action de la France en Roumanie et en Russie 
méridionale (1916–1918). Genèse, aspects diplomatiques, militaires et culturels avec leurs inci-
dences, prolongements et perspectives. Vincennes 1999; Georges-Henri Soutou: L’impérialisme 
du pauvre. La politique économique du gouvernement français en Europe centrale et orientale de 
1918 à 1929. In: Relations internationales 7 (1976), pp. 219–239.
21 Marjorie Farrar: French Blockade Policy 1914–1916. A Study in Economic Warfare (= Ann 
Arbor Microfilm). Ph.D., Stanford 1968, pp. 162 f.
22 On Briand and Romania, cf. Georges Suarez: Briand. Vol. 3: 1914–1916. Paris 1939, pp. 352 ff.; 
on Greece cf.: Yannis G. Mourélos: L’intervention de la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre (1916–1917). 
Athens 1983.
23 Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Dépôt de Nantes, Ambassade de Londres, 1914–1920, car-
ton 36.
24 Soutou: La France et les Marches (see note 15), p. 359.
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disposing of the unitary Reich altogether.25 Meanwhile Luxemburg was attracting 
more and more attention, and extensive economic war aims were devised that in-
cluded customs unions with Belgium and Italy and an inter-Allied control system 
for major raw materials after the war – all to the detriment of German economy 
and to the benefit of the French. Indeed, by tripling its steel capacity with the re-
covery of Lorraine and the annexation or control of the Saar region and Luxem-
bourg, France would become a major industrial power in Europe.26
Exactly in these very months (October 1916–January 1917) the General Staff 
(under Joffre and later under Nivelle) was preparing, in full agreement with the 
political leadership, what was to be known in April 1917 as the “Nivelle Offen-
sive”, which, coming after the blow delivered to Germany by the Battle of the 
Somme, was expressly designed to “seal the ruin of the Central Powers”.27 Several 
meetings of Joffre with the principal ministers and Poincaré ensured that all the 
necessary preparations were fully coordinated.28 Now, for the first time, the gov-
ernment was fully informed of the operational plan and contributed to it its im-
plementation (through the reorganisation mentioned above). Nothing less than 
complete victory was contemplated.
The same went for the Allies: on the basis of a French general staff memoran-
dum of 12 November 1916 (which had been sent to Poincaré and Briand) an Al-
lied staff conference in Chantilly proclaimed on the 15th that the 1917 campaign 
would be “decisive”.29 Joffre’s successor, Nivelle, retained the projected offensive 
and its extensive aims, including not only the liberation of territories occupied by 
the Germans, but also the “control of enemy territories, possession of which is 
necessary to negotiate peace and achieve favourable terms”.30
The chronology testifies not only to the close connection between the prepara-
tion of a “decisive” offensive and the setting up of ambitious war aims, but to the 
profound agreement between government and high command.
May to November 1917: Peace Feelers, More Prudent War Aims,  
and Their Strategic Implications
From April 1917 to May 1918, however, starting with the failure of the Nivelle 
offensive followed in June by numerous acts of indiscipline in the French Army 
25 Ibid., p. 360.
26 Georges-Henri Soutou: L’or et le sang. Les buts de guerre économiques de la première guerre 
mondiale. Paris 1989, pp. 171–188.
27 Joffre: Mémoires (see note 5), vol. 2, p. 341.
28 Ibid., pp. 341 ff.; Raymond Poincaré: Au service de la France. Neuf années de souvenirs. Vol. 9. 
Paris 1917, p. 15, p. 22.
29 Joffre: Mémoires (see note 5), vol. 2, pp. 346 ff.
30 Operation plan for 1917, 25. 1. 1917. In: Commandant de Civrieux. L’offensive de 1917 et le 
commandement du Général Nivelle. Paris 1919, pp. 42 ff. (account supportive of Nivelle but very 
well informed).
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in June, the difficult military situation demanded a defensive strategy, flanked by a 
secret diplomatic approach to Vienna. During the summer and autumn 1917 a ne-
gotiated peace could no longer be ruled out, and French war aims were corre-
spondingly reduced. Certainly, Alsace-Lorraine was to be recovered at all events, 
but outright annexations in the Rhineland were no longer seriously considered. 
Even so, there might be a permanent military occupation or the separation of 
some areas from the Reich; at any rate, all were agreed that, as a minimum, some 
sort of security guarantee for France in the region was absolutely necessary.
This scaling down converged with the views of the average soldier in the field, 
as recorded by the military censors who checked their mail: they deeply felt that 
they were engaged in a rightful, defensive war, and that Alsace-Lorraine should be 
restored to France. Beyond that, however, they wanted no annexations but a 
peace underpinned by some sort of international system of guarantees to prevent 
Germany’s challenging it in the future.31 After all, they realised, however dimly, 
that France was also fighting for a “Republican model”, as opposed to the “Prus-
sian authoritarian militaristic system”.
In Paris, the same general orientation, if somewhat more sanguine, could be 
observed in the Assembly, in on the only occasion on which it was able express its 
views about war aims (the government usually prevented any discussion of the 
topic), after the publication of a number of secret Franco-Russian agreements by 
the provisional government in Petrograd. At the beginning of June 1917 the As-
sembly set up a “secret committee” and passed a resolution rejecting “all thought 
of conquest”, while reaffirming the need to bring down “Prussian militarism” and 
establish “lasting guarantees of peace”. The debates, too, showed that although 
the deputies renounced the idea of annexing the Rhineland, they wanted it under 
permanent occupation after the war, or even separated from the Reich.32
Paul Painlevé, a former education minister in the Briand Cabinet, war minister 
under Ribot from March to September 1917, then prime minister until November, 
was a particularly prudent exponent of an alternative policy and pushed the new, 
moderate, orientation even further. He no longer believed – particularly after the 
Russian revolution – in the possibility of a decisive victory, and decided to replace 
Nivelle, after the failure of his offensive, by Pétain, who was convinced that until 
the Americans appeared at the front in force and until the new armaments, partic-
ularly the tanks, could be produced in quantity, Allied strategy had to remain de-
fensive.33
As for war aims, Painlevé abandoned many of the ambitious goals devised since 
1914. For him there was only one noli me tangere, the return of Alsace-Lorraine 
31 François Lagrange: Moral et opinions du combattant français durant le premier conflit mon-
dial d’après les rapports du contrôle postal de la IVème armée. Paris 2009 (Ph.D. at Paris IV in 
March 2009, under my supervision).
32 Soutou: La France et les Marches (see note 15), p. 370–373.
33 About that question and the domestic policy and war aims background see: Georges-Henri 
Soutou: Poincaré, Painlevé et l’offensive Nivelle. Des étoiles et des croix. Mélanges offerts à Guy 
Pedroncini. Paris 1995.
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(still within the 1790 borders, however, and including a big part of the Saar re-
gion). Beyond that everything would depend on how the war ended. In short, 
Painlevé rejected the idea of an all-out offensive followed by an imposed peace. 
For him, the only way was to seek a relative victory by combining a defensive 
strategy with a set of diplomatic manoeuvres, particularly in the direction of Vi-
enna – either to entice Austria-Hungary into concluding a separate peace, or to 
persuade Berlin, by raising the spectre of isolation, to accept a general peace con-
ference.
As regards the Dual Monarchy, a whole series of peace feelers went from Pain-
levé to Vienna which cannot be detailed here.34 The general idea was to offer the 
bait of a guarantee of Austria-Hungary’s survival; but the Monarchy would have 
to be reconstructed along federal lines, according a due share of influence to the 
Slavs, and thus ensuring that Vienna would lean more on Paris than on Berlin in 
future. Vienna should also support France over disarmament and security mea-
sures in the Rhineland, and reparations. Even so, Germany might be granted com-
pensations, for perhaps in the French colonies. In short, Painlevé was proposing 
what he saw as a fair and comprehensive settlement, vastly diminishing the hege-
monic position of Germany in Europe through a new balance quite favourable to 
France, but without tearing up the whole fabric of the Continent.
All these issues were discussed between Painlevé and Lloyd George and be-
tween Briand and von der Lancken, the chief of the German administration in 
occupied Belgium, in Boulogne on 25 September 1917. Two points are of interest 
for us here: in the first place, there was general agreement on the idea, which was 
being ventilated in many quarters,35 that peace might be easier to achieve if in re-
turn for concessions to the Allies in the West the Germans were allowed to com-
pensate themselves at the expense of Russia. In the second, probably sensing that 
peace negotiations might be imminent, Painlevé lost no time in extracting from 
Lloyd George the undertaking (which London had so far stubbornly resisted) 
that there could be no peace without the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France 
– as Lloyd George, albeit hardly overjoyed, announced in public on 11 October.36
Of course the fleeting moment when a negotiated peace seemed possible soon 
vanished again. On the one hand, the Germans managed to bring the Austrians 
into line, on the other, a coalition of conservatives and “jusqu’au boutistish” lead-
ers London and Paris forced Lloyd George to abandon the idea of negotiations 
and drove Painlevé from office altogether.
34 Georges-Henri Soutou: Paul Painlevé und die Möglichkeit eines Verhandlungsfriedens im 
Kriegsjahr 1917. In: Walther L. Bernecker/Volker Dotterweich (eds.): Deutschland in den inter-
nationalen Beziehungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. München 1996, pp. 169–187; id.: Paul Pain-
levé et la possibilité d’une paix négociée en 1917. In: Claudine Fontanon/Robert Frank Paul 
(eds.): Painlevé (1863–1933). Un savant en politique. Rennes 2005, pp. 71–82.
35 As the King of the Belgians told Poincaré, on September 22nd; see: Poincaré: Au service (see 
note 28), vol. 9, p. 293.
36 David Stevenson: French War Aims Against Germany 1914–1919. Oxford 1982, p. 83.
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Meanwhile, however, Pétain, Nivelle’s defensive-minded successor as com-
mander in chief, chosen by Painlevé after the failure of the April offensive had of 
course revised his strategy on the assumption that full victory was now very 
doubtful, that some sort of negotiated peace might come quickly, and that it might 
not be disastrous for France if both camps agreed to end to the war at the expense 
of defeated Russia.37 (Significantly, many of Painlevé’s peace overtures too had 
been made through the Deuxième Bureau of the General staff, in charge of evalu-
ating the enemy and in control of the Secret Service). Of course Pétain, exactly 
like Painlevé, wanted to ensure that in any case France would achieve its minimal 
war aim: the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine; but the offensive plan for 1918 which 
he devised in October 1917 did not really aim at beating the Germans “decisive-
ly”, like earlier war plans (and as all the grand strategists of the Clausewitz-Foch 
school had preached). Its aim was simply to secure Alsace-Lorraine physically for 
France, come what may.38 Once again war aims and strategy were co-ordinated, 
but with far more modest ends in view.
November 1917 to July 1918: The Brest-Litovsk Armistice,  
the  Impending German Onslaught and the End of the Peace Feelers
Clemenceau, prime minister from 17 November 1917, soon put an end to the 
peace feelers initiated by his predecessor, and vowed to make war and nothing but 
war. He refused to be specific in about French war aims, apart of course from Al-
sace-Lorraine, but in private he did not conceal his intention to work for the more 
favourable 1790 boundary, the annexation of the Saar, and at the very least the 
permanent occupation of the Rhineland. However, he also had to take President 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points into account, unenthusiastic as he was about them; and 
he rightly suspected that the Americans and the British would be difficult as re-
gards French war aims.39
As his war aims were more extensive than those of his predecessor, it was not 
surprising that he refused to support Pétain’s strategic plan for 1918, which had 
been strictly defensive in expectation of the German offensive which would evi-
dently follow the transfer dozens of German divisions from the Eastern to the 
Western front. (Pétain had planned to regain the initiative in 1919, when there 
would be enough American forces in France; but that would have meant that the 
war would become even more Anglo-American than it was already, and that 
France would have even less say about peace terms.40) Clemenceau, therefore, 
pronounced in favour of Foch (Allied commander-in-chief since March 1918) and 
his plan to confront the enemy with counter-attacks, and, if the occasion arose, to 
37 Guy Pedroncini: Pétain général en chef (1917–1918). Paris 1974, p. 235.
38 Ibid., pp. 122–137.
39 Soutou: La France et les Marches (see note 15), pp. 380 f.
40 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle: La Grande Guerre des Français. 1914–1918. Paris 1994.
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launch “a combined offensive with decisive aims”, even in 1918.41 This was exact-
ly what was to occur with Foch’s offensives that started, after Ludendorff’s spring 
and summer offensives had run out of steam, on 18 July.
July 1918, the Big Push: Common Allied War Aims,  
or a Particular French Agenda?
For a time, even after the Germans began to retreat after the big Allied offensive 
of 18 July, the future looked uncertain. Pétain, commander in chief of French 
forces, and Foch, the Allied commander in chief, were divided as to the course to 
follow. Foch prepared a series of offensives along most of the front involving all 
the Allied forces but his aim at this stage was simply to push the Germans back as 
far as possible and to regain important railways and industrial assets – certainly 
not to achieve a decisive result already before the end of the year.42
At the same time, however, the French general staff and Pétain had another 
idea: they wanted to launch a concentrated offensive in Lorraine. On the one 
hand, the German front was thinner there, and given the importance of Lorraine 
in terms of lines of communication, important strategic results could be expected. 
On the other hand, the idea was patently to conquer and to hold in French hands, 
independently of the Allies, territorial assets that would be particularly important 
for Paris in any forthcoming peace negotiations.43 Foch refused to agree to this (in 
complex discussions that need not be recounted here) until 5 November. As a re-
sult the Lorraine offensive – the plans had been basically completed on 10 Octo-
ber, but time was still needed to concentrate the necessary forces – was scheduled 
to begin on 14 November. The Armistice intervened three days before.44
As for Clemenceau, although he did not usually hesitate to intervene forcefully 
in high command matters, reminding everyone of that he was (as not only presi-
dent of the council but also war minister) the “constitutional chief of the Armies”, 
his role in this debate is hard to discern. It is difficult to believe that he did not 
understand the scope of the issues at stake. He was, however, trapped in a contra-
diction between French war aims (including those regarding the Rhineland) as 
they had developed since 1914, which he did not – pace his critics – abandon, and 
the hard fact that if France was to enjoy American and British support at the end 
of the war, she would have to abide, at least outwardly, by the Wilsonian agenda.45
It could be said that Foch’s strategy was really an inter-Allied strategy, designed 
to facilitate a basic agreement with London and Washington at the conference table 
and after the war, while Pétain’s strategy was the more strictly “national” one, based 
41 The best account in: General ***: La crise du commandement unique. Le conflit Clemenceau 
Foch Haig Pétain. Paris 1931, pp. 55–70.
42 Pedroncini: Pétain (see note 37), p. 414.
43 Ibid., p. 422.
44 Ibid., pp. 423–427.
45 Soutou: La France et les Marches (see note 15), pp. 381–383.
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on the conviction that a number of specific French war aims would not be readily 
accepted by the Allies unless the French themselves could create faits accomplis be-
fore the fighting ceased. Clemenceau was caught in a contradiction between his car-
dinal policy of keeping in line with the two other major liberal democracies, and his 
desire to achieve France’s national objectives. Here, perhaps, lay the roots of his less 
than decisive approach to strategy in the summer and autumn of 1918?
The Armistice Controversy: Insufficient Coordination between 
French Strategy and French War Aims?
The failure to start the Lorraine offensive was the subject of fierce debate at the 
time and later, as to whether the chance had been missed to achieve a decisive re-
sult, and whether, as many in Paris felt, the Armistice had been granted to Germa-
ny too soon.46 Did the acceptance of the 11 November mean the renunciation of 
former war aims? Was there a sudden disconnection between war aims and the 
conduct of the war? Or did the Armistice not rather connect with Clemenceau’s 
policy of achieving the most that could be achieved without breaking with the 
Allies – who would remain after all the main source of French security in the face 
of a Germany which would emerge from the war diminished, but in no way elim-
inated from the European scene as many had hoped in 1914 and later.47 Much has 
also been made of a dispute between Foch and Clemenceau at the time when the 
Armistice articles were being prepared: Foch wished the armistice agreement to 
either proclaim or refer to the annexation of the Rhineland to France, or at least 
the formation of a State separated from the Reich. Clemenceau demurred, object-
ing that that would have amounted to a confusion between military and political 
matters and that Foch, in charge of the Armistice as Allied commander in chief, 
should have no say in drafting peace terms anyway. Some have claimed that here 
Clemenceau was renouncing any extensive war aims. This was not so; but he rec-
ognised all the same that France would have to bring the Allies, not only the Ger-
mans, to accept its views. He managed, at any rate, to extract from the Allies the 
condition that German forces should evacuate not only Belgium, the occupied 
territories, Alsace-Lorraine, but also the Left Bank of the Rhine, including the 
bridgeheads on the Right Bank. He understood perfectly well what could be later 
achieved from that staging ground. As he told Foch: “Peace guaranties must find 
anchor points in the Armistice.” The British, for their part, were all too well 
aware of the ulterior motives of the French, and feared, that once they were en-
sconced on the Left Bank, they would be very difficult to dislodge.48
46 Pierre Renouvin: L’armistice de Rethondes. Paris 1968.
47 Margaret Macmillan: Peacemakers. The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War. 
Londres 2001; Georges-Henri Soutou: 1918. La fin de la Première Guerre mondiale? In: Revue 
historique des Armées 251 (2008), pp. 4–17.
48 Renouvin: L’armistice (see note 46), pp. 195 ff.
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For the present, even Foch was convinced that the occupation of the Left Bank 
and of the bridgeheads made it impossible for Berlin to resume hostilities in the 
immediate future; and that the Allied powers could therefore devise peace terms 
at their ease.49 Nor were Clemenceau’s terms those of a peace of renunciation. 
True, the Reich would not be divided after all: Clemenceau was convinced, unlike 
many of his countrymen, that German unity was not artificial; but that it could 
nevertheless with the help of the USA, and UK and the new independent States in 
Central Europe, be controlled in an international system along Wilsonian lines. 
This would not preclude either a broad French influence over the Saar and Rhine 
regions and Luxembourg and German economy and a strictly limited German 
military; or even French support for independence movements that might develop 
in the Rhineland and in Bavaria.
In short, Clemenceau, although he had not supported Foch’s demand to include 
the annexation of the Left Bank in the Armistice, remained active and retained his 
ulterior motives. On 16 February 1919 he assured the Senate that the Rhineland 
would be separated from the Reich, and would form an autonomous State under 
French occupation and linked to France through a customs union: “In other 
words, we shall occupy until the region will be ready to join France.”50
He also permitted the French military and secret service to support Rhineland 
autonomists seeking separation from Prussia and the transformation of the Reich 
into a loose confederation. The Dorten coup of May 1919 enjoyed secret but ef-
fective support from the French authorities, and even from Clemenceau himself, 
who desisted only because of Wilson’s strong reaction. At the same time Clem-
enceau supported the attempt of the French High Commissar for the Rhine terri-
tories, Tirard, to promote the French democratic model as a sort of magnet to in-
fluence the evolution of Germany as a whole in a more democratic direction. 
Hence, Clemenceau’s Rhineland policy was multi-faceted advancing French “re-
publican” political and cultural influence in Germany as a whole; and, if the in-
habitants of the Rhineland wished to go in that direction promoting a large degree 
of autonomy from Berlin, and, eventually, closer and closer links to France.51 By 
such devices, Clemenceau could reconcile his genuine liberalism and dislike of an-
nexations with his obsession about buttressing France’s security.52
Without entering into the complex negotiations over the Peace treaty, it is 
worth noting that many of its provisions were linked to complex time-tables: the 
final status of the Saar was to be resolved by a plebiscite in 1935; the occupation 
of the Rhineland, linked to the payment of reparations, would last 15 years or 
more. The French were convinced that by 1935 the inhabitants of the Saar would 
49 Raymond Recouly: Le mémorial de Foch. Mes entretiens avec le Maréchal. Paris 1929, pp. 29 ff.
50 Soutou: La France et les Marches (see note 15), p. 384.
51 Pierre Jardin: La politique rhénane de Paul Tirard (1920–1923). In: Revue d’Allemagne et des 
pays de langue allemande 21 (1989) 2, pp. 208–216.
52 Cf. Georges-Henri Soutou: The French Peacemakers and Their Home Front. In: Manfred 
B. Boemecke/Gerald D. Feldman/Elisabeth Glaser (eds.): The Treaty of Versailles. A Reassess-
ment after 75 Years. Cambridge 1998, pp. 167–188.
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come to appreciate the superior French social system and vote for France. As for 
the Rhineland, Clemenceau himself was convinced that Germany could never pay 
the reparations and that France would stay on the Rhine indefinitely.53 But for 
Clemenceau this rather disingenuous system of time-tables at least allowed him to 
paper over his differences with the Allies, whose support, as he fully recognised, 
was so vital to French security.
The elimination of Germany as a unified national State remained a long term 
aspiration in influential circles in France, but Clemenceau never adhered to it, he 
was convinced that German unity was both strong and a natural development.54 
But even there his attitude was more complex than is often assumed. Between 
complete dissolution and a fully centralised Reich many possibilities could be en-
visioned, such as some sort of loose confederation or at least “federalism”, in the 
sense of greater autonomy from Berlin. Clemenceau, among others, believed that 
such an evolution might be appropriate not only for the Rhineland, but for Bavar-
ia.55 For all these short-term aims and long-term ulterior motives a lengthy period 
of occupation of the Left Bank, as envisaged by the Armistice and later the Treaty 
of Versailles was, as things stood, about the best that Paris could hope for; and 
there was perhaps more harmony after all between French strategy and French 
war aims than has usually been assumed.56
Conclusions
The French government, the French Army and a significant body of public opin-
ion were in agreement, throughout the entire war, on France’s minimal war aims 
– the “de-annexion” of Alsace-Lorraine; and even if we consider that real mili-
tary-political coordination was not achieved until the end of 1916, already before 
that date France enjoyed better coordination than, for instance Germany (witness 
the dissension over Belgium in the internal German debate about war aims). In 
France, generally speaking, the interplay between strategy and the definition of 
war aims, was productive, with two exceptions: the Near East (where French in-
terests were not much in evidence, and French military power on the spot was 
53 Soutou: La France et les Marches (see note 15), p. 385.
54 Cf. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle: Clemenceau. Paris 1988, p. 727.
55 See Georges-Henri Soutou: La France et la Bavière, 1866–1949. In: France-Bayern. Paris 2006, 
pp. 252–261; id.: La France et le problème de l’unité (see note 17), pp. 761 f.
56 The same applies for Eastern Europe, where the political aim to create new states as bulwark 
against Germany was supported on the spot by the numerous French military missions in the 
region. Stevenson: French War Aims (see note 36), pp. 137 f.; François Grumel-Jacquignon: La 
Yougoslavie dans la stratégie française de l’Entre-deux-guerres (1918–1935). Bern et al. 1999; 
Traian Sandu: Le système de sécurité français en Europe centre-orientale. L’exemple roumain 
1919–1933. Paris 1999; on top of that Paris was diligently furthering an economic penetration of 
the whole region to eradicate German influence: Georges-Henri Soutou: L’impérialisme du 
pauvre. La politique économique du gouvernement français en Europe centrale et orientale de 
1918 à 1929. In: Relations internationales 7 (1976), pp. 219–239.
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overshadowed by the British); and 1918, when a divergence arose between what 
might be termed French national war aims supported by a French national strate-
gy and an Allied strategy, to which French war aims had to be adjusted if they 
were to be accepted by the Allies.
Keith Jeffery
British Strategy and War Aims in the First World War
Before we can explore this topic we need to consider the apparently unremarkable 
but in fact potentially tricky term “British”, which is conventionally used to de-
scribe the United Kingdom, but at the time of the First World War often compre-
hended the wider British Empire and its distinctive strategic concerns. If, in the 
words of Benedetto Croce, “all history is contemporary history” this might ac-
count for one characteristic feature of recent military history writing on the 
First World War: the “disaggregation” of the British military war effort. This re-
flects modern and contemporary political developments, and changes in our un-
derstanding of “British” and “Britishness”, in both a political and a cultural sense. 
Ever since the First World War, speculation about a possible break-up of the Unit-
ed Kingdom (and, after all, the strains of that war were one reason for the secession 
of part of Ireland in 1921) has encouraged researchers to question the concepts of 
“Britain” and “Britishness” and to write in terms of particular “Irish” and “Scot-
tish” elements in the British war effort. Indeed, the growth of sectional and sepa-
ratist nationalisms in the United Kingdom has sometimes fostered perceptions of 
the past which focus on the component parts of the United Kingdom to the exclu-
sion of any sense of overarching Britishness or unified national endeavour. This 
has been most obvious in the case of Ireland (to which I myself have contributed),1 
but studies of a distinctively Scottish engagement with the war are on the increase 
too.2 How far such perspectives really help us to understand historical reality is, of 
course, debatable. As Catriona Pennell has recently demonstrated,3 it was similari-
ty of response and national unity that were the predominant characteristics of the 
United Kingdom, in the early months of the war at least.
What we might call the disaggregation of the “British world” – or British impe-
rial world – is even more apparent when we consider the broader imperial context 
of 1914–18 and the Great War histories of the self-governing British Dominions, 
which in a striking number of cases favour the sectional to the exclusion, even 
suppression, of the historical actuality. This is most egregious regarding Gallipoli 
1 For example, in my book: Keith Jeffery: Ireland and the Great War. Cambridge 2000.
2 A pioneering example is: Catriona M. M. Macdonald/Elaine W. McFarland (eds.): Scotland and 
the Great War. East Linton 1999.
3 Catriona Pennell: A Kingdom United? Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World 
War in Britain and Ireland. Oxford 2012.
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where the established Antipodean narrative focuses relentlessly on the Australian 
and New Zealand – ANZAC – involvement, to the considerable disadvantage of 
the British (indeed, English) majority troops on the peninsula.4 We can see this 
phenomenon elsewhere, too: Beaumont-Hamel on the Somme is today largely 
possessed by the Canadians despite the fact that on 1 July 1916 no Canadian sol-
diers fought there at all (just one battalion of Newfoundlanders), and the over-
whelming majority of troops in action at that place on that day were British (no-
tably the Scottish 51st (Highland) Division).
What has this got to do with “British war aims and strategy”? It is relevant be-
cause the very term “British” can be problematical, given that the United King-
dom was both a multi-national state and an imperial one. In terms of high policy 
and grand strategy the domestic dimension is perhaps less important, though it is 
not wholly irrelevant as the implications of Irish political challenges to the au-
thority of the British government could influence strategic decision-making.5 The 
“imperial dimension”, by contrast, is of paramount importance to understanding 
the environment within which British policymakers were operating. Any limited 
and exclusive focus on British-as-United-Kingdom policy-making fails to do jus-
tice to the imperial actualities of the times – what might be termed the British 
“imperial mind”. And while the moment of commitment to war in August 1914 
had an understandably European focus, the experience of the war itself lent the 
conflict an increasingly imperial dimension that eventuated in an “imperial” mo-
mentum which continued even after the war on the Western Front had ended.
The Imperial Dimension
The imperial dimension of British strategic policy was important in two respects. 
First, United Kingdom policy-making encompassed a global, imperial power sys-
tem, reaching far beyond the British Isles; and, second, the empire itself was able 
to a certain degree to influence strategic policy-making.6 We can see this in the 
articulation of British strategy, as put before the representatives of the Dominions 
(the British white colonies of settlement of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Newfoundland and South Africa) in May 1911 at the imperial conference and on 
23 August at the famous meeting of the British Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID) comprising the only high-level and comprehensive review of British strate-
gy before 1914.7
4 This is discussed in the introduction to Jenny Macleod: Gallipoli. Making History. London 2004.
5 See Geoffrey R. Sloan: The Geopolitics of Anglo-Irish Relations in the 20th Century. London 
1997, pp. 114–163.
6 The discussion below draws on my chapter: Keith Jeffery: The Imperial Conference, the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment. In: Peter Dennis/Jeffrey Grey 
(eds.): 1911. Preliminary Moves. Canberra 2012, pp. 20–40.
7 Michael Howard: The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in 
the Era of Two World Wars. Harmondsworth 1974, p. 51.
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On 26 May, during the imperial conference, Dominion representatives were in-
vited to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence (which since 1902 
had been the primary forum for the specialised discussion of British defence is-
sues). Here Sir Edward Grey treated them to a frank summary of British foreign 
policy, emphasising that “what really determines the Foreign Policy of this coun-
try is the question of sea power”. Grey described how, since about the turn of the 
century, Britain’s relations with France and Russia had appreciably improved, to 
such an extent that it had become “apparent that our relations with Russia and 
France were better than our relations with Germany”. While it was British policy 
to remain friendly towards Germany, “if we come to any understanding with 
Germany of a public kind which puts us on good relations with Germany, it must 
be an understanding which must not put us back into the old bad relations with 
France and Russia”.
As Grey described it, thus, France and Russia had a veto power over any possi-
ble future Anglo-German rapprochement. Reflecting on the military dangers of 
the current diplomatic situation, Grey outlined the threat posed by Germany 
(though without mentioning it by name). He asserted that there was “no appre-
ciable danger” of Britain “being involved in any considerable trouble in Europe”, 
unless “some Power, or group of Powers” had the ambition of achieving what he 
called “the Napoleonic policy”, by which a single power might aim individually 
to crush other states. “The moment the weakest Powers in Europe were assailed, 
either by diplomacy or by force”, he warned, “one by one they would appeal to 
us to help them”. And, although Britain was not committed by any existing “en-
tanglements which tie our hands”, if the country “sat by and looked on and did 
nothing, then people ought to realise that the result would be one great combina-
tion in Europe, outside which we should be left without a friend”. Stressing the 
imperial strategic dimension of this position, he said that there was an “obvious 
[…] common interest between us here at home and all the Dominions”, since “if 
the control of the seas was lost, it would not only be the end of the British Empire 
as far as we are concerned, but all the Dominions would be separated from us, 
never to be rejoined”.8
Four months later, prompted by the Agadir, or “second Moroccan”, crisis, 
which raised the spectre of war between France and Germany,9 a meeting of the 
CID was summoned on 23 August 1911 to discuss “Action to be taken in the 
event of intervention in a European war”.10 At this meeting the army’s preferred 
strategy (as propounded by the Director of Military Operations, Brigadier-Gen-
eral Henry Wilson) committing Great Britain to definite intervention at the side 
of the French in the event of a German attack was adopted (as against the navy’s 
8 Minutes of CID 111th meeting, 26. 5. 1911, UK National Archives (henceforward TNA), CAB 
38/18, no. 40.
9 The best general account is in Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.: The Politics of Grand Strategy. Britain 
and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914. Cambridge, MA. 1969, pp. 141–166.
10 Minutes of CID 114th meeting, 23. 8. 1911, TNA, CAB 2/2/2.
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vaguer plans for a maritime blockade coupled with limited military strikes against 
the German North Sea coast).11
Two points might be observed about this decision. First, it confirmed that Great 
Britain’s essential strategic interests lay primarily in Europe. “Imperial defence” at 
its most basic was the defence of the United Kingdom’s position in Europe, in-
cluding its relations with other European Great Powers. Hence, the first call on 
the resources of the empire would always be for the protection of the “Mother 
Country”. Second, despite assurances given at the time of the imperial conference 
that Dominion representatives would be invited to attend defence discussions af-
fecting them, this did not happen in August 1911, and in fact the Dominions were 
not offered any meaningful share in strategic policy-making until well into the 
First World War. But the formal inclusion of the Dominions in policy-making is 
only one aspect of the “imperial dimension”; for whatever the focus of the debate 
might be, whether operations in Western Europe or Lord Curzon’s preoccupa-
tions elsewhere, a markedly “imperial” world-view was always one of the “un-
spoken assumptions” of British decision-makers (especially after Lloyd George 
replaced Asquith as prime minister in December 1916).
The influence of the Dominion governments, however, was hardly greater in 
the summer of 1914 than it had been in the summer of 1911. Although they rallied 
loyally to the side of the “Mother Country”, unstintingly committing men and 
matériel to the cause, they were still treated very much as spectators and excluded 
from the decision-making process.12 The Canadians were the first to jib at this: 
early in 1915 the Canadian prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, travelled to Lon-
don himself to seek information about British policy-making. In October An-
drew Fisher resigned as Australian prime minister and became High Commis-
sioner in London so as to be nearer the centre of affairs. But their hopes of gain-
ing a voice in the direction of the war were disappointed. In January 1916, Borden, 
back in Canada, was dependent on newspapers for information. “As to consulta-
tion”, he complained to the Canadian High Commissioner in London, “plans of 
campaign have been made and unmade, measures adopted and apparently aban-
doned and generally speaking steps of the most important and even vital character 
have been taken, postponed or rejected without the slightest consultation with the 
authorities of this Dominion. It can hardly be expected that we shall put 400,000 
or 500,000 men in the field and willingly accept the position of having no more 
voice and receiving no more consideration than if we were toy automata. Any 
person cherishing such an expectation harbours an unfortunate and even danger-
ous delusion. Is this war being waged by the United Kingdom alone or is it a war 
waged by the whole Empire?”13
11 The circumstances of this decision are discussed in Keith Jeffery: Field Marshal Sir Henry 
Wilson. A Political Soldier. Oxford 2006, pp. 92–97.
12 Nicholas Mansergh: The Commonwealth Experience. London 1969, pp. 166 f.
13 Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden to Sir George Perley, Canada’s Acting High 
Commissioner in the United Kingdom, 4. 1. 1916, quoted in: ibid., p. 171.
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Matters improved somewhat after Lloyd George became prime minister and 
called an Imperial War Conference in March 1917. Urged on by imperial-minded 
colleagues, such as Lord Milner and Leopold Amery, he invited the Dominion 
premiers to attend, forming an “Imperial War Cabinet”. This constitutional in-
novation was certainly of some symbolic importance, though the extent to which 
the Dominion premiers (who did not continuously participate in British cabinet 
meetings) actually influenced detailed policy-making is open to question. Only 
the South African Jan Christian Smuts, who was brought into the British war 
cabinet as a full member in June 1917, was given a share of executive responsibil-
ity in high-level policy-making. A measure of how far the sharing of deci-
sion-making had gone by the end of the war was the dual representation accord-
ed to the Dominions at the peace conference, both as members of the “British 
Empire Delegation” and with separate representation, equivalent to that of 
smaller Allied powers. At least, they now had more influence – for example in 
the discussions over the former German colonies – than they ever had during the 
war itself.14
Fighting the War
Neither Great Britain’s general strategic disposition nor any amount of An-
glo-French staff talks had committed the United Kingdom to go to war with Ger-
many. In 1914, however, the German invasion of Belgium was seen by the British 
as linking their underlying strategic imperative to maintain the balance of power 
in Europe to a higher moral purpose, that is to say the proper conduct of the Eu-
ropean (or international) states’ system.15 This combination of Realpolitik with a 
liberal defence of the rights of small nations was crucial, as Hew Strachan has ob-
served;16 and, as Charles Cruttwell argued, fitted into a longstanding pattern of 
British strategy: “Once every century since the end of the sixteenth”, Britain had 
gone to war “to uphold what was idealistically called the freedom of Europe and 
more prosaically the balance of power”.17 The idealistic rationale may have helped 
the governing Liberal party to remain substantially united, and this point reminds 
us of the significance of domestic political considerations in war policy-making. 
British strategy and war aims emerged from the interplay of Great Britain’s en-
during imperial strategic interests; of shifting wartime realities; and the need to 
sustain popular support for the war effort within the framework of a more-or-less 
democratic political system.
14 See ibid., pp. 173–180.
15 An explanation articulated early in the war in: Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern 
History: Why We Are at War. Great Britain’s Case. Oxford 1914.
16 Hew Strachan: The First World War. Vol. 1: To Arms. Oxford 2001, p. 97.
17 Cruttwell quoted in: Gary Sheffield: Forgotten Victory. The First World War. Myths and Re-
alities. London 2002, p. 77.
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At the start of the war in 1914 it was generally assumed that Great Britain’s 
main role would rest on its economic and maritime power, the former enabling it 
to act as paymaster to the Anglo-French-Russian Entente; the latter both securing 
maritime communications as well as enforcing a blockade on the enemy powers. 
This strategy assumed a minimal initial British military commitment, though the 
newly-appointed Secretary for War, Lord Kitchener, believed that a mass army 
should be raised, which could be deployed to significant effect by, say, 1917, when 
the other belligerents would have fought each other to a standstill.18 While it ap-
peared in August 1914 that there might still be room for debate about the extent 
to which Britain might become actively involved in a military sense, the available 
options had in fact been restricted by the war planning of the previous three years. 
The British cabinet’s discussion about whether six divisions (as had been planned), 
or four, should be deployed in France was of very secondary importance in com-
parison with the crucial decision that some British land forces must be engaged 
alongside the French. Ferdinand Foch had famously observed that the size of the 
force was irrelevant. “We only ask for one corporal and four men”, he is supposed 
to have told Henry Wilson, “but they must be there right at the start. You will 
give them to me and I promise to do my utmost to get them killed. From that 
moment I will be at ease since I know that England will follow them as one 
man!”19
So it was to be. As the conflict in the West settled down into a static war of at-
trition, the initially modest British commitment expanded into a Continental-scale 
mass army. The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war by November 1914 
opened up further possibilities. The apparent and costly stalemate on the Western 
Front which had developed by the end of 1914 led some British policymakers to 
consider where else the “Central Powers” might be attacked, and early in 1915 
they approved a plan for a naval operation against the Dardanelles.20 As it would 
not only strike close to the Turkish capital but also provide strong encouragement 
(and possibly even practical support) for Russia, this seemed to offer a relatively 
low-cost opportunity to make a dramatic difference to the balance of power. This 
option was backed by Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty and seek-
ing to exploit Britain’s naval strength) in particular, but also by Lloyd George and 
Opposition leaders, including Bonar Law. Faced with the choice between a steadi-
ly increasing “butcher’s bill” on the Western Front, and an imaginative operation 
that might materially shorten the war, it is not difficult to see why such people 
plumped for the latter. But there was also a strong body of opinion, mostly within 
the army, which warned that the war against Germany could only be won by suc-
cess on the Western Front – “the old principle of decisive numbers at decisive 
18 A succinct summary of British strategy is in: David French: Allies, Rivals and Enemies. British 
Strategy and War Aims during the First World War. In: John Turner (ed.): Britain and the First 
World War. London 1988, pp. 22–35.
19 Victor Huguet: Britain and the War. A French Indictment. London 1928, p. 26.
20 David French: British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916. London 1986, pp. 68–74.
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theatre”, as Henry Wilson noted in his diary.21 This debate, sometimes character-
ised as one between “Easterners” and “Westerners” (with the latter dismissing 
their opponent’s projects as mere “sideshows”) was to continue for most of the 
war.
David French has argued that the notion of “Easterners” against “Westerners” 
is in fact “a caricature of reality created by the memoirs and biographies of the 
participants which were published in [the] 1920s and 1930s”; and that “the real 
division” was not between “Easterners” and “Westerners”, but between the “busi-
ness as usual” school, for example Reginald McKenna, the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer in 1915–1916, who believed Britain should limit its military commitment 
on the Continent and concentrate on supplying money and munitions to its Al-
lies, and those, such as David Lloyd George, who were all for deploying a large 
conscript army in France.22 Yet perhaps there is more to these distinctions than 
French suggests. For it was not solely a question of defeating Germany, important 
though that was. The divide between “Easterners” and “Westerners” was funda-
mentally a matter of different perceptions, Weltanschauungen, or “views of the 
world”. The more imperial the perspective, and the greater the awareness of Brit-
ain’s global power system, the more “Eastern” the strategic vision was liable to be. 
In other words, the distinction should be made, rather, between a relatively limit-
ed, local and European mindset, and a more expansive, “imperial mind”, embody-
ing an imperturbable sense of global reach, the product of the nineteenth-century 
world in which Britain’s leaders had grown up.
In the event, as the Dardanelles campaign proved a costly failure, and with both 
the French and Russian war efforts faltering during 1915, it became clear that 
Great Britain would have to make a major military commitment in the West. Even 
so, a substantial British effort in the Battle of Loos in late September achieved lit-
tle, and at the end of the year an Allied conference at Chantilly agreed that the 
strategy for 1916 should comprise a co-ordinated series of Russian, French, and 
British offensives. This plan was upset by the titanic German assault against Ver-
dun which began in late February, and the failure of the Russians to defeat the 
Germans in the east. Consequently, the British were left to shoulder the main 
burden on the Somme, where a major offensive was launched on 1 July, and sus-
tained (but with no conclusive result) until November 1916.23
At home, these failures undermined support for Asquith as war leader, and 
helped to bring about his replacement by Lloyd George (December 1916). If the 
generals were evidently unable to “win” the war in the West despite its appalling 
human cost, the new prime minister was keenly interested in alternatives to costly 
21 Diary of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 1. 2. 1915, Imperial War Museum.
22 French: Allies (see note 18), p. 24.
23 For a lucid analysis of British strategy on the Somme, see Elizabeth Greenhalgh: Why the 
British Were on the Somme in 1916. In: War in History 6 (1999), pp. 147–173. The overall impact 
of the battle is much debated. See, for example, Sheffield: Forgotten Victory (see note 17), 
pp. 159–189.
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slogging-matches on the Western Front; and he turned his mind to the possibili-
ties for putting pressure on Germany and its Allies in other places – north Italy, 
Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq) or even the Caucasus. The debate between “West-
erners” and “Easterners” revived.
There were, moreover, clear limits to the manpower the British could supply to 
fight in any particular theatre. What they could supply, however, was money and 
material to bolster up their Allies, and since Russia had the greatest reservoir of 
manpower, it made sense to explore the ways in which Great Britain (and France) 
could support and encourage its efforts against Germany.
In December 1916 the Allied military leaders came to much the same conclu-
sions they had done a year before, and decided that in 1917 the Allies should once 
more mount co-ordinated attacks on each of the main fronts. A political confer-
ence in Paris resolved in addition that a special effort should be made to co-ordi-
nate strategy between West and East. “The only chance of a really great success in 
1917”, Lloyd George insisted, “was completely effective co-operation with Rus-
sia”.24 Indeed, according to the “legend” later propagated by Lloyd George, 
“Russia, had she received proper help from her western allies, could have contrib-
uted decisively to an overthrow of the German Empire quite early in the war”.25 
The Russian revolution in 1917 gave the lie to such notions, but hopes continued 
for some alternative to the interminable slaughter in the West, especially after the 
failure of yet another Anglo-French effort, the Nivelle offensive, in the spring of 
1917.
In the early summer of 1917 Lloyd George moved to improve the process of 
British strategic decision-making by establishing a “War Policy Committee”, con-
sisting of himself, Curzon, Milner and Smuts, to review policy as a whole;26 and it 
was now conceded that a “war of attrition” was the only realistic policy on the 
Western Front. True, in view of Russia’s collapse, Lloyd George proposed send-
ing troops to Italy to bring pressure on Austria, which might in turn enable the 
Allies to knock out Bulgaria and Turkey. But the British military leaders opposed 
this, and demanded another offensive in Flanders. In the end the committee, ac-
cepting the need to offer support to the French in the West (and to secure some 
morale-boosting success), grudgingly assented to the military’s plan, “but not to 
allow it to degenerate into a drawn out, indecisive battle of the ‘Somme’ type. If 
this happened, it was to be stopped and the plan for an attack on the Italian front 
would be tried.”27
Haig’s offensive, which became known as the third battle of Ypres, began on 
31 July 1917, as did a month of rain, which turned the marshy Belgian land into a 
24 At an Anglo-French Conference, 28. 12. 1916, quoted in: David French: The Strategy of the 
Lloyd George Coalition 1916–1918. Oxford 1995, p. 45.
25 Norman Stone: The Eastern Front. London 1975, p. 12.
26 Lord Hankey: The Supreme Command 1914–1918, vol. 2. London 1961, pp. 670–686; French: 
Strategy (see note 24), pp. 94–123.
27 Hankey Diary, 16. 7. 1917, quoted in: Hankey: Supreme Command (see note 26), p. 683.
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quagmire; and although September saw some limited Allied successes, with the 
return of the rains, and the mud, in October the advance ground to a halt at the 
tiny village of Passendale (Paschendaele), a name henceforth synonymous with 
the worst horrors of the Western Front. Not surprisingly, this catastrophe revived 
Lloyd George’s desire to find some alternative to the war of attrition in the West. 
Already in April he had been able to take heart when the strategic situation 
changed with the entry of the USA into the war. But by the end of the year it was 
clear that President Wilson was reluctant to become embroiled in what he regard-
ed as primarily European imperial quarrels. The USA remained an “Associated 
Power”, rather than an Ally; and Wilson’s concentration on the moral purpose of 
the war, with his Fourteen Points, Four Principles and Five Particulars of January, 
February and September 1918 obliged the Entente powers more or less to follow 
suit.
Meanwhile, Lloyd George’s determination to by-pass the unpalatable advice 
offered by the British military high command led him in November 1917 to back 
the creation, with his own man Henry Wilson as the British representative, of a 
new interallied Supreme War Council (SWC), designed to provide independent 
advice on strategy. One of its early productions, “Joint Note 12” of 19 January 
1918, advised that no victory in the West could be predicted for 1918, and that the 
Allies should merely hold and strengthen their position, both along the Western 
Front and in Italy. In the Turkish theatre, by contrast, a “decisive result” might be 
possible, for “the present condition of Turkey is one of almost complete material 
and moral exhaustion”.28 In so far as it recognised the primary importance of the 
Western Front, Note 12 was no simple “Eastern” manifesto; but it certainly em-
bodied Lloyd George’s policy preferences, and did not go down at all well with 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, or the Command-
er-in-Chief in France, Sir Douglas Haig. Even so, Lloyd George’s replacing Rob-
ertson by Sir Henry Wilson in February 1918, did not signal any dramatic change 
of policy. It was decided for the time being simply to “tread water” in the West 
during 1918, lest any frittering away of precious manpower in costly attritional 
engagements should leave the British weakened vis-à-vis the Americans; and in-
stead to build up resources for a 1919 offensive. The great German spring offensive 
launched in March 1918 upset these plans, however, and prompted a review of the 
high command on the Western Front which led to the appointment of the French 
General Ferdinand Foch as “Generalissimo” of the Allied Forces on 17 April.
In July 1918, with the German offensive running out of steam, Henry Wilson 
prepared a long paper for the Cabinet on “British military policy, 1918–1919”.29 It 
reiterated the view that the best which could be hoped for in 1918 was to hold the 
line in the West; and recommended some limited attacks to secure a tactical ad-
vantage in preparation for a major offensive in the summer of 1919. By then, Wil-
son predicted, the Allies would be only slightly superior in terms of numbers, but 
28 1918 Campaign, 19. 1. 1918, Imperial War Museum, Wilson Papers, HHW 3/14/1.
29 Wilson, British Military Policy, 1918–19, 25. 7. 1918, TNA, CAB 27/8 W.P. 70.
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(according to the Supreme War Council’s Note 12), well ahead in terms of ma-
chine-guns, tanks, aircraft and artillery. Placing faith in the latest technical advanc-
es, but not being over-optimistic, Wilson argued that “properly supported by the 
fullest equipment of every mechanical auxiliary, and efficiently directed under one 
supreme command”, there would be “a fair chance of achieving substantial mili-
tary success”. According to Paul Guinn “in its emphasis on mechanical warfare” 
Wilson’s “very able paper […] undoubtedly indicated the right road”.30 At the 
core of the study was an understanding that ultimately the war could only be won 
in the West; and after all, no one else had come forward with any another “practi-
cal general plan of action”. In the event, the sudden collapse of Germany and its 
Allies rendered the elaborate war planning of 1918 redundant. In the late autumn 
of 1918, as if belatedly to vindicate the case for “side-shows”, Bulgaria sued for 
peace in September, Turkey in October, and Austria-Hungary at the beginning of 
November. The Germans, defeated in battle, and withdrawing behind their fron-
tiers, were finally left isolated at a time when their government, indeed their 
whole political system, was beginning to buckle under the prolonged strains of 
fighting a total war.
It is clear that, as the war progressed, what we might call the “British disposi-
tion” became more imperial. In 1914 the British state, the United Kingdom, went 
to war and the empire followed. By 1918 the British war effort was less unilateral-
ly, or less exclusively, based on the United Kingdom alone. This was true in three 
distinct ways. First, perhaps most obvious, there was the territorial expansion of 
empire, from the acquisition of German colonies, to the protection of key zones 
of imperial vulnerability, such as Suez or the Persian Gulf, and finally, with con-
quest in the Middle East, the massive over-insurance of the defence of India and 
the creation of Lord Curzon’s fantasy empire in the region.31 Second, in terms of 
personnel, the First World War provided an unparalleled opportunity for obsoles-
cent imperialists to shin up the political greasy pole. Partly this was because of the 
very nature of war, the mechanisms by which the state was mobilised for war, and 
the rhetoric employed. All of these privileged imperial tropes of military service, 
of power, of dominion and of high imperial endeavour. Thus, Lord Kitchener, an 
outstanding imperial hero, was brought in at the start as secretary for war. When 
Lloyd George became prime minister he introduced Lords Curzon and Milner to 
the inner circle of his war cabinet, both imperialists, the former of the old sort, the 
latter a modernising, “progressive” (though by no means democratic) type. From 
June 1917, moreover, Jan Christian Smuts, “South African poacher turned imperi-
al gamekeeper”,32 was made a full member of the war cabinet. Lloyd George him-
30 Paul Guinn: British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918. Oxford 1965, p. 314.
31 A process discussed in: John Gallagher: The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire. 
Cambridge 1982, pp. 86–94; Keith Jeffery: The British Army and the Crisis of the British Empire 
1918–22. Manchester 1984.
32 Anthony J. Stockwell: The War and the British Empire. In: Turner (ed.): Britain (see note 18), 
p. 36.
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self proved an unlikely imperialist, considering his stance on the Boer War at the 
turn of the century. To keep the Dominions fully on board he admitted their pre-
miers to the highest policymaking level in the (albeit intermittently-meeting) “Im-
perial War Cabinet” – partly, but not entirely, a rhetorical, symbolic device; and at 
the 1917 imperial conference India, for the first time, was admitted on more-or-
less equal terms with the Dominions. Third, there was the contribution which the 
empire – India and the Colonial Empire, as well as the Dominions – made to the 
overall war effort, in terms of men, money and matériel. By the end of the war the 
British Empire had come closer than ever in its history to becoming a coherent 
political, military and strategic unit. As Lloyd George told the imperial confer-
ence of 1921: “There was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire. 
Today the Empire is in charge of Downing Street”;33 and, although the prime 
minister’s rhetoric was prone to hyperbole, this was not entirely untrue.
War or Wars?
A further approach to the analysis of British strategy and war aims is to disaggre-
gate the war itself, and investigate the extent to which we are dealing, not with 
one, but with a plurality of conflicts. At one level the conflict was primarily, in 
A. J. P. Taylor’s phrase, a “struggle for mastery in Europe”,34 essentially a contest 
between Germany and Allies against a coalition of Great Power rivals, initially 
comprising France, the United Kingdom and Russia. While this European war 
sucked in other states on the Entente side – Italy (progressively) from 1915 and 
Romania in 1916 – until 1917 the main focus of the struggle lay on Germany’s 
western and eastern frontiers. For Great Britain and France, the European War 
which began with the German invasion of Belgium in August 1914, ended with a 
German surrender on the Western Front in November 1918; and for them, in mil-
itary terms, this war was primarily fought on the Western Front. But there was a 
maritime dimension, too, the strategy of which focused on three key areas: the 
defence of the British Isles; the protection of British maritime supply-lines and 
imperial communications; and the enforcement of a blockade on the enemy.
The defence of the British Isles was conspicuously successful. Despite prewar 
anxieties about vulnerability to invasion from the Continent,35 British naval supe-
riority ensured that a German landing on Great Britain was never even a remote 
possibility. Beyond a few strikes against targets on the East coast of Britain and 
some early successes against warships in British waters, the German surface naval 
threat was fairly easily met by the Royal Navy, and the only major battle, at Jut-
land in May 1916, although costly for the British, resulted in the German High 
33 Mansergh: Commonwealth (see note 12), p. 217.
34 Alan J. P. Taylor: The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918. Oxford 1954.
35 These are extensively discussed in: A. J. Anthony Morris: The Scaremongers. The Advocacy of 
War And Rearmament 1896–1914. London 1984.
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Seas Fleet never seeking action again. British maritime dominance was under-
pinned by excellent naval signals intelligence, which also ensured the interception 
in April 1916 of a German vessel carrying arms to support a separatist rising in 
Ireland.36 British naval command of home waters also ensured that the vital 
cross-Channel communications between England and France were never greatly 
disrupted. The only sustained threat in home waters came from German subma-
rines which continued to operate until the end of the war.37
The British navy was also able – eventually – to secure Britain’s maritime sup-
ply-lines and imperial communications, the latter more easily than the former, 
with the mopping up of most German surface warships by the end of 1914. But 
submarines were a different matter and they posed the greatest threat to the trans-
atlantic supply-lines upon which Britain (and its Allies) depended for survival. 
Germany’s adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 exacer-
bated Britain’s already critical supply position, and might have achieved its aim of 
bringing Britain to its knees had the British not belatedly implemented a convoy 
system and had it not also accelerated the United States’ entry into the war.
Enforcing a blockade was the third pillar of Britain’s naval strategy. It achieved 
considerable success, not simply in weakening the enemy by denying them food-
stuffs and vital war commodities, but also from the strains to which it subjected 
the German imperial administration and civil society generally, to an extent that, 
ultimately, gravely undermined the legitimacy of government in Germany.38 Thus 
the global maritime reach of British naval power was able to bring pressure to 
bear on its chief European enemy and contribute to Germany’s general collapse in 
the autumn of 1918.
While there was a global dimension to the war from the start, with engagements 
in 1914 occurring from North China to the Middle East, Africa and the seas off 
South America, a strong case can be made for there truly being a “world war” 
only from April 1917, with the entry of the USA, after which all the greatest 
powers in the world were involved.39 The widely-scattered engagements at the 
start of the war merely reflected the fact that Britain and Germany in particular 
had global interests. But the rolling-up by Britain of Germany’s colonial posses-
sions (with assistance from France and Japan, as well as from South Africa, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand) suggests that we might find within the wider world con-
flict (however defined) a war which could be characterised as “the last war of 
British imperial expansion”. Among the earliest operations of Australian and New 
36 Eunan O’Halpin: British Intelligence and Ireland 1914–21. In: Christopher Andrew/David 
Dilks (eds.): The Missing Dimension. Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twenti-
eth Century. London 1984, pp. 54–77.
37 For example, the mail boat Leinster was sunk in the Irish Sea on 10. 10. 1918.
38 Avner Offer: The Blockade of Germany and the Strategy of Starvation, 1914–1918. In: Roger 
Chickering/Stig Förster (eds.): Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western 
Front, 1914–1918. Cambridge 2000, pp. 169–188.
39 China declared war on the Central Powers in August 1917, and Brazil joined in October, after 
which at least one major power in each continent was engaged in the war.
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Zealand forces was the seizure of German possessions in the Pacific. The first 
British shots of the whole war on land were reputedly fired on 12 August 1914 in 
Togoland, and during 1914 there were five further colonial campaigns involving 
British forces: in the Cameroons, East Africa, South-West Africa, New Guinea 
and Samoa.40 In a late revival of the nineteenth-century Partition of Africa, Brit-
ain conceded the lion’s share of the Cameroons to France in order to stave off 
demands for East African territory. In the words of Robert Holland, the suppres-
sion of unrest in Darfur during 1916 “belatedly completed the pacification of the 
Sudan” begun in the late 1890s.41
Jack Gallagher once remarked that the First World War was an “opportunity 
for a new partition of the world”, providing “a vast bargain basement for empire 
builders”.42 Nowhere was this more true than in the Middle East. Hitherto Brit-
ain’s strategy in the region had been to maintain the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire in Asia, principally in order to forestall the regional ambitions 
of France and Russia. But the entry of the Turks into the war in November 1914 
rendered that strategy obsolete and prompted the greatest British imperial expan-
sion of all. Driven by a combination of factors – not just defeating the Turks, but 
also securing the Suez Canal and the lines of imperial communications running 
through the region, preserving British interests in the Gulf and reinforcing the 
forward defence of India – and inspired by what John Darwin has called “war 
imperialism” – by late 1918 British and Anglo-Indian forces had occupied a great 
swathe of territory across the Middle East and even Central Asia. This imperial-
ism, “devoid of any concern for either the civilising mission or the economic ex-
ploitation of captured territories”,43 was sustained above all by the simple logic – 
and momentum – of conquest.
To be sure, this imperium was not acquired unilaterally, nor without a number 
of contradictory commitments, made under the pressure of wartime imperatives, 
through which Britain sought to enlist and retain wartime Allies. The Treaty of 
London (April 1915), for example, offered Italy territorial compensations on the 
Mediterranean littoral of Asia Minor. The Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916) ef-
fectively partitioned the northern Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire be-
tween Britain and France, and the Balfour Declaration (October 1917), sought to 
enlist Jews for the Entente cause by promising British support for “the establish-
ment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people”. Various agreements 
were made with Arab nationalists promising the postwar creation of an indepen-
dent Arab kingdom in exchange for Arab support against Turkey, a commitment 
enthusiastically championed by T. E. Lawrence. Russia’s collapse in 1917 left a 
40 Robert Holland: The British Empire and the Great War 1914–1918. In: Wm. Roger Louis/Ju-
dith M. Brown (eds.): The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 4: The Twentieth Century. 
Oxford 1999, pp. 114–137.
41 Ibid., p. 121.
42 Gallagher: Decline (see note 31), p. 87.
43 John Darwin: Britain, Egypt and the Middle East. Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 
1918–1922. London 1981, p. 161.
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power vacuum in the oil-rich Caucasus and Central Asia. In order to deny this 
region to the Central Powers (and, it was believed, protect India) a motley collec-
tion of British imperial forces moved forward from Mesopotamia (Iraq), Persia 
(Iran) and North-West India (now Pakistan): Dunsterforce (later Norperforce) in 
north Persia, under the command of Kipling’s Stalkey, General L. C. Dunsterville, 
which reached Baku (in Azerbaijan) in August 1918; General Wilfrid Malleson’s 
intelligence mission (“Malmiss”), originally based at Meshed in north-west Persia, 
but which by late 1918 loosely held a line in Transcaspia (Turkmenistan) from 
Krasnovodsk (Türkmenbaşy) to Askabad and Merv. Even in Central Asia Britain 
exercised maritime power, represented by a squadron of the Royal Navy in the 
Caspian Sea. This new cut-price empire reached its greatest extent in 1919, when 
British forces held territory across Caucasia, from Batumi on the Black Sea to 
Baku on the Caspian.44
The rationale for this imperial British war was articulated in mid-1918 by the 
Conservative MP Leo Amery, an especially enthusiastic imperialist on the staff of 
the Supreme War Council: “We have battled and will continue to battle our hard-
est for the common cause in Europe. But on behalf of that cause, as well as in de-
fence of our existence, we shall find ourselves compelled to complete the libera-
tion of the Arabs, to make secure the independence of Persia, and if we can, of 
Armenia, and to protect tropical Africa from German economic and military ex-
ploitation. All these objects are justifiable in themselves and don’t become less so 
because they also increase the general sphere of British influence, and afford a 
strategical security which will enable that Southern British World which runs 
from Cape Town through Cairo, Baghdad and Calcutta to Sydney and Wellington 
to go about its peaceful business without constant fear of German aggression.”45
Although British hegemony in Central Asia could not be sustained – the most 
forward positions had been abandoned by 1920 – Great Britain emerged from the 
war as the predominant power in the Middle East, with an enhanced position 
around the Persian Gulf, and mandates for Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Even 
allowing for the growing challenges of nationalism, both within the empire and in 
states such as Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, the defence of India and of British 
imperial communications through the region seemed secure as never before. 
The Ending of the War(s)
The momentum of war imperialism that carried British military operations in the 
Middle East into 1919, reminds us that, while in the West Britain’s strategic objec-
tives were evidently sufficiently met by November 1918 to permit the ending of 
44 This imperial expansion, and the strains it brought, is explored in: Jeffery: British Army (see 
note 31).
45 Amery: British War Aims, 8. 6. 1918, UK Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/2/1/24.
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open hostilities, this was not entirely the case elsewhere. Fighting across the world 
did not stop the moment the whistle blew on the Western Front.
The ways wars end can be revealing about both strategy and war aims (actual 
as well as perceived), since the point at which the costs of continuing to fight 
outweigh the benefits must be one when at least some war aims have been ob-
tained. Indeed, strategy and war aims are all about the peace; the moment (for 
the victors at least) when they have been sufficiently met to allow fighting to 
cease. Similarly, the objectives that states pursue at peace conferences (“war by 
other means”), will embody those war aims; though what they can actually se-
cure may well fall short of their ambitions. Chronology is important here, for 
judgments as to whether war aims have been achieved often change with the pas-
sage of time, and may well look very different on, for example, 11 November 
1918; 28 June 1919 (when the Treaty of Versailles was signed); 10 September 1919 
(Treaty of St Germain with Austria), and so on. Certainly, for the British Em-
pire, its apparent success in the Middle East enshrined in the Treaty of Sèvres of 
10 August 1920 proved no more than an interim settlement, to be replaced by the 
last of the First World War peace treaties at Lausanne in July 1923.
In general terms, the British strategic requirements outlined by Grey in 
May 1911 had apparently been triumphantly met by the end of the war. The 
threat of a power “or a group of Powers, acquiring […] a dominating position 
in Europe” had – for the time being – been eliminated by the comprehensive 
defeat of the Central Powers. On the crucial question of sea power (“what real-
ly determines [British] Foreign Policy”), the scuttling of the German High Seas 
Fleet at Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919 could give no more dramatic demonstra-
tion of Britain’s maritime power. But – and here the chronology may be particu-
larly significant – if one moves the moment of assessment forward by only 
three years or so to the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 the situation 
looks very different. Here, for the first time ever, Britain agreed to a measure of 
disarmament (if only of obsolete warships), and the towering British maritime 
supremacy of November 1918 and June 1919, had become no more than a com-
mitment to maintaining set proportions of capital ships with (for the moment) 
friendly powers.46
The means by which the British imperial war effort had been sustained be-
tween 1914 and 1918, which combined an intensification of governmental con-
trol and exploitation of domestic and imperial resources with the espousal of ide-
alistic war aims (including, in the end, a measure of self-determination for na-
tionalities), catalysed national movements and stimulated national challenges in 
the unsettled aftermath of the war: in India, in Iraq, in Egypt, and in Ireland. 
Even in the Dominions, the experience of the war had a centrifugal effect, plac-
ing them more definitely on the road to autonomy. The lofty position described 
in December 1918 by the Commander-in-Chief in India General Sir Charles 
46 John Robert Ferris: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–26. London 1989, pp. 99–
101.
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Monro – “Now it is all over […] the Empire stands on a pinnacle built by her 
tenacity & courage”47 – was unsustainable. For a brief moment only, the success-
es of British arms and the momentum of war imperialism propelled Great Britain 
and its empire to a position of global power unknown before. Even so, perhaps 
the case for speaking of an imperial decline in the 1920s, so brilliantly made by 
Jack Gallagher in his matchless survey of the British Empire as a power system 
in the twentieth century, can be overstated.48 After all, Great Britain remained a 
superpower in the interwar years and the British imperial power system retained 
sufficient vitality for the “decline” to give way to enough of a revival to fight 
another war, essentially for the same strategic objectives as in 1914–1918. Here 
again, although much weakened, Great Britain survived to emerge on the win-
ning side – but this time the cost of imperial victory was the empire itself.49
47 Monro to Sir Henry Rawlinson, 12. 12. 1918, National Army Museum, London, Rawlinson 
Papers, 5201/33/79.
48 Gallagher: Decline (see note 31); for an operational account, see Anthony Clayton: The British 
Empire as a Superpower, 1919–39. London 1986.
49 As is argued in Keith Jeffery: The Second World War. In: Louis/Brown (eds.): Oxford History 
(see note 40), pp. 326 f. 
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War as Legitimisation of Revolution,  
Revolution as Justification of War
Political Mobilisations in Russia, 1914–19171
From the very start of the First World War there was a constant struggle in all the 
belligerent Powers to define objectives that would be both acceptable to those di-
recting policy and effective in persuading the public to fight for them. Everywhere, 
military operations became the subject of special propaganda efforts, while politi-
cal decision-makers were in turn exposed to pressure from public opinion both in 
their countries and, occasionally, overseas. Russia, however, became something of a 
special case among the Great Powers, as there the task of persuading the public to 
continue the fight was complicated by a revolutionary crisis that demanded a par-
ticular rationale to justify the government’s war aims. Indeed, their development 
from 1914 to 1917 was very much influenced, and finally completely overshad-
owed, by the impact of the increasing strains of war on the internal situation.
The Political Decision-Makers: The Emperor, the Duma and the Parties
The attitude of these actors towards the war was often determined by their views 
on the internal situation. The Emperor and the monarchists hoped that the slogan 
of the defence of Russia would create a broad political coalition, and that in the 
end victory would consolidate the power of the dynasty. The reunification of Po-
land under Russian rule (perhaps as an autonomous part of the empire), the acqui-
sition of Eastern Galicia, Constantinople with the Dardanelles and Bosphorus 
Straits, Eastern Anatolia – these ambitious goals elaborated between 1914 and 1916 
inspired both Russian conservatives and liberals despite their conflicting views on 
other matters, and the government tried to exploit them to mobilise their support.
The Emperor was, of course the key political actor: the Council of Ministers 
consisted of bureaucrats and generals nominated by him, and all ministers report-
ed to him. Certainly, issues might be discussed in the Council before being ap-
1 The author wishes to thank Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies for its support and for 
its special scholarly atmosphere. I’m grateful to Daniel Orlovsky and Mikhail Lukianov for their 
comments and advice.
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proved by the Emperor; but some important decisions of internal and foreign 
policy were implemented without formal discussions when a minister had man-
aged to persuade the sovereign through personal contact.2 In the realm of legisla-
tion the Emperor’s power was vast: without his approval no bill, even if passed by 
the (wholly elected) State Duma and by the State Council (half elective and half 
appointed by the Emperor) could obtain legal force; and he retained the right to 
sign ukazes (decrees) that had the full validity of law.3
The Emperor was well aware that taking the country into war would inevitably 
create serious internal problems, but he was under strong pressure from political 
and military elites that in the last critical days was supported by the people in the 
streets. The capital became the scene of violent nationalist demonstrations, the 
police having to improvise barricades to protect the German and Austrian embas-
sies; and when war broke out and the police were unable to prevent the storming 
of the German embassy (in which one embassy employee was killed), the gover-
nor of St. Petersburg banned all demonstrations in the city.4 As for more accept-
able manifestations of public opinion, the Emperor played an active role in mobil-
ising patriotic feeling. Moreover, contrary to rumour, he absolutely refused to 
consider a separate peace with Germany or her Allies (which would have been 
political suicide for him). Altogether, the Emperor was concerned to shape and 
channel patriotic mobilisation in a way that could strengthen the monarchy, and 
he certainly hoped that diplomatic successes and military victories would increase 
his authority.
The State Duma’s membership certainly did not reflect the views of the whole 
population – suffrage was neither universal nor equal, and different social groups 
were represented according their property and status, while some ethnic groups 
were not represented at all – but the three main groups in the State Duma – con-
servatives, liberals and radical left – could be said to reflect the views of the polit-
ical elite. Most conservatives supported the Emperor’s and Russia’s war aims; but 
some of them also added a xenophobic note, denouncing the “German yoke” 
under which the country laboured, and supporting legislation to limit the rights 
(including property rights) of people of German and other “alien” origins.5 Oth-
er conservative politicians, by contrast, thought that Russia was making a mis-
take in confronting Germany, and predicted that the end of the war would bring 
2 E.g. the famous appeal to the Poles (August 1914) was officially signed by Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaevich. The text was prepared in the Foreign Office and approved by the Emperor. Other 
ministers were shocked when this controversial manifesto was released. Grigory N. Trubetskoi: 
Russkaja diplomatija 1914–1917 gg. i vojna na Balkanakh. Montreal 1983, pp. 34 f.
3 Paul P. Gronsky: The War and the Russian Government. In: The War and the Russian Govern-
ment. New Haven, CT 1929, p. 7, p. 119.
4 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: The February Revolution. Petrograd, 1917. Seattle/London 1981, p. 4; Bo-
ris I. Kolonitskii: “Tragicheskaja erotica”. Obrazy imperatorskoj sem’i v gody Pervoj mirovoj 
voiny. Moscow 2010, p. 77, pp. 82 f.
5 Eric Lohr: Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during 
World War I. Cambridge, MA/London 2003, pp. 55–120.
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the collapse of the monarchies in both countries; and while they could not speak 
up explicitly the idea of a separate peace, they found ways to express some of 
their misgivings by criticising Russia’s Allies, first and foremost Great Britain.6 
The main liberal force, the Constitutional-Democratic Party (CD), wanted to 
create a real constitutional monarchy in the country.7 The authorities were tradi-
tionally suspicious about their loyalty – during the Russo-Japanese war some of 
them had seen in the victory of the enemy the lesser evil for Russian society – 
and their newspaper was even closed for a while at the beginning of the war. 
These suspicions were in fact groundless – the party supported Russia’s war 
aims; but its support for the Government was, in the long run, conditional: the 
CD hoped for political reforms after the war, and soon began to demand reforms 
even during the war. Their pro-British and pro-French attitudes fitted in with 
their political ideals: constitutional monarchy and liberal values. In 1915, during 
the “great retreat” of the Russian Army a coalition of several liberal and conser-
vative fractions – the “Progressive Bloc” – was created that controlled the State 
Duma, with only the extreme Right and Left refusing to support it; but although 
its demands for immediate reforms and the creation of a “government of confi-
dence” was supported by influential newspapers, associations and local govern-
ments, and even though some ministers were ready for such a dialogue,8 Nicho-
las II refused to work with the “Progressive Bloc”. On the contrary, the war 
seemed to have offered the government an opportunity to reduce the Duma from 
a legislative to a consultative body. For the outbreak of hostilities had in fact en-
hanced the official powers of the Emperor: the normal course of work in the 
legislative chambers was interrupted9 and, as a contemporary scholar observed, 
“several wartime finance measures especially the imposition of taxes, were passed 
by special enactments of the government, without consulting the Duma. At best 
Duma deputies could use the parliament as a tribune to voice their oppositional 
criticism of the regime, but they had no power over the military budget, war 
aims or the conduct of the war.”10
6 Boris I. Kolonitskii: Politicheskie funktsii anglofobii v gody Pervoj mirovoj voiny. In: N. N. 
Smirnov (ed.): Rossija I Pervaja mirovaja voina. Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kol-
lokviuma. St. Petersburg 1979, pp. 271–287. Anti-English sentiments had a tradition in Russian 
politics.
7 Norman Stone describes the Constitutional Democratic Party as “self-confessedly Republi-
can”. Norman Stone: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917. London 1975, p. 194. However during the 
February Revolution Pavel Milyukov defended the principle of monarchy even at the time when 
more conservative politicians had ceased to do so.
8 On the “Progressive Bloc” see: Valentin S. Diakin: Russkaja burzhuazija i tsarism v gody Per-
voj mirovoj voiny. 1914–1917. Leningrad 1967; William G. Rosenberg: Liberals in the Russian 
Revolution, 1917–1921. Princeton 1974; Evgenii D. Chermenskii: IV-aia Gosudarsvennaia duma 
is sverzhenie tsarizma v Rossii. Moscow 1976; Melissa K. Stockdale: Pavel Miliukov and the 
Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880–1918. Ithaca 1996.
9 Gronsky: War (see note 3), pp. 119 f.
10 Mark von Hagen: The First World War, 1914–1918. In: Ronald G. Suny (ed.): The Cambridge 
History of Russia. Vol. 3: The Twentieth Century. Cambridge 2006, pp. 94–113, here: p. 98.
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In reality, however, the course of the war witnessed an increase in the political 
role of State Duma. Liberal and conservative deputies participated in various pa-
triotic mobilisation projects (including industrial mobilisation), and they created a 
number of committees that allowed them to act when the Duma was in recess. 
They also developed their contacts within the civilian and military administration; 
and their influence over public opinion increased in spite of censorship – and 
sometimes because of it: rumours about speeches in the Duma that were prohibit-
ed for publication excited the popular imagination. At the same time some minis-
ters found it useful to exploit their contacts within the Duma. The foreign minis-
ter Sazonov, for example, could cite the “will of public opinion” when pressing 
Russia’s war aims on the Allies; and he quoted discussions in Duma concerning 
the issue of the Straits.11
The socialist parties had only a small representation in the State Duma (thanks 
to the electoral law), most of the left-wing newspapers were closed during the 
war, and many activists were arrested and exiled. Initially, the public knew little 
about the fierce discussions among small groups of émigrés and exiles, under-
ground activists and radical intelligentsia, but in the course of the war, and espe-
cially after the fall of monarchy, the role and influence of the socialists was to in-
crease dramatically. Although different nationalities of the Russian Empire had 
their own Socialist parties or (and) their special groups within all-Russian Social-
ist parties, there were two main socialist parties in Russia, both advocating the es-
tablishment of a democratic republic as their first goal. The Russian Social-
ist-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) was a Marxist organisation, while Socialist 
Revolutionary Party (SR) combined the Russian populist socialist tradition with 
other radical theories. Both parties were split according to their tactics and basic 
ideas of how they should be organised; and while the SR rejected elections to the 
Duma, two fractions of RSDLP – the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks – were rep-
resented there.
The World War changed the structure of Russian Socialist movement. Some 
leaders decided to support the war effort of the Entente, among them George 
Plekhanov, an émigré celebrity who enjoyed the reputation of the “grandfather of 
Russian Marxism”. Initially he concentrated on supporting “western democra-
cies”, rather than the “defence of the Fatherland” but gradually he came to sup-
port the Russian government, and even demanded a postponement of all reforms 
in Russia until the end of the war: “Victory will be beneficial for my country and 
her democracy.” Not surprisingly his articles were approved for publication in 
Russia.12 Some prominent SRs émigrés also demanded the postponement of the 
revolution until the end of the war; centrist groups demanded the subordination 
11 Trubetskoi: Russkaja (see note 2), p. 127.
12 Samuel H. Baron: Plekhanov. The Father of the Russian Marxism. London 1968, p. 328; Sta-
nislav V. Tutukin: Vojna, mir, revolutsia. Idejnaia bor’ba v rabochem dvizhenii Rossii, 1914–1917 
gg. Moscow 1972, pp. 54–57; id.: Georgij V. Plekhanov: Sud’ba russkogo marksista. Moscow 1997, 
pp. 301–323.
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of revolutionary interests to the interests of war, and even socialist activists sup-
ported the war effort by participating in the War Industries Committees (while 
criticising the inefficiency of the government).13
A number of groups of SR and Social-Democrats who supported the Russian 
war effort were termed “Defensists” – (although sometimes they adopted the 
name themselves). These Socialist defensists hoped that the alliance with the 
“Western democracies” against “German militarism” would lead to the democra-
tisation of Russia after the war: the “people’s war” required reform rather than 
revolution; and in some of their appeals the “defensists” opposed industrial 
strikes. Even some members of the Bolshevik group supported the Entente, and 
like many Russian radical émigrés, several former followers of Lenin volunteered 
for the French Army.14 On the other hand, many Socialists, including Social-Dem-
ocrats and the Social Revolutionaries, in Russia and abroad, decided that they 
could not support the autocracy in any circumstances. The SR theoretician Victor 
Chernov, leaders of different Social Democratic fractions like Vladimir Lenin, Lev 
Martov and Lev Trotsky attended the Zimmerwald Conference (September 1915). 
There, while some radical Socialists demanded revolution in order to stop the 
“imperialist war” Lenin denounced their projects as utopian “revolutionary paci-
fism”, urging instead turning the “imperialist war” into a “civil war”. Lenin’s po-
sition was defined as “defeatist”: for him, the defeat of Tsarist autocracy by Ger-
many would be the “lesser evil” for the Russian working class. This was too much 
even for some Bolsheviks to accept: though most of them confronted the “defen-
sists” in countless discussions they found it difficult to convince Russian workers 
of the necessity of defeat, and some of them took refuge in the slogan of “revolu-
tionary pacifism”. Lenin, of course, stood by his “international” position: the 
proletarians of all countries, not just the Russian workers, must fight their own 
national governments first;15 but even such internationalists as Trotsky rejected 
the “defeatist” approach.16 The views of local Mensheviks could be even more 
complicated: Noi Zhordania, the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks recalled that: 
“I wished defeat on Russia, but I didn’t want France to be defeated” (and other 
leading Georgian Mensheviks were actually pro-German).17 In the Socialist Revo-
lutionary Party too, the antiwar movement was also divided. As Michael Melan-
con has shown, Chernov and a number of SR were not initially afraid of a Russian 
defeat: it would not be a national but the “government’s” defeat and would lead to 
the creation of the “people’s government”. Polemics continued between “interna-
13 Tutukin: Vojna (see note 12), pp. 205–225.
14 Michael Melancon: The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War Movement, 1914–
1917. Columbus, OH 1990, pp. 18–189.
15 Tutukin: Vojna (see note 12), pp. 105–156.
16 On Martov’s anti-war position see: Israel Getzler: Martov. A Political Biography of a Russian 
Social Democrat. Cambridge 1967, pp. 139 f.; on differences between Trotsky, Lenin and Martov 
see also: Ian D. Thatcher: Leon Trotsky and World War One. August 1914 to February 1917. 
London/New York 2000, pp. 38–110.
17 Noi Zhordania: Moja Zhizn’. Stanford 1968, p. 68.
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tionalist” Social Revolutionaries and “defeatist” Social Revolutionaries; some alli-
ances of radical Internationalist SRs and RSDLP groups (including the Bolshe-
viks) were established underground, and there were even united socialist organi-
sations.18 Although the Tsarist police confronted even “patriotic” Socialists, some 
of whom were arrested and exiled, it was the anti-war Socialists who were hardest 
hit, their newspapers being closed, and even Bolshevik members of the State 
Duma arrested and exiled to Siberia.
Patriotic Culture and Anti-German Propaganda
While the political decision-makers and the government embarked on the patriot-
ic mobilisation of society, others – writers, publishers, theatre and film directors 
– also threw themselves into the process: initially the war was a good brand that 
sold itself. In his magisterial study of Russian “patriotic culture” as exemplified in 
posters, postcards, theatre performances, cinema films, songs, and poems Huber-
tus Jahn concluded that the Russian patriotic culture was very efficient in creating 
negative images of the enemy: favourite targets such as the German soldier and 
the Kaiser proved to be effective instruments for the negative integration of Rus-
sian society. Patriotic symbols for positive integration, by contrast, were accord-
ing to Jahn a more difficult proposition: the Emperor himself failed to provide 
such a symbol despite of all the efforts of monarchist propaganda, with fateful 
consequences for Russian patriotic mobilisation, and to some extent, for the even-
tual revolutionary crisis.19
It might be argued, however, that there were some positive images of social 
integration but that these proved problematic, if not actually dangerous, for the 
regime; just as the more successful negative propaganda images of the enemy also 
created problems for authorities. Wilhelm II, for example, was for Russian pro-
pagandists the very personification of the enemy; but he appeared in different 
“incarnations”, some of which backfired: while he was depicted as a head of a 
state that had prepared for war “for forty years”, some peasants would say after 
defeats of the Russian Army: “The German tsar is clever: he’s prepared for the 
war for 40 years, he ordered to design new artillery guns and to produce more 
munitions. And what did our fool do? He’d just sold vodka” (an allusion to the 
unpopular state monopoly of vodka sales). Thus, even anti-German propaganda 
could give rise to jokes at the expense of the Russian Emperor – not so much 
because the peasants were unpatriotic or anti-monarchist, but because in the cir-
18 On Chernov’s and SRs position see: Melancon: Socialist Revolutionaries (see note 14), pp. 23 f., 
p. 31, pp. 35 f.; on cooperation between the Bolsheviks and other Internationalist groups see: Tu-
tukin: Vojna (see note 12), pp. 226–243; on the split within different Socialist groups in emigration 
and in the Russian capital see also: Robert B. McKean: St. Petersburg between the Revolutions. 
Workers and Revolutionaries, June 1907–February 1917. New Haven/London 1990, pp. 351–355.
19 Hubertus F. Jahn: Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I. Ithaca/London 1995, 
pp. 172–174.
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cumstances, they just did not see Nicholas II as a good Russian monarch, as a 
“real Tsar”.20
Certainly, such features of patriotic mobilisation as spy mania and Germano-
phobia were peculiarly dangerous for the regime because of the family connec-
tions of the Romanovs and the German origin of Empress herself. Of course, oth-
er royal dynasties with relatives in belligerent countries, could also find them-
selves in difficulties; but in Russia there were a number of political activists out to 
exploit such “patriotic” propaganda for their own radical purposes, and a verita-
ble system of negative images of the imperial family had been an component of 
the revolutionary subculture for many decades. These revolutionaries were quick 
to seize on the most provocative inventions of “patriotic” propaganda, tapping in 
to what was a deep tradition of Germanophobia within Russian culture to dis-
credit their political opponents, the imperial family included. As Russian ethnic 
Germans and Baltic Germans were overrepresented in the bureaucratic, military 
and business elites, a whole variety of land and labour conflicts, business rivalries 
and competition for career promotion could be fought out within the context of 
military patriotic propaganda, which supplied protesters with “legitimate” rheto-
ric devices. Russia was not the only country that experienced problems of that 
sort; but in Russia there were perhaps proportionately more political activists 
ready to use, politicise and radicalise such conflicts. Last but not least, there was a 
highly elaborate culture of militancy in the political subcultures of both Left and 
Right; and even the old Moscow–St. Petersburg rivalry and the competition be-
tween the business elites of the two capitals were influenced by phobias of that 
sort, with one famous Moscow industrialist lashing out against “the deadening 
atmosphere and German influence of St. Petersburg”.21
The famous anti-German riot in Moscow (May 1915) is often underestimated 
by scholars of the Russian revolution. When disastrous news from the front coin-
cided with social conflicts and rumours of German sabotage, labour unrest broke 
out, the property of Germans (and some other foreigners who were treated as 
“the Germans”) was looted or destroyed, and some people were even killed by 
the mob. The strikers used not only the pretext of patriotic mobilisation to fo-
ment the unrest but the traditions of anti-Jewish pogroms.22 National flags and 
portraits of the Tsar, Orthodox icons and the Russian anthem were also employed 
to legitimise the riot, and indeed the police were initially hesitant to confront this 
“patriotic manifestation”. In the end, however, the troops were ordered to fire, 
there were clashes between the Moscow mob and army units, some barricades 
were erected, and both sides suffered losses.23 The reaction of Moscow Socialists 
20 On judicial cases of that sort see: Kolonitskii: “Tragicheskaja erotica” (see note 4).
21 Alfred J. Rieber: Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia. Chapell Hill 1982, p. 377.
22 On the cultural code of pogroms see: John D. Klier/Shlomo Lambroza (eds.): Pogroms. An-
ti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History. Cambridge 1992.
23 Lohr: Nationalizing (see note 5), pp. 31–54; Yuri I. Kirianov: Sotsialno-politicheskii protest 
rabochih Rossii v gody Pervoj mirovoj voiny (iul’ 1914–fevral’ 1917 gg.). Moscow 2005, pp. 54–
57.
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to these events is instructive. Whereas some radical Internationalists confronted 
the chauvinist mood of the mob, other radicals were ready to welcome any con-
frontation with the government and saw the riot as an initial stage of the revolu-
tion. Be that as it may, the Moscow riots demonstrated how dangerous patriotic 
mobilisation could be for the regime. The censors were instructed to clamp down 
on the anti-German and anti-Austrian fervour of the press, and authorities even 
forbade some patriotic demonstrations;24 but orders of this sort only intensified 
anti-German suspicions and fed the rumours of treason in high places. Certainly, 
they did little to alleviate the situation. Perhaps the most dangerous omen was the 
mutiny of the Gangut (one of the dreadnoughts of the Baltic fleet) in 1915. Al-
though Soviet historians have depicted this as a revolutionary uprising inspired by 
Bolshevik agitation it was in reality a spontaneous revolt against “the German 
barons” (Baltic German officers who were overrepresented in the Navy, especial-
ly in the Baltic fleet), and it was significant that in framing their protest the muti-
nous sailors used the language of patriotic propaganda.25
Leadership Conflicts: Emperor versus Grand Duke
The politics of patriotic unification around “positive symbols” gave rise to a va-
riety of cults based on Russian heroes and warlords. The popularity of the Em-
peror had increased at the beginning of the war but it was soon rivalled by other 
patriotic cults. His uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Commander in 
Chief of the Russian Armies (a position originally designed for the Emperor 
himself) enjoyed enormous power, with even some civilian authorities reporting 
to him. Indeed, some scholars even talk of a “martial law regime”.26 At any rate, 
this created a very complicated situation from both political and administrative 
points of view: the term “dual power” was not just a post-revolutionary phe-
nomenon.27
The Grand Duke did not owe his importance solely to the authority invested in 
him by law but also to his own remarkable charisma. A great symbolic actor, he 
revelled in the attention of the Russian press, and he drew his support from a va-
riety of sources. At the beginning of the war Nicholas II himself supported the 
commander – his popularity was crucial for patriotic mobilisation – showering 
new promotions and decorations on the Grand Duke, whose popularity was con-
firmed by the market (posters and postcards with his images were in demand) and 
by folklore – he was the hero of a number of popular tales and legends, and many 
24 Kolonitskii: “Tragicheskaja erotica” (see note 4), pp. 558 f.
25 Denis A. Bazhanov: Schit Petrograda. Sluzhebnye budni baltiiskih dreodnoutov v 1914–1917 
gg. St. Petersburg 2007, p. 96.
26 Von Hagen: First World War (see note 10), pp. 97 f.
27 On the crisis of central administration see: Mikhail F. Florinskii: Krizis gosudarstvennogo 
upravlenia v Rossii v gody Pervoj mirovoj voiny. Sovet ministrov v 1914–1917 gg. Leningrad 1988.
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people sincerely (but wrongly) credited him with heroic deeds on the battlefield. 
Indeed, as the war progressed the cult of the Commander came to overshadow 
that of Nicholas II, with the successes of the Russian Army – real and imaginary 
– being attributed to the Grand Duke alone, while any defeats, mistakes and 
shortcomings were blamed on the imperial couple, generals with German names 
and unpopular ministers. People compared the “efficient”, “strong” and “patriot-
ic” Commander to the “weak” and “foolish” Emperor who was “manipulated” 
by his German wife and Rasputin. (To some extent these images were confirmed 
by German front line propaganda addressed to the Russian soldiers, which com-
pared the “peaceful” Emperor to the cruel warmongering Commander.)28 Of 
course, the cult of a strong commander could be problematic for other monarchs 
too (the Hindenburg cult is one example); but in Russia it was particularly dan-
gerous for the regime, as the commander was a relative of the Emperor – who was 
not unaware of the fact that people were already beginning to talk about “Nicho-
las III”.29 Indeed, it was the fact that the Grand Duke was becoming the personi-
fication of patriotic mobilisation (rather than his indifferent military record) that 
lay behind Nicholas II’s decision to dismiss him in August 1915 – admittedly after 
the army had suffered a terrible run of defeats. However, critics of the regime 
only saw in this a further confirmation of their suspicions; while the Emperor’s 
decision to take personal command of the army himself was strongly criticised by 
his ministers and opposition, by memoir writers and historians. Although the 
Emperor’s objectives were rational enough – to unite the government, combat the 
dangerous popularity of the Grand Duke, and perhaps stem the tide of defeats – 
the move perhaps only made things worse: as the historian Nicholas Riasanovsky 
put it, “in spite of the protests of ten of his twelve ministers, the sovereign un-
wisely took personal command of the armed forces [...] leaving Alexandra and 
Rasputin in effective control in the capital. Thus a narrow-minded, reactionary, 
hysterical woman and an ignorant, weird peasant [...] had the destinies of an em-
pire in their hands.”30
Riasanovsky, like many critics at the time and since, overestimated the role of 
the Empress and Rasputin; and although their political importance certainly in-
creased after August 1915 as their unpredictable interventions led to a veritable 
“ministerial leapfrog” that sapped the morale of the government, their “real” im-
pact is still a matter for debate.31 At the time, however, many people, from illiter-
28 On propaganda leaflets on the Russian front see: Alexander B. Astashov (ed.): Propaganda na 
Russkom fronte v gody Pervoj mirovoj voiny. Moscow 2012.
29 Joseph T. Fuhrmann (ed.): The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and 
the Empress Alexandra (April 1914–March 1917). Westport, CT/London 1999, p. 239.
30 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky: A History of Russia. New York/Oxford 41984, p. 421.
31 It is impossible to deny Rasputin’s interference in nominations within the Russian Orthodox 
Church, which insulted both clergy and laymen, and alienated them from the regime. The 
“Church revolution” was an integral part of the Russian revolution. Pavel Rogozny: Tserkovnaja 
revolutsia. Vysshee duchovenstvo Rossijskoj Tserkvi v bor’be za vlast’ v eparciah posle Fevral’skoj 
revolutsii. St. Petersburg 2008.
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ate peasant soldiers to officers of the General Staff and the political elite were 
convinced that Rasputin had become the real ruler of the empire; and given the 
political situation in pre-revolutionary and revolutionary Russia such rumours 
could often count for more than actual facts in creating a new political reality. 
From here, it was no great leap to attributing Russia’s defeats and shortcomings to 
treason in high places; and a number of conspiracy theories were intertwined. For 
the revolutionaries the monarchy itself was an institutionalised conspiracy against 
the people (as was proved by all problems of the war); just as the war itself was a 
global conspiracy of monarchs (ruling classes) against nations (working classes). 
Liberals and conservatives had their own conspiracy theories about the war, in 
which German and Jewish espionage and sabotage often figured as “explanations” 
of all Russia’s problems.32 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and his entourage 
did a lot to foster such a mentalité in their efforts to find scapegoats for Russian 
defeats and provoke new waves of patriotic enthusiasm by xenophobic accusa-
tions – all of which only furthered the multiplication of conspiracy theories, one 
benefiting from another. 
Thoughts of Revolution
In the course of the war a number of political groups – Socialist, Liberal and even 
Conservative – became attracted to the idea of revolution. Some liberal politicians 
made contact with Generals, including General Alexeev, the Tsar’s Chief of Staff; 
others discussed plans for a coup d’état; and conspiracies that were in turn found-
ed on conspiracy theories all added fuel to the revolutionary crisis. To some So-
cialist opponents of the war the idea of revolution came quite naturally, although 
their future plans varied widely. While most Internationalists wanted a revolution 
that would stop the war, Lenin and his followers wanted to turn the “imperialist” 
war into a “civil” war; and although they were a minority among underground 
Socialist groups, they, like other revolutionary groups in Russia (SR, Finnish, 
Ukrainian, and Georgian national movements and Moslems) and the Entente 
countries – enjoyed the support and sponsorship of the German government.33 
The role of “German money” in provoking the Russian Revolution should be 
32 Korneliy F. Shatsillo: Delo Polkovnika Myasoedova. In: Voprosy Istorii 4 (1967), pp. 103–116; 
William C. Fuller, Jr.: Foe Within. Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia. Ithaca 
2006.
33 Zbynek A. B. Zeman (ed.): Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915–1918. Documents 
from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. London 1958; Zbynek Zeman/Winfried 
B. Scharlau: Merchant of Revolution. Alexander Helphand, 1867–1924. London/New York 1965; 
Seppo Zetterberg: Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918. Helsinki 1978; Gennadij 
L. Sobolev: Taina “nemetskogo zolota”. St. Petersburg 2002; id.: Tainyi sojuznik. Russkaja revo-
lutsija I Germania. St. Petersburg 2009. On Turkish efforts in Georgia, Ukraine and Russian 
Muslim territories see: Michael A. Reynolds: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Rus-
sian Empires, 1908–1918. Cambridge 2011, pp. 129–134.
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considered in the general context of the war. Russia was the scene of a great pro-
paganda battle, in which all the Great Powers participated both before and after 
1917. At the same time, a number of revolutionary groups were getting increasing 
support from Russian sources, thanks to the cooperation between some revolu-
tionary Socialists and radicalised Liberals. Not that any of this financial support, 
some of which bore no fruit at all, really determined the course of the internal 
crisis in Russia.
While moderate Socialists initially hoped that Russia’s alliance with French and 
British “democracies” against “German imperialism” might help to create a revo-
lutionary situation after the war, they soon turned to the idea of a revolution 
during the war to ensure the “victory of democracy”. For them, the chief charge 
against the Tsarist government was that it was not efficient enough to ensure mili-
tary success, a charge that seemed to be confirmed by a host of rumours. In 1915 
even Plekhanov declared that the slogan of “national defence” was turning into 
one of “merciless struggle” against the autocracy. Some defensist Social Revolu-
tionaries also turned towards revolution: “The struggle for freedom is in the in-
terests of defence. Defence is a way to freedom. Revolution in the name of de-
fence. Defence as a way to revolution.” Although Lenin in emigration denounced 
such talk as “revolutionary chauvinism”34 some Bolsheviks in Russia established 
tactical alliances with other socialist groups.
There was a parallel movement in the same direction on the part of the Russian 
liberals. Although they were of course interested only in reforms, and were at 
first prepared to postpone even those until victory, they soon began to demand 
reforms in order to achieve victory. As for revolution, they were desperately anx-
ious to prevent it, as their own experience in 1905–1907 had taught them that they 
could not control mass movements. However, when they came to discuss ways of 
channelling the revolutionary activity of the masses they considered the option of 
a revolution from above to prevent a Russian defeat. Even some Conservatives 
toyed with the idea of a “palace revolution” to force the Tsar to abdicate and to 
eliminate “German influence in the country”. Neither Liberals nor Conservatives, 
however, wanted more than a limited and controlled revolution of elites, a kind of 
a military coup to head off a revolution “from below” – although some of them 
took the revolutionary movement into account and planned if possible to utilise 
it. Some politicians speculated about possible actions involving the General Staff 
and Imperial Guards officers; some liberals established contacts with moderate 
Socialists, others with pragmatic bureaucrats; while masonic ties were used by 
radical intelligentsia to establish contacts between different groups of Socialists 
and liberals.35 True, given the insurmountable differences between and within so-
cialist, liberal and conservative groups, no united revolutionary front ever actually 
materialised; but the success of the February Revolution was a result of the partic-
ipation of all those groups; just as the proliferation of rumours about treason in 
34 Tutukin: Vojna (see note 12), pp. 189–205.
35 Hasegawa: February Revolution (see note 4), pp. 172–197.
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high places was essential in uniting those disparate political groups in their oppo-
sition to the regime.
The political impact of rumours – the word is often found in the sources and 
research literature – was indeed far-reaching. Millions of soldiers believed that the 
Empress was a German spy and that the Emperor himself was planning to sign a 
separate peace. These “facts” were never proven, but information of this sort, 
“confirmed” at the time by officers of the General Staff and Imperial Guards, and 
retailed by foreign diplomats and prominent intellectuals of different varieties, in-
cluding conservative intellectuals, had a huge political impact. For example, when 
the unpopular (and German-sounding) bureaucrat Boris Stuermer replaced Sazo-
nov as Foreign Minister in July 1916 it was viewed as a step towards a separate 
peace, and high-ranking officials within his Ministry created an unofficial group 
to prevent any actions incompatible with Russia’s war aims and international 
agreements (and which was to continue its activity after the February Revolu-
tion).36 In more general terms, the proliferation of rumours served to sap the loy-
alty of those forces that might normally have been expected to spring to the de-
fence of the regime. In February 1917 there were certainly staunch Russian mon-
archists (who may well have long had their doubts about Nicholas II’s ability to 
govern the empire) who now decided that they simply could not support him, 
even though they had no desire to see the monarchy fall. Similarly, some officers 
of the Imperial Guard and General Staff refused to participate in any coup d’état, 
but they refrained from alerting the authorities to such subversive proposals; and 
the authorities – and even some members of the imperial family – were involved 
in the rumours and conspiracies. The political de-mobilisation of the monarchists 
was an important factor in the February Revolution. 
Revolution: War or Peace
The first political struggle after the February Revolution was that over its inter-
pretation. The conservatives stressed its patriotic and anti-German character: 
“The end of German dominance”; “Victory over the German government”; “We 
have beaten the Germans here, we will now beat them in the field”. (In fact, a 
number of army and naval officers with foreign names had been special targets for 
revolutionary sailors and soldiers, and many of them were arrested, purged or 
even killed.)37 Allied diplomats and army officers were enthusiastically welcomed 
36 Georgy Nikolaevich Mikhailovsky: Zapiski. Iz istorii rossijskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo ve-
domstva, 1914–1920, vol. 1. Moscow 1993, p. 247, p. 300. Actually Stuermer authorised some con-
tacts with German representatives: Diakin: Russkaja burzhuazija (see note 8), pp. 279 f.
37 On Russian nationalism and xenophobia in the revolution see: Boris Kolonitskii: The “Rus-
sian Idea” and the Ideology of the February Revolution. In: Teruyuki Hara/Kimitaka Matsuzato 
(eds.): Empire and Society. New Approaches to Russian History. Sapporo 1997, pp. 41–71. Some 
Russian Allies also viewed the Revolution as a blow to Germany; Hew Strachan: The First World 
War. London 2003, p. 242.
War as Legitimisation of Revolution, Revolution as Justification of War 73
by revolutionary crowds.38 The Provisional Government too, was composed 
mostly of liberals who wanted to continue the war “until complete victory” and 
accepted the war aims of the Tsarist government. On the other hand, the new for-
eign minister and ambitious leader of CD, Pavel Milyukov, was given the sarcastic 
sobriquet of “Dardanelski” by his critics on the Left. For the Provisional Govern-
ment held no monopoly of power in the capital, being forced to share it with the 
Petrograd Soviet (Council) of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies composed of a va-
riety of socialists (with the Bolsheviks initially a small minority group). There, the 
majority incined neither to Lenin nor to the Socialist “patriots”, but to the “Rev-
olutionary ‘defensism’” of the moderate “Zimmerwald Socialists” (social Demo-
crats and Social Revolutionaries who had accepted the anti-war declarations of 
the Zimmerwald conference).39 This still meant that, for them, fighting to defend 
the “most democratic country of the world” (in contrast to “Tsarist Russia”) was 
acceptable and even necessary. At the same time they labelled the war itself as 
“imperialist”, and invited all European Socialists to organise an international con-
ference to devise a common programme of “democratic peace” and force all gov-
ernments to follow it. On the 14/27 March the Soviet adopted a special Manifesto 
(“An Appeal to All the Peoples of the World”) demanding peace “without annex-
ations and indemnities”.
This was not the only dividing line between the Soviet and the Provisional 
Government. There was the question of control over the army. When the Soviet 
issued “Order Number One”, creating a system of committees elected by sol-
diers, NCOs and (sometimes) officers, in the army and navy, the High Com-
mand and the Government protested (though they admitted that some such 
committees were needed to restore calm). Finally an unsatisfactory compromise 
was reached (preserving the system of committees but leaving their rights only 
loosely defined) that proved a constant source of conflicts between committees 
and commanders, officers and men.40 The combination of the “democratisation” 
of the army, logistical problems (which increased in the course of revolution) and 
rumours about land reform provoked huge problems and gravely undermined 
discipline among soldiers and sailors. In May, when the Government was reor-
ganised after Socialist leaders agreed to enter a coalition (with Victor Chernov, 
the participant of the Zimmerwald Conference, as Minister of Agriculture) the 
policy of “democratic peace” “without annexations and indemnities” became the 
official policy of the government and Russia’s pre-revolutionary war aims were 
abandoned. At that time it was the only way to mobilise public opinion for the 
war effort.
38 Harvey Pitcher: Witnesses of the Russian Revolution. London 1994, pp. 43–45.
39 On “revolutionary defencism” see: Ziva Galili: The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolu-
tion. Social Realities and Political Strategies. Princeton 1989.
40 On Order Number one and its implementation see: Alan K. Wildman: The End of the Russian 
Imperial Army. Vol. 1: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt. March–April 1917. Princeton, NJ 
1987, pp. 182–201.
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Kerensky and the Army
Alexander Kerensky, the new minister of War and Navy, was a strong man within 
the Provisional Government. Elected to the State Duma as a member of Labour 
Group, a small and moderate populist organisation, he had combined his career as 
a lawyer and lawmaker with illegal activity, exploiting his deputy’s immunity in 
order to establish contacts between different Social Revolutionary groups.41 After 
the outbreak of war the Labour Group had expressed its solidarity with the army, 
but abstained (like the Social Democratic fractions) during the vote on the war 
budget. Kerensky’s own attitudes towards the war were flexible – almost eclectic. 
His rhetoric was influenced by Zimmerwald conference, but he tailored his pro-
nouncements to suit his audience; and while he generally did his best to create a 
united front against the regime, he could also deliver patriotic speeches when nec-
essary.42 Enjoying increasing popularity because of his oratorical skills, appointed 
Minister of Justice after the February Revolution, and at the same time a vice-chair-
man of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, he was the only person that in a 
position of authority in both the institutions that constituted the dual power. 
When in May Kerensky became Minister of War and Navy, the High Command 
and the generals made haste to express their enthusiasm; for while these displays 
were insincere (a young radical lawyer speaking the language of the Zimmerwald 
conference was hardly to their taste), they recognised that they needed Kerensky 
to inspire the troops and restore discipline in the army in preparation for the next 
offensive.43 They had miscalculated: Kerensky never promised to restore the old 
discipline. On the contrary, in pursuit of the revolutionary project – idealistic and 
unrealistic in the long run – of “democratizing the army”,44 he proclaimed a “new 
iron discipline” of the “citizen-soldier”, “the discipline of conscious duty”, and 
“the discipline of free citizens” – in contrast to the “slave discipline” of the old 
army. He went on to define the rights of committees and consolidate the system of 
government commissars in the armies. This was followed by a new purge of the 
command, in which politicised officers and generals were promoted. Despite all 
Kerensky’s efforts, however, and the efforts of commissars and committee mem-
bers to raise the morale of the troops, the July offensive was a disaster: 48 battal-
ions refused to go into battle, the offensive led to about 150,000 losses and even 
more desertions. It was the end of the Russian Imperial Army.45
41 Richard Abraham: Alexander Kerensky. The First Love of the Revolution. New York/London 
1987, pp. 53–145.
42 Ibid., pp. 98–100.
43 Alan K. Wildman: The End of the Russian Imperial Army. Vol. 2: The Road to Soviet Power 
and Peace. Princeton, NJ 1987, pp. 22–37.
44 Boris Kolonitskii: “Democracy” in the Political Consciousness of the February Revolution. 
In: SR 57 (1998) 1, pp. 95–106.
45 Wildman: End (see note 43), pp. 3–111; Stephen A. Smith: The Revolutions of 1917–1918. In: 
Suny (ed.): Cambridge History (see note 10), pp. 114–139, here: p. 125. According to other re-
search the Russian Army lost 132,500 men; see: Alexander P. Zhilin: Poslednee nastuplenie. 
Iiun’ 1917 goda. Moscow 1983, p. 76.
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Kerensky’s July Offensive and the Army
What motivated the key decision-makers to send the army into an offensive in 
such shape? Some of the political figures involved – and later Soviet historians – 
cited the pressure applied by Russia’s Allies. The offensive was part of the Allied 
strategy agreed for 1917, and had only been postponed from May to July owing 
to the Revolution’s impact on the Russian Army. Certainly, loyalty to the Allies 
was an important theme of Kerensky’s rhetoric; but in his speeches in 1917 and in 
his memoirs Kerensky also stressed another motive: the offensive was the only 
way to establish discipline within the Russian Army which had been gravely un-
dermined by fraternisation. Indeed, fraternisation was a central military and polit-
ical issue of the Russian Revolution, and was to have serious impact on Russia’s 
war aims. While fraternisation had generally been stamped out on the Western 
front, on the Eastern front religious holidays (especially Easter) as occasions for 
peaceful contacts with the enemy had almost become a tradition. At Easter 1916, 
for example, dozens of Russian regiments fraternised with the enemy, and Nicho-
las II himself had had to issue a special order forbidding all such practices. Some-
times fraternisation was semi-official, with officers participating and military 
bands playing. True, such fraternisation, although it was a clear sign of decline of 
discipline in general, was not always associated with anti-war sentiments and 
some officers and even generals (including General A. A. Denikin, future leader 
of the Whites) treated it as a kind of military tradition.46
Fraternisation after the Revolution was inevitable, and the large-scale fraterni-
sation at Easter 1917 was quite predictable. Germany and her Allies, for their 
part, decided to take advantage of it to further their own war aims: special propa-
ganda units were trained, leaflets and newspapers printed in Russian, and loads of 
gifts prepared (including stores of liquor). Initially this was a major success for 
the German command: on the one hand, there were real ceasefires lasting for 
weeks in several parts of the front, which enabled the Germans to transfer units to 
the Western front; on the other, serious conflicts broke out within the Russian 
Army, especially between the infantry and artillery units (when the command 
tried to use artillery fire to stop fraternisation). According to Russian émigré his-
torians, out of 220 Russian infantry divisions 165 participated in fraternisation, in 
the course of which at least 38 promised not to attack Austrian and German units. 
German military intelligence estimated that out of 214 Russian divisions on the 
front, no fewer than 107 had been contacted by Austrian and German propaganda 
and intelligence officers.47
46 Anton I. Denikin: Ocherki russkoj smuty. Krushenie vlasti I armii. Fevral’–sentiabr’ 1917 g. 
Moscow 1991, p. 329; see also: Sergey N. Bazanov: Phenomen bratanija v Pervuju mirovuju 
voinu. In: Elena S. Sinjavskaja (ed.): Vojenno-istoricheskaja antropologija. Ezhegodnik. Moscow 
2002, pp. 287–301.
47 Anton A. A. Kersnovsky: Istoria russkoj armii. Vol. 4: 1915–1917 gg. Moscow 1994, p. 270; 
Mikhail S. Frenkin: Russkaja armiia I revolutsiia 1917–1918. Munich 1978, p. 173.
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Russian Socialists were divided in their attitudes towards fraternisation. Some 
influential Soviets and committees supported it and published revolutionary 
counter-propaganda in German and Turkish. Even some Russian Army officers 
viewed fraternisation as a good chance to undermine the morale of the enemy 
(which was sometimes the case, especially as regards Austrian units). One promi-
nent officer of the Russian General Staff even considered the idea of organised 
“counter-fraternisation”, and his article was published in the War Ministry news-
paper in preparation for the Russian offensive.48 However, such views were ex-
ceptional. The army command, the conservative and liberal press, and even some 
socialist newspapers demanded an end to fraternisation. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Bolsheviks and some other Internationalists continued their frater-
nisation propaganda, and they enjoyed the support of non-party activists in some 
regimental and even divisional committees. The issue was a major challenge for 
the “revolutionary defensists”, but in the end the Petrograd Soviet and the influ-
ential military committees rejected fraternisation. As for the government, it opted 
for an offensive as the only possible means to stop fraternisation and increase the 
morale of the Russian Army; and the July offensive was launched against a back-
ground of orders and speeches by Kerensky and patriotic propaganda of all kinds 
preaching not only solidarity with the Allies but an end to fraternisation.
Meanwhile, the logic of “revolutionary defensism’s” position demanded a special 
rationalisation of the offensive. There was a strong revolutionary message within 
militant offensive propaganda: democratic Russia was offering generous terms for a 
democratic peace, but these had been spurned by the enemy, and even by Russia’s 
Allies, because Russia’s slogans were not backed up by the real strength of her 
armies. Revolutionary soldiers therefore must enforce the ideas of democratic 
peace on Europe. The slogan was coined “the peace offensive”, an offensive that 
would bring about a democratic peace. Of course, all this had strong internation-
al-revolutionary, even utopian connotations: Kerensky himself talked about 
“bringing new freedom to the heart of Europe with our bayonets”, military propa-
ganda promised revolutions among the Central Powers as a result of the offensive, 
and some enthusiastic Russian soldiers even had a vision of the red flag over the 
German Reichstag.49 As one soldier declared: “We must do battle not only for the 
Russian Revolution, but for the triumph of truth in the whole world, for a third 
International, for our Fatherland.”50 The language of revolutionary intervention-
ism was elaborated during this propaganda campaign. The Russian offensive was 
advertised as the best way to increase the influence of German Social-Democrats, 
and Karl Liebknecht was depicted as an ally of the Russian revolutionary Army. 
The image of the army attacking the enemy with red banners was central for Ke-
rensky’s rhetoric, and he promoted a plan for decorating the best combat units with 
48 Georgij Klerzhe: Kontr-bratanie kak sredstvo bor’by. In: Russkij invalid. 1917. 24 maja.
49 From the very beginning of the Russian revolution different rumors about revolution in Ger-
many were circulating and enthusiastically welcomed.
50 Wildman: End (see note 43), p. 32.
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Red Revolutionary banners (a plan implemented by the Bolsheviks in the course of 
the Civil War). While socialist culture generally provided the language and symbol-
ism for antiwar protest, in certain cases – of which the Russian July offensive was a 
good example – that same culture could be used to mobilise a country for war.51
Kerensky also had a political motive for launching the offensive. He was hop-
ing to unite an eclectic coalition, ranging from radical Socialists, Zimmerwaldists, 
Russian patriots and committee members, to business elites and the younger gen-
eration of generals, behind the idea of revolutionary offensive against “German 
imperialism” and “German autocracy”. Even some conservative and liberal politi-
cians, as well as generals were attracted to the idea in the hope that the offensive 
could revive the patriotic mood and lead to a restoration of Russia’s pre-revolu-
tionary war aims.
These hopes, of course, like their hopes of a return to the old discipline in the 
army, collapsed with the failure of the offensive. But even that failure was turned to 
his advantage by Kerensky who was clever enough to prepare public opinion for a 
“stab in the back” conspiracy theory even before the offensive started; and the con-
cept was easy enough to deploy after the abortive Bolshevik copy of the July Days 
(even though it had been clear at the end of June that the offensive on the South-
ern-Western front had ground to a halt). The upshot was a double, if only tempo-
rary, triumph for Kerensky, with the establishment of a new, “revolutionary” sys-
tem of administration in the army and the creation of the cult of the revolutionary 
and military leader (Kerensky). Through the first, tens of thousands of ambitious 
and militant men got a sense of real power and thought of themselves as heroes of 
the offensive. They had managed to persuade regiments and divisions to attack with 
red banners in their hands, they had lost their comrades in the first lines of attack-
ers; they had confronted Bolshevik agitators and deserter snipers, and they were set 
to become the new political class of revolutionary Russia. As for the second, a 
whole host of supporters of the offensive – conservatives, liberals and most of all 
socialists – now did their best to increase the authority of Kerensky (regardless of 
their own personal attitudes towards him) and the “new political class” in the army 
too was instrumental in creating and ministering to the cult of “leader of the revolu-
tionary army” (that was later to have such an impact on Soviet political culture).52
Conclusion: The Birth of a New Culture in Russia
Russian literature was famous for its creative and precise recording of new social 
and cultural trends. However, unlike other national literatures of the twentieth 
51 John Horne: Public Opinion and Politics. In: id. (ed.): A Companion to World War I. Oxford 
2010, pp. 279–294, p. 286.
52 On the cult of Kerensky see: Boris I. Kolonitskii: Kerensky. In: Edward Acton/Vladimir Iu. 
Cherniaev/William G. Rosenberg: Critical Companion to the Russian revolution, 1914–1921. 
Bloomington/Indianapolis 1997, pp. 138–149.
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century it failed to record a whole “lost generation”. One possible explanation is 
that during the revolutionary period young, ambitious Russian veterans found 
themselves in different committees and political organisations, and later, during 
the Civil War, in opposing armies. Their war experiences shaped their specific pa-
triotic identities and militarised them, while patriotic indignation fuelled by ru-
mours and military propaganda alienated them from the government and the im-
perial family. Speeches in the Duma confirmed their suspicions, which intensified 
after the dismissal of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Their specific military 
patriotism became less and less based on loyalty to the Emperor. Yet while many 
sections of society were disillusioned with national politics before the revolution, 
it was only after the fall of the monarchy and the dramatic radicalisation of poli-
tics that ensued that new elements such as ambitious ensigns and NCOs really 
came into their own. Many of them got their first real taste of power when they 
were elected to committees (like the future Soviet marshals – Budenny, Zhukov, 
Rokossovsky, and Konev); “revolutionary defensism” offered them an acceptable 
identity – patriotic and revolutionary at the same time; the creative and charismat-
ic Kerensky helped them to find their new style, new language, while they helped 
in turn to create his cult of the leader. The June offensive legitimised these social, 
cultural and political processes. Kornilov challenged their power and was defeat-
ed. Kerensky and his followers were also defeated in the end; but their role in 
creating a new political culture was crucial. Different elements of that new culture 
would later be taken up by both the Bolsheviks and their opponents, while con-
flicts within that “class” made the Civil War inevitable.
Dušan T. Bataković
Serbian War Aims and Military Strategy, 1914–1918
The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war of 28 June 1914 found both the Serbian 
government and the General Staff completely unprepared for a major military 
conflict. In that summer, after spectacular military successes in the Balkan wars 
(1912–1913), Serbia was still recovering from the enormous financial effort and 
considerable losses in manpower and military equipment. Although Serbia was on 
the way to becoming a regional political hub with considerable prestige among 
South Slavs of Austria-Hungary, her political and military leaders had no plans 
for armed confrontations in the foreseeable future: tens of thousands of soldiers 
wounded in the Balkan Wars were still recovering in hospitals and there were 
shortages of war materiel. After all exports had ceased and the procurement of 
war materiel doubled expenditure on imports, state revenues had dropped sharp-
ly. The total cost of the Balkan Wars, was about one billion francs.1
Moreover, Serbia needed a substantial period of peace and stability, not only for 
restoring the agricultural production drained by military campaigns, but also for 
fully integrating the newly-acquired territories in the south: Old Serbia and Mace-
donia. Serbia had almost doubled her territory – by an additional 39,000 km2, con-
taining some 1,290,000 inhabitants, including often hostile Albanian and Bulgarian 
minorities. The New Territories were labouring under an Ottoman legacy of a 
backward feudal-type economy and lacked the rule of law and political liberties.2
After peace had been restored by the Conference of Ambassadors in London 
and the Treaty of Bucharest of 10 August 1913, Serbia’s immediate concern was to 
repel frequent Albanian armed incursions from Albania into Kosovo and Bulgari-
an comitadjis into eastern Macedonia. Apart from the impending border delimita-
tion with Albania, the only (secret) plans on the table in early 1914 were for the 
merging of two Serb kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro, into a real union with 
common military, customs and diplomatic structures.3 As for any eventual war 
planning, the delicate international situation, together with the sharpening inter-
nal conflict between military pressure groups and the democratically elected gov-
1 Cf. more in: Andrej Mitrović: Serbia’s Great War 1914–1918. London 2007, pp. 53–63; Frederic 
Le Moal: La Serbie du martyre à la victoire. 1914–1918. Saint Cloud 2008, pp. 20–32. On Balkan 
Wars: Henry Barby: Les victoires serbes. Paris 1913, pp. 55–84, pp. 119–149.
2 Michael Boro Petrovich: History of Modern Serbia 1804–1908, vol. 2. New York/London 1976, 
pp. 603 f.
3 Dušan T. Bataković: The Kosovo Chronicles. Belgrade 1992, pp. 173–176.
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ernment were decidedly limiting factors on any Serbian activity. The internal 
strife, mounting since the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and the hu-
miliating recognition of this act by Belgrade in March 1909, had led to the found-
ing of “National Defence”, an anti-Habsburg organisation to defend the endan-
gered rights of the Bosnian Serbs; but once the initial revolutionary enthusiasm 
had abated, National Defence had limited its activities mostly to cultural action 
through a network of confidants. Meanwhile, the pressure of the Young Turks’ 
pan-Ottoman policy on Serbs in Turkey-in-Europe after 1908 had exacerbated 
national frustrations among Serbian Army officers previously involved in secret 
comitadji action (četnička akcija) in Macedonia;4 and it was against this back-
ground that a clandestine pan-Serbian organisation, “Unification or Death” – 
soon to become notorious as the “Black Hand” – was founded in 1911 in order to 
further the process of Serbian unification. Consisting mostly of army officers and 
led by younger conspirators of 1903, this influential military clique was a mixture 
of uncompromising patriots and fervent nationalists with limited political experi-
ence. In terms of foreign policy, national unification was the society’s absolute 
priority.5 Its unofficial leader, Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis, head of the Intelli-
gence Department of the Serbian General Staff, started by setting up an intelli-
gence service of officers stationed along the borders with the Ottoman Empire 
and Austria-Hungary; and after 1912, drawing on confidants of the National De-
fence, and boosted by the enthusiasm of the Serbian population living in both 
neighbouring empires, they developed a rapidly expanding network of agents. 
Also admitted into the “Black Hand” were Serbian students from Bosnia, such as 
Vladimir Gaćinović, leader of Young Bosnia, and Yugoslav patriots from Dalma-
tia.6 During the Balkan Wars, the “Black Handers” proved to be first-class offi-
cers, leading the Serbian Army in its key battles at Kumanovo, Monastir and Bre-
galnitza; and they enjoyed the protection of the leading Serbian strategist, 
Field-Marshal Radomir Putnik, architect of Serbia’s victories in the Balkan Wars, 
who held their military skills and ardent patriotism in high regard.7
Only a few of the “Black Hand’s” leading figures had any political agenda be-
yond national unification. Its daily Pijemont (Piedmont), started in 1911 by a 
group of Belgrade freemasons (Ljuba Jovanović Čupa, Branko Božović, Bogdan 
Radenković), had among its contributors Serbian, Croat and Jewish journalists 
(including Tin Ujević and Moša Pijade) of both pan-Serbian and Yugoslav orien-
tation (as the two were often considered compatible).8 Apart from tirelessly cam-
4 Vojislav J. Vučković: Unutrašnje krize u Srbiji i Prvi svetski rat. In: Istorijski časopis 14/15 
(1963–65), pp. 173–229.
5 Čedomir A. Popović: Organizacija “Ujedinjenje ili smrt” (“Crna ruka”). Uzroci i način postan-
ka. In: Nova Evropa 15 (1927) 12, pp. 401 f.
6 Oskar Tartalja: Veleizdajnik. Moje Uspomene. Zagreb/Split 1928, pp. 31–33.
7 Cf. more in: Milan Ž. Živanović: Pukovnik Apis. Solunski proces hiljadu devetsto sedamnaeste. 
Prilog za proučavanje političke istorije Srbije od 1903 po 1918 god. Belgrade 1955. 
8 Dnevnik ppuk. Velimira Vemića, Arhiv SANU (Archives of Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts), no. 14.434/6; cf. also: Ivan Mužić: Masonstvo u Hrvata. Split 1983, pp. 77–89.
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paigning for pan-Serb unification, Pijemont offered a variety of mostly rightist 
political ideas, targeting corruption and discord in Serbia. The post-1903 Serbian 
democracy was portrayed as an unrestricted democratic chaos with endless politi-
cal rivalries absorbing most of the nation’s energy.9 The symbol of the prioritisa-
tion of party politics over sacred national goals – and hence a main target of Pi-
jemont’s attacks – was Nikola P. Pašić, charismatic leader of the Old Radicals. An 
experienced and shrewd politician, Pašić was in fact a patriot as well as a demo-
crat, but he was never prepared to allow the democracy he had struggled for in 
the decades before 1903 to fall victim to the influence of the military clique, or to 
enter into long-term arrangements with them.10
Pijemont, by contrast, determined to assert itself as a political movement in the 
making, denounced both Pašić’s government and the opposition (Independent 
Radicals, Liberals, Progressives, Social Democrats) and sought to make the mili-
tary the key factor in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. During the nego-
tiations for the Balkan alliance with Bulgaria, the “Black Hand” had backed 
Pašić’s cabinet, but a definitive rift opened up between them over territorial con-
cessions to Bulgaria. The “Black Handers” were also at odds with Crown Prince 
Alexander, who was gathering around himself a rival group of military officers 
popularly known as the “White Hand”. In 1913, the conflict between the govern-
ment and the “Black Hand” officers, put on hold at the start of the Balkan Wars, 
re-erupted in full force over the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute over the “contested zone” 
in Macedonia. 
The escalating military-civilian conflict between the “Black Hand” and the Pašić 
government, became public early in 1914, when the “Priority Decree” by Interior 
Minister Stojan M. Protić accorded priority to civilian over military authorities in 
the newly-liberated areas. Initially, the Pašić government had not extended the 
provisions of the Serbian Constitution to Old Serbia and Slavic Macedonia; but its 
provisions were now gradually introduced through special decrees and regulations 
which opened the way for power abuse by civilian officials, usually Old Radicals, 
and sharpened the rivalry between civilian and military authorities.11 The “Black 
Handers”, as the most influential pressure group within the army, emboldened by 
their late military victories, demanded that Serbian Army representatives should 
continue to take precedence over civilians on public occasions in the New Territo-
ries; and Apis even advised the military commanders, mostly members of the 
“Black Hand”, to threaten the government with a military coup if their priority in 
the newly-acquired territories was not recognised. Clearly, the “Black Hand” 
9 Cf. David MacKenzie: Ljuba Jovanović-Čupa and the Search for Yugoslav Unity. In: David 
McKenzie (ed.): Serbs and Russians (= East European Monographs, vol. 459). Boulder/New York 
1996, pp. 111–131.
10 Dušan T. Bataković: Nikola Pašić, les radicaux et la “Main noire”. Les défis à la démocratie 
parlementaire serbe 1903–1917. In: Balcanica 37 (2006), pp. 155–162.
11 The Priority Decree was eventually modified in order to defuse discontent within army ranks. 
In detail: Dušan T. Bataković: Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti u Srbiji u proleće 1914. In: Istorijski 
časopis 29/30 (1982–1983), pp. 477–492.
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posed a major political threat to Pašić, who, determined to resist the undermining 
of democracy by politically “irresponsible factors” such as the “Black Hand”, 
moved to thwart them with the support of the ambitious Heir Apparent, Prince 
Alexander, and the influential Russian Minister in Belgrade, Nikolai Hartwig. The 
upshot was that old King Petar, who although popular enough as a constitutional 
and democratic ruler, was in the last resort unwilling to make a stand against the 
army that had put him on the throne in 1903, was persuaded to abdicate “on the 
grounds of ill health”, and hand over his regal powers to his second son, Alexan-
der, who became Prince-Regent on 24 June 1914, a few days before the Sarajevo 
assassination. Meanwhile Pašić, determined to get rid of the threat posed to Serbi-
an democracy by Apis and his dangerous meddling once and for all,12 proceeded to 
call new elections in the hope of rallying popular support against his opponents, 
the Independent Radicals and Liberals, tactically backed by Apis.
The Defensive War Strategy and Plans for Yugoslav Unification,  
1914–1915
It was in the middle of this crisis, when Pašić was on his electoral tour in southern 
Serbia, and the ailing Chief of Staff, Radomir Putnik, was actually in Austria, taking 
the cure at a spa, that the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to the foreign 
ministry in Belgrade. Totally unprepared for war as the Serbs were, they did every-
thing they felt they could justifiably do to avoid it.13 The Serbian response to the 
ultimatum was conciliatory and very skilfully drawn: the only conditions that were 
rejected were those incompatible with the status of a sovereign state – that delegated 
investigators from the Habsburg police be permitted to search for potential accom-
plices on Serbian soil. Otherwise, Belgrade expressed its readiness to fulfil, with mi-
nor modifications, all terms of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum.14
The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war was met with defiance. The Prince Re-
gent reminded his people that “thirty years ago, Austria-Hungary conquered Serbi-
an Bosnia and Herzegovina”, provinces which “it finally and unlawfully appropri-
ated six years ago”, and summoned the nation to defend “their households and the 
Serbian race with all their strength”. In Montenegro King Nicholas announced that 
his subjects were “ready to die in defence of our independence” – in fact, when war 
broke out the only tangible political and military support Serbia could count on 
was from the co-nationals of Montenegro. Serbia had no formal alliance with the 
Triple Entente apart from her 1913 treaty of alliance with Greece, Athens explained 
to Pašić, would not be activated unless Bulgaria attacked Serbia.15
12 Dušan T. Bataković: La Main noire (1911–1917). L’armée serbe entre démocratie et autoritaris-
me. In: Revue d’histoire diplomatique 2 (1998), pp. 94–144, esp.: pp. 127–136.
13 Mark Cornwall: Serbia. In: Keith Wilson (ed.): Decisions for War, 1914. London 1995, pp. 55–95.
14 Mitrović: Serbia’s Great War (see note 1), pp. 43–52.
15 Dušan T. Bataković: Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies. Lausanne 1994, p. 118.
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Ever since 1903, when Belgrade had chosen to look for support to Russia and 
France instead of the Dual Monarchy, Austria-Hungary had been the most likely 
adversary of Serbia. Since then, relations had gone from bad to worse, as the 
Monarchy launched the “Tariff War” in 1906 (in Serbian eyes a crude attempt at 
coercion by crippling their economy), annexed Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 
1908, and by 1912 even used the threat of military action to force Serbia to with-
draw her troops from the Adriatic littoral of autonomous Albania, Vienna’s new 
protégé. Not surprisingly, therefore, Serbia’s strategic planning in these years was 
very much directed towards coping with a potential Austro-Hungarian inva-
sion.16
Once war broke out Serbian strategists, like most of their counterparts 
abroad, believed that the military conflict would be over within two or three 
months. In the Serbian General Staff, this view was strengthened by the conclu-
sions they drew from the Balkan Wars.17 Hence, the Serbs planned to stick to a 
purely defensive strategy for the first few months of the war, expecting – in fact 
correctly – that the major attack would not come through the open valley of the 
Save to the north, but from the west, across the Drina.18 In this case, the Serbs 
reckoned that their best chance of inflicting a mortal blow on the Austro-Hun-
garian troops would be to allow them to penetrate deeper into Serbian territory. 
In the event, this defensive strategy worked: the first invasion of Serbia, from 
eastern Bosnia, was marked by a brilliant Serbian victory on the slopes of Cer, 
from 16 to 19 August 1914 – the first Allied victory in what had now become 
the Great War – and a second invasion was successfully repulsed in December.19 
Offensive operations, by contrast, were less successful. Two Serbian break-
throughs into the Austro-Hungarian territory during 1914 – in eastern Bosnia, 
up to Pale near Sarajevo, and in the Srem area, now Vojvodina – although wel-
comed by both the local Serbs and the South Slav population in general – proved 
insufficiently prepared and overambitious for the limited effectives of the Serbi-
an Army.
As regards Serbian war aims, these were at first strongly influenced by the be-
lief that the war would not last longer than a few months – and were naturally 
formulated at an early stage of the war.20 In September 1914, Pašić summoned a 
16 Cf. in detail: Vladimir Ćorović: Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku. Belgrade 
1991, pp. 371–488.
17 Like so many others they drew the wrong lessons: they should have looked not at the light-
ning (rather flukish) victories at the start, but at the endless slog of the trench warfare that devel-
oped at Chataldja.
18 Hew Strachan: The First World War. Vol. 1: To Arms. Oxford 2001, here: pp. 335–347.
19 For the victory in the battle of Cer, General Stepa Stepanović was promoted to Field Marshal 
(vojvoda). A still valuable account in: Crawfurd Price: Serbia’s Part in the War. Vol. 1: The Ram-
part against Pan-Germanism. London 1918, pp. 85–114; Marie Alphones Th. R. A. Desmazes/
Naoumovitch: Les victoires serbes en 1914. Paris 1928.
20 Dimitrije Djordjević: Vojvoda Putnik. The Serbian High Command and Strategy in 1914. In: 
Béla K. Király/Nandor Dreisziger (eds.): East Central European Society in the First World War. 
Boulder 1985, pp. 569–585; Dimitrije Djordjević: The Idea of Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth 
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number of eminent Serb scholars to Niš to put together a statement of Serbia’s 
war aims, including the vision of a union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. When 
asked about the post-war borders, Pašić indicated an area on the map that in-
cluded Marburg, Klagenfurt and Szeged. “If we fail”, he said, “we shall fail in 
good company – with the Entente powers”.21 In Serbia, the idea of Yugoslav uni-
fication was primarily a programme embraced by the Independent Radicals, the 
second largest political party. Prior to 1914, an influential group of Serbian intel-
lectuals (St. Novaković, J. Cvijić, J. Skerlić, J. M. Žujović, A. Belić) had strongly 
advocated a Yugoslav union, citing linguistic similarities, a common culture and 
ethnic origins. Meanwhile, the Croato-Serbian Coalition, both in Croatia-Slavo-
nia (under Hungary) and Dalmatia (under Austria), and a growing pro-Yugoslav 
feeling among the younger generation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, boosted tangible 
support for the Yugoslav movement.22 The cultural unity of Yugoslavs (Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes) was also preached, prior to 1914, by an influential elite of 
Croatian scholars (V. Jagić, T. Maretić). Yugoslavs were described as “a nation in 
the making” (M. Marjanović, Š. Kurtović) which would constitute a synthesis of 
East and West in the Slavic South. Already in 1911 the Serbian historian and dip-
lomat St. Novaković, was predicting that a future Yugoslav state would stretch 
from Split in the west, to Subotica in the north, and from Lake Ohrid in the 
south to Marburg (Maribor) in the north. Croatian advocates of the Yugoslav 
idea included Dalmatians who were imbued with more central-European atti-
tudes, including Mazzinian ideas.23 Another important theoretical basis for the 
Yugoslav idea was provided by the geographer Jovan Cvijić, who argued that the 
Dinaric Alps (covering most of Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Dalmatia) 
were a specific geopolitical whole with an almost uniform ethnic composition 
(since numerous migrations had mixed up Serbs and Croats and created related 
patterns of culture and civilisation). At any rate, with the outbreak of war this 
Yugoslav idea, essentially a construct of theorists before 1914, became an impor-
tant and concrete element of Serbia’s programme of war aims. Moreover, thanks 
to the military and political support of the Triple Entente in their struggle against 
the Dual Monarchy, the Serbs were presented for the first time with the opportu-
nity to achieve Yugoslav unity and by creating a large “Yugoslav” state under the 
Serbian dynasty to rid themselves once and for all of Austria-Hungary’s relent-
less threats to their sovereignty and independence. As Pašić declared in a circular 
of 4 September to all Serbian legations “Serbia should become a strong 
south-western Slavic state that would include all the Croats and all the Slovenes 
as well”. Only such a state could achieve “the abolition of Germanic supremacy 
Century. In: id. (ed.): The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914–1918. Santa Barbara/Oxford 1980, pp. 1–18, 
esp. pp. 7–14.
21 Panta M. Draškić: Moji memoari. Ed. by Dušan T. Bataković. Belgrade 1990, p. 87.
22 Milorad Ekmečić: Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914. Belgrade 1971, pp. 80–112; Ljubinka Trgovčević: 
Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje Jugoslavije 1914–1920. Belgrade 1986, pp. 28–32.
23 Bataković: Yougoslavie (see note 15), pp. 124–129.
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and its penetration towards the East” and stand up to “all the combinations 
whose aim would be to endanger European peace or to annul the successes of the 
Allies’ weapons”.24
Further military successes against the second Austro-Hungarian invasion at 
the end of the year boosted the self-confidence of the Serbian government and 
the army considerably; but the overall situation in the kingdom remained diffi-
cult. In the two campaigns in 1914, out of 250,000 Serbian soldiers 163,557 per-
ished, while 69,000 civilians died in the campaign of terror conducted by Aus-
tro-Hungarian troops.25 (According to renown Swiss forensic expert Aus-
tro-Hungarian troops committed horrible massacres in western and central 
Serbia, executing thousands of civilians, including elderly people, women and 
children.) Meanwhile, some 600,000 internally displaced Serbs constituted an ad-
ditional heavy burden on a country which two Austro-Hungarian invasions had 
left with a ravaged economy and agriculture.26
Moreover, although the Serbian Front along the border with Austria-Hungary 
was to remain quiet for nearly a year after the Battle of the Kolubara the military 
and economic exhaustion of Serbia caused by the ravaging of western and central 
Serbia and large-scale war crimes by Austro-Hungarian troops, led in early 1915 
to the outbreak of a typhoid epidemic, which epidemic took the death toll of 
more than 100,000 of 400,000 infected soldiers and civilians, and undermined 
Serbia’s defensive capacity considerably.27
The official proclamation of Serbia’s war aims came in December 1914 
during the Battle of the Kolubara, regarded as a decisive victory over the Dual 
Monarchy, a vanishing empire doomed to crushing defeat at the hands of the 
Allies. Proud but exhausted, Serbia now hoped for a speedy end to the war 
which had already drained most of her military and economic strength. When 
Belgrade, was liberated and the last Habsburg soldier was expelled from Serbia 
between early and mid-December, the moment seemed appropriate for an offi-
cial statement of Serbia’s war aims, whereupon the new coalition cabinet head-
ed by Pašić and including ardent pro-Yugoslav Independent Radicals sum-
moned a National Assembly in Niš, the wartime capital of the kingdom, on 
7 December and issued the Niš Declaration proclaiming the unification of the 
24 Milorad Ekmečić: Serbian War Aims. In: Djordjević (ed.): Creation (see note 20), pp. 19–36, 
here: pp. 21–23; see also Djordje Dj. Stanković: Nikola Pašić. Saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije. 
Belgrade 1981, pp. 47–55.
25 The architect of the Serbian counteroffensive in the Battle of Kolubara (3–14 December 1914), 
General Živojin Mišić, was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal. Cf. Dušan T. Bataković/Ni-
kola B. Popović (eds.): Kolubarska bitka. Belgrade 1989.
26 Rodolphe A. Reiss: Report upon the Atrocities Committed by the Austro-Hungarian Army 
during the First Invasion of Serbia. London 1916, pp. 30–146 (chapter “Massacres and Atrocities 
Perpetrated on Civilians”); cf. also: Henry Barby: Avec l’armée serbe. De l’ultimatum autrichien 
à l’invasion de la Serbie. Paris 1918, pp. 112–147.
27 Cf. chapters on Serbia in 1915 in: John Reed: The War in Eastern Europe. New York 1916, 
pp. 22–96.
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South Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) of Austria-Hungary as Serbia’s ulti-
mate war aim.28
Six months later, in May 1915, these Serbian war aims were endorsed by the 
Yugoslav Committee of exiled Croats, Slovenes and Serbs in Paris. Sponsored by 
the Serbian government, the leading members of the Yugoslav Committee – 
A. Trumbić (its President), F. Supilo, N. Stojanović, F. Potočnjak, H. Ninković – 
vigorously promoted the idea of Yugoslav unity in Allied capitals. Thus, the Niš 
Declaration became not merely a Serbian vision of Yugoslav unity, but also a re-
sponse to the demands of prominent Yugoslav political exiles from the Austria-Hun-
gary for the formation of a common state with Serbia and Montenegro. As the 
very first Manifesto of the Yugoslav Committee called explicitly for South Slav 
unification, the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy was clearly on the agen-
da.29 Meanwhile, a Yugoslav Congress, held in Niš in May 1915 under the presi-
dency of the Dalmatian writer Ivo Ćipiko, also adopted a resolution calling for 
the “complete and indestructible national unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”. 
The Serbian government, for its part, sent a group of leading Serbian scholars 
(J. Cvijić, A. Belić, P. Popović, J. M. Žujović, Lj. Stojanović) to Allied capitals to 
promote the Yugoslav union, the necessity for which, incidentally, suggested that 
proposals for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary were not universally wel-
comed.30 Petrograd, for instance, objected strongly to the Serbs’ uniting with 
Croats and Slovenes, since the latter had fought fiercely against the Russian Army 
on the Eastern Front.31 In Rome, too, there was fierce opposition to Serbia’s Yu-
goslav programme, and Italian war aims as embodied in the 1915 Treaty of Lon-
don with the Entente gave rise to major conflicts with both the Serbian govern-
ment and the Yugoslav Committee. For example, the Treaty gave Italy most of 
Dalmatia, Adriatic islands and Istria, which the Croats and the Dalmatian Serbs 
were claiming as a part of the future Yugoslav state with Serbia as its “Piedmont”; 
and although the Yugoslav Committee was focused primarily on the dismember-
ment of Austria-Hungary, its first broader action was a fervent campaign against 
the provisions of the Treaty of London.32
28 Dragoslav Janković: Niška Deklaracija. In: Istorija 20 (1969) 10, pp. 7–111. On overall situa-
tion in Niš in late 1914 see the memoirs of the Russian chargé d’affaires: Vasilij Štrandman: 
Balkanske uspomene. Belgrade 2009.
29 [Le Comité yougoslave]: Le programme yougoslave: avec une carte. Paris 1916; Dragovan 
Šepić: Srpska vlada i počeci Jugoslavenskog odbora. In: Historijski zbornik 13 (1960), 
pp. 1–45.
30 Dinaricus [Jovan Cvijić]: Jedinstvo Jugoslovena. Niš 1915, pp. 5–60; Jovan Cvijić: La pensée 
de la nation serbe. In: Revue hebdomadaire, 10. 4. 1915, pp. 209–219; St. Novakovitch: Pro-
blèmes Yougo-Slaves. In: La Revue de Paris, 1. 9. 1915; W. M. Petrovitch: Serbia. Her People, 
History and Aspirations. London 1915; Trgovčević: Naučnici Srbije (see note 22), pp. 35–54.
31 Michael B. Petrović: Russia’s Role in the Creation of the Yugoslav State 1914–1918. In: 
Djordjević (ed.): Creation (see note 20), pp. 73–94, here: p. 76.
32 Cf. more in: Vaso Bogdanov: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu u povodu 50-godišnjice osnivan-
ja. Zagreb 1966; Gale Stokes: The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugos-
lavia. In: Djordjević (ed.): Creation (see note 20), pp. 51–71.
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One unforeseen consequence of putting forward demands for the dismember-
ment of Dual Monarchy at this early stage of the war was felt by the ordinary 
population of Serbia after the third invasion ended in the occupation of the entire 
country in late November 1915. The kingdom was divided into Austro-Hungari-
an and Bulgarian zones, and a systematic campaign to denationalise the Serb pop-
ulation was accompanied by the systematic plundering and destruction of cultural 
property, libraries, archives and monastery treasuries. Indeed, a veritable cam-
paign of terror by the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian military authorities 
against civilians now ensued, which included internment in detention camps in 
Hungary, arbitrary arrests, hostage-taking, and mass executions. Between August 
and October 1916, 16,500 Serbs were deported to detention camps in Hungary; 
by May 1917 the number of Serbs held in detention camps of the Dual Monarchy 
had risen to 40,000; and even the Pope was moved to intervene in Vienna against 
the internment of children. After a Serbian insurrection in the region of Toplica in 
1917, however, deportations and mass executions intensified further.33
The Allies, Bulgaria’s Claims and the Serbian Campaign in Albania 
1915
In their efforts to attract Bulgaria into their camp in 1915 the Entente Powers ex-
erted growing pressure on Serbia to cede most of Macedonia (the 1912 “contested 
zone”) to Bulgaria, offering in return territorial compensations at the expense of 
Austria-Hungary: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slavonia, Bačka, northern Albania and 
most of Dalmatia, up to the port of Split (August 1915). None of these offers were 
accepted: Pašić considered the Morava-Vardar axis vital to maintaining the bal-
ance of power in the Balkans, which would be seriously upset by the further en-
largement of Bulgaria. In any case, Serbian officials were sure (and were later 
proved right) that the Central Powers were offering Sofia even more significant 
territorial concessions at Serbia’s expense than the Allies.34
Meanwhile, an undeclared war had been going on since 1913 on Serbia’s border 
with Albania: Albanian paramilitary units, often trained by Ottoman officers and 
financed by the Dual Monarchy, had launched a number of incursions in an at-
tempt to instigate a large-scale rebellion of Kosovo Albanians. Pašić, for his part, 
sent 23,000 soldiers into Albania in May 1915 to support Essad Pasha Toptani, his 
only ally in this traditionally hostile environment. Essad, formally a supporter of 
the Entente, was balancing between Italy and Serbia, and had concluded two 
agreements with Pašić about closer political cooperation, in Niš in 1914 and in 
33 Dimitrije Djordjević: Austro-Ugarski okupacioni režim u Srbiji i njegov slom 1918. In: Nauč-
ni skup u povodu 50-godišnjice raspada Austro-Ugarske Monarhije i stvaranja jugoslovenske 
 države. Zagreb 1969, pp. 220 f.; on Toplica insurrection more in: Andrej Mitrović: Ustaničke borbe 
u Srbiji 1916–1918. Belgrade 1987.
34 Dušan T. Bataković (ed.): Histoire du peuple serbe. Lausanne 2005, pp. 272 f.
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Tirana in 1915. Now, with Serbia’s decisive military support Essad Pasha defeated 
the supporters of the Central Powers and re-established his authority in central 
Albania. Giving military assistance to Essad Pasha had been a bold political gam-
ble; but it was to prove fully justified later in the year, during the Serbian retreat 
across Albania.35
The Third Campaign Against Serbia: Military Defeat and Exile,  
1915–1916
Halted on the Marne and compelled to resort to trench warfare, the German High 
Command chose to cut back on its operations on the Serbian front. After its Aus-
tro-Hungarian Allies had suffered two humiliating defeats in 1914, Germany had 
taken command of the campaign against Serbia, and by late August was preparing 
a new offensive. On 22 September Bulgaria finally joined the Central Powers and 
ordered a general mobilisation. The outlines of the impending offensive were tak-
ing shape: a German attack from the north towards the Morava valley under Gen-
eral Mackensen; an Austro-Hungarian attack across the Drina from the west; and 
a Bulgarian move into the Vardar valley from the east to cut off the southward 
route of retreat for Serbian troops. The Entente Powers had adamantly rejected 
the demands of Putnik and Pašić for a pre-emptive strike to neutralise Bulgaria 
and Serbia now found herself unable to fight on two fronts.36 True, Venizelos, the 
Prime Minister of Greece, in a defensive alliance with Serbia against Bulgaria since 
1913 and Serbia’s only ally in the Balkans besides Montenegro, asked the Allies to 
send 150,000 Allied troops to Salonika from the Near East, and actually ordered 
mobilisation a day after Bulgaria. But on 5 October, as the Allied troops began to 
disembark in Salonika, King Constantine, brother-in-law of Wilhelm II, deter-
mined to keep neutrality of Greece, dismissed Venizelos from office. The new 
cabinet in Athens declined Serbia’s desperate appeal to implement the 1913 alli-
ance treaty and assist her against her Bulgarian attackers.37
The Austro-German offensive against Serbia was launched on 5 October 1915, 
and Bulgaria’s from the east on the 7th, on a front that was almost 1,000 kilometres 
long, and comprised three German and three Austro-Hungarian Army corps 
which crossed the Save at Belgrade, and two Bulgarian armies advancing towards 
Niš and Skoplje. Belgrade, under fierce attack, was abandoned after heroic resis-
tance. The Serbian plan to secure a retreat route via Niš and Skoplje to Salonika, 
and join the Allied forces under General Sarrail, had already been thwarted by the 
fall of Venizelos’s government and the slow disembarkation of Allied troops in 
35 Dušan T. Bataković: Essad Pasha Toptani and Serbian Government. In: Andrej Mitrović (ed.): 
Serbs and Albanians in the 20th Century. Belgrade 1991, pp. 57–78.
36 Balcanicus [Stojan M. Protić]: The Aspirations of Bulgaria. London 1915.
37 Dušan T. Bataković: Serbia and Greece in the First World War. An Overview. In: Balkan Stu-
dies 45 (2004) 1, pp. 59–80.
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Salonika.38 As early as 16 October, the vital communication line, the Niš-Skoplje 
railway, was severed by the rapidly advancing Bulgarian troops, while the Serbian 
attempt to break the Bulgarian front line at Kačanik and get to Skoplje had ended 
in failure by mid-November. 
Not that these reverses sapped the determination of the Serbs to fight on. As 
early as 4 November, as rumours began to circulate that Austro-German agents 
were offering peace negotiations, Pašić, for whom the separate peace was no op-
tion, dispatched the following instruction to all Serbian diplomatic missions: “I 
have learnt that Serbia is rumoured to be about to conclude a separate peace treaty 
with Germany and her Allies. I would kindly ask you to deny such rumours cate-
gorically and assure the domicile government that Serbia, even though she is in a 
very difficult situation, and even if the situation gets more difficult, is nonetheless 
determined to fight the invader to the end, and, loyal to her Allies, endure the 
whole war which she is convinced will end with the enemy’s defeat.” Even when, 
on 18 November, after two more weeks of disasters, the Serbian government, now 
in exile in Scutari, discussed the separate peace offers it was almost unanimous in 
its support of Pašić’s firm stance.39
The plan for a gradual retreat to join the Allies at Salonika was finally aban-
doned after General Sarrail held his forces back from penetrating further into 
Macedonia to meet the Serbian troops. The proposal of Field-Marshal Živojin 
Mišić, the hero of the Battle of the Kolubara, to concentrate in Kosovo for a deci-
sive counter-offensive against the combined German-Austrian and Bulgarian 
force was also abandoned. Instead, on 25 November, the Serbian General Staff 
ordered a general retreat across Albania.40
This, of course involved a change of retreat routes. One headed towards Scutari 
and Saint Giovanni di Medua through Montenegro. Defending the western flank 
of the retreating Serbian Army, the Montenegrin Army inflicted a serious defeat 
on the Austro-Germans in the epic Battle of Mojkovac (7 January 1916) but could 
not withstand another attack. The Montenegrin parliament decided to follow the 
Serbs and withdraw into exile without surrendering. King Nicholas, however, 
crushed and demoralised, left for Italy in early 1916, while the Montenegrin gov-
ernment, after the fall of Lovćen, was forced to sign a capitulation.41
The other route was via Prizren. Putting up fierce resistance and launching oc-
casional counterattacks, the Serbian rear-guard secured the retreat of the main 
body of the army and masses of civilian refugees, through Kosovo Polje to the 
Albanian border west of Prizren. In Albania, the only safe area for the retreating 
Serbian troops was the domain of Essad Pasha in Durazzo and its hinterland. Ac-
38 See: Charles E. J. Fryer: The Destruction of Serbia in 1915. Boulder/New York 1997, pp. 74–
93.
39 Stanković: Nikola Pašić (see note 24), pp. 79–82.
40 A concise documentation on Serbian military operations in: Mihailo Vojvodić/Dragoljub 
R. Živojinović (eds.): Veliki rat Srbije 1914–1918. Belgrade 1970, on retreat through Albania, 
pp. 221–260.
41 Novica Rakočević: Crna Gora u Prvom svjetskom ratu 1914–1918. Cetinje 1969, pp. 152–167.
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cording to the Serbian General Staff’s initial plan, the troops would reassemble 
under the protection of Essad Pasha, and re-equip themselves with material that 
the Allies were to supply by sea.42
This plan soon proved unfeasible and, at the initiative of France and the insis-
tence of the Tsar, plans were set on foot to evacuate the Serbian troops on Allied 
ships. In view of the difficult terrain and wintertime conditions the Serbian Army 
decided to abandon its military equipment, including the French cannons, and to 
cross into Albania with only small arms. In early December 1915, the terrible or-
deal of the retreat, long to be remembered as the “Albanian Golgotha”, began, 
over snow-laden Albanian mountains and swollen rivers.43 The exhausted Serbs, 
were ill prepared and suffering from shortages of food, warm clothing and foot-
wear in extreme winter conditions. Once outside the region controlled by Essad 
Pasha’s gendarmerie, they faced surprise attacks from hostile Albanian tribes; and 
owing to Italian obstruction, they were obliged to fight their way through to Va-
lona in the south, where French ships waited to evacuate them to safety.44
In fact, the “Albanian Golgotha”, went down to history as the worst human 
catastrophe in the history of modern Serbia. The overall losses in 1915–16 amount-
ed to 247,887 dead, wounded, captured or missing. The Allied ships, mostly 
French, first took 10,000 exhausted evacuees to Bizerta, but the vast majority – 
the army, the ailing King, the government, the parliament and masses of civilian 
refugees – were evacuated to Corfu, occupied by the French for that purpose. In 
Corfu, host to 151,288 soldiers by the spring of 1916 and Vido, a further 7,751 sol-
diers died from exhaustion and diseases;45 but by May, recovered and rearmed, 
three Serbian armies over 115,000-strong with a cavalry and six infantry divisions 
were deployed on the Salonika Front within the ranks of the French-led Armée 
d’Orient. At first, the Serbian Prince-Regent, as the Supreme commander of the 
Serbian Army, tried to insist on exercising a fully autonomous command; but it 
was eventually agreed that General Sarrail would assume effective command in 
his name.46
“Greater Serbia” or Yugoslavia, 1916–1918?
In strategic terms, Serbia’s Yugoslav programme was a success in so far as it drew 
a considerable number of volunteers into the Serbian Army, whose reputation 
was enhanced by important victories in 1916 (battle of Kajmakčalan, recapture of 
42 Djoko Tripković: Srpska ratna drama 1915–1916. Belgrade 2001.
43 John Clinton Adams: Flight in Winter. Princeton 1942, pp. 151–197.
44 Fortier Jones: With Serbia into Exile. An American’s Adventures with the Army that Cannot 
Die. New York 1916, pp. 351–391; cf. also: Henry Barby: Epopée serbe. Agonie d’un people. Pa-
ris 1916.
45 Lieutenant-Colonel Ripert D’Alauzier: Un drame historique. La résurrection de l’armée serbe. 
Albanie, Corfou, 1915–1916. Paris 1923, pp. 174–208.
46 Cf. more in: Petar Opačić: Le front de Salonique. Belgrade 1979, pp. 52–62.
Serbian War Aims and Military Strategy, 1914–1918 91
Bitolj [Monastir]);47 and two divisions of volunteers under Serbian command 
served on the Salonika Front. Apart from Serbs – the majority – the volunteers 
included a number of Croats and Slovenes attracted by the prospect of Yugoslav 
unification, a number of whom came from as far afield as North and South Amer-
ica (having originally emigrated from the South Slav provinces of Austria-Hunga-
ry). Indeed, a separate “Yugoslav division” was made up of Yugoslav volunteers 
enlisted primarily in the United States. Meanwhile, the show trial at Salonika of 
Apis and his clique of “Black Hand” officers in 1917, indicted for alleged conspir-
acy against life of the Prince-Regent, eliminated both a threat to democracy and 
potential opposition to Yugoslav unification within army ranks.48 On the other 
hand the February Revolution in Russia deprived Serbia of one of her main sup-
porters, namely, the Emperor Nicholas II, who had on a number of critical occa-
sions, shown his utter devotion to Serbia, whereas the old ruling elite in Russia 
frowned on Serbian plans for a union with the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary, 
preferring simply an enlarged, i.e. “Greater” Serbia.49
The Corfu Declaration signed between the Pašić government and the Yugoslav 
Committee in July 1917 – intended partly as a counter to demands for a separate 
South Slav polity within a reorganised Dual Monarchy – was an essential step to-
wards a common state, although, despite long deliberations, no agreement was 
reached as to its future internal organisation. For Pašić, the Yugoslav Committee 
had no real legitimacy; thus he considered the Corfu Declaration not as a binding 
document but as an important political statement regarding the future unification. 
In contrast, for Ante Trumbić and most other members of his Yugoslav Commit-
tee, the Corfu agreement was a binding preliminary constitutional arrangement. 
The Montenegrin Committee for unification with Serbia, also accepted the Corfu 
Declaration; and most Serbian intellectuals and politicians were in favour of Yu-
goslav unification. Pašić himself remained cautious, insisting on the unification of 
predominantly Serbian-inhabited lands (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Monte-
negro, Srem) with Serbia in advance of any eventual union with Croats and Slo-
venes – a plan which generally coincided with the territorial compensations that 
the Allies had offered Serbia in 1915 if she ceded the “contested zone” of Macedo-
nia to Bulgaria.
Meanwhile, in the Dual Monarchy, the Corfu Declaration served as a wake-up 
call for Slovenes and Croats interested in preserving the Dual Monarchy. Prior to 
the Declaration, Anton Korošec, leader of the Slovenian People’s Party, warned 
the Austrian Premier that in the south of the Monarchy, the “Greater Serbian idea 
is the strongest” and proposed countering it by uniting Slovenia with Croatia. 
Indeed, at his initiative, in May 1917, the Yugoslav club of Croatian and Slovenian 
47 Eugène Gascoin: Les victoires serbes de 1916. Paris 1919, pp. 84–143.
48 David MacKenzie: The “Black Hand” on Trial. Salonika, 1917. Boulder/New York 1995, 
pp. 373–399.
49 Petrović: Russia’s Role (see note 31), pp. 76–80; Nikola B. Popović: Odnosi Srbije i Rusije u 
Prvom svetskom ratu. Belgrade 1977, pp. 310–344.
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members of the Viennese parliament actually adopted a declaration which, “on 
the basis of the national principle and the Croatian state right, calls for the unifi-
cation of all the lands in the Monarchy inhabited by the Slovenes, Croats and 
Serbs into one independent state […] under the sceptre of the Habsburg-Lorraine 
dynasty”. The overwhelming majority of the Serbs in the Dual Monarchy, by 
contrast, remained completely opposed to such a solution.50
Concurrently with the assertion of the principle of self-determination as a solu-
tion for the Polish and Czecho-Slovak questions, the Yugoslav programme was 
gradually finding its way to the Allied cabinets, eventually featuring prominently 
in April 1918 at the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities comprising rep-
resentatives of all the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary. There, the Italian rep-
resentatives recognised the unity and independence of South Slavs or Yugoslavs; 
while the U.S. government, after deeper deliberation, assured the Serbian govern-
ment that “all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German 
and Austrian dominance”. In late July 1918, Great Britain acknowledged the uni-
fication of Yugoslavs as Serbia’s war aim, while France’s decision in the summer of 
1918, to accept the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, helped further to pave the 
way to Yugoslav unity.51
Meanwhile, the French General Franchet d’Espérey, commander of the Saloni-
ka Front since June 1918, accepted Serbia’s proposal for an offensive strategy with 
French-Serbian troops as a main component in the planned breakthrough. Spec-
tacular military victories in the autumn of 1918, in particular a breakthrough by 
two Serbian armies, brought the realisation of Serbian war aims nearer than had 
been expected.52 For, to the fury of Kaiser Wilhelm Serbia’s successes on the Sa-
lonika Front had a domino effect on military operations on other fronts and made 
a significant contribution to the outcome of the Great War. Indeed, as the Kaiser 
put it in a sarcastic telegram to King Ferdinand, commenting on Bulgaria’s sudden 
capitulation: “Disgraceful, 62,000 Serbs decided the war.”53
With all of pre-war Serbia liberated on 1 November 1918, the strategy for Ser-
bian unification prior to the formation of a common state with Croats and Slo-
venes began to move forward. Serbian troops under Field-Marshal Stepa Ste-
panović were invited by the National Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina to liberate 
these provinces and were solemnly greeted in Sarajevo on 6 November, while 
French and Serbian troops liberated Kosovo and entered Montenegro. The un-
conditional unification of Vojvodina (24 November in Novi Sad) and Montenegro 
50 Bataković: Yougoslavie (see note 15), pp. 134 f. In contrast to Yugoslav programme, the typical 
Croat-inspired positions against unification with Serbia are summarised in: L. von Südland [Ivo 
Pilar]: Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg. Übersichtliche Darstellung des Gesamt-Prob-
lems. Wien 1918.
51 Dragan R. Živojinović: America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919). New York 
1972; Le Moal: Serbie (see note 1), pp. 216–228.
52 Opačić: Front (see note 46), pp. 93–103.
53 Peter Kirch: Krieg und Verwaltung in Serbien und Mazedonien 1916–1918. Stuttgart 1928, 
pp. 101–111.
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(26 November in Podgorica) with Serbia was followed by the successive unifica-
tion of 42 of 54 districts of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bihać, Kl-
juč, Jajce, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Višegrad, Gacko, Nevesinje, Rogatica, etc.) directly 
with the Kingdom of Serbia.54
The future position of the non-Serbian South Slavs, by contrast, remained un-
certain. True, in late October 1918, all state and legal ties with Austria-Hungary 
were declared annulled by a National Council based in Zagreb, an ad hoc body 
which went on to proclaim a separate “State of the Slovenians, Croats and Serbs” 
within the Yugoslav provinces of the former Monarchy. This state was not rec-
ognised by the Allies, however, and lacked popular approval; and the National 
Council’s calls for military mobilisation met with no response. The National 
Council authorised the Yugoslav Committee to represent it abroad: but in early 
November 1918, in discussions with Serbian officials at Geneva, the Croat and 
Slovene negotiators, led by Dr Anton Korošec, President of the National Council 
and Ante Trumbić, insisted that the new state be organised along dualist, i.e. fed-
eralist lines (on the model of the former Austria-Hungary). Suspecting that the 
Prince-Regent might try to resolve the issue of unification along centralist lines, 
and pressured by the opposition, Pašić reluctantly agreed to the dualist model and 
to a proviso that its monarchist character be not specified.55
The Geneva Agreement caused a cabinet crisis: several Serbian ministers re-
signed, warning that the agreement tended “to separate the Serbs of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Srem and Slavonia, Dalmatia and Lika, Bačka, Banat and Baranja, 
from Serbia, and to play them off against Serbia”. Minister St. M. Protić stressed 
that “our brothers from former Austria Hungary have been materially liberated 
thanks to the rivers of Serb and Allied blood, but they have not been liberated 
spiritually. Their ideology remains Austro-Hungarian.” At this point Pašić him-
self submitted his resignation, thereby invalidating the Geneva Agreement alto-
gether; while it was also denounced by the National Council in Zagreb, which 
was always, like the Yugoslav Committee, more of a revolutionary than a repre-
sentative body.56
All this left simple unification with Serbia as the only viable option. After the 
Villa Giusti armistice Italy moved to occupy most of Dalmatia and Istria and parts 
of Slovenia, while Austrians and Hungarians started fighting for control of Carin-
thia and Styria. Fearing further territorial losses, a delegation from the Zagreb 
National Council rushed to Belgrade, whereupon Prince Regent Alexander hasti-
ly proclaimed the new “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” in the name of 
54 Dušan T. Bataković: The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. History and Politics. Paris 1996, 
p. 91. On Montenegro, where the popular representatives deposed the King Nicholas I and his 
dynasty to merge with Serbia, see: Jovan R. Bojović: Podgorička skupština 1918. Dokumenti. 
Gornji Milanovac 1989.
55 Bogdan Krizman: Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslovenske države. Zagreb 1977, 
pp. 80–89, pp. 163–172.
56 Bataković: Yougoslavie (see note 15), pp. 136 f.; Mitrović: Serbia’s Great War (see fn. 1), 
pp. 321–323.
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King Peter I, on 1 December 1918. In that way, Pašić’s plan for creating a unified 
or – as the Austrians termed it –, “Greater” Serbia in advance of overall Yugoslav 
unification was abandoned. True, the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes in 1918 was to some extent a fulfilment of Serbian war aims; but the 
price had been very high: according to the official report submitted to the Peace 
Conference in Paris, Serbia had lost some 845,000 civilians and 402,000 soldiers, a 
total of 1,247,000 lives.57
57 Cf. more in: Milorad Ekmečić: Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918, vol. 2. Belgrade 1989, pp. 810–
832.
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The pursuit of uncompromising war aims is, in the common understanding, one of 
the hallmarks of total war. To use Stig Förster’s characterisation, total war is war 
“to the bitter end”, its object “the complete subjugation of the enemy”.1 The pas-
sions aroused by mobilising populations for total war, so runs the argument, allow 
no room for compromise, negotiation, or diplomatic manoeuvre. Despite the 
ghastly price of achieving it, the unconditional surrender of one side or the other 
offers the only possible resolution. Although this is in many ways an apt descrip-
tion of the First World War, the proposition masks problems of great complexity. 
Two orders of calculation, strategic and political, bore on the issues of war aims 
and peace negotiations, and their interplay complicated understandings of both 
politics and strategy, as well as understandings of war aims and peace negotiations.
Understood in connection with the theatre-level deployment and commitment 
of armed force, strategic calculations were, almost by definition, paramount in the 
First World War. Military thinking in 1914 was governed in all the European 
armies by an “ideology of the offensive”. Founded on readings of Clausewitz by 
generations of his admirers, this doctrine held that warfare found its natural cul-
mination in the decisive battle and that both strategy and tactics should be geared 
to offensive operations, which alone could bring victory in the great test of arms.2 
Compromise was foreign to these calculations. It could only mean the failure of 
the great strategic project. Again with appeals to Clausewitz, proponents of this 
view embraced a corresponding proposition about the relationship between strat-
egy and politics, one that was itself hostile to the very idea of compromise. The 
two realms were, in this understanding, entirely independent of one another. The 
function of the statesman was to present the strategist with the political terrain on 
which the battle was to be fought, the roster of friends, foes, and neutrals, and the 
goals to be achieved. The statesman was then to withdraw from the field until 
 informed by the generals that the battle was over. At this point, the statesman 
1 Stig Förster: Introduction. In: Roger Chickering/Stig Förster (eds.): Great War, Total War. 
Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918. Cambridge 2000, pp. 1–16, here: p. 7.
2 Jack Snyder: The Ideology of the Offensive. Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. 
Ithaca 1989.
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 returned in order to settle the political consequences. “Policy”, as the German 
emperor William II once noted, “is to remain silent in war until strategy permits it 
to speak once again”.3
Most civilian statesmen resisted their banishment in this fashion to the strategic 
periphery in wartime. The intersections between strategy and politics proved count-
less, as well as inherently contentious. Nonetheless, most statesmen were hostage to 
a political logic that was itself resistant to the principle of a compromise peace.4 Al-
though a now extensive literature has enjoined caution and nuance in generalising 
about the “war enthusiasm” of 1914, one critical truth has survived.5 The war began 
as a moral bargain between state and society. Every belligerent country entered the 
war in 1914 with broad popular support. Systematically encouraged by govern-
ments, consensus reigned everywhere that this was a war to resist foreign aggres-
sion, and that national unity and resistance would be rewarded when it was over. 
The propaganda of the first months – the extravagant claims and atrocity stories 
that circulated on both sides – sealed the initial experiences of war in demonised 
images of the enemy. Intellectually and morally, these images organised understand-
ings of the war’s terrible human costs, which began to register almost immediately. 
In these circumstances, compromise with the demons was unthinkable: it would 
have required an altogether different reading of the war, which could not have car-
ried the same intellectual and emotional load. The origins of the war would have to 
be framed not in resistance to barbarism but instead in diplomatic miscalculation – 
the war as a dreadful mistake. No belligerent government could have survived this 
confession. Political leaders lacked “the courage to make peace”, as one of the Ger-
man emperor’s advisors put it in 1916, “because they fear their own people”.6
Together the logic of both strategy and politics produced a scenario that corre-
sponded in the main to the preferences of the generals. In questions of peace ne-
gotiations, diplomacy was shackled to the situation on the battlefield; and even if 
they wished to, statesmen were all but helpless to negotiate an end to the war un-
til the military outcome was clear. Although there was no dearth of channels 
through which diplomatic communications – so-called “peace feelers” – could es-
cape the tight confines imposed by coalition warfare, international negotiation 
was directed principally toward neutrals and allies.7
3 Jehuda L. Wallach: Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht. Die Lehren von Clausewitz und 
Schlieffen und ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen. Frankfurt a. M. 1967, p. 289.
4 Gerhard Ritter: Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutsch-
land. 4 vols. München 1954–1968, here: vol. 2, pp. 9–77.
5 For a brief survey see Roger Chickering: “War Enthusiasm?” Public Opinion and the Out-
break of War in 1914. In: Holger Afflerbach/David Stevenson (eds.): An Improbable War? The 
Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914. New York/Oxford 2007, 
pp. 200–212.
6 Moriz Freiherr von Lyncker, 27. 8. 1916, Schloss Pless, in: Holger Afflerbach (ed.): Kaiser Wil-
helm II. als Oberster Kriegsherr im Ersten Weltkrieg. Quellen aus der militärischen Umgebung 
des Kaisers 1914–1918. München 2005, p. 417, Nr. L 458.
7 David Stevenson: The First World War and International Politics. Oxford 2000.
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The same constraints operated on discussions of war aims. These revolved in 
every belligerent state around visions of victory, and they were formulated in the 
first instance with allies and domestic audiences in mind. No matter who sought 
to formulate them, whether soldiers or statesmen, war aims retained a contingent, 
ephemeral, conjectural character, since the strategic circumstances of the war’s end 
would dictate their practical relevance. For this reason, debates over war aims also 
militated against a compromise peace, as they tended to raise the stakes in an at-
mosphere in which the very suggestion of negotiation was thought to be a confes-
sion of weakness. A compromise peace would have had to square the circle.8 It 
required political agreement that each side had won a victory of some plausible 
kind over the other.
In all these respects, however, the complexity of the situation during the 
First World War was compounded by an additional circumstance. Strategy, poli-
tics, war aims, compromise, negotiation, victory, peace, and the relationships 
among them were fluid concepts all. They were objects of unremitting conflict, 
which intensified with the lengthening war in all the belligerent states.
In the hope of illustrating these dynamics in action, the following essay ad-
dresses several moments in the German history of the First World War. These 
represented the principal junctures at which the German leadership pondered the 
feasibility of a negotiated peace with more than the casual speculation that attend-
ed most discussions of this subject.9 “Negotiated peace” is understood here to be 
an end to the fighting prior to a clear strategic decision. For the sake of brevity, 
the essay focuses on the interaction of strategy and politics in German thinking 
about a negotiated peace. Hence, it considers only in passing Germany’s relations 
with its several allies, despite their central role in this thinking;10 and it pays but 
fleeting attention to strategic and political calculations in the enemy countries. It 
seeks to demonstrate, however, that in several different sets of circumstances, and 
for different reasons at several points in the war, the logic of strategy and the logic 
of politics posed, separately and in combination, insurmountable obstacles on the 
German side to a negotiated resolution of the war.
Although German strategic thinking in 1914 was also wedded to doctrines of 
the offensive, it was peculiar in several important political respects, at least if 
British, French, and Italian examples are taken as the norm.11 In Imperial Ger-
many, both the civilian and the military leadership was responsible to the em-
8 Volker Ullrich: Zwischen Verhandlungsfrieden und Erschöpfungskrieg. Die Friedensfrage in 
der deutschen Reichsleitung Ende 1915. In: GWU 37 (1986), pp. 397–419, here: p. 407.
9 See ibid., pp. 397–419; Lance Farrar: Divide and Conquer. German Efforts to Conclude a Sepa-
rate Peace, 1914–1918. Boulder 1978; André Scherer/Jacques Grunewald: L’Allemagne et les pro-
blèmes de la paix pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. 4 vols. Paris 1962–1978.
10 As a classic instance see Wolfgang Steglich: Bündnissicherung oder Verständigungsfrieden. 
Untersuchungen zu dem Friedensangebot der Mittelmächte vom 12. Dezember 1916. Göttingen 
1958.
11 Antulio J. Echevarria: After Clausewitz. German Military Thinkers before the Great War. 
Lawrence, KS 2000.
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peror alone, not to the federal parliament, the Reichstag. This institution was it-
self nevertheless indispensable to the waging of war, insofar as its consent was 
required for the war bonds that provided the financial underpinning of the 
whole effort. In addition, the Reichstag deputies, who were elected by demo-
cratic male suffrage, collectively represented the most immediate institutional 
index of German popular sentiment. The vectors of wartime power in imperial 
Germany were thus more complex (not to say chaotic) than to the west.12 The 
national executive owed no institutional responsibility to the national legisla-
ture. Nor, aside from what the emperor provided, was there any institutional 
coordination between the civilian and military leadership, or between the service 
arms at either the ministerial or staff levels (or often even between army com-
mands). The emperor’s temperamental inability to provide effective coordina-
tion of any kind had become clear before the war. As the war continued, it grew 
both more obvious and more grave in its consequences insofar as William II re-
mained at least potentially, in Holger Afflerbach’s words, “an important, ines-
capable (unübergehbarer) power-factor” in any major strategic or political deci-
sion.13 The emperor’s failings blurred still further the already troubled distinc-
tions between policy and strategy; and they encouraged the intrigue, institutional 
rivalries, ill will, and miscalculation that plagued both. To these difficulties the 
German constitution added another. Because the emperor was command-
er-in-chief, it stood to reason that military victory would redound to the credit 
of the constitutional system that he embodied. The converse was also true. Anxi-
eties were rampant in both the civilian and military leadership that anything 
short of an unambiguous military triumph would breed calls for democratic re-
form, if not revolution, threatening not just the government, but the authoritari-
an constitutional order itself.
The possibility of a negotiated peace first surfaced late in 1914. The failure of 
the German offensive in the west signalled the collapse of the great strategic plan 
that General von Schlieffen had laid for a German military victory.14 In order to 
assess the implications of this perplexing turn of events, the country’s leading sol-
dier and its leading civilian met on 18 November 1914. It was their first major 
consultation since the outbreak of war. Having just presided over the final fruit-
less German attempt to turn the Allied flank in Flanders, the head of the army’s 
supreme command (OHL), General Erich von Falkenhayn, announced to the fed-
eral chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, that Germany was not militar-
ily powerful enough to achieve a “respectable (anständigen) peace” against a coa-
12 Wilhelm Deist: Strategy and Unlimited Warfare in Germany. Moltke, Falkenhayn, and Luden-
dorff. In: Chickering/Förster (eds.): Great War (see note 1), pp. 265–280, here: pp. 270 f.
13 Afflerbach (ed.): Kaiser (see note 6), p. 7; cf. Wilhelm Deist: Kaiser Wilhelm II. als Oberster 
Kriegsherr. In: id.: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft. Studien zur preußisch-deutschen Militärge-
schichte (= Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, vol. 34). München 1991, pp. 1–18; John C. G. Röhl: 
Wilhelm II. Der Weg in den Abgrund 1900–1941. München 2009, pp. 1191–1195.
14 See Hans Ehlert/Michael Epkenhans/Gerhard P. Groß (eds.): Der Schlieffenplan. Analysen 
und Dokumente (= Zeitalter der Weltkriege, vol. 2). Paderborn 2006.
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lition of France, Britain, and Russia.15 From this confession of strategic failure, 
the general proceeded to demand that the chancellor find a diplomatic solution. 
The key, he insisted, was to be a separate, negotiated peace with Russia, which he 
believed Germany could not conquer in view of its vast spaces and manpower re-
serves. A lenient settlement with this antagonist would free German forces to 
concentrate in the western theatre; it might also, he reasoned, persuade France to 
make peace as well and leave Germany free to defeat Great Britain, which Falken-
hayn, like many others, had identified as Germany’s most implacable enemy, the 
power “with which the plot against Germany stands and falls”.16 To this end, he 
suggested limiting military operations in the east in order to encourage the Rus-
sians into a negotiated settlement, in which the Germans would demand no more 
than an indemnity and, for strategic reasons, minor territorial adjustments.
Stunned by the general’s proposal, Bethmann Hollweg at first suspected a ma-
noeuvre by the soldiers to blame the civilians for the failed military campaign (a 
suspicion that was, at this stage in the war, not so much wrong as premature). His 
own concerns were primarily political, for he was more attuned than Falkenhayn 
to the domestic circumstances of the war – the dramatic sense of home-front uni-
ty during the first hours, the high costs of the initial campaigns, and the popular 
expectations to which the sacrifice had given rise. His own understanding of a 
“respectable peace” had taken shape in this atmosphere, amid a cascade of peti-
tions and manifestos that arrived in his office during the first weeks of the war 
from influential political groups. As the reward for sacrifices borne in the cause of 
victory, these documents laid out an extravagant vision of German hegemony on 
the continent, anchored by vast territorial annexations in eastern and western Eu-
rope, as well as in Africa.17 Whatever his personal sympathies in the summer of 
1914 or his subsequent beliefs about the feasibility of this vision – and these re-
main a controversial topic – the chancellor was convinced in November that some 
dramatic political reward, a Siegespreis, was essential both for the future strategic 
security of the country and to compensate Germans for their wartime sacrifices. 
In both respects, he found Falkenhayn’s call for an immediate diplomatic com-
promise unacceptable.
This discussion represented a unique moment in the history of the war in Ger-
many: the civilian was resisting the soldier’s demand for immediate peace negotia-
tions, the soldier recommending not only a policy of diplomatic compromise, but 
also the terms of the political settlement. The statesman objected, however, not 
only to the policy, but also to its strategic premises. The paradoxes let loose in the 
process extended well beyond the clash of strategy and policy, military and civil-
15 Holger Afflerbach: Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. München 
21996, pp. 204–208, cited: p. 204; Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: vol. 3, pp. 55–62.
16 Cited in: Hans von Zwehl: Erich v. Falkenhayn. General der Infanterie. Eine biographische 
Studie. Berlin 1926, p. 97.
17 Fritz Fischer: Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 
1914/1918. Düsseldorf 1961, pp. 87–108.
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ian authority;18 and the effort to negotiate the difficult boundary between strate-
gic and military matters was now complicated by a personal animosity rooted in 
differences of temperament between the general, whose arrogance had earned him 
many enemies within the army and without, and the chancellor, a man whose 
ponderous circumspection struck many soldiers as a sign of weakness. Communi-
cation between the two men quickly broke down in the following weeks, as each 
concluded that the other was unfit for the office he held.
Strictly speaking, Falkenhayn had observed the constitutional proprieties, tak-
ing care, in his dealings with the chancellor, to justify his policy recommendations 
on strategic grounds. In reality, however, his recommendations served a broader 
strategic purpose, namely of redefining the war into something he thought the 
German Army could win. The difficulty was that his policy recommendations, 
and the strategic calculations on which they rested, met with disfavour in a num-
ber of important places, of which the chancellor’s office was only the first. In fact, 
Bethmann’s reaction to Falkenhayn’s call for peace negotiations represented the 
beginning of a tortuous struggle to devise a political resolution for the basic and 
abiding strategic dilemma that Falkenhayn had spelled out: the fact that Germany 
now found itself in a war that it could not win by military means. True, on the ba-
sis of Falkenhayn’s strategic assessment, Bethmann reluctantly accepted in princi-
ple the idea of a separate negotiated peace in the east, in part because he, too, 
hoped that it might split the entente. He resisted, however, the suggestion of im-
mediate negotiations, lest the difficult strategic situation imply German military 
weakness and make winning an acceptable Siegespreis unlikely. Instead, encour-
aged by officials in the Foreign Office, who were also worried about the morale 
of Austrian troops, Bethmann argued that additional military conquests by the 
Central Powers in Poland would provide the “leverage” (Faustpfänder) necessary 
to strengthen the German position for subsequent negotiations with Russia.
These calculations governed the chancellor’s reaction to the unexpected Danish 
offer of mediation, which arrived in December 1914.19 Bethmann did nothing to 
encourage serious negotiations. His response to the Danish overture was dilatory 
and unenthusiastic – a fact that he sought to hide from the more hopeful Falken-
hayn. It quickly became clear, in any case, that the venture had no prospects of 
success. Not only was the Russian leadership under great pressure from its allies 
to remain in the war; it was no less reluctant than the German leadership to give 
the impression of negotiating from weakness. The circle could not be squared. 
Neither side was willing to concede enough.
The chancellor’s tepid response to the Danish offer also betrayed his basic mis-
givings about Falkenhayn’s strategic judgment. As these misgivings intensified, he 
18 Karl-Heinz Janßen: Der Kanzler und der General. Die Führungskrise um Bethmann Hollweg 
und Falkenhayn (1914–1916). Göttingen 1967, pp. 41–70.
19 See Wilhelm Ernst Winterhager: Mission für den Frieden. Europäische Mächtepolitik und dä-
nische Friedensvermittlung im Ersten Weltkrieg vom August 1914 bis zum italienischen Kriegs-
eintritt Mai 1915. Stuttgart 1984.
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did not shrink from intruding into strategic affairs, showing fewer scruples than 
Falkenhayn about constitutional niceties.20 He turned for confirmation of his 
own, more favourable assessment of Germany’s strategic prospects to other army 
leaders, particularly in the camp of the so-called “easterners”, who rejected 
Falkenhayn’s strategic preference for the western theatre and lobbied for his re-
moval as head of the army. The most important figures in this camp were the 
popular leaders of German forces in the east, the heroes of Tannenberg, Paul 
von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.21 These men never made any secret of 
their disdain for Falkenhayn and his estimation of Germany’s strategic situation, 
and they insisted that with the proper support they could achieve a brilliant mili-
tary triumph and win the war in the eastern theatre.22
With Hindenburg’ approval and Bethmann’s support, Ludendorff now became 
the leading force in an elaborate cabal, which extended from the top ranks of the 
army to the emperor’s family and entourage. His goal was to replace Falkenhayn 
in the OHL with Hindenburg or somebody else. One remarkable feature of the 
campaign was Hindenburg’s threat to resign his command if Falkenhayn remained, 
for it was an act of insubordination toward the emperor, his commander-in-chief. 
Another was Bethmann’s personal intervention with the emperor on behalf of 
 Ludendorff as Falkenhayn’s successor. This step, an incursion into the emperor’s 
authority of command, was at best an act of dubious constitutionality. At this stage 
in the war, however, the emperor invoked his powers as the constitutional superior 
of all the main players in the scheme. Because he and his advisors were comfortable 
with Falkenhayn, disliked Ludendorff, and feared Hindenburg as a potential Wal-
lenstein, no change took place in the supreme command. A temporary truce was 
established among the conflicting civilian and military agencies on the uneasy basis 
of a commitment to Durchhalten, or “holding out” both in the field and at home 
until something agreeable transpired strategically or politically.23
Bethmann continued nevertheless to support Hindenburg and Ludendorff. He 
remained blind to Falkenhayn’s virtues – his respect for the constitutional limits 
of his own power and his sober realism about the strategic challenges of the war 
– and remained unconvinced that Falkenhayn’s prioritisation of the western front 
could produce the political results, the “respectable peace”, that he himself be-
lieved necessary to vindicate the war effort on the German home front. The extent 
of his own aspirations for a Siegespreis he concealed in abstract allusions to Ger-
many’s “self-assertion” or Selbstbehauptung, although he hinted that this concept 
20 He had already sought to intervene with the emperor in order to influence land operations in 
Flanders. See Janßen: Kanzler (see note 18), p. 39.
21 The best guides are now the two recent studies: Wolfram Pyta: Hindenburg. Herrschaft zwi-
schen Hohenzollern und Hitler. München 2007, pp. 91–380; Manfred Nebelin: Ludendorff. Dik-
tator im Ersten Weltkrieg. München 2010.
22 See Ekkehart P. Guth: Der Gegensatz zwischen dem Oberfehlshaber Ost und dem Chef des 
Generalstabes des Feldheeres 1914/15. In: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 35 (1984), pp. 75–
111.
23 Afflerbach (ed.): Kaiser (see note 6), p. 21.
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embraced a certain “strengthening” (Stärkung) of the German position in Europe 
by means of “securities” and “guarantees”.24 At the same time, he calculated that 
installing the popular Hindenburg and Ludendorff into the OHL would make a 
compromise peace, whatever its terms, more politically palatable at home.
Bethmann persisted in this calculation despite a lot of evidence that it was per-
verse. Erich Ludendorff, the driving force in the eastern command, knew no hesi-
tation or doubts about the possibility of military victory. In this respect he was 
more captive than Falkenhayn to the norms of German strategic culture, as em-
bodied in Schlieffen with his vision of the Vernichtungsschlacht.25 Ludendorff was 
easy to describe as a Willensmensch, a soldier of brutal obstinacy and no scruples. 
His experience on the eastern front had only confirmed his instinctive view that 
strategic success was above all a question of resolve. He was not so much insensi-
tive to potential conflicts between politics and strategy as he was a confirmed believ-
er in the subordination of policy to strategic imperatives, if not in the identity of the 
two. “Germany must have secure borders and reliable neighbours”: his postulates 
were at once strategic and political.26 When, in 1916, Falkenhayn’s opponents final-
ly achieved their goal and installed Hindenburg (together with Ludendorff) in the 
supreme command, a new political dynamic took hold in the German war effort, 
and it proved very much to Bethmann’s disadvantage. As the possibility of a negoti-
ated settlement again became a central issue, the chancellor found Ludendorff’s 
shadow looming over every attempt to define the bases of a compromise peace.
The dispute between Bethmann and Falkenhayn at the turn of the 
year 1914/1915 had taken place largely out of public view. Although Falkenhayn’s 
enemies were in touch with several figures in the Reichstag, neither the political 
nor the strategic issues became the object of public debate. The practical conse-
quences of the dispute, however, soon did. The emphasis in Falkenhayn’s strategic 
thinking remained fixed on the western front. Here he resolved to hold onto the 
territorial gains of 1914 and to wear down his opponents with a strategy of limit-
ed offensive operations, despite the conundrums inherent in this approach. 
Falkenhayn seemed wedded to the paradox that, as he explained in the autumn of 
1914, “if we don’t lose the war, we will have won it”.27 Translating a strategy of 
attrition into a practical political scenario for the end of the war involved another 
paradox. It appeared to require a victorious peace – albeit a “moderate” one 
(gemäßigten Siegfrieden) – in the west, with military triumphs significant enough 
to persuade one or more of the country’s antagonists to make political conces-
sions at the negotiating table.28 These could then be sold to the German public as 
24 Winterhager: Mission (see note 19), pp. 533 f.
25 This conclusion is admittedly at odds with the observations of Isabel Hull: Absolute Destruc-
tion. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Ithaca/London, pp. 217–
225; see also Sven Lange: Hans Delbrück und der “Strategiestreit”. Kriegführung und Kriegsge-
schichte in der Kontroverse 1879–1914. Freiburg i. Br. 1995.
26 Nebelin: Ludendorff (see note 21), p. 381.
27 Cited: Afflerbach: Falkenhayn (see note 15), p. 198
28 Cited: Afflerbach (ed.): Kaiser (see note 6), p. 28.
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a victory. The difficulty with this scenario, which invoked hopeful recollections of 
the Peace of Hubertusburg in 1763, was that the country’s antagonists were better 
able than the Germans to sustain a war of attrition.29 And by the summer of 1916 
this point had become incontrovertible. Falkenhayn’s approach stumbled into a 
massive and misconceived offensive at Verdun, to which the Entente powers re-
sponded with their own massive and misconceived offensives at the Somme and in 
Galicia, in which they showed little sign of being worn down.30 So the war con-
tinued. The price of “holding out” on the German home front meanwhile became 
increasingly difficult to endure.31 Thanks in large part to the Allied blockade, but 
encouraged by home-grown bureaucratic disarray, shortages of food and other 
basic goods became the bane of everyday life in Germany, as well as the source of 
growing popular protest.
Bethmann Hollweg’s decision late in 1916 to make a formal offer of peace ne-
gotiations came in response to these pressures. It reflected his growing pessimism 
about Germany’s strategic predicament, and it played out in a broader political 
forum, which now included admirals as well as generals, the Reichstag, Germa-
ny’s allies, and the president of the United States. The debates that provided the 
context for the chancellor’s peace offer focussed on the German submarine fleet, 
whose ruthless deployment now seemed to promise more than relief from the di-
lemmas of attritional warfare; it portended the kind of decisive military victory 
that had eluded German forces in 1914.32 By mid-1916, after more than a year of 
controversy over the risks as well as the benefits of unrestricted submarine war-
fare, a showdown loomed in a renewed clash of strategy and politics. The argu-
ments in favour of unleashing the submarines were formulated in the German 
Admiralty, reinforced by an imposing body of expert testimony, and pervasively 
popularised in order to mobilise public support. They rested on the (strategic) 
claim that unrestricted submarine warfare would drive Britain out of the war and 
render the Entente unable to continue fighting within a matter of months. The 
opposing arguments reflected scepticism about these extravagant strategic claims, 
but were ultimately political: unlimited submarine warfare against Allied com-
merce threatened to drive the neutrals, above all the United States, into the war on 
Britain’s side and to assure Germany’s eventual defeat.
As the issue was at once strategic and political, it was again difficult for the 
German leadership to resolve. Falkenhayn and Bethmann Hollweg had long quar-
relled over it.33 The general contended that deploying submarines was purely a 
strategic decision, over which the admirals’ professional judgment could not be 
29 Wallach: Dogma (see note 3), p. 301.
30 See, in addition to Afflerbach: Falkenhayn (see note 15), pp. 351–359, pp. 410–423, Robert 
T. Foley: German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development 
of Attrition, 1870–1916. Cambridge 2005.
31 For a survey, see Roger Chickering: Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918. Cam-
bridge 32014.
32 See Bernd Stegemann: Die deutsche Marinepolitik 1916–1918. Berlin 1970.
33 Afflerbach: Falkenhayn (see note 15), pp. 376–403; Janßen: Kanzler (see note 18), pp. 190–209.
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impeached by civilian leaders with no constitutional authority in such matters; 
and Bethmann insisted that the civilian leadership bore the final responsibility for 
such a decision, whose political impact threatened to defeat its strategic purpose. 
In these circumstances, the chancellor concluded that the greatest hope of averting 
both a strategic and political disaster lay in the kind of compromise peace that he 
was now offering. As the pressure for unrestricted submarine warfare mounted 
from the army, the navy, the Reichstag, and the press, the chancellor struggled to 
find a diplomatic resolution.
His efforts were complicated by the change of army leadership in the late sum-
mer of 1916, in the wake of Romania’s entry into the war on the Entente’s side. 
Once Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over the OHL, a decision about the sub-
marine could not be postponed much longer. Bethmann originally welcomed the 
change in the supreme command, calculating that the new leaders would be more 
open than Falkenhayn to his own political reasoning and that they would provide 
cover for the diplomatic offensive that he was now planning (although he failed to 
share his hopes with the two soldiers in question).34 He proposed to publish an 
offer of peace negotiations, possibly with American mediation, in the hope that 
the overture would split the Entente, bring an end to the war with France or Rus-
sia, and result in German territorial gains that, however “lean” (mager), would 
prove politically acceptable in Germany because they would enjoy the endorse-
ment of the two new army leaders.35 In this scenario the popular generals were to 
provide Bethmann with, as Karl-Heinz Janßen put it, his “alibi with the German 
people”.36 Even if the negotiations did not get this far, a German offer to negotiate 
in good faith might, Bethmann reasoned, serve as a tactical device to win sympa-
thy in America for Germany’s plight and reduce the risk of war with the U.S. over 
the submarines.37
As became evident in tangled negotiations during the fall of 1916, Bethmann 
was worse than wrong in his assumptions. His tactics conceded a central role to 
the two army leaders – both as arbiters in the strategic debate over submarine 
warfare and as political godfathers to any negotiated peace. In one of their roles, 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff agreed to postpone a decision about the submarines 
until the campaign against Romania was over.38 In their other role, they arrogated 
to themselves the power to define the bases on which Germany would offer to 
negotiate. As he sought to define the terms of his peace offer, hence the minimum 
34 Karl-Heinz Janßen: Der Wechsel in der Obersten Heeresleitung 1916. In: VfZ 7 (1959), 
pp. 337–371.
35 Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg: Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege. Ed. by Jost Dülffer. Essen 
1989, p. 175.
36 Janßen: Wechsel (see note 34), p. 345.
37 On this episode see Karl E. Birnbaum: Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare. A Study of Imperial 
Germany’s Policy towards the United States, April 18, 1916–January 9, 1917. Uppsala 1958, esp. 
pp. 100–251; Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: vol. 3, pp. 319–385.
38 Birnbaum: Peace Moves (see note 37), p. 136, p. 180; Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: 
vol. 3, pp. 320 f.
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goals to be achieved, Bethmann Hollweg was reminded of the perils of discussing 
war aims in the absence of a strategic resolution of the conflict. His own ambi-
tions had evidently retreated. He was by now in fact coming to adopt a definition 
of a victorious outcome much like that of Falkenhayn in late 1914: “If we survive 
against this coalition of superior strength (Übermacht) and emerge able to negoti-
ate credibly”, he confided in late October 1916, “we will have won.”39 Even on 
the subject of Belgium, whose retention had become a central symbolic marker of 
a victorious peace in Germany, his ideas constituted, as Professor Ritter has writ-
ten, “a programme of extreme moderation” (although they did not envisage the 
complete restoration of the status quo ante).40
The chancellor was hardly in a position, however, to make the peace offer inde-
pendently. “No one can imagine the enormous difficulties in which every action is 
entangled”, wrote his confidant, Kurt Riezler, as Bethmann worked on his pro-
posals. “Agreement must be achieved with the OHL and our allies, the federal 
states informed, the ministries filled in, the party leaders [and] the press managed 
– to say nothing of the emperor.”41 The complications quickly multiplied. When 
Bethmann consulted the other Central Powers, in whose name the offer was also 
to be extended, he received a catalogue of ambitious war aims, which stood not a 
chance of acceptance by the Entente as bases for negotiation.42 When he sought 
the views of the army’s supreme command about the strategic dimensions of a 
German negotiating position, he was robbed of all his illusions about the generals 
whose ascent he had recently abetted. Hindenburg and Ludendorff laid before 
him their own long list of demands for indemnities and annexations in the east 
and west. This document radiated Ludendorff’s understanding of secure borders 
and reliable neighbours, as well as his disdain for Bethmann’s diplomatic project, 
whose best outcome would be, he believed, to fail and thus to provide a pretext 
for unrestricted submarine warfare. That a peace offer was nonetheless published 
in December 1916 was a testimony to Bethmann’s persistence and negotiating 
skills; but it arrived stillborn and shorn of any specific demands. Lest it be con-
strued as a confession of German weakness, the supreme command insisted that 
its public announcement be swaddled in allusions to Germany’s military strength 
and that it contain a scarcely veiled threat of unrestricted submarine warfare 
should the overture be rejected. For good measure, on the prompting of the su-
preme command, the emperor then contributed a widely reported, blustering 
speech to the same effect. As a consequence, Bethmann’s peace offer invited the 
conclusion abroad that Germany had already won the war.43
The complications that beset even inter-allied negotiations on war aims spoke 
volumes about the obstacles to a compromise peace in this war; and the difficul-
39 Ibid., p. 336.
40 Ibid., p. 335.
41 Kurt Riezler: Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente. Ed. by Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Göttingen 
1972, p. 377.
42 Steglich: Bündnissicherung (see note 10), pp. 59–93, pp. 107–125.
43 Birnbaum: Peace Moves (see note 37), p. 249.
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ties that stood in the way of agreements with the enemy were even more formi-
dable.
Whatever the degree of Bethmann’s moderation, no language – short of an offer 
of military surrender – would have persuaded the Entente to accept either the 
overture from the Central Powers in December 1916 or Woodrow Wilson’s offer 
to mediate, which arrived in Europe several days later. The collapse of Bethmann’s 
diplomatic plan removed the last barriers to unrestricted submarine warfare. In 
the face of another extravagant memorandum from the Admiralty, in which the 
virtues of the strategy were allowed to swamp the political perils, even the chan-
cellor dropped his opposition to the step. The formal decision came in early Janu-
ary 1917, in a meeting at which the emperor presided. This meeting represented a 
unique instance of institutional coherence in the German war effort, the sole oc-
casion on which a major decision emerged after consultations, however perfunc-
tory, among all the agencies concerned, political as well as military.44 But correct 
procedures were no guarantee of sensible decisions; and this one was a fateful leap 
in the dark.45 It pandered to desperate hopes, which were grounded in the same 
popular stereotype of a “nation of shopkeepers” that had underpinned the image 
of Great Britain as Germany’s most dangerous and devious foe.46 The decision 
also reflected, not for the last time, Ludendorff’s profound ignorance of the Unit-
ed States, which he regarded as a less serious strategic threat than Holland or 
Denmark. In fact, for him the decision for war with the U.S. held no qualms, if 
only because a compromise peace was nowhere in his intellectual repertoire, as his 
actions confirmed several months later.
The collapse of the German peace offer of December 1916 hastened the dramat-
ic realignment of power that had begun in Berlin with the appointment of the new 
OHL. The decision to let loose the submarine, a weapon that had by the begin-
ning of 1917 assumed the aura of a Wunderwaffe, was greeted with widespread 
jubilation in Germany. Popular commitment to the vigorous prosecution of the 
war was now embodied in the supreme command, particularly in the figure of 
Hindenburg, who had become, thanks in part to his astute cultivation of his own 
image, the symbol supreme of a victorious peace.47 The power of the new su-
preme command thus had a popular, acclamatory basis. It differed fundamentally 
from Falkenhayn’s, which had rested entirely on support within the emperor’s 
inner circle. In so far as a majority in the Reichstag continued to vote in favour of 
the war bonds, the chancellor could claim a degree of tacit popular support, but 
his power, too, ultimately rested on the confidence of the emperor. Bethmann was 
thus more vulnerable in the new political landscape. So was the emperor himself, 
44 Deist: Strategy (see note 12), p. 277.
45 Moriz Freiherr von Lyncker, 26. 1. 1917, Pless, in: Afflerbach (ed.): Kaiser (see note 6), p. 468, 
Nr. L 550.
46 See Matthew Stibbe: German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914–1918. Cambridge 2001.
47 See, in addition to Pyta: Hindenburg (see note 21); Anna von der Goltz: Hindenburg. Power, 
Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis. Oxford 2009, pp. 14–42; Jesko von Hoegen: Der Held von Tan-
nenberg. Genese und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos. Köln 2007.
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who had, in Riezler’s judgment, “fled into the shadow of the two soldiers – and 
swims meekly in their wake”.48 William II’s own credibility was now hostage to 
threats of resignation from the heroes in the supreme command. Given this new 
dynamic, an intensifying public debate over how to end the war drove sentiment 
toward two institutional poles, the army’s supreme command and the Reichstag, 
each of which could lay claim to some sort of popular mandate. The issue was 
more complex than the institutional polarisation of strategy and politics, however, 
for the positions of both the OHL and the Reichstag entailed far-reaching strate-
gic as well as political implications.
From the moment it was appointed, the new OHL enjoyed secure authority 
over strategic decision-making, for it faced none of the dissent and intrigue within 
the officer corps that had plagued Falkenhayn. Under the aegis of Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff, the logic of strategy also shed the subtle ambiguities that had 
stalked Falkenhayn’s thinking about how to end the war. The new commanders 
were resolved to win it by means of a decisive military victory, although, paradox-
ically, they adopted their predecessor’s belief that the great battle would take place 
in the western theatre. Less paradoxically – and less subtly – they embraced the 
political logic that had guided Bethmann’s thinking. The sacrifices borne by the 
German people demanded a Siegespreis. As a reminder of this fact and in hopes of 
raising morale in the army as well as on the home front, the OHL pressed the 
political leadership in the fall of 1916 to remove all restrictions on public discus-
sion of German war aims. Like the decision to force the wholesale regimentation 
of the German economy in anticipation of a great strategic offensive, and like the 
decision to launch unrestricted submarine warfare, this move showed how far the 
army leaders’all-embracing view of strategy now intruded into politics.49
It is tempting, in view of these developments, to speak of a military dictatorship 
in Germany after 1916.50 To do so, however, would be to underestimate the institu-
tional constraints placed on the OHL, particularly by the Reichstag, which now 
emerged as a significant voice in the issue of war aims and peace. Here the increas-
ing strains of war had found expression in growing restiveness, as well as in sympa-
thy within the left-wing parties for the idea of a negotiated peace. Thanks in no 
small part to decisions by the supreme command, events in the first half of 1917 
not only intensified the unrest in the Reichstag, but also brought the question of 
peace negotiations directly within its purview. Predictably, the decision to launch 
unrestricted submarine warfare drew the United States into the war in early 
April 1917, only weeks after revolution in Russia had brought down the tsarist au-
tocracy. Both events dramatically altered the ideological terrain of the war, turning 
imperial Germany suddenly into the most autocratic party in the conflict; and they 
48 Riezler: Tagebücher (see note 41), p. 383.
49 The classic study is Gerald D. Feldman: Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918. 
Princeton 1966.
50 See Martin Kitchen: The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the German High Command un-
der Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918. London 1976; Nebelin: Ludendorff (see note 21), 
has resuscitated this argument.
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had a marked impact on the German debate about a compromise peace.51 President 
Wilson’s calls for a “peace without victory” and a “world safe for democracy” res-
onated in appeals from the new Russian republic for a “peace without annexations 
or indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of peoples”.52 The messages 
from America and Russia seemed to point towards a compromise peace; and by 
linking such a peace to democratic reform they emphasised that the future consti-
tutional order in Germany would be determined by the outcome of the war.
Nowhere was this nexus more a goad to action than in the German Social Dem-
ocratic party, the largest in the Reichstag. This party spoke for the poor, the social 
groups that were most vulnerable to the material burdens of the lengthening war. 
It was already the leading parliamentary proponent of a compromise peace when 
the events of the spring of 1917, particularly the revolution in Russia, altered the 
political stakes. For one thing, to the Socialists the fall of the Russian autocracy 
represented a great victory, fulfilling their central war aim and resolving the prin-
cipal issue that had persuaded the party to support the war in 1914. For another, 
events in Russia threatened to fan revolutionary opposition to the war within the 
labour movement in Germany, the Social Democratic party’s primary constituen-
cy. The formation of a radical anti-war party, the Independent Social Democratic 
party in April 1917, raised the alarm. All these pressures lent new urgency to de-
mands for a compromise peace, and they created a potential solvent for the politi-
cal and strategic obstacles to negotiation. The key lay in the definition of an alter-
native Siegespreis, to be obtained from a negotiated end to the war: the reward for 
the sacrifices of the German people was now not to be territorial aggrandisement 
but democratic reform of the German constitution instead – the establishment of 
ministerial responsibility to the Reichstag, as well as suffrage reform in Prussia 
and the other German states.
Prospects for this kind of peace carried a high price, however, namely the end 
of the national consensus in favour of war, which had been struck in 1914. The 
heated debates over war aims, which had intensified since late 1916, made this 
truth all too evident. Both within the Reichstag and without, loud and articulate 
sentiment on the Right insisted on holding out for a much grander Siegespreis, the 
great territorial annexations that would accompany a German military triumph. 
The similarities to the thinking of the OHL were not coincidental; they corre-
sponded to the material and moral support that the army provided to the advo-
cates of this expansionist vision. Such were the lines along which political opinion 
polarised in Germany between Right and Left, between the proponents of a deci-
sive “Hindenburg Peace” and the supporters of a negotiated “Scheidemann Peace” 
(named after the Social Democrats’ parliamentary leader).53 At issue now were 
51 Wolfgang Steglich: Die Friedenspolitik der Mittelmächte 1917/18. Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 59–116.
52 Arno Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin. The Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918. Cleve-
land/New York 1967, p. 133.
53 See Steffen Bruendel: Volksgemeinschaft oder Volksstaat. Die “Ideen von 1914” und die Neu-
ordnung Deutschlands im Ersten Weltkrieg. Berlin 2003.
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conflicting definitions of victory, which meant conflicting visions of peace, as well 
as conflicting visions of domestic politics, for the Right insisted that military vic-
tory would vindicate the authoritarian institutions that the Left proposed to re-
form.
In the middle stood Bethmann Hollweg. The logic of the chancellor’s own 
thinking about a negotiated peace entailed, as he himself recognised, concessions 
of some kind to domestic reform. So did his effort to preserve the support of the 
Social Democrats for the war bonds. But making constitutional reform, in addi-
tion to a negotiated peace, politically acceptable put all his powers of compro-
mise, obfuscation, and intrigue to their greatest test. His tactic again featured an 
effort to compose intractable issues into ambiguity. In this case, contradictory as-
surances to the leaders of the Left and Right accompanied a series of vague public 
promises of domestic change. These culminated in the so-called Easter Message 
(Osterbotschaft) of 1917, a proclamation from the emperor that spoke of reform-
ing the Prussian suffrage, but only after the war. Such gestures satisfied neither the 
Left nor the Right, so the domestic debate over peace and domestic reform smoul-
dered on until it erupted in early July, in a parliamentary attack on the strategic 
direction of the war.
The uproar was occasioned by the leader of the Catholic Centre Party, Matthias 
Erzberger, who in a sensational speech to a parliamentary committee, declared that 
the German submarine campaign against Allied shipping had failed, that this strat-
egy had been based on faulty reasoning from the start, and that, to make matters 
worse, the country’s Austrian ally was on the verge of collapse. A majority in the 
Reichstag, which extended from the Social Democrats on the left to the Centre 
Party, thereupon voted to respond formally, on its own authority, to the Russian 
and American declarations about a negotiated end to the war. “The Reichstag”, 
read the resulting resolution, “strives for a peace of understanding and the perma-
nent reconciliation of the peoples. With such a peace, forced acquisitions of territo-
ry and political, economic, or financial oppression are inconsistent.”54 This action, 
a defiant challenge to both the chancellor and the OHL, turned the Reichstag into 
the public proponent of a negotiated peace in Germany. But it also left no doubt 
where power ultimately resided. In the eyes of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who 
had long regarded Bethmann as little more than the manager of opinion in the 
 Reichs tag, the peace resolution represented his terminal failure in this capacity. The 
resolution itself they condemned on strategic grounds, as detrimental to “the of-
fensive and defensive capability of the army”.55 Before it could even come to a 
vote, they provoked a showdown. They threatened to resign if Bethmann remained 
in office. The bewildered emperor, whom Bethmann had coaxed remarkably far 
towards making political concessions to the Reichstag, had no choice but to accept 
his chancellor’s resignation and to appoint as his successor a little known bureau-
crat, Georg Michaelis, whose principal qualification for office was his respect for 
54 Mayer: Wilson (see note 52), p. 133.
55 Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: vol. 3, p. 580.
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the strategic and political views of the soldiers. This much he made clear in his ini-
tial appearance before the Reichstag, when he pledged to support “your” resolu-
tion “as I understand it”, noting that his understanding excluded any peace that 
did not “guarantee the security of Germany’s borders for all time”.56
The implications of Michaelis’ appointment for the prospects of diplomatic 
compromise quickly became evident at the next stage in the unhappy history of 
peace negotiations during the First World War: the Papal Peace Note of 1 August 
1917. This overture to the belligerent powers, which proposed the renunciation of 
German claims on Belgium as the basis for peace negotiations, has inspired a long 
controversy in Germany and a small mountain of literature, largely because a 
committee of the Reichstag was peripherally involved in formulating the German 
response.57 In truth, this controversy has been beside the point. Quite apart from 
the resistance that it encountered generally among the belligerent powers, the 
Pope’s overture foundered on the political realities in Germany, including the re-
luctance of Michaelis and Richard von Kühlmann, the foreign minister, to re-
nounce German claims for fear of the domestic political consequences. Those 
members of the Reichstag who wished to pursue the Pope’s overture had no pow-
er to do so. The OHL, which did have the power to do so, had no thought what-
soever of renouncing Belgium. “We would be completely secure”, replied Luden-
dorff when asked for his views on the strategic aspects of the problem, “only if we 
occupied all of Belgium militarily and stood on the Flemish coast”.58 Ludendorff’s 
logic, whether one called it strategic or political, was a barrier around which no 
proposal for peace negotiations could manoeuvre. The principal role of Michaelis 
and the foreign minister was to persuade the Reichstag not to challenge this truth.
The same truth crippled the peace feelers that the two sides continued to put 
out during the rest of the year.59 It also governed the unsettled political situation 
in Germany during the last year of the war, as the polarisation intensified around 
the questions of peace and constitutional reform. Large organisations, the Ger-
man Fatherland Party and the People’s League for Freedom and Fatherland, 
sought to mobilise popular support for the various Siegespreise that were now as-
sociated respectively with the names of Hindenburg and Scheidemann.60 Their 
56 Bert Becker: Georg Michaelis. Preußischer Beamter, Reichskanzler, Christlicher Reformer 
1857–1936. Eine Biographie. Paderborn 2007, pp. 369–378.
57 Steglich: Friedenspolitik (see note 51), pp. 117–231; Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): Der Friedensap-
pell Papst Benedikts XV. vom 1. August 1917 und die Mittelmächte. Diplomatische Aktenstücke 
des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums des Äußern, des Öster-
reichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äußern und des britischen Auswärtigen Amtes aus den 
Jahren 1915–1922. Wiesbaden 1970, esp. pp. 1–17; see also Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: 
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58 Steglich (ed.): Friedensappell (see note 57), p. 537.
59 Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): Die Friedensversuche der kriegführenden Mächte im Sommer und 
Herbst 1917. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen, Akten und Vernehmungsprotokolle. Wiesbaden 
1984; Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: vol. 4, p. 248.
60 Heinz Hagenlücke: Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. Die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaiser-
reichs. Düsseldorf 1997.
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activity revealed how war-weariness was now affecting the debate over war aims. 
The advocates of the Ludendorff Peace faced the charge that they were Kriegsver-
längerer, warmongers whose extravagant demands were prolonging the war in 
their own political interests (which included the advantages afforded them by sys-
tems of class-based suffrage), while the advocates of compromise peace (and de-
mocracy) could offer an earlier end to the war.61 The whole debate merely con-
firmed the fact, however, that constitutional reform was in principle no different 
from any other war aim. Like Belgium, Poland, or the iron fields of Briey-Longuy, 
its future awaited the strategic outcome of the war. This had been Ludendorff’s 
premise all along; and in the end, he was right.
The German quest for a compromise peace had a coda, in which Ludendorff 
himself played a bizarre role. For a brief moment in the spring of 1918 it appeared 
that the general’s ferocious resistance to a compromise peace would be vindicated 
– and this with the support of the Reichstag. Late in 1917 his armies won the war 
in the east. The ensuing negotiations at Brest-Litovsk resulted in a draconian trea-
ty that not only documented Ludendorff’s understanding of a compromise peace. 
The ratification of the treaty by a majority in the Reichstag also threw a revealing 
light on this institution’s understanding of the same concept.
Ludendorff thereupon set out in the spring of 1918 to win the war in the west. 
The initial success of the great German offensives in France, towards which his 
strategic and political thinking had been oriented since the summer of 1916, raised 
prospects that the war would end in a magnificent German military triumph and a 
peace that would, like Brest-Litovsk, reward the most ambitious visions of a 
Siegespreis. By July, however, with the Allied counteroffensives, the collapse of 
these hopes became undeniable. It remains uncertain when Ludendorff admitted 
the failure to himself. He had nothing but contempt for the political offensive that 
the civilian leadership began to signal in June. After the middle of July, however, 
as strategic setbacks mounted along with indications that the morale of the Ger-
man armies was eroding, his erratic actions and statements, like his hectic search 
for scapegoats, suggested the limits of his own confidence. At the end of Septem-
ber, pressed by his own advisers, he abruptly confessed the bad news to Hinden-
burg and the civilian leadership, calling for “an immediate armistice to prevent a 
catastrophe” and, to facilitate this escape from strategic crisis, the reform of the 
German government “on a broader basis”.62
Ludendorff’s demand recalled Falkenhayn’s challenge to Bethmann Hollweg in 
November 1914. Once again the soldier confessed strategic failure and told the 
statesmen to enter peace negotiations – though now much more in the transparent 
hope of deflecting responsibility for military defeat onto the civilians. Like 
Falkenhayn, Ludendorff also called for a diplomatic compromise with the enemy. 
To this end, he offered, as “an enormous military concession”, the orderly evacu-
61 For one local example: Roger Chickering: The Great War and Urban Life in Germany. Frei-
burg, 1914–1918. Cambridge 2007, pp. 536–538.
62 Nebelin: Ludendorff (see note 21), pp. 462 f.
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ation of the territories occupied by the German army in the west.63 Then, in the 
expectation that the route to negotiations would be easier via the Americans, he 
endorsed the idea of approaching President Wilson, whose Fourteen Points, read 
superficially, seemed to promise a less vindictive settlement, albeit one negotiated 
by a democratic German government.64
Here the parallels with 1914 ended. This time the strategic catastrophe was no 
longer latent. Ludendorff’s own subsequent efforts to argue otherwise only beto-
kened his own increasing flight into fantasies. His admission of defeat at the end 
of September found a responsive audience among the civilian politicians, who, af-
ter brief consternation occasioned by the abrupt character of the news, could har-
bour few illusions about either the strategic or political implications.
With his confession, Ludendorff set in motion forces over which he quickly 
lost control, although his behaviour in this final crisis revealed habits of thought 
that had been impossible to break. The very language he used to describe the ar-
mistice he was seeking, “an offer of peace and armistice” (Friedens- und Waffen-
stillstandsangebot), reflected the thoroughgoing conflation of political and strate-
gic categories in his mind, as well, perhaps, as his continuing retreat into his own 
illusions.65 He seemed in fact to have regarded the offer primarily as a strategic 
manoeuvre, a move toward a cease-fire that would be protracted enough to allow 
the German armies to regroup for further action. As the ongoing negotiations 
with Wilson revealed the futility of this expectation, Ludendorff invoked strategic 
considerations in an attempt to block the political consequences of his own ac-
tions. Wilson’s third note, which arrived in late October, prompted him to sign – 
without consulting the civilian government – a general order that dismissed Wil-
son’s terms as unacceptable, “an exhortation (Aufforderung) to us soldiers to con-
tinue resisting with all our powers”.66
By this stage, however, the politicians no longer heeded him. Unlike Falken-
hayn in 1914, Ludendorff could not survive the terrible confession of strategic 
failure, for it destroyed the basis of his own political power, which in the end had 
rested on the promise of military victory. The emperor could no longer save him, 
because, thanks largely to Ludendorff, he himself was impotent. Nor could Hin-
denburg save him, as long as he himself hoped that his nimbus would somehow 
survive the catastrophe for which he shared responsibility with Ludendorff.67 The 
dynamics were different in 1914 and 1918 in one other, fundamental respect. For 
the first and only time during the war, the strategic and political imperatives were 
now aligned in favour of a settlement. The civilian statesmen and the generals who 
mattered now agreed on the urgency of negotiations. The difficulty was that Ger-
63 Ibid.
64 See Patrick O. Cohrs: “American Peace” – Ein “demokratischer Frieden”? In: Jost Dülffer/
Gottfried Niedhart (eds.): Frieden durch Demokratie? Genese, Wirkung und Kritik eines Deu-
tungsmusters. Essen 2011, pp. 73–103.
65 Ritter: Staatskunst (see note 4), here: vol. 4, p. 416.
66 Ibid., p. 446.
67 Pyta: Hindenburg (see note 21), pp. 350 f.
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many was no longer in a position to “negotiate” for peace. The strategic decision 
had been reached. Germany had lost.
“Germany risks losing the war strategically with Falkenhayn and losing it po-
litically with Ludendorff.”68 Whatever its general accuracy as a verdict on Germa-
ny’s military leadership during the First World War, this remark, which Bethmann 
Hollweg is reported to have made in the summer of 1916, well captured the gist of 
the chancellor’s complaints about the two soldiers with whom he had to work in 
search of a negotiated peace. The same remark also threw light on the great obsta-
cles – the difficulties of securing a consensus of political and military judgment – 
that prevented this outcome, for such a consensus was the indispensable prerequi-
site for any diplomatic compromise that might have had the remotest chance of 
success. The struggles between the civilian and military leadership were testimony 
as well to the immense problems that attended top-level decision-making in Ger-
many, where institutional disarray compounded the contested conceptual ambi-
guities of strategy and politics.
Several points in this story deserve emphasis at the end. Although the soldiers 
erected high barriers to peace negotiations, they were not the only ones to do so. 
The civilians’ political objections to ending the war without a conclusive military 
verdict were decisive early in the war; and they remained formidable throughout, 
even as war-weariness mounted and political pressures for a compromise peace 
gathered in the Reichstag. As this institutional development also made clear, deci-
sions about peace negotiations were never the monopoly of a small group of civil-
ian or military leaders. Thinking in the army leadership about strategy was deeply 
embedded in military institutions and traditions. The anxieties of the civilian lead-
ership about the domestic political consequences of a negotiated peace were nei-
ther narrowly held nor illusory, as the bitter public debates over war aims and 
then the events in the autumn of 1918 demonstrated. It is arguable that the real 
illusion was the very prospect of a negotiated end to the First World War. It does 
not suffice simply to describe the resistance to such an outcome in Germany. The 
strategic and political obstacles were insurmountable everywhere.
68 Cited in: Janßen: Wechsel (see note 34), p. 371.
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“A Life and Death Question”: 
Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the First World War
Introduction
While a good deal of research has been done on the war aims of Germany and a 
number of other Great Powers, the aims of Austria-Hungary have been compara-
tively neglected. This chapter seeks to reappraise Austro-Hungarian war aims and 
to argue that they were far from incoherent, inconsistent, or insignificant. Rather, 
both civilian and military leaders in Vienna and Budapest pursued aggressive and 
expansionist policies aimed at securing and increasing the territorial, economic, 
and military power of the Dual Monarchy. A detailed analysis of the Monarchy’s 
most important war aims, as discussed internally and in conjunction with its most 
important ally, Germany, will demonstrate three points: first, that these war aims 
were more offensive, expansionist, and annexationist in the Balkans and in Poland 
than previously thought; second, that the Foreign Ministry remained in overall 
control of the formulation of war aims, in opposition to the army’s wishes and 
contrary to the German example; and third, that Austria-Hungary’s at times al-
most delusional insistence on its principal war aims was of considerable historical 
importance as a factor prolonging the war.
Phase I: Stalemate and Uncertainty – July 1914 to October 1915
Historians of the Dual Monarchy agree that, at the outbreak of the war in 
July 1914, few of its leaders had any specific war aims in mind beyond the mili-
tary defeat and political subjugation of Serbia. However, once the Monarchy was 
at war with Russia and it was clear that the conflict would not be as short as orig-
inally hoped, the Austro-Hungarian leadership began to develop detailed, and ul-
timately very extensive, war aims which formed the subject of furious debate at 
the highest echelons of power. Initially, the military focused on battlefield suc-
cesses in Serbia and Galicia, while the diplomats concentrated on preventing hos-
tile interventions by Italy and Romania.
But from the very start of the war until the defeat of Serbia eighteen months 
later, Austro-Hungarian officials, confronted with stalemate on the battlefield and 
potential threats from the Monarchy’s neighbours, were uncertain about their 
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wartime goals. Even so, as this section will show, key policies were developed and 
crystallised with regard to the Balkans and Poland. In these months of relative 
political harmony, the Foreign Ministry (Ministerium des Äußeren, henceforth 
MdÄ) under Leopold Count Berchtold and the Military High Command (Ar-
meeoberkommando, henceforth AOK) under General Conrad von Hötzendorf 
were in agreement that political and military hegemony over Serbia and the West-
ern Balkans was a vital war aim. The Hungarian Prime Minister István Count 
Tisza, by contrast, was more preoccupied with so-called “negative war aims”, no-
tably warding off hostile Romanian, Italian, and even Bulgarian intervention. It 
was Berchtold’s perceived weakness in this area that led to his replacement by the 
“Balkanist” István Baron Burián von Rajecz.1 As Burián was Tisza’s close ally, 
however, the change still left the MdÄ in a strong position to insist that an hon-
ourable peace depended on victory in the Balkans rather than against Russia.
Given the military defeats the Monarchy was facing on all fronts, the AOK’s 
influence on war aims was as yet somewhat limited. Yet, the whole Austro-Hun-
garian leadership – both military and diplomatic – continued to pursue offensive 
goals in the Balkans, even when the crushing might of Russian intervention forced 
them to undertake a northwards troop deployment the purpose of which was 
mere survival. Even so, in these months of AOK failures to achieve victory on 
 either front, the MdÄ was less inhibited in defining the Monarchy’s war aims than 
at any later stage, even if these remained theoretical for the time being. These 
ideas provided the framework for consistent war aims planning by the MdÄ, 
 albeit later modified by the AOK’s excessive and Tisza’s minimalist demands, but 
continually under the auspices of the Monarchy’s foreign policy establishment. 
Finally, the conviction of the elites, even after several failed invasions of Serbia, 
was that an honourable peace could not be achieved unless their Balkan war aims 
were met – hence the need to fight on.
War Aims Regarding Serbia and the Balkans
The area where Austro-Hungarian officials were most united over war aims was 
Serbia: it was here that the sacrifices of the war could be made good in terms of 
territorial expansion and political control. The question was just how much could 
the Monarchy demand.
Tisza’s towering stance against an offensive war at the Common Ministerial 
Council (Gemeinsamer Ministerrat, henceforth GMR) of 7 July 1914 in response 
to Sarajevo is well documented;2 he followed it up with a letter to Emperor Franz 
1 Francis Roy Bridge: Österreich(-Ungarn) unter den Großmächten. In: Adam Wandruszka/Pe-
ter Urbanitsch (eds.): Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. Vol. 4,1: Die Habsburgermonarchie 
im System der internationalen Beziehungen. Wien 1989, pp. 313–318.
2 See i.e.: Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.: Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. 
New York 1991; Wandruszka/Urbanitsch (eds.): Habsburgermonarchie (see note 1); József Ga-
lántai: Hungary in the First World War. Budapest 1989; Richard F. Hamilton/Holger H. Herwig: 
Decisions for War, 1914–1917. New York 2004.
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Joseph himself insisting that Serbia should not be “destroyed, much less annexed”3 
– a position he would hold to throughout his term in office. Instead, Serbia must 
cede territory to Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, along with a few “strategically im-
portant border corrections” in favour of Austria-Hungary, as well as pay repara-
tions. All this, Tisza argued, would suffice to keep Serbia under the Monarchy’s 
control. The fact that he hoped that this “middle road”,4 non-annexationist ap-
proach might suffice to keep Russia out of the war only testifies to the unbridgeable 
gulf that had opened up between the Monarchy and Russia. Tisza was, after all, the 
most moderate member of the GMR, yet even he was espousing the reduction of 
Serbia as a war aim. Although he still professed a desire for “as little territorial 
growth as possible”, he nevertheless stated that some regions needed to be annexed 
due to “very important strategic concerns”, including the north-western corner of 
Serbia called the Mačva, the north-east of Serbia around Negotin, and Belgrade.5 He 
expressed similar views to the Germans.6 These were by no means minor border 
rectifications, and demonstrate an incremental growth in Tisza’s war aims planning 
that brought it closer to the MdÄ’s goals. After the AOK lost Belgrade and Schabatz 
(the administrative centre of the Mačva) in mid-December 1914 and it even looked 
as though the Serbs would launch a counter-attack into Austro-Hungarian territory, 
Tisza spoke of an impending “catastrophe”.7 Yet despite what was looming on the 
northern front, Tisza argued to Berchtold and the Emperor that quashing the dan-
ger in the south and solving the Serbian question was still the “most important prin-
cipal duty” of the Monarchy, which would have to be “solved by all means”.8
Berchtold, too, was remarkably tenacious in his insistence on the primacy of 
the Balkan theatre:9 from a “political perspective the prostration of Serbia” and 
the ancillary benefits of extending the Monarchy’s influence in the Balkans were 
“far more important” than advancing further in Russia or even recapturing occu-
pied Austrian territory in Galicia.10 Although he generally deferred to Conrad on 
military matters, in one of Berchtold’s few moments of independent strength he 
emphasised the “great political importance” of the Balkan front;11 proposals for a 
“peace without victory” could not be entertained as long as the Serbian Army was 
still intact. While the Foreign Minister professed to be concerned with securing 
the supply lines to Turkey as the Germans wanted, it was the goal of bringing 
Serbia to its knees that was “an absolute imperative”.12
3 Tisza to Franz Joseph, 8. 7. 1914, Magyarországi Réformátus Egyház Zsinati Levéltar (= REZL) 
[Hungarian Reformed Church Synodal Archives, Budapest], 44b.12.10a.
4 Ibid.
5 Tisza, Memorandum, 16. 11. 1914, REZL, 44b.12.10a.
6 Tisza, Aide Memoire, 5. 12. 1914, REZL, 44.7.21-22.
7 Tisza to Franz Joseph, 23. 12. 1914, REZL, Box 45/17.
8 Tisza to Berchtold, 15. 12. 1914, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Wien (= HHStA), PA-I-499.
9 Berchtold to Giesl (AOK), 26. 11. 1914, HHStA, PA-I-500.
10 Ibid.
11 Berchtold to Giesl (Conrad), 26. 11. 1914, HHStA, PA-I-499.
12 Ibid.
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The Foreign Ministry’s officials, who were engaged in developing various polit-
ical and economic plans for Serbia, went even further and on occasion even disre-
garded the views of Tisza. One of their plans, for example, drawn up for Berch-
told by MdÄ Section I (Balkans) in early August 1914, listed various ways in 
which Serbia could be subjugated and exploited. The most “radical” method, and 
one they recognised as being contrary to the GMR decision, was Serbia’s com-
plete disappearance by means of annexation and integration.13 Alternatively, an 
“independent” Serbian state might be limited by a customs union or similar de-
vice, although Austria-Hungary would need to control much of the country’s in-
ternal administration such as customs and finances. If the country was to be re-
leased after the war, the officials recommended a commercial treaty similar to 
those prior to 1908.14
In practice, however, from the outbreak of war until the new year, it was 
Tisza’s position on Serbia that was the decisive factor in Austro-Hungarian war 
aims planning. During the July Crisis, his goal had been to prevent Russian in-
volvement by assuring the world of Austria-Hungary’s defensive intentions. Af-
ter this failed, he began to gradually support and then even to spearhead the 
MdÄ’s policy of limited annexations, particularly in talks with the Germans. 
Moreover, he agreed with the MdÄ that, although the AOK was suffering heavy 
losses on the Russian front, success on the Balkan front remained the principal 
goal; they had similar objectives in key trans-Danubian border areas such as Bel-
grade, Mačva, and Negotin. Although Berchtold and Tisza had some differences 
in approach, the fact their goals were the same allowed the MdÄ to retain overall 
control of policymaking and the formulation of war aims. For the MdÄ as for 
Tisza, a victory in the Balkans remained the only basis on which a peace with 
Russia could be negotiated.
Polish Sub-Dualism or Tisza’s Division?
In addition to the Balkans, Austro-Hungarian officials spent considerable time de-
bating the future of Poland. The question of Polish independence was a poisoned 
chalice for Austria-Hungary. On the one hand, removing Poland from the already 
overwhelming Russian power-complex was a clear policy goal from mid-Au-
gust 1914,15 but acquiring it would not necessarily be beneficial. True, some politi-
cians in Vienna might calculate that detaching the Galician Poles and uniting them 
with their brethren in Congress Poland would remove from the Reichsrat an im-
portant Slav grouping which threatened the German majority. But that is where 
the potential benefits ended. A strengthening of the Polish national consciousness 
13 Andrássy, Denkschrift, 10. 8. 1914, REZL, 44.7.21-22.
14 Ibid.
15 Lothar Höbelt: Die austropolnische Lösung – eine unendliche Geschichte. In: Heeresge-
schichtliches Museum (ed.): Der Erste Weltkrieg und der Vielvölkerstaat (= Acta Austro-Poloni-
ca, vol. 4). Wien 2012, pp. 35–54.
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might lead to further centrifugal pressures in the Monarchy. The Hungarians, for 
their part, were dead against anything that might lead to the replacement of Dual-
ism by a Trialist system which would dilute Magyar power. Tisza therefore sup-
ported a so-called Austro-Polish solution, which would see Poland unified but 
 under Cisleithanian (i.e. Austrian) suzerainty in a “sub-Dualist” fashion.
With the defeats on the Russian front in 1914 and the loss of Galicia, neither 
option could be implemented. This did not prevent the MdÄ from developing its 
plans, however. For the former Consul General in Warsaw and future Zivillandes-
kommissar in Lublin (Poland), Leopold Andrian zu Werburg, for example, the 
aim of this war must be for Austria-Hungary to remain “independent and 
strengthened”;16 and his maximum programme, to be implemented if Germany 
managed to be victorious in the west, was to make Austria-Hungary truly a “Eu-
ropean Great Power of the first order” through widespread annexations in Poland 
at the expense of a defeated Russia.17
The Hungarians, by contrast, were less interested in annexations in Poland and 
Tisza’s bias in favour of Serbia became clear. Rather than insisting on Bosnia for 
Hungary as a compensation for Poland’s falling to the Austrian half of the Mon-
archy, he was already thinking a step ahead. As early as December 1914 he recom-
mended to Berchtold and various other leaders a pre-emptive division of (as yet 
unconquered) territory. With the excuse that a “triple allocation” of civilian occu-
pation personnel in Serbia (Austrian, Hungarian, and Imperial Austro-Hungari-
an) was wasteful and would lead to “completely superfluous tensions”, Tisza rec-
ommended a “competitive advantage” approach.18 By employing “Hungarian of-
ficials in Serbia and Austrian officials in Russian Poland”, Tisza thought a 
“natural” division of labour would strengthen the Monarchy’s administration of 
each of these regions.19 Although his request was rejected by both Berchtold and 
the Austrian Prime Minister Count Stürgkh,20 Tisza’s goal had been to make use 
of Hungarian officials in Serbia to prevent the army’s de facto annexation, gam-
bling that the Austrians would never allow Poland to secede entirely.
The other problem with Poland was Germany’s involvement, as Poland was a 
central war aim for Berlin too.21 As early as August 1914 the German State Secre-
tary Gottlieb von Jagow had rejected the idea of an Austro-Polish solution,22 and 
the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg had tied the question 
to the Mitteleuropa programme. Mitteleuropa, the initially vague German plan for 
16 Andrian, Denkschrift “Übersicht der für den Friedenschluss in Erwägung zu ziehenden Lö-
sungsmodalitäten”, December 1914, HHStA, PA-I-496.
17 Ibid.
18 Tisza to Berchtold, 2. 12. 1914, HHStA, PA-I-973.
19 Ibid.
20 Stürgkh to Tisza, 11. 12. 1914, HHStA, PA-I-973.
21 Gary W. Shanafelt: The Secret Enemy. Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918. 
New York 1984, p. 39.
22 John Leslie: Austria-Hungary’s Eastern War Aims. August 1914 to August 1915. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Diss. Cambridge 1975, p. 45; cited in: Höbelt: Austropolnische Lösung (see note 15), p. 2.
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a customs union with Austria-Hungary and any other friendly or dependent 
countries, would remain German policy throughout much of the war and was 
formally put forward in November 1916 as a condition for Germany’s acquiesc-
ing in an Austro-Polish solution.23
Burián’s Brinkmanship
Berchtold’s replacement by Burián at the helm of the MdÄ on 13 January 1915, 
the result of the former’s perceived weakness in the face of Italian threats of war, 
strengthened Tisza further. Burián was dismissed by his detractors as a mere 
“doctrinaire” diplomat who “has always been in the Balkans and conducted a Bal-
kan policy”.24 In the event, however, Burián, stern of demeanour and given to 
strong rhetoric, applied himself with some vigour to strengthening the prestige of 
the Monarchy and ensuring its parity with Germany. To this end, he engaged in a 
degree of brinkmanship, rejecting the option of Serbian peace, for example, but 
also the army’s annexationist attitudes, in pursuit of policy aimed at securing the 
conditions necessary to achieve the Monarchy’s war aims in the Balkans.
Initially, he concentrated on preventing the Balkan neutrals and Italy from at-
tacking Austria-Hungary. In February 1915 he stated that he would rather have 
war with Romania and Italy than give up even a “square meter”25 of Austro-Hun-
garian soil. However, in his first turbulent months in office Burián was faced with 
the loss of the fortress Przemyśl in March and the Gallipoli landings in April; and 
when Italy, enticed by Entente promises of extensive gains, called his bluff and 
declared war May 1915, the Monarchy was fighting on three fronts.
The failure of Burián’s unyielding line against Rome did not, however, alter his 
behaviour towards Romania, whose demands he continued to reject. This exasper-
ated the Germans26 and even his benefactor Tisza, who believed that a Romanian 
attack would “automatically” follow an Italian one. Such a fourth front would lead 
to Italian, Romanian, and Serbian troops invading deep into Austrian and Hungar-
ian territory, rendering any gains on the Russian front useless. Indeed, it would 
mean the “complete collapse” of the Monarchy, leading to its “dissolution”.27
Burián was not impressed by this gloomy talk; nor would he consent to the vast 
offers of territory to Bulgaria that Tisza and the Germans were demanding to se-
cure Bulgaria’s assistance.28 Tisza insisted frantically that the “entire future de-
23 Shanafelt: Secret Enemy (see note 21), p. 71.
24 Stephan Burián von Rajecz: Báró Burián István Naploi [diaries], (henceforth Burián: Napló), 
1907–1922. Edited by Magyarországi Réformátus Egyház Zsinati Levéltar, Erzsébet Horváth, 
Sándor Tenke. Budapest 1999, p. 139, fn. 159; quoting Forgách to Tisza, 26. 2. 1915, REZL, 44b 
154–155, 44a 27.
25 Bridge: Österreich(-Ungarn) (see note 1), p. 344; original location is HHStA-PA-I, Forgách 
Aide Memoire, 10. 01. 1915.
26 Burián, Memorandum, 25. 5. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-503; also: REZL, 44.10.27.
27 Tisza to Burián, 1. 5. 1915, REZL, 44.11.28.
28 Tisza to Burián, 18. 5. 1915, REZL, 45/17.
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pended” on holding the Balkan situation, mainly by using the Bulgarian link,29 as 
this was the “only way to prevent the collapse in the Balkans”;30 yet Burián was 
only prepared to make a few concessions to Bulgaria in the region of Macedonia, 
but nowhere else in the Balkans.
As regards Serbia, Burián’s war aims, despite his initial hesitations, ended up 
becoming more extensive. Although when in late May 1915 the Germans suggest-
ed a separate peace with Serbia, Burián told Bethmann he was prepared to consid-
er it, he was not thinking of an unconditional accommodation with Belgrade.31 
Indeed, he ruled out a return to the status quo ante and insisted on Serbia’s “hu-
miliation”; his demands included border corrections, the cession of Macedonia to 
Bulgaria, and guarantees against Greater Serbian “machinations”. Bethmann, for 
his part, was dismayed, and complained that Burián was not prepared to offer any 
“tangible benefits” to Serbia in return for a separate peace, and only “highlighted” 
Serbia’s “humiliation and diminution” as Austria-Hungary’s war aims.32
The positive implementation of war aims could only begin in earnest after the 
most serious losses were reversed. Although the AOK was able to hold back the 
larger Italian Army in the Alps, Serbia had still not been defeated and it took Ger-
man assistance to turn the tide for Austria-Hungary in 1915. This came with the 
Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów (May to September), which brought the liberation of 
almost all Austro-Hungarian territory and pushed the Russians out of Congress 
Poland all together. As the Dual Alliance successes against Russia grew, so did 
optimism about eventual victory in the Balkans; but with the ensuing march 
southwards Burián found himself facing strong adversarial challenges, from both 
Germany and Bulgaria, in the Monarchy’s own historic backyard.
Despite the fierce fighting on the northern and then Italian fronts, Burián contin-
ued, and even developed further, Berchtold’s policy of giving priority to the Bal-
kans. At the same time, however, he had been installed in office in order to 
strengthen the Monarchy’s prestige and establish its parity with Germany by driv-
ing a very hard bargain with Italy; and he was stubbornly determined not to cave in 
to pressure from Berlin or anywhere else. Although he ultimately failed to prevent 
Italian intervention, his approach only hardened vis-à-vis Romania; but whether he 
would be able to implement his Balkan war aims would depend on the defeat of 
Serbia, for which the Monarchy needed both German and Bulgarian assistance.
Phase II: Conquest and Occupation – October 1915 to January 1917
Austria-Hungary achieved its long desired goal of defeating Serbia and Montene-
gro in the winter of 1915. After the Gorlice-Tarnów offensive the Bulgarians con-
29 Tisza to Burián, 23. 5. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-519.
30 Tisza to Burián, 18. 5. 1915, REZL, 45/17.
31 Burián, Memorandum, 25. 5. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-503; also: REZL, 44.10.27.
32 Ibid.
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cluded that the Central Powers were likely to win the war, and agreed to join 
them in exchange for Serbian Macedonia. The addition of Bulgarian troops was 
vital to achieving the fall of Serbia by engulfing it in a three-pronged pincer move-
ment, creating widespread optimism in Vienna and Budapest: Serbia could at last 
be taught a “lesson” to satisfy “Austria-Hungary’s prestige”.33 (This, of course, 
ignored the fact that the Monarchy’s successes had mainly been achieved thanks 
to German and Bulgarian assistance.) This section will analyse the internal and 
external pressures the Monarchy’s leaders faced in determining and securing their 
war aims in these months of apparent success and what changed in their planning 
when the Brusilov Offensive once again put Austria-Hungary on the defensive.
The Future of the Balkans
With the retreat of Serbia’s Army across Albania, military realities began to give 
the AOK a new, disproportionate voice in discussions on the future of the Bal-
kans. Conrad, for example, now began an aggressive foray into influencing Aus-
tro-Hungarian war aims, which can be traced in the discussions between the 
MdÄ, AOK, and the Emperor via the military-bureaucratic framework of the 
Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät (MKSM). In October 1915, in one of the earliest 
wartime examples of his annexationist views, Conrad advocated “potential terri-
torial growth in Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Italy”.34 In November, in an ex-
traordinary approach to the Emperor himself – who generally only communicat-
ed with his Foreign Minister about such matters – Conrad insisted that Serbia 
should not be restored as an independent state, which would only be an “agitation 
cauldron” that could reignite yet another “catastrophic war”.35 He recommended 
a simple solution: the complete annexation of both Montenegro and Serbia by the 
Monarchy; and dismissed as irrelevant the resulting increase in Austria-Hungary’s 
Slavic component. Rejecting the frontier modifications that had been mooted ear-
lier, he argued that an “artificial construct” linked to Albania and including only 
Belgrade, the Mačva, and the Sandjak without wider annexations would leave the 
Monarchy with a disjointed and indefensible southern frontier that would inevita-
bly lead to a “most serious conflict”.36 The question was important, Conrad ex-
plained, because the Balkans represented the “most natural development region 
for the economic goals of the Monarchy”,37 – in comparison with which the Polish 
question was secondary. His aims in the western Balkans were, therefore, to 
throw the Italians out, to avoid a protectorate over Albania by dismembering it, 
and to annex or at least perpetually occupy Montenegro and rump Serbia so as to 
keep Bulgaria in check. In short, for Conrad, the “final delineation and stabilisa-
33 Hohenlohe to Burián, 6. 10. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-952.
34 Conrad to Franz Joseph, 10. 10. 1915, Kriegsarchiv (= KA), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät 
(= MKSM), 1915 18-27, 25-1/5.
35 Conrad to Franz Joseph, 22. 11. 1915, KA, MKSM, 1915 18-27, 25-1/5.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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tion” of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan aims and borders represented of all political 
and military questions the “most vital of the vital questions”,38 and to allow even 
a small Serbia to survive would mean that despite its military victory “the Monar-
chy would have to consider the war a defeat”.39
Conrad’s plans and recommendations stood in sharp contrast to Tisza’s. Essen-
tially, the Hungarian Prime Minister wanted the Monarchy to reserve the ex-
ploitation of rump Serbia for itself while keeping Germany and Bulgaria out. 
Burián was of similar mind: Serbia was a “border land” in the “most immediate 
sphere of interest” of the Monarchy, and therefore its occupied regions had to be 
exclusively under the control of an Austro-Hungarian military and civilian ad-
ministration.40 However, while no one in the Monarchy wanted to share the Aus-
trian half of the Austro-Bulgarian partition of Serbia with Germany, Tisza could 
not afford to see it annexed to the Monarchy. He was worried – unlike the cava-
lier Conrad – that annexation would eventually mean political power for the 
southern Slavs which could overwhelm the Dualist configuration of the Monar-
chy. Hence, Tisza desired to keep the majority of Serbs out of the Monarchy and 
to segregate them in the newly incorporated border regions from rump Serbia.41 
The means to do this would be a lengthy transition period during which the new-
ly acquired border territories would be governed autocratically, while the Monar-
chy implemented a “generous colonisation of Hungarian and German elements”.42 
This new “patriotic majority” would form a wedge between the Serbian rump 
state and the Serbian population of Slavonia and south Hungary. In an analogous 
fashion, Tisza wanted to see a “systematic augmentation” of Hungarian and Ger-
man towns in Syrmia, Bacska, and the Banat as a barrier to protect the southern 
border of the Monarchy from without and repress the Serbian minority within.43 
He therefore advocated a Hungarian annexation of the Mačva, followed by an 
“intensive colonisation” of reliable Hungarian and German farmers in order to 
create a wedge between the Serbs inside and those outside the Monarchy. In this 
way, Tisza hoped, Belgrade would sink to the level of a Hungarian provincial 
town and cease to be the focus for South Slav nationalism.44 Placing his premier-
ship on the line, Tisza threatened to resign if his colleagues and the Emperor de-
cided to annex rump Serbia; and certainly he, above all others, deplored the idea 
of extensive territorial growth by the Monarchy. Yet his own solution (tanta-
mount to demographic rearrangement similar to the German “Grenzstreifen con-
cept” in Poland) was at its core also both an expansionist and aggressive policy; 
Tisza even recognised that Russia would remain an enemy as a result. He believed, 
38 Ibid.
39 Conrad to Burián, 25. 12. 1915, KA, MKSM, 1915 18-27, 25-1/5.
40 Burián to Thurn, 7. 11. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-973; also: REZL, 45/15.
41 Tisza to Franz Joseph, 4. 12. 1915, REZL, 44.14.31; also: REZL, 44.9.25.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Miklós Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Österreichisch-Unga-
rischen Monarchie, 1914–1918. Budapest 1966, p. 365.
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however that this was the only acceptable solution, and that the best chance for an 
honourable peace lay in leaving at least a portion of Serbia intact.45
It was Burián who applied the brakes to both Conrad’s and Tisza’s extravagant 
ideas – although his own policies, while more moderate than theirs, could still 
hardly be considered modest. For example, he wanted territorial changes in the 
Balkan peninsula and elsewhere to provide for the “greatest possible increase in 
power and security” for Austria-Hungary,46 neutralising Serbian-Russian agita-
tion47 and ensuring that in some form or another Serbia and Montenegro would 
fall under Austria-Hungary’s “political, military, and economic rule”.48 True, 
while he assured Tisza that he regarded Austrian and Hungarian security as indi-
visible,49 and promised Conrad that he would work for some, but not all, the an-
nexations the AOK was demanding, he refused to endorse their wilder plans for 
“radical territorial reorganisation”.50 It was not that Burián was opposed in prin-
ciple to annexing Serbian territory, or to expanding his Balkan war aims; but he 
was unwilling on the one hand to sell himself short by committing himself too 
early, or on the other to commit himself to annexations which might prevent an 
honourable peace. Even so, he was of one mind with both Conrad and Tisza over 
a quite impressive programme of war aims: Montenegro must lose its coastline, 
including Mount Lovćen which threatened the Austro-Hungarian naval base at 
Catarro, and some northern territory to the Monarchy, and territory to Albania, 
while Serbia must lose Belgrade, the Mačva, and the territory promised to Bulgar-
ia.51 Albania would become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate, while Poland was 
to be kept away from Germany and “affiliated” with the Monarchy. Tisza also 
pushed for his ‘Poland for Austria, Serbia for Hungary’ plan, which he considered 
the “most important question”.52
The final GMR to settle this debate took no decisions in detail about Serbia, 
allowing for maximum flexibility, but it agreed that any territory annexed by the 
Monarchy would go to Hungary.53 Some later writers have erroneously interpret-
ed this as a GMR decision for the outright annexation of Serbia,54 but according 
to statements from diplomats at the time this was clearly not the case; although 
Burián admitted in his diary that he personally preferred to annex Serbia,55 he was 
more pragmatic in discussions at the GMR. In fact, although there would be three 
45 Tisza to Franz Joseph, 4. 12. 1915, REZL, 44.14.31; also: REZL, 44.9.25.
46 Burián to Conrad, 25. 12. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-499; also cited in: Fritz Fischer: Griff nach der 
Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18. Düsseldorf 1967, p. 396. 
47 Conrad to Burián, 21. 12. 1915, REZL, 44.14.31; Burián’s comments, quoted by Conrad.
48 Conrad to Burián, 25. 12. 1915, KA, MKSM, 1915 18-27, 25-1/5.
49 Burián to Tisza, 10. 12. 1915, REZL, 44.3.3.
50 Burián to Conrad, 10. 12. 1915, HHStA, PA-I-499; also: Burián to Tisza, 10. 12. 1915, REZL, 
44.3.3.
51 Ibid.
52 Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle (see note 44), 4. 1. 1916, p. 363.
53 Ibid., p. 374.
54 Fischer: Griff (see note 46), p. 397.
55 Burián: Napló (see note 24), p. 167.
“A Life and Death Question” 127
more GMRs under Burián’s auspices in 1916, none of them raised the issue of war 
aims again. Burián therefore was left with a free hand to determine war aims poli-
cy, and he exercised it immediately. At the end of January 1916 he told his top 
negotiator that the discussions with Montenegro would be “less about negotiat-
ing, than about dictating Austria-Hungary’s peace conditions”56 and this Diktat 
included the cession of Montenegro’s coastline, the Lovćen plateau, other militar-
ily vital areas, and domestic policing and customs control.57 Although Burián be-
lieved these terms would create a strong position for the Monarchy in Montene-
gro – a goal deemed to be a “life and death question”58 for Austria-Hungary – they 
satisfied neither Conrad (who felt they were too lenient)59 nor the Germans (who 
felt they were too harsh).60 There were similar controversial debates about Alba-
nia, which Burián wished to treat as a protectorate and expand Austria-Hungary’s 
influence right down the eastern Adriatic and into the Mediterranean.61 Here too, 
however, despite pressures from internal and external stakeholders, Burián stood 
firm and the MdÄ continued to pursue the war aims he had laid down.
The Austro-Bulgarian Clash
Perhaps the strongest evidence of Austria-Hungary’s willingness to resist any en-
croachment on its sphere of interest came from its confrontations with Bulgaria 
over Serbia early in 1916. Indeed, a diplomatic and military clash over Kosovo 
nearly caused a fatal unravelling of the Quadruple Alliance. For while Burián, in 
his determination to keep his hands free, was refusing to clarify his intentions re-
garding Kosovo and other regions of Serbia which did not fall on the Bulgarian 
side of the agreed treaty line, the Bulgarians began to advance into this territory, 
provoking both Conrad and Burián to respond in a manner which was harsh even 
by their standards.
True, the German Foreign Ministry disapproved of Bulgaria’s encroachments 
west of the treaty line,62 and Burián managed to use this to obtain Berlin’s support 
for his planned protectorate over a greater Albania, which was to include Koso-
vo.63 He even got the Turks (never keen to see Muslims consigned to Slav rule) to 
support his project.64 The Bulgarians, however, continued to attach “very great 
56 Burián to Otto, 19. 1. 1916, HHStA, PA-I-953k.
57 Burián to Conrad, 20. 1. 1916, HHStA, PA-I-953k; also: REZL, 45/16.
58 Burián to Fürstenberg, 22. 1. 1916, HHStA, PA-I-954p; also: REZL, 45/16.
59 AOK to Burián, 22. 1. 1916, HHStA, PA-I-953k.
60 Tschirschky to Jagow, 22. 1. 1916, National Archives Records Administration, USA (= 
NARA), PG-1117, SA (T-136).
61 Marvin B. Fried: The Cornerstone of Balkan Power Projection. Austro-Hungarian War Aims 
and the Problem of Albanian Neutrality, 1914–1918. In: Diplomacy & Statecraft 23 (2012) 3, 
pp. 425–445.
62 Jagow to Treutler, 31. 1. 1916, NARA, UM-3/1-297.
63 Burián to Hohenlohe, 2. 2. 1916, HHStA, PA-I-1007; also Hohenlohe to Jagow, 5. 2. 1916, 
NARA, UM-3/1-297.
64 Tschirschky to Bethmann-Hollweg, 13. 2. 1916, NARA, PG-1117, SA (T-136).
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importance”65 to annexing Pristina and Prizren in Kosovo, which fell on the Aus-
trian side of the treaty border but where they had already installed civilian admin-
istrators. Torn between their allies, the Germans were perplexed and divided: on 
the one hand, Kaiser Wilhelm repeatedly urged Tsar Ferdinand to accept “the in-
dependence of Albania under Austrian protection”.66 (According to Fischer, the 
Germans were beginning to fear for their fair share of the “spoils of war”,67 and 
Berlin may have been hoping that German support for an Austro-Hungarian suc-
cess in the Balkans might sugar the pill of a German rejection of the Austro-Pol-
ish solution.) However, while the German Foreign Ministry supported Burián, 
the German High Command supported Sofia.
In this situation, the Bulgarians were unimpressed by equivocal advice from 
Berlin and continued to maintain their civilian administrators in Pristina, Prizren, 
and elsewhere in Kosovo. The first actual confrontation with the Austrians oc-
curred on 27 February 1916, when an Austro-Hungarian unit was prevented by 
Bulgarian troops from entering Kazanik in southern Kosovo, whereupon Conrad 
immediately halted all deliveries of war supplies to the Bulgarians.68 In Berlin, 
Foreign Secretary Jagow was extremely alarmed lest independent actions by the 
Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian High Commands might result in further clash-
es; he supported Burián’s recommendation (made rather contrary to Conrad’s 
wishes) to ask the German General August von Mackensen to mediate. Burián, 
meanwhile, firmly reminded Tsar Ferdinand that “west of the treaty border began 
the Austro-Hungarian sphere of interest” and insisted to Jagow that it was only 
due to the “cool heads” of the AOK that more serious incidents had not taken 
place.69 Although, when Vienna ordered the withdrawal of its forces from the 
area, the situation had returned to “approximately the status quo ante”,70 the 
Austrians still refused to permit the Bulgarians to administer Kazanik and left 
their troops in Pristina and Prizren to keep an eye on the Bulgarians and demon-
strate the Monarchy’s continuing interest in the area.
With regard to Bulgaria’s future activities, Burián planned to continue friendly 
negotiations,71 while at the same time supporting the AOK in its negotiations, 
under German auspices, with its Bulgarian counterpart.72 Unfortunately for 
Conrad, however, German good offices did not make much difference on the 
ground. On 7 March the AOK learned of a written Bulgarian order prohibiting 
all further requisitioning by Austro-Hungarian troops in Pristina and Prizren, 
prompting AOK protests. Clearly incensed but aware that the Monarchy was 
currently too weak to “defend its rights with military means of coercion”, Con-
65 Jagow to Treutler, 11. 3. 1916, NARA, FT 5004 (T-120,2522); also: NARA, UM-3/1-297.
66 Jagow to Falkenhayn, 19. 2. 1916, NARA, FT 5004 (T-120,2522) E285613-748.
67 Fischer: Griff (see note 46), p. 288.
68 Treutler to Jagow, 1. 1. 1916, NARA, FS-UM-134 (T-137) 1-156.
69 Jagow to Treutler, 3. 3. 1916, NARA, FS-UM-134 (T-137) 1-156.
70 Jagow to Treutler, 2. 3. 1916, NARA, FS-UM-134 (T-137) 1-156.
71 Jagow to Treutler, 5. 3. 1916, NARA, FT 5004 (T-120,2522).
72 Burián to Thurn/Tarnowski, 5. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
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rad proceeded to ask Burián for more diplomatic support against these “ever 
larger and more alarming violations”:73 Bulgaria must agree to a partition of the 
Pristina-Prizren region, recognise Austria-Hungary’s exclusive military authori-
ty in north Albania and all of Montenegro, and retreat from Djakova.74 This epi-
sode opened a second Austro-Bulgarian crisis – at alliance level. Burián support-
ed Conrad’s demands,75 but his repeated pleas to the Bulgarians for restraint in 
the matter of civilian administration fell on deaf ears;76 his compromise sugges-
tion of a joint Austro-Hungarian-Bulgarian military commission to control Pris-
tina-Prizren was rejected by Conrad.77 The Bulgarians, for their part, felt they 
had the right to install civilian administrators in any territory they conquered; 
and Vienna was afraid that they would never be willing to part with such territo-
ries.78 Even Tisza, who badly needed the Bulgarian goodwill to keep Romania in 
check, roundly condemned their “exorbitant greed”.79 On 18 March Sofia for-
mally demanded that Prizren, Pristina, and Elbassan remain under their Bulgari-
an civilian administrations. Jagow considered this plan both fair and beneficial to 
Germany, since otherwise “a serious conflict with Vienna” could result, which 
must be avoided “at all costs”.80 However, Burián’s “brusque”81 rejection of it 
made Jagow fear that Bulgaria might defect from the alliance – a nightmarish 
prospect indeed, given that “the bloc whose coalition first goes to pieces” would 
be doomed to lose the war.82
Meanwhile, the situation on the spot again became precarious. By 23 March the 
Bulgarian administration in Djakova (Montenegro) was using force to prevent the 
population from following the directives of the local Austro-Hungarian com-
manders.83 Conrad warned the Bulgarian High Command that unless the local 
Bulgarian commander abstained from meddling with the Austro-Hungarian ad-
ministration, a “conflict with Austro-Hungarian troops” would be “inevitable”.84 
In the event, although the Bulgarians continued to station troops in Kosovo, on 
25 March they sealed off the treaty border, thereby formally designating it, in ef-
fect, as the “new Bulgarian national border”.85 This move was actually welcome 
to Conrad – hence his decision, abandoning his previous intransigent attitude, to 
recall an Austrian battalion deployed on the Bulgarian side of the treaty border: 
for this gave him the opportunity to summon the Bulgarians to withdraw their 
73 Thurn to Burián, 7. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
74 Burián to Tarnowski, 8. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
75 Burián to Conrad, 10. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
76 Burián to Tarnowski, 8. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
77 Ibid.
78 Oberndorff to Jagow, 15. 3. 1916, NARA, UM-3/1-297.
79 Tisza to Tarnowski, 18. 3. 1916, REZL, 44b.8.6.
80 Jagow to Treutler/Oberndorff, 18. 3. 1916, NARA, UM-135/777-795.
81 Oberndorff to Jagow, 23. 3. 1916, NARA, UM-135/777-795.
82 Jagow to Oberndorff, 25. 3. 1916, NARA, UM-135/777-795.
83 Wiesner to Burián, 24. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
84 Ibid.
85 Thurn to Burián, 25. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
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units stationed on the Austro-Hungarian side of the treaty border, namely in Pris-
tina-Prizren, Djakova, and Elbassan.86
The Chief of the German General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, attempted to 
broker a temporary agreement whereby both sides would withdraw their military 
forces from the disputed towns;87 but Burián was in no mood to accept even this 
proposal, let alone what he termed “unjustified Bulgarian claims” on Pristi-
na-Prizren; and he was pleased to see that the AOK had redeployed troops there 
to enforce Austria’s wishes.88 Apparently, Sofia regarded Serbian territory west of 
the treaty border as fair game because the Austrians had not laid claim to any-
thing beyond a Belgrade bridgehead and the Mačva.89 Conrad therefore urged 
Burián and the MKSM to make it clear once and for all that “formerly Serbian 
territory west of the treaty border remains reserved exclusively under Aus-
tro-Hungarian dominion”.90
The crisis was suddenly defused on 27 March when the AOK – in accordance 
with Conrad’s wishes and contrary to Burián’s stated position on the matter – 
provisionally vacated the Pristina-Prizren area in exchange for the Bulgarians do-
ing the same in Djakova and Elbassan.91 The agreement was made without in-
forming Berlin or Pless beforehand,92 but at least it met with the approval of the 
Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand.93 Burián, frustrated in his hopes of removing the Bul-
garian civilian administration from Pristina-Prizren, attempted at first to plead ig-
norance of the military deal.94 In the end, however, he was forced to accept what 
he termed the AOK’s “military provisional arrangement”, although it had been 
made “against the objections of the MdÄ”. Burián rejected Conrad’s charge that it 
had been his failings that had whetted Bulgarian appetites for Kosovo in the first 
place, and pointed out that the MdÄ had repeatedly informed Sofia that the area 
to the west of the treaty border was “an Austro-Hungarian sphere of interest”.95 
In the end, Burián and Jagow would have to work hard to insist on the temporary 
status of the military agreement over Prizren-Pristina, and that the Austrian gov-
ernment “fully maintained its demands” on Kosovo96 – despite the “vehement 
lamentations” of Tsar Ferdinand who had clearly hoped the issue had been settled 
permanently in his favour.97 In the summer of 1916, however, all these questions 
were pushed into the background as the Monarchy once again faced an existential 
threat emanating from Russia. 
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88 Burián to Wiesner, 25. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
89 Conrad to Burián, 25. 3. 1916, REZL, 45/16.
90 Ibid.; also: Treutler to Jagow, 28. 3. 1916, NARA, FT 5004 (T-120,2522).
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The Brusilov Offensive
The success of the Gorlice-Tarnów offensive in Poland and Bulgaria’s interven-
tion in the Balkans marked the high point of Austria-Hungary’s hopes of achiev-
ing its war aims in both regions. In the south, Austria-Hungary had established 
occupation regimes in Serbia, Montenegro, and half of Albania, while in the north 
it controlled roughly a third of Congress Poland from Lublin. Once the Brusilov 
Offensive started in June 1916, however, followed by the hostile Romanian inter-
vention in August, the Monarchy was no longer able to fight independently and 
had to rely henceforth on its powerful German ally. It was only with German as-
sistance that these offensives had been halted (with staggering losses in the Rus-
sian case); the weakening of Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic position as a result of 
these military embarrassments was bound to undermine its ability to pursue and 
achieve its own war aims. Out of the victory over Romania, for example, the 
Monarchy achieved only limited gains (albeit including the dock of Turn-Severin, 
Romania’s “largest and most efficient dockyard”,98 indispensable for the control 
of the Iron Gates); but for the rest – valuable resources and services such as Dan-
ube transport, food reserves, industry, and agriculture – the Germans slowly and 
steadily appropriated for themselves.
Although Tisza had made it clear that “securing Austro-Hungarian interests in 
the Balkans was a principal axiom” of the Monarchy’s policy,99 Vienna now 
found its allies encroaching more and more on its most vital spheres of interest: 
Bulgaria, for example, her eyes still “peering towards the Adriatic”,100 continued 
to create tension in the western Balkans. Perhaps even more worrying, in pow-
er-political terms, the Germans seemed to have set their sights on the Albanian 
port of Valona. In a top-secret memorandum for Bethmann Hollweg in Novem-
ber 1916 recommending the establishment of a Mediterranean naval base in Al-
bania, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff declared straight out that Valona 
“must become German”.101 Meanwhile, the Germans were interfering with Aus-
tro-Hungarian planning in other areas, such as Montenegro and Serbia. 
In a discussion of war aims on 15 November 1916, Burián attempted to 
counter German demands, protect Austria-Hungary’s conquests, and secure 
conditions for peace. He failed, and the weakness of his position was demon-
strated when he was forced to sacrifice almost all interests relating to Albania 
and the western Slavs. The Germans rejected an Austrian annexation of Monte-
negro, pressing instead for the union of Montenegro with Serbia.102 Only on 
one point was Burián able to resist with a categorical refusal: the idea of allow-
ing a Serbian port in the Adriatic at the expense of Albania. This, he said, would 
98 Conrad to Czernin, 17. 1. 1917, HHStA, PA-I-1043.
99 Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle (see note 44), 12. 1. 1917, p. 447.
100 Wedel to Zimmerman, 10. 12. 1916, NARA, T-120-1498-D627063-627714.
101 Holtzendorff to Auswärtiges Amt, 26. 11. 1916, NARA, T-120-1498-D627063-627714.
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give Serbia’s prestige such a boost that Vienna would “really have to ask itself 
why it was fighting this war”.103 For the rest, his hopes of putting forward a 
peace “without relinquishing vital interests”104 were dashed in the face of Ger-
man resistance.
As regards Poland, the military disasters of the summer at last forced Burián, 
under pressure from Tisza and Stürgkh, to give up the Austro-Polish solution, as 
the Germans were demanding; but he still continued to demand complete parity 
with Germany in Poland.105 From July, however, the Germans were pressing the 
Austrians hard to accept a subordinate role in Poland, arguing that a German-con-
trolled Poland would be a “kind of parallel to the ‘Balkans’ for Austria-Hunga-
ry”.106 Burián, for his part, refused to equate the two and played down Austria- 
Hungary’s future role in the Balkans in order to achieve parity in the Polish 
question, which, he reminded Berlin, was “politically, militarily, and economical-
ly” the Dual Alliance’s “most important joint accomplishment”.107 Besides, he 
argued, control of Courland and Lithuania would be a greater gain for Germany 
than Serbia, Montenegro and Albania put together would be for Austria-Hunga-
ry.108 In short, Burián was attempting to treat the Balkans as non-negotiable with 
the Germans, just as Berlin would never allow Vienna a voice in Baltic affairs. 
The key difference was, of course, that Germany was helping to win a war in the 
Balkans which Austria-Hungary could not manage alone; but Burián continued 
to hanker after ensuring parity in Poland to justify Austria-Hungary’s sacrifices 
there, while demanding for the Monarchy exclusive control over as much of the 
Balkans as possible. Ultimately, the decision to establish Poland as a constitu-
tional monarchy under the joint control of the Central Powers was made in Au-
gust, and finalised at Pless in October. A Polish “Condominium” was duly pro-
claimed on 5 November 1916, but the question of who would in fact control it 
remained open. At any rate, despite Burián’s earlier insistence that “conquest of 
Poland had not been a war aim”,109 he was still hoping somehow to draw the 
territory into the Monarchy’s sphere of influence. Indeed, if the flame of Aus-
tro-Hungarian expansionism had flickered temporarily with the military set-
backs of the summer of 1916, it had by no means been extinguished – as the final 
section of this chapter will show.
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affaires étrangères. Vol. 1: Des origines à la déclaration de la guerre sous-marine à outrance. 
Août 1914–31 janvier 1917. Paris 1962, p. 517.
105 Shanafelt: Secret Enemy (see note 21), p. 89.
106 Burián to Hohenlohe, 4. 7. 1916, HHStA, PA-I-501; also: REZL, 45/17.
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109 Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle (see note 44), p. 290.
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Phase III: Hunger and Decline – January 1917 to October 1918
The final phase of the development of Austria-Hungary’s war aims testified to an 
irreversible decline in its power that inevitably diminished its ability to achieve its 
goals. Although the Monarchy was to fight on for almost two years after the 
death of Emperor Franz Joseph, the focus of the new leadership was less immedi-
ately concerned with achieving offensive goals than with heading off starvation, 
revolution, and dissolution. Even so, it is striking that both the new Emperor 
Karl I and his Foreign Minister Ottokar Count Czernin von und zu Chudenitz 
clung to the belief that an honourable peace must still include territorial conquest 
and economic domination and that despite the Monarchy’s obviously declining 
importance, Berlin still had to pay at least lip service to Vienna’s daydreaming.
Peace as Cover for Conquest
In this last phase of the war, when hunger became the most pressing issue facing 
the Monarchy, Karl and Czernin began to encounter stiff resistance from an es-
tablishment unwilling to settle for simply making peace. Although Karl managed 
to remove his most troublesome opponents in the form of Burián, Conrad, and 
eventually Tisza by mid-1917, other diplomats and soldiers stepped in to defend 
what they perceived to be the Monarchy’s interests from the young Emperor and 
his crafty Foreign Minister.
It should be noted, however, that even Karl was not prepared to settle for 
peace on absolutely any terms. Although he was prepared to make compromises 
to secure the Monarchy’s more important accomplishments – for example, to al-
low Serbia to survive provided his “principal war aim”, maintaining the Monar-
chy’s integrity, was assured110 – he nevertheless sanctioned an accord signed by 
Czernin and Bethmann in March 1917 setting out the maximum and minimum 
war aims of the Central Powers. According to the minimum programme, their 
armies would only withdraw from Russia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and Ro-
mania if the status quo ante bellum were restored in the east and the west. The 
maximum programme provided for expansion “in the east” for Germany and in 
Romania for the Monarchy;111 although the actual extent of these annexations 
would depend on the ultimate diplomatic position on the “performances/
achievements” of each of the allies (which implied that Germany would receive 
the lion’s share).112
Ostensibly, Czernin only wished to talk about peace, and he even endorsed 
Woodrow Wilson’s plans for disarmament, international arbitration, and a League 
of Nations. In reality, however, his desire for expansion in the Balkans remained 
110 Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle (see note 44), 12. 1. 1917, p. 451.
111 Czernin to Bethmann-Hollweg, Agreement, 27. 3. 1917, HHStA, PA-I-524; also: NARA, 
T-120-1498-D627063-627714.
112 Ibid.
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as strong as ever, although he kept other parties in the dark about it.113 From 
Bethmann he demanded no less than complete “parity with Germany in econom-
ic and territorial questions”, with no Balkan or Russian (i.e. Polish) territory be-
ing returned until the occupied portions of the Monarchy had been returned.114 
By demonstratively aligning himself with peace parties such as the Meinl Group, 
he sought to prove that Austria-Hungary was not “fighting a war of conquest”;115 
but secretly he wanted to “arrange” a number of Balkan questions “according to 
Austria-Hungary’s wishes”,116 calculating that the Entente would turn a blind eye 
rather than to allow the entire peace negotiations to fail. In Montenegro, for ex-
ample, he sought to create a “kind of fait accompli”117 by annexing the entire 
Lovćen outright, together with enough of the coastline to create a connection 
with Albania.118 Such plans were consistent with previous Austro-Hungarian war 
aims, and Czernin was willing to mask his true intentions to achieve them. The 
Germans, by contrast, felt no such compunction, as the High Command began to 
ignore Austria-Hungary’s wishes and sought to control not only vast territories in 
the east and the west, but the Dual Monarchy itself.
Poland, Ukraine, and Brest-Litovsk
Amidst all the talk of war aims, the conclusion of a peace that would secure the 
food supply – “the most burning question of the whole war”119 – was beginning to 
replace territorial expansion as the Monarchy’s primary objective. As the threat of 
starvation and of infection by the Russian revolution intensified the emperor’s de-
sire for a speedy peace, Czernin took unprecedented steps to persuade Germany to 
give ground in the west. He offered to hand over all of Austrian-occupied Poland, 
and even Galicia, the Monarchy’s largest crown territory and Austrian since 1815, 
to a Polish state that would be controlled from Berlin. This offer, endorsed by the 
AOK in July 1917, was made in the hope of obtaining grain supplies from Roma-
nia (where the Germans were still in control) and the Ukraine;120 and it showed 
that the AOK was no less prepared than Czernin to cede Austrian territory pro-
vided that as part of a final peace the population of the Monarchy would be fed, its 
Hungarian territory enlarged, and its Balkan acquisitions secured.
This was Czernin’s policy at the Brest-Litovsk peace conference, where, in an 
attempt to secure grain supplies from the new Ukrainian government in exchange 
for the cession of the Cholm district of Galicia, he signed the so-called “Bread 
Peace” with the Ukraine on 9 February 1918. In the event, however, the Monar-
113 Arz to MdÄ, 6. 10. 1917, KA, AOK-Fasz-3483, MV-165.044.
114 Czernin, Memorandum, 16. 3. 1917, HHStA, PA-I-504.
115 Czernin to Otto, 18. 8. 1917, HHStA, PA-I-1074.
116 Ibid.
117 Czernin to Otto, Secret Annex, 18. 8. 1917, HHStA, PA-I-1074.
118 Ibid.
119 Czernin to Hohenlohe, 23. 4. 1917, as cited in: Shanafelt: Secret Enemy (see note 21), p. 140.
120 Kuhn to Burian, Belgrade, 22. 7. 1917, HHStA, PA-I-973.
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chy received no grain owing to the chaos prevailing in Kiev; while the cession of 
the Cholm so infuriated the Poles that any future ‘Austro-Polish’ solution or sim-
ilar method of controlling Poland indirectly was destroyed forever. Despite Karl’s 
attempts to backtrack, proposing to Berlin the creation of a Poland “as satisfied 
and untrimmed as possible”,121 the damage had been done. Even the Poles of 
Galicia now broke with the government in Vienna; and by the autumn all talk of 
resolving the Polish question by some form of association with Austria-Hungary, 
even with German consent, had come to nothing as Austria-Hungary was itself 
being torn apart.
Daydreaming amid Collapse
In some respects, things seemed to look good in the summer of 1918. Austria-Hun-
gary had achieved most of its offensive war aims: Russia had been defeated and 
forced to accept peace on terms that even Czernin thought excessively draconian, 
Ukraine was a possible future grain supplier and buffer-state, and despite estrang-
ing Poles at home and abroad the Monarchy retained its Lublin occupation zone 
and therefore a say in the area. In Romania, the threat from irredentist expansion-
ism had been crushed while the Monarchy won key border rectifications, an an-
nexation of the Iron Gates, and a one-third stake in the state oil monopoly – al-
though Germany secured near total control of the infrastructure. In the Balkans, 
its territorial “backyard”, Vienna had successfully fended off a series of German 
and Bulgarian threats to its occupation zones in Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania. 
Finally, the Monarchy’s most despised enemy, Italy, had nearly collapsed after 
Caporetto and in spite of Allied assistance was no longer the threat it had once 
been. Perhaps most important of all, the territorial integrity of the Monarchy had 
been restored, as foreign forces had been evicted from all of its lands and its 
armies stood without exception on enemy territory.
Yet this impressive scenario was to a large extent, if not utterly, vitiated by a 
number of facts on the ground: at home, the Monarchy was grappling with ram-
pant hunger, constant strikes, and the very real threat of a Bolshevik-style revolu-
tion; abroad with political and military subordination to Germany, and the physi-
cal exhaustion of its armed forces. This being the case, Austria-Hungary’s ambi-
tious programme of war aims, which had always contained surreal elements, could 
now only be described as daydreaming. Changes at the top – with the Sixtus affair 
in April 1918 undermining the emperor’s credibility and precipitating the resigna-
tion of Czernin and the return of Burián to the Ballhausplatz – did nothing to 
remedy the situation. On the contrary, voices now gained a hearing that were 
even more remote from reality. 
In the summer of 1918 the Chief of the General Staff Arz von Straussenburg, 
who initially after his elevation in Conrad’s place had been far less aggressive and 
121 Ungron Report, 6. 4. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-1039 Liasse 56/30, as cited in: Höbelt: Austropolni-
sche Lösung (see note 15), p. 9.
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involved in political questions than his predecessor, suddenly developed a strong 
belief in the AOK’s right to criticise the Foreign Ministry’s allegedly feeble posi-
tion on war aims. While the AOK was gearing up for what would turn out to be 
Austria-Hungary’s last offensive in the war, on the Piave, Arz embarked on a dis-
cussion of the Balkans with Burián on 27 May. Arz pressed him to agree to the 
annexation of Albania,122 but the Foreign Minister objected that as even Italy had 
given up its Balkan colonialism for the principle of national self-determination, 
Vienna could not possibly revert to reactionary “annexationist tendencies”.123 
This did not satisfy Arz at all, who dismissed MdÄ attitudes as mere procrastina-
tion while Austria-Hungary’s last region of potential expansion slipped out of its 
control. Even as the material and psychological exhaustion of the Monarchy was 
threatening its collapse, the AOK persisted with its demands for annexations as if 
the war were being won on all fronts.
For example, while the OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung) suffered a major setback 
with the failure of its Champagne-Marne Offensive in July 1918, Arz himself was 
busily planning a counterattack in Albania set for 24 July. Indeed, on 21 July he 
sent Burián an extensive, and somewhat astonishing, memorandum on Aus-
tro-Hungarian war aims in the western Balkans, together with several elaborate 
maps detailing the division of territory in best-case to worst-case scenarios. Even 
his minimum war aims involved widespread annexations of Serbian and Montene-
grin territory. Arz insisted that Austria-Hungary’s “war aims in the Balkans must 
be the complete incorporation” of both Serbia and Montenegro into the Monar-
chy;124 for a victor had the right to determine the outcome of his victory, and 
Austria-Hungary was undoubtedly the “victor in the Balkans”. Of course, Arz 
might have said more about the fact that Bulgaria still maintained extensive claims 
right across the Balkans, that the Entente still held a so far impenetrable front 
from Valona to Salonika, and that Germany was slowly making itself dominant in 
Romania. In fact, he did warn that the strengthening of Bulgaria would be “tanta-
mount” to a “hegemonic takeover” in the Balkans which would in turn mean the 
Monarchy’s “losing its hegemony” in the only area where it was still capable of 
exercising it. If Vienna were politically and economically rolled back in the Bal-
kans, it would lose “all elbow-room” and would be forced into a new war to se-
cure the territory it needed for its economic expansion.125 In short, Arz had come 
to understand that only in the Balkans could Austria-Hungary hope to extract 
any territorial gains from what was a disastrous and costly war; although it has to 
be said that his faith in the Monarchy’s ability to survive and fight a future war 
was truly remarkable.
122 Trauttmansdorff to Burián, 27. 5. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-1007; also: Arz to Burián, 11. 6. 1918, 
AOK-Fasz-3543, MV-318.295, based on Helmut Schwanke: Zur Geschichte der österreichisch-
ungarischen Militärverwaltung in Albanien (1916–1918). Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. Wien 1982.
123 Burián to Trauttmansdorff, 5. 6. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-1007.
124 Arz to Burián, 21. 7. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-500.
125 Ibid.
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Aware that the MdÄ and the Hungarians would resist the wholesale incorpora-
tion of the western Balkans, Arz laid out the minimum military border rectifica-
tions necessary to protect Austro-Hungarian interests from “most serious dam-
age” if an independent Montenegro and Serbia had to be created. Not that this 
was a very generous offer anyway: Arz remained committed to Austria-Hunga-
ry’s earliest war aims in the region – Mount Lovćen, the Sandjak, and Majdanpek 
mines – and the Montenegrin and Serbian capitals would both be annexed. Any 
territory whatever that was incorporated would have to be ruled militarily “for 
decades” to properly “educate” the populations.126 Finally, Arz stressed the need 
for speedy action: after all, Austria-Hungary’s “unpreparedness” for peace negoti-
ations had had very “detrimental consequences”, in the north-east and Poland and 
such mistakes must not be repeated in the Balkans. There, Austria-Hungary’s pas-
sivity would be exploited by the Bulgarians and the Germans, both of whom had 
interests that conflicted with the Monarchy’s and damaged its prestige.127
In contrast to Arz, Burián remained level-headed enough to know the AOK’s 
far-reaching plans could not be achieved. On 30 July he told Arz that he failed to 
understand the necessity of “transitioning to a policy of conquest”;128 but even he 
was now prepared to admit that the vagueness that had characterised the MdÄ’s 
policy since early 1915 could always be clarified to suit the military situation, and 
might well prove useful in securing the maximum gains for the Monarchy. 
Germany as the Final Guarantor
Apart from fending off Arz, Burián had to contend with German attempts to 
deny Austria-Hungary a voice in the debate over northern questions. In a discus-
sion with Chancellor Georg von Hertling and his Foreign Secretary Richard 
von Kühlmann on 11 June 1918, Burián returned to the Austro-Polish solution 
but was directed towards compensations in Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. 
He replied that annexations of large swathes of territory in the latter two coun-
tries was “not part of Austria-Hungary’s policy programme”;129 and that he per-
sonally, unlike the AOK and the Hungarians, was “decidedly opposed” to any 
annexations in Serbia whatsoever.130 In fact, all talk of the Monarchy’s expanding 
further into Slav territory was fast becoming a pipedream, as before the month 
was out U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing had proclaimed Wilson’s goal of 
liberating all branches of Slavs from German and Austro-Hungarian rule, and 
both France and Britain had rallied to his support. The Monarchy was now fight-
ing for its own survival, and though the Germans gave way over Serbia, Montene-
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Burián to Arz, 30. 7. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-1007.
129 Burián Report of Hertling/Kühlmann talks, 11. 6.–12. 6. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-505; also: HHStA, 
PA-I-536.
130 Ibid.
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gro, and Albania, they insisted on retaining Valona, together with control over 
petroleum, trains, and shipping.131 The fact that in return for these grudging con-
cessions the Monarchy was pledged to go on fighting in Europe for German ob-
jectives as far away as the Crimea, Egypt, and Mesopotamia was further evidence 
Vienna was steadily falling into a condition of vassalage to Berlin.
By September 1918, when Burián met Kühlmann’s successor Paul von Hintze 
in Vienna, it was clear that the war effort of the Central Powers was collapsing. 
What remained was to identify some minimal joint aims that could still be 
achieved. Yet even here there were differences of approach: while Burián was ask-
ing the Germans to guarantee what he still described as the Monarchy’s “war 
aims”,132 it was significant that Hintze’s handwritten record of the conversation 
referred only to common “peace goals”.133 According to Hintze, the two sides 
agreed on the following programme: Germany wanted its territorial integrity and 
the freedom of the seas, in return for renouncing annexations and granting inde-
pendence to Belgium, to which it was prepared to pay compensation.134 Burián 
also professed his commitment to the status quo ante, but at the same time went 
on to list a number of “small territorial expansions”. These peace conditions in-
cluded the Lovćen and a “border strip” in Romania.135 Even at this late stage in 
the game, when not even Germany felt it could prosecute an effective war and 
was prepared to accept the status quo ante bellum for the sake of an immediate 
peace, Burián tried to insist on Hintze’s taking responsibility for Austria’s expan-
sionist war aims. Hence, although both men spoke of the need for common war 
aims, the talks ended without an agreement.
Hintze’s evasive tactics only served to spur the Austrians into action. One day 
before the Allied Balkan offensive of 15 September that would knock Bulgaria out 
of the war, Burián issued Karl’s emotional public proclamation, calling on all bel-
ligerents, without ceasing military operations, to send official delegates to a neutral 
state to discuss terms of peace. Although he had gone behind the Germans’ backs, 
he was after all only proposing a compromise, not a separate peace; but the initia-
tive came to nothing anyway, being interpreted, as the Germans had warned, as a 
capitulation. After this, Vienna’s voice ceased to matter in international circles.
By the end of September the Central Powers were collapsing on every front 
from Syria to the Somme, and after the Bulgarians requested a ceasefire, Luden-
dorff demanded an armistice at once, even before the Hindenburg line had been 
breached. In Berlin, the issue of war aims was put on hold, as the elite sought to 
contrive a revolution from above that would get them a peace on the basis of Wil-
son’s Fourteen Points. The situation in Austria-Hungary was even more serious. 
131 Bridge: Österreich(-Ungarn) (see note 1), p. 363.
132 MdÄ, Notes of Burián/Hintze conference, 5. 9. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-524k.
133 Hintze, Handwritten Notes, 6. 9. 1918, NARA, T-120/1500.
134 Burián, Notes of private Hintze talks, 6. 9. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-524k; see also David Steven-
son: The First World War and International Politics. Oxford 1988, p. 223.
135 Hintze, Handwritten Notes, 6. 9. 1918, NARA, T-120/1500.
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On 27 September the AOK began its retreat from the Balkans.136 The Bulgarian 
armistice of 29 September meant that Austria-Hungary could no longer hold Al-
bania without being outflanked, and was probably going to be pushed out of 
Montenegro and Serbia too by the advancing Entente Army. By 10 October 
Burián’s programme had been reduced to ensuring that Austria-Hungary received 
the same treatment as Germany in any armistice.137 He was now prepared to agree 
to everything: Serbian access to the sea, and the re-establishment of Montenegro, 
Albania, Serbia, and Romania. As for expansion, his only, final claim was for a 
small border rectification against Romania, which he insisted should not be re-
garded as an annexation.138
It all came to nothing. Karl, Czernin, and Burián had tied the Monarchy to Ber-
lin and were reduced to hoping that Germany might yet come to its rescue; but 
Germany herself was defeated and in no position to negotiate terms on behalf of 
Austria-Hungary with adversaries uninterested in any such a conversation. On 
14 October came Burián’s unilateral request for an armistice, followed by Karl’s 
promise of a federalised Austria (though not Hungary). Lansing responded on 
18 October stating that the Fourteen Points no longer applied to Austria-Hunga-
ry. All hopes of imperial gains were finally buried on the following day, when 
Burián acceded to a request by General Kövess to seek a ceasefire in the Bal-
kans.139 Five days later Burián resigned and Karl severed the alliance with Germa-
ny on 26 October, in the midst of the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, which ended in a 
defeat for Austria-Hungary and a separate peace by means of armistice on the 
Italian front. After the South Slavs, Czecho-Slovaks, and even Hungarians had all 
declared independence, Austria-Hungary ended not only its tragic involvement in 
the First World War but also its political existence; and the offensive goals that the 
government and military had wrangled over for more than four years of war dis-
appeared along with them.
Conclusion
Austria-Hungary’s war aims were one of the reasons why its elites sought to con-
tinue fighting during the First World War, and they risked – fatally as it turned out 
– paying the ultimate price a state could pay, namely its existence. The evidence 
shows that extensive war aims were continually being developed and pursued in 
both the Balkans and in Poland; and it was to these areas that the elites looked to 
fulfil their political, economic, and military objectives in a post-war world.
The evidence has also shown that the political leadership in Vienna and Buda-
pest managed, albeit sometimes not without a struggle, to retain control of deci-
136 Lejhanec to Burián, 27. 9. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-999.
137 Burián to Trauttmansdorff, 10. 10. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-966.
138 Burián to Hohenlohe, 11. 10. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-966.
139 Burián to Trauttmansdorff, 19. 10. 1918, HHStA, PA-I-966.
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sion-making and to keep both the military and its allies in check. Ultimately, the 
Monarchy failed in its endeavour, by pursuing offensive, expansionist war aims, 
to conquer, subjugate, or otherwise control the neighbouring states in order to 
preserve, even enhance, its Great Power status. Even so, its pursuit of them in the 
first place was clearly among the underlying causes of both the protracted conflict 
and what came after.
Reflection

Lothar Höbelt
Mourir pour Liège? World War I War Aims  
in a Long-Term Perspective
War Aims versus “Profound Forces”
It is a commonplace to say that the First World War changed the international 
system profoundly. It marked the transition from the old-established 18th-century 
European pentarchy to a fairly asymmetrical system of five potential super-pow-
ers that in the end was to have almost as little time for victorious France as it had 
for defeated Austria-Hungary, whereas both Germany and Russia undoubtedly 
continued to be members of that exclusive club. Earlier World Wars had seen Eu-
ropeans fighting each other overseas with the help of native Allies. That still held 
true for parts of Africa. But in terms of the Great War, Lettow Vorbeck’s exploits 
– and the reaction of General Smuts, poacher turned game-keeper – were no more 
than an exotic side-show.1 The salient point was that for the first time the USA 
had decisively intervened in a European conflict, and even Japan had managed to 
send a few destroyers to the Mediterranean. The First World War ushered in a 
period where the process of globalisation switched currents, and Europe has tend-
ed to be at the receiving end ever since.
The results of the Great War can be seen as a natural outcome of the famous 
“profound forces” that shape history. However, it is in fact surprisingly difficult 
to establish a connection between the war aims of the supposedly victorious pow-
ers and the long term results of the Great War. True, France got Alsace-Lorraine 
and Italy got Trento e Trieste. But the single biggest change on the map of Europe 
– in terms of both territory and population – was undoubtedly the re-creation of 
an independent Poland, just as the single biggest net-result of the French Revolu-
tionary period had been the disappearance of the Polish “rzeszpospolita”. 
Strangely enough, moreover, the resurrection of Poland was the one item on the 
agenda about which – at least after the First Russian Revolution – all the contend-
ing parties were in agreement.2
1 Hew Strachan: The First World War in Africa. Oxford 2004, pp. 135–164.
2 Austro-Polish diplomat Count Alexander Skrzynski immediately saw that meeting as a possi-
ble turning point. Poland was the one and only area where “in our own interest we could move 
closer to the programme of our enemies”. Skrzynski to Andrian, 10. 4. 1917, Haus-, Hof- und 
Staatsarchiv, Wien (= HHStA), PA I 1013, fol. 256.
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In global terms, of course, one might note the loss of the German colonies but 
that was a loss for which – for all the diamonds in Namibia – every German 
Chancellor of the Exchequer could only give heartfelt thanks. Germany was a 
world power because it outproduced all the rest of Europe in steel not because it 
owned a few palm trees or patches of desert overseas. Some far sighted Boers may 
even have thought that they had succeeded in laying the foundations of a White 
Africa along the mountainous Eastern spine of their continent. Maybe the fate of 
the Middle East deserves a little more attention as most of today’s political head-
lines – and headaches – can still be traced back to the consequences of the break-
up of the Ottoman Empire, from the Balfour Declaration to the Arab awakening. 
At the time, Britain – although pursuing three quite different strategies, favouring 
Saudis, Hashemites and Zionists, in turn3 – made great strides in securing its lines 
of communication with India. But those were developments that turned out to be 
transient. On the the other hand, the USA got nothing and Japan only a few bar-
ren islands in the Pacific. Once again, territorial changes were poor indicators of 
who had actually benefited from the First World War.
The discussions over war aims during the War have provided a field day for 
polemicists castigating wicked Imperialists, greedy robber-barons and militarists 
with tunnel vision. Emperor Charles’ angry outburst in the autumn of 1917 that 
peace was being held up because the Germans would not let go of Liège, is just 
one of many examples.4 Even on the Entente side, Versailles and the associated 
treaties were later called all sorts of names, starting with a “Cartaginian peace”. 
Balfour chimed in with his description of Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
as “three all-powerful, all-ignorant men carving up continents”.5 Yet, seen from a 
long-term perspective, all the peace terms look fairly moderate, if not at all times 
innocuous. That view may seem strange coming from Vienna. Yet, the break-up 
of the Habsburg Monarchy had little to do with the war aims of the Western 
powers. Once the black-and-yellow colours had finally been hauled down, there 
was no way the Western powers could have stopped its constituent parts from 
going their own way. They could fiddle around with the small-print, order a pleb-
iscite in Carinthia or hand over Eger to Bohemia rather than Bavaria,6 but they 
could hardly tell the Yugoslavs or Czechoslovaks to go back to Habsburg rule for 
the sake of the balance of powers.
3 On the Saudi aspect, favoured by India, see Madawi Al-Rasheed: A History of Saudi-Arabia. 
London 2002, pp. 41–46; John C. Wilkinson: Arabia’s Frontiers. The Story of Britain’s Boundary 
Drawing in the Desert. London 1991, pp. 132–140; Jacob Goldberg: The Origins of British-Sau-
di Relations. The 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty Revisited. In: Historical Journal 28 (1985), pp. 693–
703.
4 Diary of FML Ferdinand v. Marterer, Vice-Chief of the Military Chancellory of the Emperor, 
10. 10. 1917, Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät, Wien (= MKSM), Kriegsarchiv (= KA), B/16.
5 See that treasure trove of juicy quotes: Simon Sebag Montefiore: Jerusalem. The Biography. 
London 2011, p. 514.
6 That possibility was at least discussed among the “Great Four” in 1919 but rejected for conve-
nience sake; see Paul Mantoux (ed.): Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars–28 juin 
1919). Paris 1955, p. 149 (4. 4. 1919).
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As Dennis Showalter succintly observes, the First World War was indeed a 
“Total War for Limited Objectives”.7 Napoleon expanded the French Empire to 
the Baltic; Clemenceau toyed with annexing the Saar. Hitler annexed all of Po-
land; Jagow dithered over border rectifications that might strengthen the Polish 
minority in Prussia. Even if one chooses to discount Napoleon or Hitler as mega-
lomaniac aberrations, the various wars of national unification during the long 
nineteenth century (i.e. including the Balkans Wars of 1912–1913) doubled the size 
of Prussia, Serbia and Greece, let alone Piemont, after a few weeks campaigning. 
Of course, this purely territorial approach ignores the reparations issue: but war 
indemnities were not such a novel idea, either.8 If anything, the reparations issue 
pointed to the dilemma facing the Western powers. Only a Germany that was al-
lowed to dominate Europe economically could earn enough foreign exchange to 
be able to pay reparations. But such a Germany was exactly the sort of Germany 
France had every reason to fear.
Indeed, in themselves, the war aims of the major powers, even if sometimes re-
garded as outrageous, would have done little to change the balance of power in 
Europe. The “disannexation” of Alsace-Lorraine satisfied the yearning for a “re-
vanche pour Sedan”; it did not really improve the geo-political position of France 
all that much. Strategists of course had their obsessions with specific bits of terri-
tory they regarded as indispensable for security. The acquisition – or the neutrali-
sation – of Liège would have eased the worries of German staff officers anxious to 
avoid getting stuck in that bottle-neck on their way to brush the Channel with 
their sleeves. But then, one of the lessons of the Great War had surely been that if 
the Schlieffen Plan had not succeeded in the fairly free-wheeling world of 
1914-style operations, it was even less likely to work in the era of trench warfare 
that had replaced it.9 On the Eastern Front, too, German possession of the Narev 
fortresses, the notorious “Grenzstreifen”, might stop any repetition of Tannen-
berg in its tracks.10 That might be one temptation less for the Russians; but it 
would hardly stop them from being a great power.
The First World War is sometimes seen as the first stage of another Thirty Years 
War in Europe. It might be worthwhile for a moment to compare this twenti-
eth century Thirty Years War with its predecessor in the age of the baroque. That 
Thirty Years War, and its Franco-Spanish extension that ended with the Peace of 
7 Dennis Showalter: Total War for Limited Objectives. An Interpretation of German Grand 
Strategy. In: Paul M. Kennedy (ed.): Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven 1991, 
pp. 200–208.
8 Arms limitations clauses imposed by a victorious power pose a more difficult problem, histori-
cally. Even so, there was the example of Napoleon and Prussia in 1807, let alone the Romans who 
forbade the Seleukids to build a fleet or own elephants in the second century BC. See: Sebag 
Montefiore: Jerusalem (see note 5), p. 75.
9 Of course, “by the mid-1930s things had changed [...] to the Guderians and Mansteins […] the 
internal combustion engine was restoring the parameters of strategy”; Showalter: Total War (see 
note 7), p. 120.
10 Imanuel Geiss: Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914–1918. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegsziel-
politik im Ersten Weltkrieg. Lübeck 1960.
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the Pyrenees, marked the transition from the siglo d’oro to the era of the Sun 
King, from Spanish to French pre-dominance in Europe. But once again, those 
fundamental shifts within the balance of power had very little to do with the two 
fortresses of Arras and Perpignan that changed hands in 1659, or even with Brei-
sach, which Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar had bequeathed to France. Whether one 
chooses to attribute the decline of Spain to imperial overstretch, demographic col-
lapse or Cromwell’s folly,11 it was a cause rather than the consequence of the loss 
of two tiny border provinces.
What was really at stake in 1659 was the future of the Iberian Empires, or rather, 
the impact of their temporary eclipse, both in the old world and the new. What was 
at stake in 1917–1918, one might venture to say, was the fate of the Russian Empire 
or the impact of its temporary eclipse, both in Europe and in Asia. For France, 
Louis XIV’s marriage to the Infanta Maria Teresa, which was an integral part of the 
peace settlement in 1659, held out the hope of winning the Spanish inheritance as a 
whole, thus achieving no less than a renversement des alliances (and finally elimi-
nating the Northern front that was so uncomfortably close to Paris and the French 
heartland). It was the “flanking powers” (to use Dehio’s term12) like Sweden, and 
later on Cromwell’s England, that had helped France to defeat the Habsburgs, just 
as it was America that helped France defeat the Kaiser. But those war-time alliances 
proved to be transient constellations. The U.S. withdrew from Europe, just as the 
Swedish position in Germany vanished almost overnight once their army had been 
paid off. Only a switch in alliances could consolidate the achievements of French 
victory. In 1917–1918, the trouble for France was that such an opportunity beck-
oned for the Germans rather than for the heirs of Richelieu and Mazarin.
War Aims versus Compromise Peace
During the First World War, winning the war became almost an end in itself.13 
That was partly a result of domestic politics, notably the perception prevalent 
amongst almost all policy makers that after such huge sacrifices people were ex-
pected to expect gains commensurate with the losses they had suffered. “The 
greater the participation of a population in a war, the greater must be the reward 
(or bribe) offered.”14 Any government that seemed prepared to close such a trau-
matic experience without further ado was commiting suicide.15 Even though it was 
11 For the latter, see Churchill’s doubts on his return from the Teheran conference: John Charm-
ley: Churchill. The End of Glory. London 1993, p. 467.
12 Ludwig Dehio: Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie. Betrachtungen über ein Grundproblem der 
neueren Staatengeschichte. Krefeld 1964, p. 12, pp. 209 f.
13 Victor H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914–1918. Oxford 1971, p. 45.
14 Gary Sheffield: Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities. London 2001, 
p. 57.
15 David French: The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition 1916–1918. Oxford 1995, p. 147; 
paradoxically, it was war weariness that made a passive policy unacceptable.
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war weariness rather than disappointed chauvinism that led to revolution or muti-
ny in 1917–18, governments were apparently still convinced that anything that 
could be interpreted as a deviaton from the straight and narrow path of patriotism 
would be punished just as severely. Thus, to quote but one famous example, in 
Germany in 1916 Bethmann and Jagow thought they could get away with a “puny 
peace” only if Hindenburg gave it his blessing (which was one of the reasons why 
they were so anxious to be associated with him in the public eye).16
In the absence of reliable opinion polls, it is difficult to tell whether those as-
sumptions were justified or not. Press reactions are a popular but inherently mis-
leading measure of “public opinion”. Under war-time conditions in particular, 
Churchill’s famous adage about statistics might almost be reformulated as: never 
believe a newspaper you have not censored yourself.17 The public’s willingness to 
subscribe to war loans might be a way to measure support for the war effort but 
not necessarily for specific war aims. Above all, it may not always be possible to 
pigeonhole popular dissatisfaction neatly as left-wing or right-wing: the Aus-
tro-German political atmosphere of April 1918 (after the uproar over the Sixtus 
affair) certainly combined war-weariness (i.e. complaints about the dismal supply 
situation) with the resentment of nationalists outraged by peace-feelers that they 
regarded as a betrayal of the German alliance.18
Debates about war aims in the first half of the war were largely exercises in 
wishful thinking, what the Austrians call “drafting letters to Santa Claus”. If your 
side won – and patriotism seemed to demand no less than complete faith that it 
would win – every lobby had to be ready with its shopping-list. The more, the 
merrier. In the first half of the war there were hardly any attempts at peace feelers, 
only attempts to woo, bribe or deter the neutrals. Courting the neutrals was an 
absorbing game, with the Italian trick turning out to be less decisive than the Bul-
garian one, with Romanian neutrality being the catalyst. Germans, or maybe even 
more so, Austrians were amazed at their good fortune in 1915 but saw no way to 
turn those military successes into political gains: “We don’t know what to do with 
our victories.”19 The Entente, for its part, was simply waiting until Kitchener’s 
armies could redress the balance in 1917, if not earlier.
The idea of winning the war by enticing a member of the opposing coalition into 
making a separate peace certainly had its attractions but the harsh fact was that no 
16 Jagow to Tschirschky, 3. 8. 1916, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Abt. IA, Öster-
reich 88/7. I owe that quote to Rudolf Jerabek, the eminence grise of the Austrian State Archives; 
Wolfram Pyta: Hindenburg. Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler. München 2009, 
p. 215.
17 That view may reflect Austrian prejudices; to the outrage of the Austrian ambassador, the 
Germans proved to be far more tolerant with dissenting voices, Report 33–B, 5.3. 1917, HHStA, 
PA III 173.
18 Even at the time, the Austrian MP Josef Redlich drew that conclusion in a letter: Redlich to 
Bahr, 1. 5. 1918, in: Fritz Fellner (ed.): Dichter und Gelehrter. Hermann Bahr und Josef Redlich in 
ihren Briefen 1896–1934 (= Quellen zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 2). Salzburg 
1986, p. 334 (1. 5. 1918).
19 Marterer, Diary, 21. 8. 1915, MKSM, KA, B/16, quoting his boss, General Bolfras.
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real opportunity beckoned. At best, the Central Powers had high hopes of detach-
ing Russia, but these were based on nothing but rumour. Incidentally, this idea was 
one of the few things Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed about, although Austrians in 
general and Burian in particular were less keen on it, partly because they sensed 
that such a peace would be concluded at their expense. Later on, Charles I became 
known for his efforts to broker a peace with the western powers; but first and 
foremost, however, he was a fan of the Three Emperors alliance.20 France seemed a 
less likely candidate for a separate peace, but the British always had their doubts 
about the reliability of France and saw a “dovish” Caillaux government ante portas 
whenever a Paris cabinet got into difficulties. However, these fears seem to have 
been much exaggerated or were sometimes even used as scare-tactics by the French 
to get their way i.e. over Salonika or the 1917 offensive21 – a strategy avidly copied 
by Czernin after 1917, with ponderous Professor Heinrich Lammasch cast in the 
role of Caillaux.22 Entente efforts in the direction of a separate peace primarily 
centered on Bulgaria, with little help from a Serbia that was unwilling to part with 
its gains from the Second Balkan war to ensure victory in the Third. The British in 
particular, with Lloyd George and “Wully” Robertson for once agreeing, contin-
ued to toy with the idea of detaching Sofia from the Central Powers even after 
“Foxy Ferdinand” had taken the plunge in the summer of 1915.23
If a separate peace was unattainable, and final victory a long way off, what was 
left was the idea of a compromise peace. Such a parti remis could be based on one 
of two concepts, either uti possidetis or the status quo ante bellum. A strict inter-
pretation of uti possidetis was clearly unacceptable to the Entente as long as the 
Germans continued to occupy Belgium and parts of Northern France. Yet, the 
situation at the fronts would obviously have to be taken into account when for-
mulating negotiating positions. In their first round of discussions about possible 
peace terms in late 1916 and early 1917, the Austrians were still worried about the 
fate of Russian-occupied Eastern Galicia and Italian-held Gorizia. While pressing 
for peace openings, both Burian and Czernin also held out for a reciprocal territo-
rial guarantee. Such preoccupations found their counterpart in German worries 
about their colonies, even if the Austrians were outraged that Tarnopol should be 
compared with Tsingtao.24
20 See Charles’s notes from 1914 in: Elisabeth Kovács (ed.): Politische Dokumente zu Kaiser und 
König Karl I. (IV.) aus internationalen Archiven (= Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neu-
ere Geschichte Österreichs, vol. 100,2). Wien 2004, p. 79, pp. 85 f. Such a desire was made easier 
for him because he was not enamoured of the Poles (ibid., p. 74, p. 82); Miklós Komjáthy (ed.): 
Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie (1914–
1918). Budapest 1966, pp. 448 f. (12. 1. 1917).
21 David Dutton: The Politics of Diplomacy. Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World 
War. London 1998, pp. 61–83; French: Strategy (see note 15), pp. 117–119.
22 Heinrich Benedikt: Die Friedensaktion der Meinlgruppe 1917/18. Graz 1962, pp. 130 f., pp. 151 f.
23 Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 51, p. 118, p. 141, p. 171, p. 221; see Stephen Con-
stant: Foxy Ferdinand. Tsar of Bulgaria. New York 1980.
24 When Bethmann-Hollweg tried to turn the Austrians away from the idea of a complete terri-
torial guarantee by suggesting that nobody could expect the Austrians to fight until Tsingtao was 
Mourir pour Liège? 149
Perhaps a more promising concept than uti possidetis was the status quo ante 
bellum or at least the status quo ante with only minor changes. Charles I and 
Czernin held fast to this more or less consistently, albeit with a certain amount of 
doublethink as far as the Balkans were concerned. Their idea of a plausible inter-
pretation of the status quo ante applied to the Great Powers only and did not ex-
clude the creation of a Greater Bulgaria or a partitioning of Rumania. (At one 
point Czernin mused that Rumania might as well be reduced to a miniature prin-
cipality in the Danube delta, comparable in size to Monaco or Liechtenstein.25) 
This South-East European smallprint apart, one of the reasons the Habsburgs 
found it easier to charge ahead in pursuit of an early peace was that for the general 
public the war-aims debate in Austria was focussed not on territorial expansion, 
but on a reorganisation of the empire, on issues such as autonomy for the Sudeten 
Germans versus Bohemian state rights. If anything, many Austro-Germans actu-
ally wanted to get rid of surplus Slavs, like the Galician Poles. Even so, Charles I 
remained as stubborn about concessions to Italy, as Bethmann was about Alsace 
– any cession would have to be camouflaged as an exchange of territory, even if 
Charles was willing to settle for face-saving wastelands like Somalia rather than 
the ore-mines of Briey as compensation.26
A status quo peace of course raises the same question as the concept of neutral-
ity: neutral for whom? Who would emerge as the real winner if there were no 
winners? Not surprisingly, both Conrad and Ludendorff are on record with state-
ments that a return to square one – without any improvements of the strategic 
map – would be tantamount to defeat. So is “Wully” Robertson even if intrigu-
ingly he still regarded a “reasonably strong Germany” as a necessity, too.27 On 
the other hand, Hindenburg once mused that the Great War should be interpreted 
as a repeat performance of the Seven Years War that finally put Prussia on the 
map as a great power.28 A Hubertusburg-style peace – with not a square mile 
changing hands, in Europe at least – sounded reasonable enough, even if it meant 
holding on to Alsace, just as Frederick the Great had insisted on keeping Glatz 
rather than offer that salient as a sweetener to Maria Theresa. In the light of later 
Prussian history, Hubertusburg had opened the gate for better things to come. 
The implication of all this was that once Germany had survived this trial, rich 
pickings (like the Polish partitions of the late eighteenth century) would automat-
German again, Burian retorted that colonies could not be compared with European territories; 
4./6. 12. 1916, HHStA, PA I 536, fol. 217.
25 André Scherer/Jacques Grunewald (eds.): L’Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix pendant la 
Première Guerre mondiale, vol. 2. Paris 1966, p. 51 (26. 3. 1917); Czernin seems to have projected 
his own feelings for Romania, where he had been ambassador between 1913 and 1916, onto oth-
ers. He argued the Entente “hated and despised” the Romanians just as much as the Central 
Powers did; see: Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle (see note 20), p. 446.
26 Elisabeth Kovács: Untergang oder Rettung der Donaumonarchie? Die österreichische Frage. 
Kaiser und König Karl I. (IV.) und die Neuordnung Mitteleuropas (1916–1922). Wien/Köln/Wei-
mar 2004, p. 172.
27 French: Strategy (see note 15), p. 34.
28 Pyta: Hindenburg (see note 16), p. 209.
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ically accrue, even if, for the time being, having defended the status quo against all 
comers had to be deemed sufficient.
Yet it would seem, as regards the beneficiaries of a status quo peace, that the 
First World War had more in common with the Thirty Years War, rather than the 
Seven Years War. When the Emperor was sounding out the Swedes about peace 
terms in the years before 1648, there is one consideration that crops up over and 
over again. For the Swedes, let alone the French, the enemy alliance was a given, 
something permanent: the Habsburg “family compact” – to borrow a term coined 
later for the Bourbons, but even more applicable to the Habsburgs – might some-
times find it difficult to coordinate their moves but they would always find it easy 
to team up at a moment’s notice. The coalition that served as a counterweight to 
Habsburg dominance, by contrast, was a one-off arrangement that had taken 
much time, effort and good luck to piece together. Once dissolved, it would be 
very difficult to reassemble again, let alone at short notice. Hence, the Habsburgs 
had to be decisively defeated before the Allies could afford to stop fighting.29
Similar considerations could well be said to have coloured the attitudes of En-
tente statesmen in the First World War. Their predicament was similar to that of 
the anti-Habsburg forces in the seventeenth century. The alliance of the Central 
Powers, for all the constant bickering that figures so prominently in the historiog-
raphy, was held together by far more than foreign policy interests. Even apart 
from German national feeling, their aristocratic elites were intertwined in a way 
that was noticeable even for the cosmopolitan European upper class of yester-
year.30 Some Austrian leaders, like Conrad who provided historians with an em-
barrassment of riches in terms of bitchy quotes about the Prussians, resented big 
brother’s patronising attitude but they could hardly be blind to the fact that it was 
German arms that had saved the Dual Monarchy from being crushed by the com-
bined efforts of Russia, Serbia and Italy in 1915.
On the other hand, for all the talk about an encirclement of Germany, a status 
quo peace was likely to lead to a re-orientation of Russian foreign policy in a di-
rection that British diplomats had already described as dangerous in 1914 because 
of its implications for their position in Asia “where our very existence as an Em-
pire will be at stake”.31 After all, Russia had more of a choice than most. Russians 
had suffered disproportionate losses; they were entitled to at least some of the 
gains they had been promised, and if these were not forthcoming, the Entente 
might well be written off as an unprofitable investment. Thus, it is no surprise to 
find one of the chief architects of the Anglo-Russian Entente, Sir Charles Hardinge, 
29 True, in 1646–1647, it was the Dutch who rose above those anxieties when they made their 
separate peace with the Habsburgs. It was one of their descendants, General Smuts, who ap-
proached a similar level of detachments in his conversations with Count Mensdorff.
30 On this point I admit I do respectfully but strongly disagree with Salomon Wank: In the Twi-
light of Empire. Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal (1854–1912), vol. 1. Wien 2009, p. 222. The 
Fürstenberg, Hohenlohe and Hoyos families spring to mind.
31 Keith Wilson: Britain. In: id. (ed.): Decisions for War, 1914. London 1995, pp. 175–208; here: 
p. 186.
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echoing Ludendorff’s words in even more apocalyptic terms: a compromise peace, 
he thought, would signal “the destruction of our country”.32
The long-term Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, the Mar-
grave of Pallavicini, reiterated the obvious solution: suitable compensation could 
be found for everyone if the powers agreed to partition the Ottoman Empire. 
For example, Russia could give up Poland in return for the Straits and maybe 
Armenia.33 With hindsight, and allowing for all the caveats associated with coun-
terfactual hypotheses, Pallavicini’s suggestions, even if perfidious, seem to out-
line the only solution that might actually have been acceptable to both sides. In 
that case, Germany would had lost an ally, but improved its position on the con-
tinent. Austria’s Balkan ally Bulgaria would still have emerged victoriously from 
the war, thus making Serbia’s eventual survival irrelevant. True, open discussion 
of such a solution was risky, as leaks might produce a violent reaction from those 
about to be sacrificed; but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Central 
Powers – certainly Czernin, with Bethmann-Hollweg not that far behind – were 
far more willing to countenance something approaching a compromise peace, 
than the Entente. Indeed, the latter were, for equally understandable reasons, al-
most bound to reject it, as Henri Georges Soutou has emphasised in his paper.34 
Lloyd George summed up Britain’s demands as “restitution, reparation, guaran-
tee against repetition”.35 Of course, even reparations might be included in the 
term “status quo peace”, under a suitably “loose construction”. But what about 
guarantees against a repetition of German aggression, or rather against the possi-
bility of successful German aggression, or even worse, against a Germany that no 
longer needed to behave aggressively because no one was going to stand up to it, 
anyway ? Only “a peace secured permanently by the United States” could render 
a status quo peace acceptable to at least some of the decision-makers in London 
and Paris.36
The pertinent charge against Ludendorff (or his followers on the German Right 
in general) is not that his programme was excessive in itself, but that given the 
benefits that would accrue to Germany from a status quo peace, he did not do 
more to bribe France and Britain to acquiesce in German dominance in the East. 
32 Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 41.
33 HHStA, PA I 945, Liasse 21a, reports 102 A–D/P (11. 12. 1917) and 103 A–E/P (15. 11. 1917). 
Similar ideas may also have crossed the mind of Sir Eduard Grey’s advisor Eric Drummond; see: 
Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 56.
34 Too much such should not be made of the specific wording of Cabinet minutes, but it is sug-
gestive that when Czernin outlined his proposals for a status quo peace to his colleagues, he 
added that he thought it advisable to leave the entente and in particular England under the illu-
sion (!) that there would be no victors or vanquished, thus antedating Wilson’s formula by ten 
days; Komjáthy (ed.): Protokolle (see note 20), p. 447 (12. 1. 1917).
35 French: Strategy (see note 15), p. 38.
36 Daniel Larsen: War Pessimism in Britain and an American Peace in Early 1916. In: IHR 34 
(2012), pp. 795–817, here: p. 798, concentrates on McKenna’s arguments; for similar sentiments on 
Grey’s part see also Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 21; for the general argument 
Dehio: Gleichgewicht (see note 12), p. 211.
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That might have enhanced his reputation as a Moltke turned Bismarck, but it is 
unlikely to have changed the course of history. Perhaps Czernin when pressing 
the Germans to let go of Alsace-Lorraine, gave the game away when he enthused 
about the benefits of peace with France: “And if that is so, we have won.” Precise-
ly.37 There are a few tantalising hints that some French staff officers were simulta-
neously drafting memoranda discussing a compromise peace.38 Maybe there was a 
window of opportunity in the late summer of 1917, just before Clemenceau’s rise 
to power. Then a sham victory for French amour propre, combined with a tacit 
admission of Germany’s hegemony on the continent, might just have been possi-
ble, at a time when doubts about Russia had started to surface but before Russia’s 
collapse turned such a deal into an all too obvious boon for Germany.39
However, Britain seemed to turn a deaf ear to all such suggestions: at the Belle-
vue meeting in September 1917, for example, Kühlmann managed to push his 
 offer of secret negotiations on the basis of a German withdrawal from Belgium 
past Hindenburg, thus invalidating Charles I’s charge that peace prospects were 
foundering on the issue of Liège. According to Wolfgang Steglich, Kühlmann’s 
initiative failed because his Spanish intermediaries got confused and did not fol-
low up their initial contacts.40 British sources prove, however, that such an offer 
had already been discussed in governmental circles in London a few weeks earlier 
– and rejected, at least for the time being.41 After all, why discuss terms with an 
opponent who had already shot his bolt and missed. Once the submarine chal-
lenge had been met, there was no reason why the British should not wait for the 
weight of the U.S. to make itself felt – even if they were dismayed to learn that 
U.S. help would come later than expected, and with all sorts of uncomfortable 
political strings attached.42
37 Besprechung mit Michaelis, HHStA, PA I 504, fol. 842 ff. Charles wrote in a similar vein to the 
German Crown Prince, see: Ottokar Czernin: Im Weltkriege. Berlin 1919, p. 98. Of course, 
Czernin may have been hinting at a separate peace that might be bought with Alsace.
38 Hannes Leidinger: Die Ukrainepolitik Frankreichs. In: Wolfram Dornik et al.: Die Ukraine 
zwischen Selbstbestimmung und Fremdherrschaft 1917–22. Graz 2011, pp. 391–412; here: p. 393; 
David Stevenson: French War Aims against Germany, 1914–1918. Oxford 1982, p. 93, p. 249 
(no. 157); Roy A. Prete: French Military War Aims. In: Historical Journal 28 (1985), pp. 887–899, 
paints a far more hard-line picture of the French military, at least among the top people.
39 There was an extra inducement idly mentioned by a German diplomat after “Red October”. 
Germany might hold out the promise of repayment to French owners of Russian bonds by 
“pooling” French claims and German armed might; Wolfgang Steglich (ed.): Die Friedensver-
suche der kriegführenden Mächte im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Quellenkritische Untersuchun-
gen, Akten und Vernehmungsprotokolle. Stuttgart 1984, p. 326 (note of Count Kessler about a 
conversation with Count Karolyi, 28. 11. 1917).
40 Wolfgang Steglich: Die Friedenspolitik der Mittelmächte 1917/18. Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 186–
190, pp. 217–219, pp. 285 f.
41 French: Strategy (see note 15), p. 178.
42 Ibid., p. 102, p. 294; for his reference to the shock when Britain realised that American help 
would come late, thus putting Britain into a military dilemma in 1917/18 and possibly into a po-
litical one in 1919 when she might be exhausted and America able to dictate the peace; ibid., p. 94, 
p. 278.
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Thus, although all sorts of contingency plans were hatched, no real peace ini-
tiatives were launched after the spring of 1917. Of course, there is the one fasci-
nating scenario suggested by Lloyd George’s apparent willingness in Septem-
ber 1917 to discuss a peace based not on the status quo ante but on a package 
that amounted to a fairly radical Ostverschiebung of Germany.43 Once the possi-
bility of Russia’s withdrawal from the war had become a probability, or, in Cur-
zon’s terms, once the Western powers concluded that they were dealing “with an 
ally who is really a traitor”, it was a matter of bowing to the inevitable and grant-
ing Germany a free hand in the East. In return they would not only get Al-
sace-Lorraine, but also be allowed to keep the German colonies (and, presum-
ably, large swathes of the Ottoman Empire). It seems, however, that here Lloyd 
George was fairly isolated within his Cabinet, while the Foreign Office did its 
utmost to sabotage the idea.44
French support for Lloyd George’s ideas was uncertain, to say the least, and 
was even less likely after Clemenceau’s rise to power.45 In any case there was, yet 
again, no one on the other side who was in a position to accept the offer, anyway. 
Charles and Czernin might have supported it in secret, but in public they felt 
constrained to put the defence of Strasbourg in the same league as the defence of 
Trieste. The return of the German colonies had always been regarded as an essen-
tial quid pro quo for a German withdrawal from Belgium, and any mentioning of 
ceding Alsace had to be approached with great caution. Kühlmann could hardly 
be expected to get away with giving way on all of these issues simultaneously in 
return for the Western Powers’ consent to a “new order” in Eastern Europe that 
they were unable to prevent in any case.
With hindsight, of course, the Germans should have jumped at the idea. But it is 
extremely doubtful if they – or Lloyd George – could have prevailed against the 
scepticism of their colleagues or Allies. As regards the opposition within the En-
tente, even German moderation in the East would not have helped that much, after 
November 1917. In the Western capitals, the Bolsheviks were increasingly seen as 
German agents46 – an over-simplification that may have turned into a self-fulfilling 
43 Interestingly, the Danish Foreign Secretary Scavenius had already predicted in January 1917 
that after having ridden to power on a wave of chauvinism, Lloyd George would now try and 
arrive at a compromise peace; Tagesberichte, 26. 1. 1917, 20. 2. 1917, HHStA, PA XL 57.
44 Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 100 (Curzon’s quote), pp. 106–109; French: Strat-
egy (see note 15), pp. 145 f.
45 See Stevenson: French War Aims (see note 38), p. 105: Clemenceau und Pichon were “never 
tempted by a peace which would satisfy the Allies in the west at the price of a free hand for the 
Central Powers in the east”.
46 The Head of the French Military Mission to Rumania said so almost literally: “Les bolsheviks 
qui ne sont d’ailleurs que les agents boches”; Glenn Torrey (ed.): General Henri Berthelot and 
Romania. Boulder 1987, p. 115, p. 124. Obviously, that was a long drawn-out process, with the 
talks between Trotskij and Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart acting as a counter-current into the spring 
of 1918; but the British refusal to recognise Lenin’s government on 7/8 Feb. 1918 might be seen 
as the turning-point; see Michael Kettle: Russia and the Allies. 1917–1920. Vol. 1: The Allies and 
the Russian Collapse. March 1917–March 1918. London 1981, pp. 222–228.
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prophecy, but one which, in the short term at least, was a valid assumption for all 
that. Prussian generals and Russian revolutionaries both had their ulterior motives, 
and from the very beginning of their strange partnership they tried to undermine 
each other; but throughout 1918 self-interest drove them to uphold their alliance in 
the face of all sorts of temptations – witness Germany’s willingness to risk a con-
flict with Turkey in mid-1918 rather than antagonise the Soviets over Baku and the 
Transcaucasian lands.47 Except for President Wilson with his easy-going approach 
towards revolutions from Mexico to Moscow,48 it is unlikely that German willing-
ness to offer better terms to Russia would have been regarded as anything else but 
further evidence of collusion between Lenin and Ludendorff.49
The Dilemmas of Neutrality: Opting Out or Switching Partners?
In fact, the Russians were not switching sides out of pique but simply trying to 
opt out of the war under duress in 1917; but they discovered that it was not easy 
to do this without fatally antagonising their former Allies. To the Western pow-
ers, after the collapse of Russia a diminuition of German power appeared all the 
more imperative, and even more difficult to achieve. Unless Russia could be put 
on its feet again, Germany had won, to all intents and purposes. As Hankey had 
put it in a nut-shell a few months earlier: “Of all the assets on the side of the Al-
lies, the manpower of Russia is one that ought to come first.”50
The probable fate of Poland exacerbated the problem. If the Central Powers 
had breached the status quo unilaterally by proclaiming the independence of Po-
land in November 1916, the Entente soon topped their opponents’ proclamation 
with a similar promise of their own.51 However, just as the First Russian Revolu-
tion improved the terms of trade for the Entente with respect to Poland, the Sec-
ond Russian Revolution left all but the most left-wing Poles with no option but 
to throw themselves into the arms of the Central Powers, like it or not, German 
arms, in military terms, preferably Austrian ones, politically.52 The Austrian be-
47 Sean McMeekin: The Berlin Baghdad Express. The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for 
World Power, 1898–1918. London 2010, p. 333; Winfried Baumgart: Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918. 
Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges. Wien 1966, pp. 184–206.
48 Eugene Trani: Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia. A Reconsideration. 
In: JMH 48 (1976), pp. 440–461 sums up his attitude in both cases as: “Let them sort it out them-
selves.”
49 If anything, Britain was concerned not about the Baltic states but about a possible threat to 
India emanating from the Southern parts of the old Czarist Empire.
50 French: Strategy (see note 15), p. 62 (8. 12. 1916).
51 Ronald Bobroff: Devolution in Wartime. Sergei D. Sazonov and the Future of Poland, 1910–
1916. In: IHR 22 (2000), pp. 505–528; Jeffrey Mankoff: The Future of Poland, 1914–1917. France 
and Great Britain in the Triple Entente. In: IHR 30 (2008), pp. 741–767.
52 During the following months, several indications reached the eager Austrians that even 
Dmowski and the National democrats (“Endeks”) were reconsidering their hitherto Pan-Slav or 
at least pro-Russian options, at least for the time being; Telegram 325, 21. 4. 1918, HHStA, PA I 
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trayal of Polish aspirations at Brest-Litovsk caused much heart-searching but did 
not fundamentally alter the situation. 53
Meanwhile, the Polish conundrum gave rise to a number of witticisms such as: 
“Whoever loses, gets Poland.”54 But such quips aside, the reality was once again 
that a neutral alternative, in this case one that demanded sacrifices from both 
sides, turned out to favour the Central Powers. Throughout the inter-war period, 
Poland effectively isolated Germany from Russian pressure, as Balfour had al-
ready warned much earlier;55 and ideological cleavages only exacerbated France’s 
problems in that respect. Of course, German pride was offended to see Warsaw 
lording it over the junkers or cutting off East Prussia from the Reich.56 But strate-
gically an independent Poland – let alone one led by Pilsudski, with his slogan: 
“Oczy na wschod” (Eyes to the East) – still proved to be an asset for Germany.57
As for France, she could no longer even be certain of her status as a great power 
unless she could find a substitute for the Russian Army. Unfortunately for her, 
after 1917, Germany found itself in a much better position vis-à-vis Russia. Berlin 
could play “Red Army” and “White Russians” against each other, in a fairly suc-
cessful combination. In a double-think procedure that finds its exact parallel in 
the minds of Allied leaders,58 the Kaiser and Ludendorff agreed that it was imper-
ative to back the anti-Bolshevik side, both for ideological and for practical rea-
sons, as they were most likely to win. But the German Foreign Office neverthe-
less successfully curbed any attempt to give substance to that policy (apart from 
fighting guerillas in the Ukraine).
The Entente shared many of the basic assumptions of the Germans; and they 
also often courted the same Allies in Russia. (As Kühlmann once observed: “Isn’t 
it strange that most of our newly-found friends have formerly served as adjutants 
1015; the alternative, as Prince Eustace Sapieha complained, was to emigrate to the U.S., see: Re-
port 208 A-B/P, 3. 12. 1917, HHStA, PA I 1013. The standard account by Heinz Lemke: Allianz 
und Rivalität. Die Mittelmächte und Polen im ersten Weltkrieg (bis zur Februarrevolution). Wien 
1977, ends on a more pessimistic note because it stops after the First Russian Revolution.
53 Lothar Höbelt: Die austropolnische Lösung – eine unendliche Geschichte. In: Heeresge-
schichtliches Museum (ed.): Der Erste Weltkrieg und der Vielvölkerstaat (= Acta Austro-Poloni-
ca, vol. 4). Wien 2012, pp. 35–54.
54 Fritz Fellner/Doris Corradini (eds.): Schicksalsjahre Österreichs. Die Erinnerungen und Tage-
bücher Josef Redlichs 1869–1936, vol. 2. Wien 2011, p. 4 (8. 1. 1915).
55 Balfour to Dmowski, quoted by Emmerich Seiwald: Die österreichische “Polenpolitik” zwi-
schen den beiden russischen Revolutionen im Kriegjahr 1917. Diss., Innsbruck 1977, p. 81.
56 Probably the worst aspect of German losses in the East, both formally and economically, the 
loss of Upper Silesia in 1921, actually resulted from a revision of the Versailles treaty. Hans-
Christof Kraus: Versailles und die Folgen. Außenpolitik zwischen Revisionismus und Verständi-
gung 1919–1933. Berlin 2013, p. 47.
57 Anthony Polonsky: Politics in Independent Poland. The Crises of Constitutional Govern-
ment. Oxford 1972, p. 200.
58 Michael J. Carley: The Origins of the French Intervention in the Russian Civil War, January–
May 1918. A Reappraisal. In: JMH 48 (1976), pp. 413–439; Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen: The Mayer 
Thesis Reconsidered. The Poles and the Peace Conference. In: IHR 7 (1985), pp. 68–102, here: 
p. 95. The French Army – more concerned with short-term prospects – was less taken with at-
tempts to roll up Russia from the periphery.
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of the Czar ?”59) But the Western Powers found it more difficult to either woo or 
threaten Lenin, even if the Czech Legion’s advance to the Volga – 12.000 amateurs 
who almost brought down the Bolshevik regime in July – caused something of a 
sensation.60 The armistice left the Western powers in a half-way house: committed 
to the Whites, but equally committed not to be committed too much. It has often 
been hinted, especially after Hitler’s rise to power, that the Versailles treaty left 
some “unfinished business” behind. In that respect, Karel Kramar, the first Prime 
Minister of Czechoslovakia, was right.61 To put a seal on winning the war the 
West would have to finish their business in the East. At Versailles the Allies still 
insisted on a clause that left the door open for the Russians to rejoin the Entente 
and claim their share of reparations.62 But with every passing month that prospect 
became increasingly utopian.
For Austria-Hungary, once Serbia and Russia were defeated the war had ceased 
to have much point. The problem was the Monarchy could not simply opt out 
without switching alliances, either. Charles I’s peace efforts have attracted a lot of 
attention, and the intermediaries he employed successfully clouded the issue both 
for contemporaries and for a few historians, by giving the impression that Austria- 
Hungary was on the point of signing a separate peace and just needed one final 
push to do so. The fact was, however, that the Emperor had no intention of sign-
ing a separate peace, unless Germany rejected a reasonable peace offer from the 
Entente. Czernin made this clear to the Germans in no uncertain terms. “Suppose 
Entente offers peace on the basis of the status quo. You want to continue fighting. 
We say no. Then casus foederis lapses.” 63 The Austrians even considered bribing 
the Germans with Galicia, and at one point even with Austrian Silesia. (Once the 
Kaiser rejected the Galician offer, it is true, the Austrians returned to the pursuit 
of the Austro-Polish solution with a vengeance, but they did so mainly for rea-
sons of domestic politics.) In the end, Czernin failed to soften up the Germans 
enough: Alsace-Lorraine remained out of bounds; but even more important, as 
we know, the Entente offer to negotiate on the basis of the status quo that he was 
expecting never materialised.
In early 1918, Charles was pinning his hopes on contacts with the Americans. 
Czernin even made a conciliatory reference to Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”. But he 
warned the Emperor that a separate peace with the Americans “whom we are 
only fighting on paper”, was pointless. “What we have to do is both of us to rally 
59 Quoted by Baumgart: Ostpolitik (see note 47), p. 186 (26. 5. 1918).
60 Josef Kalvoda: The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (= East European Monographs, vol. 209). Boul-
der 1986, p. 407; Richard Luckett: The White Generals. An Account of the White Movement and 
the Russian Civil War. London 1971, pp. 167–170.
61 Jan Bilek/Lubos Velek (eds.): Karel Kramar (1860–1937). Zivot a dilo. Prague 2009.
62 Germany and Russia agreed to solve that problem autonomously at Rapallo in 1922; see: 
Kraus: Versailles (see note 56), p. 31, p. 51.
63 Fritz Fischer: Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 
1914/1918. Düsseldorf 41964, p. 540. Fischer’s path-breaking study unearthed a lot of interesting 
material. The trouble is that whenever German policy proves to be inconsistent, Fischer would 
still insist on its basic continuity.
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our allies behind peace proposals.”64 Moreover, even if the Austrians had been 
willing to explore the possibilities of a separate peace, the trouble was that once 
Russia had collapsed a separate peace with Austria-Hungary would not have 
helped the Entente all that much. Theoretically, it would have freed up an Italian 
Army that was unlikely to show much enthusiasm for continuing the fight on the 
Western front.65 But it would only have been of substantial benefit to the Western 
powers if Austria-Hungary had proceeded to adopt a hostile attitude towards her 
former Allies, i.e. by cutting off Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire from German 
support. Once she did so, she would effectively have switched sides. In that case, 
German retaliation might well have precipitated her disintegration.
If he had been living in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, Charles might 
have succeeded in withdrawing from the war. But in 1917/1918, such an option 
was not available. There was simply no way Austria-Hungary could be genuine-
ly neutral. Charles faced a dilemma rather like Pope Leo X whom Henry VIII 
advised to stay neutral in 1521: the Tudors could remain neutral if they so 
wished, as their realm was surrounded by the sea, but the Papal States were no 
island.66 For Austria-Hungary, too, her exposed land frontiers had long been the 
source of fears and complaints. Once it moved out of the protective shield of the 
Dual Alliance, the Monarchy faced the danger of falling between two stools. 
Smuts who certainly saw the attractions of a Habsburg monarchy as a counter-
weight to Germany, also appreciated that Austria-Hungary could only start de-
taching herself from the German alliance once the war was over – accompanied 
and buttressed by an internal reorganisation of the monarchy that could hardly 
be undertaken during war-time.67
Resümee
Much as historians love Weichenstellungen, watersheds, and partings of the ways, 
these random remarks do tend to reinforce a fatalististic interpretation of the 
First World War. War Aims discussions tell us a lot about the internal balance of 
power within each of the players, of frock coats versus brass hats, of industrial 
lobbies versus working-class movements, of the rivalries of ethnic groups and so 
on; but they tell us little about the reason why the war ended the way it did. 
Charles I was wrong: peace did not founder on the rock of Liège. For all the 
64 Czernin to Demblin, 10. 3. 1918, HHStA, PA I 1092a (Czernin papers).
65 That was why French Prime Minister Ribot had been sceptical about a separate peace with 
Austria-Hungary in 1917; see: Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 84.
66 Quoted by Christine Shaw: The Papacy and the European Powers. In: id. (ed.): Italy and the 
European Powers. The Impact of War, 1500–1530. Leiden 2006, pp. 107–126; here: p. 118.
67 Steglich (ed.): Friedensversuche (see note 39), p. CXXIV, p. 295, p. 299, pp. 360–372; on the 
connection between foreign policy and domestic politics Lothar Höbelt: Kaiser Karl und sein 
Außenminister Czernin. “Hier stehe ich, ich kann auch anders.” In: Heeresgeschichtliches Muse-
um (ed.): Kaiser Karl I. Wien 2013, pp. 17–36.
Lothar Höbelt158
charges levelled at the decision-makers of the First World War, it is difficult to see 
how they could have played their hand differently – with one glaring exception: 
the German decision, supported by all the Austro-Hungarian military leaders, to 
declare unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1917.68 Trusting to technology, 
Kipling’s “reeking tube and iron shard”,69 proved fatal to the Central Powers.
Bethman-Hollweg had tried to stave off that “second declaration of war” by 
launching his compromise peace proposal a few weeks earlier. It has recently been 
argued that the British were following a similar strategy when they encouraged 
Wilson’s offer of mediation in the spring of 1916 as a way to avoid the battle of 
the Somme. In both cases, internal constraints – from civil-military relations to 
splits within the Cabinet – conspired to make these attempts so opaque, half-heart-
ed and convoluted as to be almost unintelligible to their recipients. As a result, the 
go-it-alone factions won out, in Germany as well as in Britain. “Those who be-
lieved that Britain could win the war without the United States took their country 
to the brink of default in early 1917.” 70 But they were saved by their opposite 
numbers on the other side. Thanks to unrestricted submarine warfare, the Ger-
mans were “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory”.71
Thus, the Western powers won the Great War. That still did not enable them 
to win the peace – as Balfour confessed in August 1918, at the start of Britain’s 
military triumph and a week after the German Army’s “black day” at Amiens: 
“Even if the whole of the war aims he had indicated in Europe were fulfilled, 
Germany would still remain the biggest military power in Europe.”72 Perhaps 
the Versailles trio Balfour stigmatised with such candour were perhaps not all 
that ignorant; but they were certainly not all-powerful. They might carve up the 
Middle East, but they were unable to carve up Germany or effect a regime 
change to their liking in Russia.73 Instead, they got a regime change in Germany 
and a carve up of Russia-in-Europe that did not serve their long term interests at 
all. True, there was a “subtle difference” between “preeminence in Europe” and 
hegemony.74 But the pre-war Entente that had troubled Germany so much had 
68 See two valuable new additions to the existing literature: Vaclav Horcicka: Austria-Hungary. 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, and the United States’ Entrance into the First World War. In: 
IHR 34 (2012), pp. 245–269; Justus D. Doenecke: Nothing Less than War. A New History of 
America’s Entry into World War I. Louisville 2011.
69 Rudyard Kipling: Recessional (1897). In: id.: Poems Selected by James Cochrane. London 
1977, p. 131.
70 Larsen: War Pessimism (see note 36), p. 810, p. 814.
71 John Milton Cooper, Jr.: The Command of Gold Reversed. American Loans to Britain, 1915–
1917. In: Pacific Historical Review 45 (1976), pp. 209–230; here: p. 228.
72 Rothwell: British War Aims (see note 13), p. 283 (War Cabinet, 15. 8. 1918).
73 As Sebag Montefiore: Jerusalem (see note 5), p. 498, hints, with perhaps a little bit of exaggera-
tion, there was a link between the carving up of the Middle East and British concern over regime 
change in Russia, as London’s conversion to zionism was at least partly designed to appeal to 
Russian Jewry: “Had Lenin moved a few days earlier, the Balfour Declaration may never have 
been issued.” Churchill continued to regard Zionism as an antidote to “the foul baboonery of 
Bolshevism”; ibid., p. 521.
74 Showalter: Total War (see note 7), p. 114.
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disintegrated to such a degree that it took all of Hitler’s (or Ribbentrop’s) 
bloody-mindedness to put it together again a quarter of a century later. Thus, it 
was the Germans after all who had achieved their foremost war aim, even if the 
circumstances attending their collapse in late 1918 made it difficult for them to 
take such a cheerful view of things.
“By contrast France’s strategic position was weaker than it had been in 1914.”75 
When the French asked for a guarantee from the U.S., the answer was an un-
equivocal No. Even worse, when they tried to enforce their reparation claims 
against Germany by military means in 1923-4, their war-time partners in Wall 
Street, J. P. Morgan foremost among them, were adamant that they would bail out 
the franc yet again only if the French promised to behave themselves and no lon-
ger cause trouble in Europe.76 At roughly the same time, the armed services of the 
two potential continental giants with a grievance, Reichswehr and Red Army, 
were embarking on their cooperation. Strangely enough, it was the Italians – rath-
er than the French – who started talking about a “vittoria mutilata”; just as it was 
the Germans who believed they had been stabbed in the back when in fact they 
had just been freed from the nightmare of the Russian steam-roller that had dom-
inated their pre-war fears.77 But that is another story.
75 Sheffield: Forgotten Victory (see note 14), p. 272. I would disagree with Sheffield on German 
war-aims, but I certainly agree with his reading of the results of the war.
76 Stephen A. Schuker: The End of French Predominance in Europe. The Financial Crisis of 1924 
and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan. Chapel Hill 1976; John Douglas Forbes: J. P. Morgan, Jr., 
1867–1943. Charlottesville 1981, pp. 90–98, pp. 143 f.
77 Manfred Zeidler: Reichswehr und Rote Armee 1920–1933. Wege und Stationen einer unge-
wöhnlichen Zusammenarbeit. München 1993.
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First World War
The Ottoman decision for war, followed by the Ottoman navy’s fateful naval at-
tack on the Russian Black Sea ports on 29 October 1914 has attracted the atten-
tion of politicians and scholars for nearly a century. The political decision-making 
process, the role of political and military leaders, public opinion, intellectuals and 
the press have been well covered by recent scholars drawing on newly opened ar-
chives and comparative studies.1 We now know for certain that it was not a fore-
gone conclusion that the Ottomans would join the Central Powers. We also have 
a better picture of Ottoman leaders’ early dilemma of keeping the empire out of 
war while securing an alliance with a Great Power. Although we still come across 
old clichés2 repeated in recent books,3 most historians no longer believe that the 
Ottomans were actively seeking war in 1914, and there is no need describe the 
background to their decision at length. 
All the same, there is a dearth of academic works on Ottoman political and mil-
itary decision-making processes during the war itself; and this chapter will focus 
on a basic, and for the most part still unanswered, question – “how were war aims 
and strategy formulated and implemented?” – from the perspective of military 
history. Nevertheless, before going into this it is important to emphasise that the 
Ottoman decision to enter the war on the side of Germany was a mixture of 
band-waggoning and balancing strategies. As regards the first, given that the En-
tente was regarded in Constantinople as the stronger side, it might have made 
sense to side with that combination. However the short-sightedness of the En-
tente in refusing an Ottoman alliance offer,4 its siding with Greece over disputed 
1 Mustafa Aksakal: The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman Empire and the First World 
War. Cambridge 2008; Michael A. Reynolds: Shattering Empires. The Clash and Collapse of the 
Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918. Cambridge 2011, pp. 82–119; Erol Köroğlu: Ottoman 
Propaganda and Turkish Identity. Literature in Turkey during World War I. London 2007, 
pp. 47–71; Feroz Ahmad: The Late Ottoman Empire. In: Marian Kent (ed.): The Great Powers 
and the End of the Ottoman Empire. London 21996, pp. 5–30, here: pp. 5–23.
2 “It is difficult to think of any rational motive for this act.” Alan J. P. Taylor: The First World 
War. An Illustrated History. London 1963, p. 58.
3 Daniel A. Butler: Shadow of the Sultan’s Realm. The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire and 
the Creation of the Modern Middle East. Washington 2011, pp. 53 f.
4 Geoffrey Miller: Straits. British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the 
Dardanelles Campaign. Hull 1997, p. XXII, p. 59, pp. 196–198, pp. 205 f., pp. 234–236; Harry 
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Aegean islands, the British government’s requisitioning of two Ottoman dread-
noughts –Reşadiye and Sultan Osman5 – being built in England, the presence on 
the spot of a German Military Mission6 and the general effectiveness of German 
diplomacy7 changed the attitudes of decision makers. Although Ottoman leaders 
were about equally divided in their sympathies at the beginning of the war,8 they 
were all impressed by the power and the advantages of the German military sys-
tem. Indeed, in their view, Germany had the means and talent to achieve victory 
well before the Entente could bring the might of its colonial resources into play. 
Hence, in the short term at least, although they were well aware of the junior role 
they were likely to play, they still saw the Ottoman Army as capable of tipping 
the balance and offsetting the longer-term advantages of the Entente.
Initial War Aims
In comparison to those of the other belligerents Ottoman war aims were initially 
relatively few – just two – and conservative. The most obvious one was to pre-
serve the integrity and independence of the empire, a constant aim of Ottoman 
diplomacy and the military since the end of the eighteenth century. However the 
series of defeats in the recent Balkan Wars had shaken both the self confidence of 
the Ottoman military and the Porte’s faith in the international system. The Great 
Powers had shown their colours by endorsing the territorial gains of the Balkan 
states in direct violation of their treaties and promises.9 The Great Powers – espe-
N. Howard: The Partition of Turkey. A Diplomatic History 1913–1923. New York 21966, pp. 71–
74, p. 96, p. 106; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur: Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi, vol. 3,1. Ankara 1983, pp. 133–144; 
Reynolds: Shattering Empires (see note 1), pp. 42–45, pp. 110–112; Gerard E. Silberstein: The 
Troubled Alliance. German-Austrian Relations 1914 to 1917. Lexington 1970, pp. 50–52; Hew 
Strachan: The First World War. New York 2005, p. 103.
5 Joseph Keller: British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire 1908–1914. London 1983, pp. 116–
123; Miller: Straits (see note 4), pp. 219–224; Howard: Partition (see note 4), pp. 93 f.; Henry Mor-
genthau: Secrets of the Bosphorus. London 1918, pp. 30 f., pp. 33–35, pp. 44–52.
6 George P. Gooch/Harold Temperley (eds.): British Documents on the Origins of the War. 
Vol. 10,1: The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War. London 1930, pp. 135 f., pp. 143–277, 
pp. 338–423; Robert J. Kerner: The Mission of Liman von Sanders II. The Crisis. In: The Slavonic 
Review 6 (December 1927) 17, pp. 344–363.
7 Morgenthau: Secrets (see note 5), p. 4, p. 15, p. 17. It is important not to forget the crucial role 
played by the Austria-Hungarian diplomats during the initiation and negotiation phases of the 
alliance. Frank G. Weber: Eagles on Crescents. Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the 
Turkish Alliance 1914–1918. Ithaca 1970, pp. 5 f., pp. 17–77; Ulrich Trumpener: Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire 1914–1918. Princeton 1968, pp. 12–61; Silberstein: Troubled Alliance (see 
note 4), pp. 8–16, pp. 76–98.
8 Rear-Admiral Limpus’s message to Churchill on 8 September 1914. Martin Gilbert: Winston 
S. Churchill, vol. 3,1. London 1972, pp. 102 f.; Cemal Paşa: Hatıralar. İttihat ve Terakki. Vol. 1: 
Dünya Savaşı Anıları. Ed. by Alpay Kabacalı. Istanbul 2001, pp. 117–163.
9 Keller: British Policy (see note 5), pp. 67–82; Ahmad: Late Ottoman Empire (see note 1), p. 15; 
Gooch/Temperley (eds.): British Documents (see note 6), pp. 428 f., pp. 463–470, pp. 939 f., 
pp. 991–994, pp. 1002–1004.
Ottoman Strategy and War Aims during the First World War 165
cially Britain – formally declared at the beginning of the Balkan Wars that they 
would not accept any changes of the border and status quo. Apparently they were 
expecting an Ottoman victory. The Balkan Wars changed this perspective. Instead 
of trying to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as they had previously 
done, they had accommodated themselves to the idea that the multinational em-
pire was disintegrating. In this situation, the Ottoman government was anxious to 
enlist the support of at least some of the Great Powers, even if that meant joining 
the war.
With the luxury of hindsight Turkish and western scholars have tended to see 
the Ottoman leadership’s belief in the need to join one of the alliance systems as a 
fatal blunder.10 However they are ignoring not only the general psychology of the 
Ottomans with their ingrained fear of Russia11 but also the signs and messages 
coming from all of the Great Powers. A German alliance seemed to offer security 
against the territorial aspirations of all the other Powers, great and small. In Otto-
man eyes, Germany was the only Power that would respect the integrity and sur-
vival of the empire in return for an alliance. At the same time Ottoman leaders 
were hoping to reinforce their regional security by constructing a Balkan bloc 
with Rumania and Bulgaria; and here, too, they would need Germany’s support. 
It was certainly a gamble, but one which offered a chance of winning.12
One controversy that has become increasingly important for modern scholar-
ship is that over the role of internal problems in the Ottoman decision for war. 
These domestic problems, especially the Armenian question, certainly raised wor-
ries about the security and integrity of the empire; but at the beginning of the war 
they were still regarded as manageable and tolerable (rather like those of 
Austria-Hungary on the outbreak of war), and they do not seem to have influ-
enced Ottoman decision-making at this stage.13
10 Bayur: Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (see note 4), pp. 267 f., p. 274; Keller: British Policy (see note 5), 
p. 163; Aksakal: Ottoman Road (see note 1), p. 1.
11 Ahmad: Late Ottoman Empire (see note 1), p. 15. Starting from the late 19th century the Straits 
became the focal point of Russian political and economic interests. The disastrous defeats that 
had been suffered against Japanese played instrumental role in changing strategic orientation 
from Far East to Middle East. Although the Straits did not initially appear within the official 
Russian war aims, it was apparent to Britain and France that Russia would do everything to solve 
the Straits problem once and for all at the first opportunity. Alan Bodger: Russia and the End of 
the Ottoman Empire. In: Kent (ed.): Great Powers (see note 1), pp. 76–110, here: pp. 77–80, 
pp. 96 f., p. 102; Sean McMeekin: The Russian Origins of the First World War. Cambridge 2011, 
p. 13, pp. 17–19, p. 23, p. 26, pp. 33–35; Reynolds: Shattering Empires (see note 1), p. 29, p. 35, 
pp. 40 f., p. 72, p. 76, pp. 114 f.; Morgenthau: Secrets (see note 5), p. 16.
12 Aksakal: Ottoman Road (see note 1), pp. 13 f., p. 17, pp. 153 f.; Bayur: Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (see 
note 4), pp. 110–121; Silberstein: Troubled Alliance (see note 4), pp. 6 f.; Reynolds: Shattering Em-
pires (see note 1), pp. 119 f.; Strachan: First World War (see note 4), p. 104; Ahmad: Late Ottoman 
Empire (see note 1), p. 18; Keller: British Policy (see note 5), p. 163.
13 Gooch/Temperley (eds.): British Documents (see note 6), pp. 424–548. Some scholars claim 
that “plans for the Turkification of Anatolia” and to put an end to “the reform agreement for the 
Armenian provinces” played important part for the Ottoman decision to enter the war. Even 
though historians are divide about whether the Ottoman leadership welcomed the war as an op-
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The second Ottoman war aim was the economic independence of the empire 
and the creation of a modern economic system by radical reforms. War seemed to 
provide a unique opportunity to get rid of the irksome Capitulations, the dream 
of several generations. The Ottoman economy had always been in a critical state, 
but after the Balkan Wars it had got into an acute downward spiral and with the 
July crisis it collapsed altogether. Most western-owned businesses completely 
stopped their activities and foreign-dominated maritime transportation came to a 
halt. It was only by signing the alliance with Germany that the Ottoman govern-
ment was able to raise any foreign loans at all. These terrible experiences con-
vinced the leadership that the empire had to do all it could to establish an inde-
pendent and viable economy and that this could not wait for the end of the war. 
The Capitulations were unilaterally abrogated just before the empire entered the 
war;14 and once hostilities started economic reforms were introduced, including 
such novel measures as making use of women in the labour force.15
Contrary to a common view, irredentism did not feature prominently among 
the empire’s initial war aims.16 While Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania openly 
bargained with both sides about concrete territorial gains as a price for their sup-
port,17 Constantinople eschewed such tactics. Of course the loss of important 
European provinces just two years before was still a burning issue for all levels 
of society; but the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population of Macedonia had 
effectively made the recovery of these areas impracticable.18 To make matters 
worse, on 3 September 1915, the Ottoman government had to cede the strategi-
cally important west bank of the Maritza to Bulgaria to encourage it to join the 
war on the Ottoman-German side.19 Obviously an “irredentist” government 
would not have made such a sacrifice of the security of its last remaining Europe-
an territory. Similarly the continuing neutrality of Greece effectively stopped any 
mention of the northern Aegean islands which had precipitated a naval arma-
portunity, this view of seeing everything from the perspectives of Armenian question is a highly 
exaggerated understanding of the situation in the empire and also in Eastern Anatolia. The facts 
are not supporting the claim. For a standard version of this claim see: Taner Akçam: A Shameful 
Act. The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility. New York 2006, 
pp. 111 f., pp. 121 f.
14 Bayur: Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (see note 4), pp. 149–173, pp. 181–193; Ahmed Emin: Turkey in the 
World War. New Haven 1930, pp. 112–116; Ahmad: Late Ottoman Empire (see note 1), pp. 15–17; 
Howard: Partition (see note 4), pp. 102–106; Morgenthau: Secrets (see note 5), p. 23.
15 Zafer Toprak: İttihat-Terakki ve Cihan Harbi. Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye’de Devletçilik. Is-
tanbul 2003; Yavuz Selim Karakışla: Women and Work in the Ottoman Empire. Society for the 
Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women (1916–1923). Unpublished Diss., Binghamton 2004.
16 Ian F. W. Beckett: The Great War 1914–1918. Harlow 22007, p. 102; Keller: British Policy (see 
note 5), p. 163; Akçam: Shameful Act (see note 13), p. 112.
17 Silberstein: Troubled Alliance (see note 4), pp. 16–30, pp. 33–58, pp. 129–178; Richard J. Cramp-
ton: The Balkans, 1914–1918. In: Hew Strachan (ed.): World War I. A History. Oxford 1998, 
pp. 66–79, here: p. 66.
18 Ahmad: Late Ottoman Empire (see note 1), p. 23; Reynolds: Shattering Empires (see note 1), 
p. 150.
19 Silberstein: Troubled Alliance (see note 4), pp. 119–126.
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ment race between both countries only two years previously. In short, at the be-
ginning of war the Ottomans displayed great caution regarding possible territori-
al gains.
In fact, neither pan-Islamism nor pan-Turkism played an important role in the 
Ottoman decision for war and formulation of initial war aims. In direct contrast 
to German20 and British21 decision-makers, the Ottoman leadership had little 
faith in the potential of either of these pan-ideologies, having learned from past 
experience that pan-Islamism had failed to unite or rally the Muslim citizens of 
the empire against increasing western encroachments.22 Instead of supporting the 
empire most Muslims preferred to concentrate on their well-established local or 
regional interests and to await the outcome without throwing their lot with ei-
ther side prematurely. Even in Libya locals rallied to the Ottoman banner only 
after suffering terribly from the heavy-handedness of the Italian colonial admin-
istration and bloody counterinsurgency operations.23 Nevertheless, Ottoman 
leaders welcomed additional German funds for Pan-Islamist projects so long as 
they could finance their military and agents without committing themselves too 
much.24
To sum up: their initial war aims demonstrate clearly that Ottoman decision- 
makers were not expecting a momentous outcome in terms of either territory or 
power; and that their prime motive for entering the Great War was simply to pre-
serve the independence and integrity of the empire as far as possible, and, ideally, 
to reinforce their position by means of Balkan pact. In short, they considered 
their options and formulated their war aims rationally, not in terms of making 
gains but of eliminating threats.
Ottoman Strategy in the Early Stages of the War
The Ottoman military was completely unprepared for action when the German 
Army stormed into Belgium. The Balkan Wars had left it exhausted, demoralised 
and in need of urgent re-equipment and refurbishment. For these reasons the Ot-
toman Empire was hardly regarded as a worthy opponent by the Entente powers 
while its new ally, Germany, also had serious doubts about its potential.25 The 
20 Donald M. McKale: War by Revolution. Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the 
Era of World War I. Kent 1998, p. X, pp. 46–68; Fritz Fischer: Germany’s Aims in the First World 
War. London 1967, pp. 126–131.
21 McKale: War (see note 20), p. 3, pp. 69–75; David French: British Strategy & War Aims 1914–
1916. London 1986, p. 46.
22 Reynolds: Shattering Empires (see note 1), p. 123; McKale: War (see note 20), p. XIII.
23 Hamdi Ertuna: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi Osmanlı Devri Osmanlı-İtalyan Harbi (1911–
1912). Ankara 1981, pp. 142–182.
24 Aksakal: Ottoman Road (see note 1), pp. 15–18.
25 Weber: Eagles (see note 7), pp. 1 f., p. 10, p. 17; Jehuda L. Wallach: Bir Askeri Yardımın Anato-
misi [= Turkish translation of the German original “Anatomie einer Miltärhilfe”]. Translated by 
Fahri Çeliker. Ankara 1977, pp. 142–144.
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German Colonel Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf26 had been at the head of 
the Ottoman General Staff for less than a year. Officially, the Minister of War En-
ver Pasha was the Chief of the General Staff and Bronsart was his first assistant. 
However, Enver had neither the experience nor the training needed to handle 
highly technical and demanding general staff duties; nor had he any taste for staff 
work. Instead, he preferred to deal with important issues and even then only in 
general terms. Bronsart therefore became de facto chief of the General Staff in a 
very short time, and he immediately started reorganising it in the image of the 
German General Staff. German general staff officers were assigned as branch 
chiefs with young, talented Ottoman general staff officers, most of whom were 
German-trained, as their deputies; and it was they who duly amended the Otto-
man strategic mobilisation and concentration plans and rewrote most of the fu-
ture campaign plans under Bronsart’s close supervision.27
In addition to reorganisation and planning the General Staff was also responsi-
ble for coping with the dreadful disorder arising from the Balkan defeats. Army 
corps headquarters and divisions that were deployed around the Chataldja forti-
fied zone had to return thousands of prisoners of war to their old or new garri-
sons; detainees returning from captivity had to be reintegrated into their new 
units; and in some provinces civil disturbances had to be dealt with. The confu-
sion was so great that a number of headquarters and units were moved backwards 
and forwards and subjected to repeated reorganisations. The effect of these inces-
sant changes in the structure of military organisation structure together with un-
certainties about recruitment districts naturally tended to slow down the mobili-
sation process.28
Even without these problems, the Ottoman General Staff faced a peculiar com-
bination of constraints and dilemmas in mobilising its resources. Even after losing 
its European territories, the empire was huge; while its inhabitants were thinly 
dispersed and the means of transportation and communications poor and prob-
lematic. In fact, this all considered, the mobilisation of personnel proceeded sur-
prisingly smoothly in most of Anatolia. Indeed, so many men flooded into the 
recruitment centres that at least a quarter of them had to be sent home owing to 
the impossibility of feeding, clothing and equipping them all. In the eastern parts 
of Anatolia, by contrast, and in the predominantly Arab-populated provinces in 
the south, there was no such mass volunteering. In those areas, there existed a 
26 Deutsche Offiziere in der Türkei [Manuscript], Reichsarchiv 1940, Turkish General Staff Di-
rectorate of History [ATASE] Library, Ankara.
27 Cemal Akbay: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, vol. 1. Ankara 1970, pp. 169 f.; İsmet İn-
önü: Hatıralar. Vol. 1. Ed. by Sebahattin Selek. Ankara 1985, p. 87.
28 Şerif İlden: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Başlangıcında. Vol. 3: Ordu. Sarıkamış Kuşatma Manevrası ve 
Meydan Savaşı. Ed. by Sami Önal. Istanbul 1998, pp. 33 f.; Arif Baytın: İlk Dünya Harbinde Kaf-
kas Cephesi. Sessiz Ölüm Sarıkamış Günlüğü. Ed. by İsmail Dervişoğlu. Istanbul 2007, pp. 13 f.; 
Carl Mühlmann: Çanakkale Savaşı. Bir Alman Subayının Notları [= Turkish translation of the 
German original “Der Kampf um die Dardanellen 1915”]. Translated by Sedat Umran. Istanbul 
2004, pp. 21–24.
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wide gap between the expectations of the General Staff and the population’s un-
derstanding of universal military obligation; and most of the nomadic and moun-
tain tribes, together with non-Muslim religious groups who had practically no 
tradition of conscription, did their best to evade conscription.29
In terms of weapons, equipment and ammunition the situation was dire. More 
than half of the army’s heavy equipment and weapons had been lost during the 
humiliating retreats and surrenders of the Balkan Wars. For this reason the quality 
of weapons and equipment varied enormously between units, and the army obvi-
ously did not have the means to provide for its greatly expanded numbers. To 
make things worse, corruption, incompetence and, to a certain extent, even out-
right treason plagued the logistics of mobilisation. Nor, contrary to Ottoman 
hopes, could even the the new alliance with Germany do much to rescue the situ-
ation because of the lack of direct railway connections. All transportation be-
tween Germany and the empire was at the mercy of Romania and Bulgaria and 
only a fraction of the aid promised by Germany ever arrived.30
While the General Staff was dealing with the problems of mobilisation, the rul-
ing authorities failed to develop an effective strategy for achieving their political 
aims. In the first place, they the were divided into two camps in terms of both their 
attitude towards joining the war and their preferred alliances: Enver Pasha, Cemal 
Pasha and Talat Bey – the triumvirate of the ruling Committee of Union and Prog-
ress (CUP) – managed to win over or outmanoeuvre the opposition to the German 
alliance; but their methods aroused ill-feeling and further opposition. In the sec-
ond place, the Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha and civilian members of the leader-
ship did not fully understand the demands of war. They had only a limited under-
standing of the basic decisions that would affect the nature, scope, length, and the 
economic and human costs of the war; and they lacked the courage to tackle such 
problems. Clearly, these civilian politicians were overruled by the CUP triumvi-
rate.31 In the third place, for Enver and the inner circle of the CUP, who were firm 
believers in the superiority of German military thinking and in the imminence of 
victory, the role of the Ottoman military ought to be to tie down as many Entente 
29 Even after these regional problems the mobilised personnel strength of the military was im-
posing; more than a million men with a combat strength of 820,000. However the strength of 
regular officer corps were only 12,469, so for every one hundred combatant soldiers the adminis-
tration provided only 1.5 officers, literally a drop in an ocean of men. İlden: Birinci Dünya Savaşı 
Başlangıcında (see note 28), pp. 39 f.; Selahattin Selışık: Kafkas Cephesinde 10ncu Kolordunun 
Birinci Dünya Savaşının Başlangıcından Sarıkamış Muharebelerinin Sonuna Kadar Olan Harekatı. 
Ankara 22006, pp. 3–5; Ali İhsan Sabis: Harp Hatıralarım. Birinci Dünya Harbi, vol. 1. Istanbul 
1990, pp. 159–164, p. 285.
30 Akbay: Birinci Dünya (see note 27), pp.  171–176; Ulrich Trumpener: German Military Aid to 
Turkey in 1914. A Historical Re-Evaluation. In: JMH 32 (1960) 2, pp. 145–149; Selışık: Kafkas 
(see note 29), pp. 6 f., pp. 11–16; Mühlmann: Çanakkale Savaşı (see note 28), pp. 29–34; Morgen-
thau: Secrets (see note 5), pp. 41 f.
31 Bayur: Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (see note 4), pp. 65–70, pp. 80 f., pp. 94 f., pp. 99–106; M. Naim Tur-
fan: Rise of the Young Turks. Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse. London 2000, pp. 332–
363.
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troops as possible, so as to enable the Germans to win decisive victories on the 
main fronts. This thinking was, of course, welcomed by the German General Staff, 
which saw in the Ottoman Army a useful diversionary tool to force the enemy to 
waste more troops in “Oriental side shows”. But it was a way of thinking that 
went directly against the need to defend the empire’s territories and it confronted 
the leadership with a dilemma which they were to prove unable to resolve.32
Given the limitations of the Ottoman leadership, the German-led General Staff 
soon became the driving force in developing an effective strategy. Of the Otto-
mans only Enver and to a certain extent Cemal seem to have made any significant 
contribution to the formulation of strategy. According to them, however, the 
most vulnerable part of the empire was still the capital, and the Straits. If all too 
often in the past the enemies of the empire had sought to force the Straits in order 
to dictate terms to Constantinople, there was now also the problem that against 
all expectations Bulgaria and Romania were stubbornly refusing to join the Cen-
tral Powers. In these circumstances, not only the Straits but the empire’s Europe-
an frontier and the fortress city of Edirne (Adrianople) had to be protected against 
a possible attack. Not surprisingly, therefore, a strong defensive posture in the 
west seemed to be essential.33
As regards the strategy to be adopted against the Russian threat in the Cauca-
sus, the Ottoman leadership and General Staff took more time to reach agree-
ment. In the nineteenth century the Ottomans had twice failed to stop Russian 
assaults at the border, the Tsar’s army managing to penetrate deep into eastern 
Anatolia and capture Erzurum both in 1829 and in 1877. The feeling was there-
fore one of scepticism and it was decided to conduct a strategic defence; but no 
clear decision was reached as to where the main defensive line was to be estab-
lished. The Third Army commander Hasan İzzet Pasha received conflicting and 
vague orders, some advising him to use the archaic Erzurum fortress and the high 
ground around it, while others recommended defensive lines near to the border.34
As for the southern provinces of the empire, these were, interestingly enough, 
virtually ignored at this stage. There was no threat assessment or discussion of 
Mesopotamia, Yemen and Hejaz and only some speculations about the defence of 
Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. Indeed, units that were stationed or mobilised in 
the south were considered suitable for deployment at the Straits or in Thrace.35 
32 Friedrich Freiherr Kreß von Kressenstein: Son Haçlı Seferi Kuma Gömülen İmparatorluk [= 
Turkish translation of the German original “Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal”]. Istanbul 2007, 
pp. 11 f.; Liman von Sanders: Five Years in Turkey. Translated by Carl Reichmann. Baltimore 
1928, p. 32; Trumpener: Germany (see note 7), pp. 19 f.; Ali İhsan Sabis: Harp Hatıralarım. Birinci 
Dünya Harbi, vol. 2. Istanbul 1990, pp. 52–88, p. 167; İnönü: Hatıralar (see note 27), p. 96, 
pp. 103–108, p. 148.
33 Silberstein: Troubled Alliance (see note 4), pp. 28–39, pp. 73–76, pp. 82–88; Paşa: Hatıralar (see 
note 8), pp. 141 f., pp. 152–162.
34 Hakkı Altınbilek/Naci Kır: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu 
Harekâtı, vol. 2,1. Ankara 1993, pp. 69–72, pp. 87–94, pp. 98–100.
35 Akbay: Birinci Dünya (see note 27), pp. 157–160.
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The problem of internal security was woefully neglected.36 To create more mobile 
tactical units for the army, it was decided to reorganise the gendarmerie to suit 
conventional military needs and to establish line infantry divisions and regiments. 
Consequently, even the most volatile provinces were left without adequate securi-
ty, and governors later struggled to maintain order using old or unfit ex-service-
men and the always problematical village guards.37
One of the most novel, if least known, aspects of Ottoman strategy was with-
out doubt the decision to employ unconventional warfare against the Russian and 
British Empires. Modern scholars generally confuse this with Ottoman and Ger-
man pan-Islamist projects, but in reality it was born out of decades of counter-in-
surgency experiences against rebels and guerrillas in Macedonia and Crete. Most 
Ottoman officers in leading positions had spent many of their formative years 
fighting against all sorts of irregular forces;38 and they had been impressed by the 
Bulgarians’ use of irregular warriors behind Ottoman lines during the Balkan 
Wars. They now argued that recourse to unconventional warfare might solve the 
problem of mobilising Kurdish, Arab and some other martial tribes. These tribes 
were potentially of some military value; and they lived in regions where the Gen-
eral Staff was planning to economise on regular troops. Although they might be 
completely useless for conventional purposes their employment under experi-
enced officers might prove something of an ideal solution.39 Enver, consequently 
entrusted a semi-official Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organisation)40 with carrying 
out these unconventional operations. Initially he and the General Staff employed 
the new strategy relatively cautiously, and only in Mesopotamia, Eastern Anato-
36 In contrast to Ottoman leadership’s underestimation, the Russian military had been making 
plans to incite Christian population of the empire for several decades. The Russian Caucasus 
command began to arm Armenians and some Kurdish tribes and tried its best to incite them for 
rebellion well before the start of hostilities. Reynolds: Shattering Empires (see note 1), pp. 115 ff.; 
McMeekin: Russian Origins (see note 11), p. 17.
37 Altınbilek/Kır: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde (see note 34), pp. 81 f.; Justin McCarthy et al.: The 
Armenian Rebellion at Van. Salt Lake City 2006, p. 177.
38 A.Kadir Varoğlu/Mesut Uyar: The Impact of Asymmetric Warfare on the Military Profession 
and Structure. Lessons Learned from the Ottoman Military. In: Giuseppe Caforio/Gerhard 
Kümmel/Bandanna Purkayastha (eds.): Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. Sociological Per-
spectives. Bingley 2008, pp. 49–60, here: pp. 52–58; Charles D. Haley: The Desperate Ottoman. 
Enver Paşa and the German Empire – I. In: Middle Eastern Studies 30 (1994) 1, pp. 1–51, here: 
p. 15.
39 This strategy also turned out to be useful to get rid of not only partisan officers (including the 
former hitmen of the CUP), but also other troublesome elements like medium level CUP leaders, 
bandits and ex-convicts. They were enlisted in the creation of guerrilla bands from martial tribes. 
Arif Cemil Denker: Birinci Dünya Savaşında Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Ed. by Metin Martı. Istanbul 
[not dated], pp. 9–22; Süleyman Gürcan: Memleketim Trabzon Mahallem Tekfurçayır. Binbaşı 
 Süleyman Bey’in Manzum Anıları. Ed. by Ömer Türkoğlu. Ankara 1997, pp. 130–133; Haley: 
Desperate Ottoman (see note 38), p. 23.
40 About this organisation see: Philip H. Stoddard: The Ottoman Government and the Arabs. A 
Preliminary Study on the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Unpublished Diss., Princeton 1963, pp. 1–8, pp. 51–
60; Polat Safi: History in the Trench. The Ottoman Special Organization – Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa 
Literature. In: Middle Eastern Studies 48 (2012) 1, pp. 89–106, here: pp. 89–102.
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lia, Libya and Macedonia; later, however, it was extended to the Arabian Peninsu-
la and Sinai-Palestine.
Yet although their threat assessment – even one that discounted any threat from 
the south – rightly stressed the importance of strategic defence, the Ottoman mil-
itary leadership was greatly influenced by the “cult of offensive” in vogue all over 
Europe. Like their European counterparts they believed that modern wars would 
be very brief and the outcome would be decided by massive offensive operations. 
The Russo-Japanese War and the initial victories of the Balkan Allies were taken 
as testimony to the efficacy of the offensive. As they also feared that a protracted 
war would destroy the fragile socio-political framework of the empire in any case, 
they concluded that confine themselves to a defensive strategy was to risk defeat. 
Besides, the Ottoman military felt they would have to contribute directly to the 
main theatres of operations in Europe before the final German victory if they 
were to secure an honourable place at the peace negotiations. When, therefore, 
Liman von Sanders and Colmar von der Goltz suggested using the divisions that 
had been concentrated near the Straits to open a new front either on the Roma-
nian frontier – Berlin was at that time put pressure on Istanbul to devise a project 
to include Romania as an ally – or in Odessa, Enver was no less enthusiastic about 
this than the German General Staff itself.
One obvious difficulty, of course, was Bulgarian and Romanian neutrality,41 
but the Ottoman General Staff nevertheless went ahead and prepared a single mo-
bilisation and concentration plan (the so-called Plan Number One) in which, 
while twenty-six out of thirty-seven numbered divisions would still be concen-
trated defensively around Istanbul and the Dardanelles Straits, two army corps 
were earmarked for use against Russia (either at the Romanian border or around 
Odessa) in order to lighten the burden on the Habsburgs. As a result, one army 
corps from the Third Army, two army corps headquarters and three out of four 
divisions from the Iraq Regional Command and nearly all the divisions of the 
Fourth Army were deployed to Thrace. However when a number of conflicting 
messages began to arrive from the German political and military authorities the 
Ottomans began to change their plans drastically. For example, in order to launch 
a surprise attack against the Suez Canal, two army corps, each with two divisions, 
were reallocated to the Fourth Army; whilst the X Army Corps was returned to 
its mother unit, the Third Army, for possible operations against Russia. These 
sudden changes created havoc within the units, which found themselves first or-
dered to advance, then to retreat.42
In fact, even before the Ottoman decision to join the war the German General 
Staff, feeling increasingly optimistic about the capability of the Ottoman Army, 
had decided to intervene more directly in Ottoman military affairs and assigned 
41 Von Sanders: Five Years (see note 32), pp. 25 f.; Fevzi Çakmak: Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi 
Hareketleri. Şark Vilayetlerimizde, Kafkasya’da ve İran’da. Ankara 1936, p. 8.
42 Çakmak: Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Hareketleri (see note 41), pp. 3 f., pp. 6–8, p. 10; Selışık: 
Kafkas (see note 29), pp. 17–25, pp. 28–34; Sabis: Harp Hatıralarım (see note 32), pp. 170–174.
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more and more German staff officers to the Ottoman General Staff. Not surpris-
ingly, the Ottoman general staff officers did not like these new arrangements and 
tried to resist the tightening of German control; but within a relatively short time 
(by September 1914) Bronsart had managed to replace the Ottoman deputy 
branch chiefs with German officers or to sideline them; and he had also increased 
the number of staff branches, thereby reducing their respective powers. General 
Hans von Seeckt who succeeded Bronsart in December 1917, was to continue his 
policy of excluding Ottoman officers from positions of influence, and even kept 
them in ignorance of important developments. Indeed, it might be said that after 
September 1914 the Ottoman General Staff became more or less a field army 
headquarters (Großer Generalstab) under the direct command and control of the 
German General Staff, in which the Ottomans had little real influence.43
Application of the Strategy
Somewhat to the surprise of Constantinople, the Entente responded to the Otto-
man raid of 29 October on the Black Sea ports by initiating hostilities without is-
suing or waiting for an official declaration of war. The British light cruiser HMS 
Minerva bombarded Akaba on 1 November 1914 and the Dardanelles outer for-
tresses two days later. Russian troops started to cross the Ottoman frontier on 
4 November and a reinforced Indian divisional group (the so-called Indian Expe-
ditionary Force “D”) which had set sail well before war was declared, captured 
the crucial beachhead of Fao on 7 November. Obviously the Ottoman General 
Staff made a mistake in paying no attention to the combat strength of British In-
dia and the quasi autonomous decision-making processes of the Government of 
India. However instead of making a drastic change in Mesopotamia it was decided 
to replace the theatre commander with an experienced insurgency expert.44
Meanwhile, an over-hasty and ill-executed Russian invasion had exposed Rus-
sia’s military weakness and encouraged Enver and his staff to change their defen-
sive strategy into an offensive one.45 The plan for the Sarıkamış campaign was 
simple but daring: one army corps and a cavalry division would tie down the Rus-
sians by frontal assaults and create a window of opportunity for two more army 
corps to encircle and assault the right and rear of the enemy. At the same time 
43 Kâzım Karabekir: Birinci Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik?, vol. 2. Istanbul 1994, pp. 154–159; 
Ahmed İzzet: Feryadım, vol. 1. Istanbul 1992, pp. 182 f., p. 193, p. 216; İnönü: Hatıralar (see 
note 27), p. 148; Sabis: Harp Hatıralarım (see note 32), p. 143; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir: Maked-
onya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa, vol. 3. Istanbul 1985, pp. 380, p. 382, pp. 412–423.
44 Frederick J. Moberly: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918, vol. 1. London 1923, pp. 78–
126; Nezihi Fırat/Behzat Balkış: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, İran-Irak Cephesi, vol. 3,1. 
Ankara 1979, pp. 65–71.
45 Çakmak: Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Hareketleri (see note 41), pp. 28–42; E. V. Maslofski: 
General Maslofski’nin Umumi Harpte Kafkas Cephesi Eserinin Tenkidi. Translated by Nazmi. 
Ankara 1935, pp. 53–83; Altınbilek/Kır: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde (see note 34), pp. 101–351.
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Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa guerrilla bands supported by token conventional units would 
launch diversionary raids deep into enemy territory from the north. The cam-
paign duly began on 22 December 1914 with a surprise advance into Russian rear, 
but if the plan itself was perhaps over-ambitious, given the shortage of heavy 
weaponry and communications difficulties on the Ottoman side, terrible weather 
conditions, the difficult terrain and stiff Russian resistance were among the other 
factors contributing to the defeat of the Third Army on 4 January 1915. Whatever 
the chances for an Ottoman victory might have had been, the Sarıkamış offensive 
turned out to be a self-inflicted disaster that brought major problems for the em-
pire in its wake. Obviously a defensive or even a cautious offensive strategy would 
have left the empire in a better position. As it was, out of 118,174 combat effec-
tives on 22 December only 42,000 survived.46 The Sarıkamış Campaign not only 
effectively ended any chance of Ottoman offensive action but moved the Otto-
man General Staff to assign a low strategic priority to the Caucasus front until 
Russia collapsed at the end of 1917.
The second offensive enterprise was the Suez Canal Campaign, in connection 
with which Germans had cherished high hopes of an Islamic rebellion in Egypt. 
But this campaign too fell short of its planners’ expectations. Only two reinforced 
divisions of a newly organised expeditionary force were assigned as the first eche-
lon of the campaign. They managed to escape detection by British surveillance 
teams and patrols in the inhospitable Sinai desert; and the logistical preparation 
and planning were also of the highest order in terms of sophistication and fore-
sight. Nevertheless, when it came to actual operations, the campaign was a total 
failure. Ottoman intelligence grossly underestimated the combat strength of the 
enemy; and deficiencies of firepower and a lack of bridging and water-crossing 
equipment further weakened the chances of success. On the other hand, the the-
atre commander, Cemal Pasha, was quick to recognise the futility of continuing 
the offensive and managed to break contact skilfully and withdraw the Ottoman 
units professionally.47 Moreover, his secrecy and boldness with which the under-
taking had been conducted greatly worried the British colonial administration and 
effectively pinned down the large British garrison of Egypt for more than a year. 
In these respects at least, and taking into account the light casualties and minimal 
resources committed to the enterprise compared to the much larger British com-
mitment, the Suez Canal Campaign, contrary to conventional wisdom, can per-
haps be termed something of a success.48
46 Çakmak: Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Hareketleri (see note 41), pp. 50–81; Maslofski: General 
(see note 45), pp. 84–170; Altınbilek/Kır: Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde (see note 34), pp. 354–528.
47 Mütekait Miralay Behçet: Büyük Harpte Mısır Seferi. Istanbul 1930, pp. 4–34; Ali Fuad Erden: 
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Egypt & Palestine, vol. 1. London 1928, pp. 31–33, p. 48, p. 59; Yigal Sheffy: British Military Intelli-
gence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918. London 1998, pp. 2–20, pp. 33 f., pp. 48 f., pp. 52–59.
48 Erich von Falkenhayn: General Headquarters and Its Critical Decisions, 1914–1916. London 
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Admittedly, the achievements of “unconventional warfare” were fairly modest 
(in comparison to the extravagant expectations of Enver and his staff) and were 
psychological than military. Certainly, in military terms, the concept of drawing 
on the potential of tribal and other conventionally “unusable” groups was cer-
tainly innovative; but the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa operatives did not fully understand 
the selfish, pragmatic and ever shifting loyalties of the tribes, who were mostly 
just out to get what they could from the conflict. In Libya, for example, the locals 
were very willing to act against the Italians but not against the real Ottoman tar-
get, the British, and militarily the Ottoman-led strikes against Egypt from Libya 
achieved nothing substantial. Psychologically, however, these attacks – in combi-
nation with the repeated Ottoman Suez Canal campaigns – seemed to justify the 
worst fears of the British authorities, especially when they seemed to lead a num-
ber of Egyptian officers, and even whole companies, to desert. Moreover, in terms 
of the resources committed to it by the Ottoman Empire, it was very much a low-
cost operation (fewer than a hundred Ottoman officers and other ranks, limited 
amounts of war material and these largely financed by Germans), but an effective 
one all the same, in so far as it obliged both the British and Italians to divert much 
needed forces away from major theatres and to spend large sums of money on 
keeping local grandees loyal.49
In Mesopotamia, in contrast to Libya, the unconventional warfare strategy 
failed completely. After some initial failures Enver appointed his loyal friend, 
Lieutenant Colonel Süleyman Askeri Bey, as regional commander in Iraq and de 
facto director of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Süleyman Askeri, who had all the qualifi-
cations needed to direct unconventional warfare on a grand scale, set about blend-
ing tribal warriors with conventional forces and creating units of multi-purpose 
independent troops. In his view, success could be achieved by using regulars to tie 
the British down while the tribes hit them from every direction at every opportu-
nity. In order to divert as many enemy units as possible from the main theatre, he 
decided to send a detachment reinforced with tribal warriors to Southern Iran. In 
the first month, his new methods achieved some modest successes, which encour-
aged him to attack the British positions near Shaiba on 12 April 1915. Here, how-
ever, the offensive of the Ottoman regular units against the British defensive line 
failed, whereupon the tribes decided to flee, Süleyman Askeri committed suicide, 
and his method of unconventional warfare died with him.50
As for the local population of Mesopotamia, throughout the war they either 
watched passively or sought to take advantage of the power vacuum to stage re-
bellions and attack friend and foe alike. Enver and his staff learned the hard way 
that it was impossible to succeed in unconventional warfare against a highly 
49 MacMunn/Falls: Military Operations (see note 47), pp. 102–145; Şükrü Erkal: Birinci Dünya 
Harbinde Türk Harbi. Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekâtı 1914–1918. Ankara 1978, 
pp. 641–681.
50 Fırat/Balkış: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi (see note 44), pp. 120–131, pp. 142–161, 
pp. 172–210; Moberly: Campaign (see note 44), pp. 167–201, pp. 224–338.
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trained and disciplined modern conventional army without active popular and 
support; and they consequently modified their strategy for Iraq to one of a con-
ventional attritional war designed to lure, exhaust, and delay the advancing Brit-
ish, channelling them into the river valleys and annihilating them deep inside 
Iraq Tribal warriors would only be employed as auxiliaries for screening tasks 
and harassing the enemy. This time, the Ottoman General Staff’s assessment and 
arrangements turned out to be correct. The British expeditionary force was lured 
deep into Mesopotamia and trapped at Kut-al Amarah; a relief force failed to 
break through the Ottoman lines of contravallation and suffered 25,000 casual-
ties in nearly five months of standstill before over 13,000 British military person-
nel surrendered on 29 April 1916. It was the largest surrender of a British Army 
between Yorktown in 1781 and Singapore in 1942. Even so, perhaps the blow to 
their prestige only spurred the British on to commit even more troops to Meso-
potamia to change the military balance; and here again, while unconventional op-
erations might produce isolated successes, they were perhaps in the end no more 
than a serious nuisance for the Allies.51
The Entente naval attacks against the Dardanelles, by contrast, and later the 
Gallipoli land campaign completely changed the strategic picture. As has al-
ready been pointed out the Ottoman mobilisation and concentration plan was 
designed with an eye to coping with possible attacks on the Straits by land and 
sea. The Anglo-French naval bombardment of 3 November 1914 only seemed 
to fit in with this; and neither the naval attack nor the following land campaign 
was a big surprise for the Ottomans. The Dardanelles Fortified Zone Com-
mand, with the help of German artillery and naval experts under Admiral Gui-
do von Usedom, managed to improve the plans, fortifications and mine lines 
well before the start of the naval campaign on 19 February 1915.52 Although 
western scholars tend blame the British for their political and naval blunders, in 
reality the naval victory of 18 March 1915 was more the result of successful Ot-
toman-German defence planning and the heroic performance of the artillery 
and naval personnel.53
After this victory a new army, the Fifth Army, was activated on 25 March 1915 
under the command of Liman von Sanders, who chose to disregard the experi-
ence and advice of the Fortified Zone Area Command and, after a brief inspec-
51 Fırat/Balkış: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi (see note 44), pp. 227–257, pp. 261–265, 
pp. 287–333, pp. 421–782; Frederick J. Moberly: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918, vol. 2. 
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52 Muhterem Saral et al.: Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi. Çanakkale Cephesi Harekâtı, 
vol. 5,1. Ankara 1993, pp. 33–39, pp. 44–47; Hikmet Süer: TSK Tarihi Balkan Harbi (1912–1913). 
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1938, pp. 14–26.
53 Julian S. Corbett: History of the Great War Naval Operations, vol. 2. London 1921, pp. 223–
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tion, disbanded the old defence system. According to the old plan, all units were 
mainly stationed near possible landing sites and kept small reserves in the interi-
or. Von Sanders categorically rejected this plan as unsuitable for defence against 
modern amphibious warfare, ordering his units to establish small observation 
and screening units to watch the beaches but to maintain their main forces as 
mobile reserves.54 It is now well known that von Sanders’s concept of defense 
was ineffective in preventing landings.55 Luckily for the Ottomans the perfor-
mance and sacrifice of the Ottoman troops surpassed all expectations, surprising 
not only the Allied planners but also the Ottoman General Staff. Company and 
platoon size units kept the amphibious landings at bay for hours and, in some 
cases, for more than a day.56
Unfortunately for the Ottoman defenders, however, both von Sanders and 
later Enver fatally underestimated the deadly effect of the combination of mod-
ern fire power and entrenched infantry; just as they underestimated the destruc-
tive power of naval bombardment on infantry units attacking in dense forma-
tions. The failed counter-attacks by which they attempted to destroy the land-
ing parties ended with heavy Ottoman casualties in May and June 1915.57 The 
Allied August 1915 offensive (better known as the Suvla landing) was seen by 
the attackers as their last chance of conquering the Straits; and its failure, which 
coincided with the growing importance of the Western Front convinced British 
decision-makers of the futility of continuing the campaign. The new Allied the-
atre commander General Charles Munro immediately proposed evacuation, and 
this was duly carried out at the turn of the year. As the Ottoman field com-
manders ignored the early signs of his intentions and did little to hinder him, 
the evacuation turned out to be the sole Allied sole success in the whole cam-
paign.58
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Evolving War Aims
As it has already been mentioned the Ottomans went to war to preserve the em-
pire rather than to expand its territory; and the Sarıkamış and Mesopotamian de-
feats at first led to an even greater emphasis upon the survival of the existing em-
pire. However as the war progressed, sacrifices and costs increased, and important 
eastern and southern border provinces were occupied by the enemy, the Ottoman 
leadership began to reconsider its initial war aims. Not that there was any desire 
to abandon the original aims; but there was a growing unease lest Germany and 
Austria-Hungary might not help the empire to reclaim its lost provinces at the 
end of the war.59 In this situation, the double victories of Gallipoli and Kut and 
the apparent success of the Ottoman Army in diverting Entente divisions from 
the Western front encouraged Constantinople not only to demand concrete prom-
ises of support in recovering the occupied provinces but also to reconsider the 
question of territorial expansion.
For some, the acquisition of the northern Aegean islands had now become a 
necessity: if the Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns had reinforced pre-war anx-
ieties, the entry of Greece into the war finally removed all Ottoman inhibitions 
about it. Meanwhile, to the east, the Russian Revolution whetted the appetites of 
the Ottoman government: territorial expansion there would not only enhance the 
empire’s security, but would give it an opportunity to establish direct connections 
with the Muslims of the Caucasus. Despite contemporary and later accusations of 
pan-Turanian irredentism the Ottoman leaders were actually sober realists in their 
plans for territorial expansion at the expense of Russia. For they were convinced 
that Russia’s weakness was temporary and that she would soon re-establish her-
self in the region, and they were initially only trying to use a window of opportu-
nity their target to reclaim lost provinces and the frontier of 1877. After the rela-
tively easy advance and the recapture of some former provinces they modified 
their plans to include assistance for independence movements in the Caucasus and 
the creation of a buffer zone uniting a number of Muslim groups.60 The Germans, 
however, were uneasy from the start about the Ottomans’ enlarging their war 
aims against Russia; and their unease changed to outright hostility when the Ot-
toman units ignorCed their warnings, and even threats, and crossed the 1914 
frontier – whereupon a brigade-sized unit was hurriedly raised from German de-
tachments in Palestine and the Balkans and dispatched to Georgia to guard Ger-
man strategic interests in the Caucasus.61
59 The Ottoman suspicion about its Allies’ secret plans and deals turned out to be true. The For-
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While the two Allies were trying to outmanoeuvre each other in the Caucasus 
the Ottoman economy and society began to show serious signs of collapse. The 
British and Russian naval blockade and the heavy burdens of war were instru-
mental in causing wide spread famine and hunger. Regions like Syria, Lebanon 
and Palestine which depended on food imports even in peacetime were hit espe-
cially hard; while Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea coast were dramatically hit 
by the Russian occupation, by continuous campaigns and internal unrest. The 
government in Constantinople tried very hard not to see these obvious signs of an 
impending collapse. At any rate, they had practically no plans to counter them 
and seem simply to have hoped for a victorious end to the war to save them from 
the emergency at home.62
Strategic Reorientation
The year 1916 had started well, with a victory at Gallipoli and the imminence of 
another at Kut al-Amara. For the first time since the Sarıkamış blunder, the future 
seemed bright as the Ottoman General Staff at last had both a strategic reserve 
(the divisions massed around Gallipoli Peninsula) and the strategic initiative. Nev-
ertheless, Enver and his German advisers lost touch with the realities on the 
ground and decided to realise their vision of full participation in the European 
theatres of operations. They correctly predicted that the British would not dare to 
advance on the Sinai-Palestine Front until the end of the year and they were con-
fident of their own strength on the Mesopotamian Front. On the other hand, their 
judgement of what Russia might do could not have been more wrong. On 10 Jan-
uary 1916, taking full advantage of winter conditions, General Yudenich launched 
a massive assault against the hapless Third Army, the Russian cavalry penetrating 
eight to ten kilometres deep into the Ottoman rear. Overwhelmed by assaults 
from a multitude of different directions and unable to match the Russian tempo, 
Third Army units had no other choice but to retreat nearly fifty kilometres in 
six days. The key fortress city of Erzurum fell on 16 February after three days 
and others followed, including the main port city of Trebizond (16 April) and the 
key transport junction and logistics base of Erzincan (25 July).63
Meanwhile, while this disaster was going on, the Second Army (nine divisions 
strong) which had just been released from the Gallipoli Front had been reorgan-
ised, refurbished (with the help of the Central Powers) and reinforced with the 
best recruits available for its new mission of helping Austria-Hungary. Although 
62 Emin: Turkey (see note 14), pp. 239–265.
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the Ottoman General Staff reluctantly agreed to deploy most of this Army to the 
Caucasus front, they stripped it of its best divisions in order to help their Allies in 
Europe; and if that was not bad enough, one division was diverted to Iraq and 
another one to Syria.64 As for the Caucasus front, the General Staff neglected to 
assign a theatre-level commander at all when what was left of the Second Army 
was deployed there. The Commander of the Third Army, Vehib Pasha refused to 
serve under the operational command of the Second Army Commander, Ahmed 
İzzet Pasha; while the latter, for his part, refused to help Third Army, even though 
some of his divisions had already arrived in theatre, pleading the need to conserve 
his strength. Not surprisingly, therefore, as the Second Army divisions had lei-
surely acclimatised themselves while the Third Army continued its desperate 
struggle, the Third Army in turn sat idle when Ahmed İzzet Pasha launched his 
long awaited assault on 2 August. The August offensive of the Second Army 
achieved meagre results (only one army corps was able to reach its target) largely 
because the Russians were able to concentrate their troops against it thanks to the 
inactivity of the Third Army. Altogether, the Second Army paid a terrible price – 
some 30,000 well trained and combat-hardened Gallipoli veterans were lost – for 
its separate and ill-planned offensive, which struck a further crippling blow at the 
Ottoman Army. Its available troop strength had been effectively squandered in 
the feud between Ahmed İzzet Pasha and Vehib Pasha that left the whole region 
under threat and at the mercy of the Russians.65
Undaunted by the fate of the Second and Third Armies and despite intense crit-
icism from both Ottoman officers and the German Advisory Mission, Enver nev-
ertheless insisted on sending Ottoman troops to the European theatre. This was 
certainly good news for Germany and Austria-Hungary, who were desperate to 
make good the huge losses inflicted by the Brusilov Offensive of June 1916. In 
August, the 19th and 20th Divisions – the best divisions in the empire – were rein-
forced with selected officers and soldiers and dispatched to Galicia, where they 
remained until September 1917. After another urgent request from the German 
General Staff the VI Army Corps was assigned to joint operations against Roma-
nia between September 1916 and May 1918. Similarly, the XX Army Corps was 
sent to relieve the hard pressed Bulgarians on the Salonika Front in October 1916 
and remained there until March 1917. The overall performance and contribution 
of the Ottoman troops in these operations was noteworthy, especially when com-
pared to the performance of their Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian comrades, 
whose national aims were supposed to be at stake in these battles.66
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 If the Ottoman General Staff might be accused by some of squandering its last 
strategic reserve in the Caucasus and Central Europe, it certainly made another 
strategic error when it underestimated the importance of the Sinai-Palestine Front 
and the threat from the steadily growing British military presence in the form of 
an expeditionary force. Most probably, given its innate myopic inability to see the 
whole strategic picture, the general staff was deceived by the low cost of the early 
Ottoman victories in the Sinai and the slowness of the British military build-up. It 
regarded the Sinai-Palestine Front as nothing more than a sideshow to draw away 
the largest possible number of British troops from the European Fronts.67 Simi-
larly, dazzled by Kut al-Amara it began to assume an adventurist, offensive atti-
tude towards Iran and Azerbaijan. When the XIII Army Corps was redeployed 
from the Iraq Front to advance into Iran its orders were pretty open-ended: to 
safeguard the rear of the Sixth Army against a possible Russian advance, to clear 
foreign elements from Iran, and conquer as much territory as possible. But after 
an encouraging start the Ottoman advance stopped with the capture of Hamadan 
on 9 August. Despite Enver’s assurances, there was no local support, let alone an 
uprising. Some desultory fighting with the Russians went on while Ottoman sol-
diers fell easy prey to epidemics caused by malnutrition and lack of efficient med-
ical support.68 In the meantime, while a reinforced army corps was perishing in 
Iran for no strategic purpose the new British expeditionary force commander 
General Stanley Maude exploited the weakness of the Ottoman position and out-
flanked it from the south bank of the Tigris within two days. On 23 February 
1917 the Ottoman units managed to escape from encirclement; but by this time 
the sheer power of the British was too much for the outnumbered, outgunned and 
demoralised Sixth Army units defending Baghdad, which was evacuated and duly 
fell to the British on 11 March.69
At this juncture, the German General Staff came up with a surprising proposal 
to establish a German-led army group (the so-called Heeresgruppen-Komman-
do F) in the Middle East. Actually, the idea had been evolving well before the fall 
of Baghdad as a counter to the impasse in the Sinai and the Arab Revolt. Accord-
ing to the German General Staff, Ottoman soldiers (especially ethnic Turks) were 
of superior quality but needed equipment and leadership. Moreover, the Arab Re-
volt clearly pointed to ethnic fractures within the fabric of the empire. Germany 
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as a neutral player could easily heal the fractures and unite both Turks and Arabs 
in the common cause of defeating the Entente. Hence, the German military was 
offering to provide an army group headquarters to command and control at least 
two Ottoman field armies.70
In an atmosphere of intense criticism and ill-feeling the staff of Army Group F, 
now entitled “Thunderbolt” (Yıldırım), started work under its commanding gen-
eral, Field Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn. Originally, the Yıldırım Army Group 
was charged with re-conquering Baghdad, Iraq and Iran by taking the Sixth and 
newly formed Seventh Army under its command. However, the situation drasti-
cally changed when the enemy concentration against Gaza and Beersheba became 
much stronger, as a result of which the Yıldırım Army Group was rerouted to the 
Palestine Front before finishing its deployment to Aleppo in September 1917. But 
all this came too late: General Allenby managed to capture Beersheba on 31 Oc-
tober, and force the Ottoman Eighth Army to abandon the Gaza fortifications.71
Von Falkenhayn and the Yıldırım staff took over the responsibility for the front 
during the chaos that followed this collapse. As a veteran of the European fronts, 
von Falkenhayn doubted whether his field armies could establish a solid defensive 
position without entrenchment materials, engineers and heavy artillery support, 
and he decided instead to delay and wear down the enemy, relying on a series of 
temporary defensive positions and limited counterattacks. However, his plan to 
trade space for time while strengthening the Jerusalem defensive perimeter did not 
work very well: the Ottoman infantry regiments had limited mobility whereas the 
British had aerial superiority, strong cavalry and mechanised units; and to make 
matters worse, locally recruited soldiers began to desert their units at every op-
portunity while Arab tribes harassed lines of communication and forced field 
commanders to allocate more troops to securing the rear. After a month of battles 
Jerusalem fell to British on 11 December 1917,72 whereupon von Falkenhayn was 
relieved of his command.
The new Ottoman theatre commander Liman von Sanders received clear orders 
to defend the remaining portion of Lebanon and Syria at all costs and to keep the 
lines of communication with Hejaz secure. In the circumstances, this was an im-
possible mission. Even though he restored a measure of harmony between Ger-
man and Ottoman officers, the strategic prospects for his new command were 
70 Werner Steuber: Yıldırım [= Turkish translation of the German original “Jildirim Deutsche 
Streiter auf Heiligem Boden”]. Translated by Nihat. Istanbul 1932, pp. 5–19; Hüseyin Hüsnü 
Emir Erkilet: Yıldırım. Ankara 2002, pp. 4 f., pp. 11–13, pp. 15–26, pp. 36–83; von Sanders: Five 
Years (see note 32), pp. 173–177; Cebesoy: Birüssebi-Gazze (see note 66), pp. 23–26.
71 Kreß von Kressenstein: Son Haçlı Seferi Kuma Gömülen İmparatorluk (see note 32), p. 301, 
pp. 309–362; Paşa: Hatıralar (see note 8), pp. 210–226; Cebesoy: Birüssebi-Gazze (see note 66), 
pp. 54–80; Cyril Falls: Military Operations Egypt & Palestine, vol. 2,1. London 1928, pp. 25–141.
72 Erkilet: Yıldırım (see note 70), pp. 48–83; Kreß von Kressenstein: Son Haçlı Seferi Kuma 
Gömülen İmparatorluk (see note 32), p. 302, pp. 313–318, pp. 354–364; Paşa: Hatıralar (see note 8), 
pp. 210–214, pp. 224–226; Cebesoy: Birüssebi-Gazze (see note 66), pp. 26–35, pp. 54–80; Altay: 
10 Yıl Savaş (see note 54), pp. 128–147; von Sanders: Five Years (see note 32), pp. 76 f.; Falls: Mili-
tary Operations (see note 71), pp. 149–264.
Ottoman Strategy and War Aims during the First World War 183
dismal. Although on paper von Sanders was commanding five army corps, the 
number of combat effectives of his army group was actually that of one standard 
army corps. Consequently, he ordered his units to defend every centimetre of the 
line and committed his cavalry not as an operational reserve but to the defence of 
the passes in the army’s rear area. He could do nothing about the massive British 
superiority in cavalry, the use of which had proved so effective in breaking the 
deadlock on the Gaza-Beersheba line.73
Allenby, by contrast, built his strategy around mobility based on cavalry and 
combined infantry-artillery operations, massing five infantry divisions and the 
Desert Mounted Corps on the western sector near the coastline (a local superiori-
ty of a fourteen to one). On 19 September 1918, he launched his long awaited as-
sault, which was destined to become famous as the last great cavalry operation in 
history. During the Battle of Megiddo highly mobile British colonial infantry, un-
der the protection of massive artillery fire, easily breached the Ottoman main de-
fensive line, which the cavalry then tore through and raced to block the Ottoman 
lines of retreat. During the following days Ottoman field commanders, acting 
perforce independently of each other and under relentless pressure from the Brit-
ish cavalry, strove in vain to save their respective units.74
The disaster on the Palestine-Syrian Front and the collapse of Bulgaria effec-
tively ended any chance that the Ottoman Empire could continue the war. Even 
so, unlike its Austrian and Bulgarian Allies and its arch-opponent Russia, the Ot-
toman Army, though severely mauled, was still in the field. Its units were going 
through a massive reorganisation and some of them were still fighting in Azerbai-
jan, Dagestan and Iran. Even the disarmament clauses of the armistice did not de-
stroy its organisation and solidarity, and the Ottoman military lived on to fight a 
new war, the War of Turkish Independence.
Conclusion
Strategy demands a realistic evaluation of means in relation to ends and objectives 
that are commensurate with the resources available to achieve them. From this 
perspective the Ottomans’ formulation of their initial war aims so as to ensure 
that at the end of the war the empire would be in a better position both regionally 
and globally, seems realistic and rational. Similarly their initial strategy of concen-
trating on the defence of key areas, such as the Straits, was logical in terms of the 
level of the threat and the resources available to meet it. On the other hand, when 
it came to putting the strategy into execution the Ottoman leadership lacked co-
herence and consistency. The protection of Mesopotamia was neglected and grave 
73 Von Sanders: Five Years (see note 32), pp. 196–267; Falls: Military Operations (see note 71), 
pp. 310–312.
74 Von Sanders: Five Years (see note 32), pp. 269–305; Falls: Military Operations (see note 71), 
vol. 2,2. London 1928, pp. 447–589.
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internal problems were played down. Furthermore, once Russia’s over-hasty of-
fensive seemed to give the Turks the advantage, drastic changes were set on foot 
about which most of the Ottoman leaders were kept completely in the dark or 
only informed at the very last moment. In other words, the decision making pro-
cesses did not in practice function according to any legally and customarily estab-
lished pattern.
In all fairness one must admit that many of the empire’s problems were not 
unique. All belligerents faced similar strategic problems and shortcomings in deci-
sion-making. Serious civil-military problems and in-fighting occurred nearly ev-
erywhere throughout the war; strategic mistakes were made – for example, almost 
every belligerent took the offensive at once, and with disastrous results. Even so, 
the hard fact remains that the Ottoman leadership was unsuccessful. Why did it 
fail the test of war? The answer is closely related to the implementation of Otto-
man strategy. Even before the start of hostilities Bronsart had been practically in 
charge of planning, mobilisation and concentration; and step by step the General 
Staff extended its control, taking advantage of the political leadership’s ignorance 
of military affairs. Thus, in a relatively short time not only the political but the 
military leadership too was sidelined by Enver and the German-led Ottoman 
General Staff. Later on even Cemal Pasha and other important members of CUP 
were assigned to positions far away from Istanbul in order to keep them out of 
central decision making system. Similarly any opposition to General Staff’s plans 
and orders by field commanders was severely punished, and talented and experi-
enced generals were either dismissed or reassigned to prestigious but passive 
posts. However, while only those serving at the front could develop any sense of 
what was actually happening (or what the Germans called Fingerspitzengefühl), 
by silencing all high ranking Ottoman generals Enver and his German advisers, 
cocooned in their own world of luxurious offices in the capital far away from the 
theatres of war, naturally often had difficulty in grasping the realities of the strate-
gic situation. Indeed, they proved all too easily influenced by the General Staff in 
Berlin to give priority to Germany’s interests.
The upshot of this fatal combination of sheltered existence and absolute defer-
ence to the German General Staff was a series of strategic mistakes and flawed as-
sumptions.
For example, when Enver and the inner circle of the CUP decided that the Ot-
toman military’s role should be to divert as many Entente troops as possible in 
order to enable the Germans to win decisive victories on the main fronts, they 
were in fact showing more regard for their Allies’ demands and needs than for the 
grave crises afflicting their own empire. In theory, of course, alliances are partner-
ships of equals whatever the disparity in their political, economic and military re-
sources. That was not the case with the Ottoman-German alliance, however, in 
which, in terms of burden of commitment, risks and costs, the Ottomans general-
ly had to obey German requests and directives – even if, in a few instances, Enver 
disregarded German demands that trespassed too openly on his plans for the fu-
ture (as in the case of his independent Caucasus policy).
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Clearly, the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war was important, both in open-
ing new fronts that kept sizeable proportions of British, Russian and French forc-
es away from main theatres and in encouraging Bulgaria to join the war against 
the Entente and isolating Russia effectively.75 However these achievements came 
at a terrible price in terms of casualties and, ultimately, loss of territory. The CUP 
triumvirate had been prepared to accept heavy casualties well before they com-
mitted the empire to war; but they did not anticipate a long war of attrition in 
which resources and supplies were of such vital importance. As a result, they 
found themselves either searching in vain for simple, clear, engineering solutions, 
silver bullets to solve massive political, military, economic and social problems or 
being obliged in effect to ignore them and leave the responsibility for them to 
subordinate military commanders or governors. Meanwhile, some of their own 
desperate attempts to change the situation created more problems than solving the 
original ones.
In conclusion, therefore, the Ottoman military achieved some striking success-
es, not only on the battlefield, but in their total mobilisation of the empire’s mea-
gre human and economic resources; and this compared well with the overall per-
formances of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia. By 1918, however, the Otto-
man political and military leadership failed the test of war. Thus, in the final 
analysis, instead of improving the integrity and security of the empire, the war 
effectively dismantled it.
75 Howard: Partition (see note 4), pp. 113–115; Bayur: Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (see note 4), pp. 267 f.

John Gooch
“An Act of Madness”?
Italy’s War Aims and Strategy, 1915–1918
The historian assumes that all his individual 
characters are mad. The important question is, 
why did their madness take this particular form?
A. J. P. Taylor
The manner in which Italy entered into the First World War in May 1915 seems on 
the face of things to be yet one more example of her propensity for rash and dam-
aging international action. Guilty, it has been said, in 1911 of “arguably the most 
cynical and dangerous act of imperialist aggression in the whole pre-war period”, 
her decision to defect from the Triple Alliance – technically just about justifiable 
within its terms and scarcely surprising in view of the history of Austro-Italian re-
lations – has been variously described as another cynically Machiavellian act typi-
cal of Italian diplomatic practice, a “political gamble”, and an “act of madness (fol-
lia)”. Diplomatic madness would appear to have been matched by strategic mad-
ness in the form of Italy’s own version of the “short war illusion” that flew in the 
face of a mounting pile of contemporary evidence accumulated between Decem-
ber 1914 and May 1915 which seemed to point ineluctably to battlefronts shaped 
and determined by static warfare and not by manoeuvre. The consequence of 
ill-advised decisions (if that is indeed what they were) was the subsequent slaugh-
ter of half a million of their own citizens by an incompetent ruling oligarchy ably 
assisted, it has been claimed, by an incompetent military caste.1 The war consumed 
large numbers of men and more materials than Italy herself possessed and resulted 
in fewer and less rewarding prizes than the statesmen sought and the public ex-
pected, making it in the view of Denis Mack Smith “one of the great disasters of 
her [Italy’s] history”.2 Hindsight would therefore appear to suggest that for Italy 
1 Paul W. Schroeder: Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War: http://
www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t040829a/counter.html (accessed on 20. 4. 2015); Gian 
Enrico Rusconi: L’azzardo del 1915. Come l’Italia decide l’intervento nella Grande guerra. In: Jo-
hannes Hürter/id. (eds.): L’entrata in guerra dell’Italia nel 1915. Bologna 2005, pp. 15–74, here: 
p. 61; Holger Afflerbach: Da alleato a nemico. Cause e conseguenze dell’entrata in guerra dell’Italia 
nel Maggio 1915. In: ibid., pp. 75–101, here: p. 75, p. 89, pp. 90–94, p. 99; Lorenzo Del Boca: Gran-
de guerra, piccoli generali. Una cronaca feroce della Prima guerra mondiale.Turin 2007, passim.
2 Denis Mack Smith: Italy and Its Monarchy. New Haven, CT 1989, p. 313.
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joining and fighting the war was not a good idea – but in 1915 hindsight was an 
advantage that neither Italian diplomats nor Italian soldiers could call on. The 
questions to be answered therefore are: was joining the war a rational, or at least an 
explicable, act; and once involved in it why did Italy’s statesmen and generals per-
sist in following what appears to have been a foredoomed military strategy until 
forced by near disaster to re-think their war – but not their war aims?
War Aims and War Objectives
Italy’s decision to join the war on the side of the Triple Entente was certainly a 
gamble – but by the time that the Great War broke out gambles by great powers 
were a well-established phenomenon, so we should not be unduly surprised at or 
critical of Italy for doing what she had done in 1911 when she launched on the Lib-
yan war, and what Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary were all doing in July–
August 1914. Rome’s was however a calculated gamble. Unlike other contending 
powers, Italy was looking for relative advantage from her participation in the war, 
not outright victory and the dissolution of an enemy polity. The aim of Italian for-
eign policy during the July crisis was to secure territorial compensation from 
Austria-Hungary; the foreign minister, Antonino Di San Giuliano, set that condi-
tion before he knew of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and stuck to it thereafter. 
When the European war began, Rome looked for the best available odds.
Di San Giuliano asked himself the “what if?” questions that historians are now 
encouraged to explore, but once he decided on immediate neutrality he could find 
no easy answers. If the Central Powers won an absolute or a partial victory there 
would be no compensation for Italy, and if they lost the Entente would have no 
reason to compensate her. Going with the Entente had two very considerable 
drawbacks: it would strengthen France’s position in the Mediterranean and weak-
en Italy’s, and it would make Germany and Austria-Hungary into implacable en-
emies. One thing seemed clear and in the circumstances entirely reasonable: if Ita-
ly did take the gamble, she should join the war only when there was the certainty, 
or near certainty, of winning and when events had swung the final outcome 
against the Central Powers. To help him work out the answer to his dilemma Di 
San Giuliano sought a military assessment from general Luigi Cadorna, chief of 
the Italian general staff, and diplomatic advice from his ambassadors. None can 
have helped him much. Cadorna’s advice amounted to making sure that Russia 
attacked Austria-Hungary at the same time as Italy and as strongly as possible; 
Ambassador Bollati in Berlin thought the Germans were likely to win even if 
Austria-Hungary was defeated, in which case Italy would suffer; and Ambassador 
Tittoni in Bordeaux offered the opinion that either the war would last a long time 
and end indecisively or the Entente would win.3
3 Di Sangiuliano to Salandra, 9. 8. 1914; Di Sangiuliano to Salandra, 27. 8. 1914, encl. Cadorna to 
Di Sangiuliano, 27. 8. 1914; Bollati to Di Sangiuliano, 31. 8. 1914; Tittoni to Di Sangiuliano, 15. 9. 
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The political process of deciding and developing a programme of war aims 
which now began was influenced by the past as well as by the present. In the de-
cades following Unification Italian soldiers, sailors, diplomats and politicians 
shared a widespread perception that their country was geographically, strategical-
ly and socially vulnerable. For years the authorities had worried that unified Italy 
was too fragile and her social cohesion too feeble to put up much resistance if an 
enemy threatened her coasts. At the start of the twentieth century they believed 
Italy to be less vulnerable socially but not strategically. In 1907 the navy said that 
it could not protect the piazza marritime (coastal fortresses) or even defend Rome 
without a bigger fleet, and in 1913 the army pushed the case for more defensive 
fortifications on the north-western border. Despite Italy’s membership of the Tri-
ple Alliance and her participation in the naval convention in June 1913, admiral 
Paolo Thaon di Revel, chief of the naval general staff, was at least as worried by 
the Austrian as by the French fleet. In July 1913 he proposed a five year building 
programme that would give the Italian navy a 4:3 advantage over the Austrians: 
and while at the cabinet meeting on 1 August 1914 that decided on neutrality he 
emphasised the dangers of going to war against the British and French navies.4 
Such was his obsession with Italy’s eastern seaboard that he would later be de-
scribed as suffering from scabbia adriatica (“Adriatic itch”).
Di San Giuliano died on 14 October 1914, leaving his successor Sidney Sonni-
no to grapple with the twin problems of defining Italy’s war aims and choosing a 
side. When he explained the course of his negotiations to parliament on the eve 
of the war, Sonnino spoke of Italy’s situation in the Mediterranean and the “pos-
sible” development of her colonies, but “security and relative strength in the 
Adriatic” came first. As he told Colonel House, President Wilson’s aide, much 
later but in broadly similar terms, his foremost concerns were “nationality and 
independence, but also security”.5 For Sonnino Italy’s “declaratory” war aims 
centred on security. How it was to be achieved was a matter for practical 
geo-strategic calculation with an admixture of economic interest. The army, 
whose contribution to the list of territorial acquisitions compiled over the winter 
of 1914–1915 appears to have been limited, wanted defensible land frontiers, 
which in practical terms meant control of the watersheds in the Dolomites, and 
by the war’s end a firm foothold on the Istrian peninsula too. The navy, backed 
by the king, demanded as a minimum control of the Adriatic, which meant pos-
session of the Dalmatian coast, and looked askance at the actuality of the French 
1914; all: I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (hereafter D.D.I.). 5th series, vol. 1. Rome 1954, no. 151, 
no. 468, no. 526, no. 691, p. 83, pp. 255–257, p. 295, p. 402; William A. Renzi: Italy’s Neutrality 
and Entrance into the Great War. A Re-Examination. In: AHR 67 (1968), pp. 1414–1432, here: 
p. 1419.
4 Ezio Ferrante: Il grande ammiraglio Paolo Thaon di Revel. Rome 1989, pp. 50–54, pp. 184 f.
5 Notes for a parliamentary speech, 20. 5. 1915, D.D.I., 5th series, vol. 3. Rome 1985, no. 735, 
pp. 577–581; Pietro Pastorelli (ed.): Sidney Sonnino. Diario 1916–1922. Bari 1972, p. 314 (15. 11. 
1918). On the primacy of the Adriatic, see Sonnino to Tittoni et al., 26. 10. 1914, D.D.I. (see 
note 3), 5th series, vol. 2. Rome 1984, no. 43, pp. 29–31.
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naval presence in the Mediterranean and the possibility that the Russian fleet 
might arrive there too.
At the Consulta Sonnino focused on the Balkans, where for more than a doz-
en years he had been attracted by Greek coal, Montenegrin tobacco and the possi-
bilities for railway building. Italian possession of Albania was at the head of his 
wish list, not least as a barrier against both Serbian and Greek expansionism. He 
also took on ambitions in Asiatic Turkey which his predecessor, Di San Giuliano, 
had considered “a vital economic and political interest”.6 Although the Balkan 
wars of 1912–1913 undoubtedly reinforced Sonnino’s priorities, not much of this 
was new: talk of supremacy in the Adriatic and Italian possession of Albania dat-
ed back at least thirty years, though interest in the economic possibilities of Tur-
key only went back to 1907. Whether the army – and the navy – were actually 
capable of achieving Italy’s war aims was a question that no-one seems to have 
confronted directly.
Italy did not enter the war in 1915 in pursuit of empire. For the first eigh-
teen months colonial acquisitions were not seen as a matter of any great impor-
tance. Wanting to use the opportunity to settle some overhanging issues from the 
past, Ferdinando Martini and his advisers at the Colonial Ministry came up with a 
list of desiderata in November 1914 that included French Somaliland, Kassala, bor-
der modifications with Egypt, and the formal acknowledgement of “rights and in-
terests” in Ethiopia that Italy had written into the treaty of Uccialli (Wichale) in 
1891 and lost in 1896. Sonnino, never inclined to give colonial war aims much time, 
was happy to leave the issue to be settled after the war via Article 13 of the Treaty 
of London, which simply stipulated “compensation” if Great Britain and France 
extended their colonial dominions in Africa. In mid-1916, however, Italy’s war 
aims agenda expanded. After the conquest of the German Cameroons in Febru-
ary 1916 only German East Africa still held out, raising the possibility of a share-
out of the spoils. The Italian declaration of war on Germany on 28 August 1916 
opened that particular door and three months later Martini’s successor, Gaspare 
Colosimo, handed Sonnino the first definitive statement of Italy’s colonial war 
aims. A “maximum” programme staked a claim on 2,947,000 square kilometres of 
East and sub-Saharan Africa, while the “minimum” programme cut that amount to 
722,000 kilometres, chiefly by reducing Italy’s claims in the Libyan hinterland.
Sonnino waited three months before responding. When he did so, he refused to 
take a definite stand and would go no further than allowing that some parts of the 
colonial wish list might be fulfilled as part of the general peace settlement. In his 
view, the colonial programme could not be allowed to compromise Italian de-
mands in the eastern Mediterranean; and as far as officialdom’s colonial war aims 
went, that was more or less that until the fighting stopped and the peace process 
6 Riccardo Faucci: Elementi di imperialismo nell’Italia prefascista. In: Massimo Pacetti (ed.): 
L’imperialismo italiano e la Jugoslavia. Urbino 1977, pp. 15–82, here: pp. 38–39, pp. 52–56; Marta 
Petricioli: L’Italia in Asia Minore. Equilibrio mediterraneo e ambizioni imperialiste alla vigilia 
della prima guerra mondiale. Florenz 1983, p. 15 et passim.
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began.7 It was not, though, the end of the story as far as informed public opinion 
was concerned. Colosimo’s programmes were leaked to journalists and an intense 
press campaign began. The tone was set by senator Leopoldo Franchetti, writing 
in the “Corriere della Sera” on 8 October 1916: “It is certain that the Italian na-
tion, just as it wants unredeemed lands and military predominance in the Adriatic, 
also wants its share of the Mediterranean coasts.”8 With that the newspapermen 
began carving up the Ottoman territories between the great powers and calling 
for “greater guarantees” for Italy in North Africa and exclusive influence in Ab-
yssinia. The British occupation of Baghdad in March 1917 intensified the press 
campaign. Nationalists and journalists wrapped all the goals up together in a me-
moriale presented to premier Boselli and backed by some 3,000 signatories in-
cluding D’Annunzio and Mussolini. The swelling of Italy’s colonial aspirations in 
the latter half of the war gave many on the Right reason to keep on fighting.
Public opinion played no direct part in determining Italy’s war aims. In Giolit-
tian Italy foreign policy was conceived as being different from domestic policy 
and above party. Public opinion was guided and formed by the government, 
chiefly through the press, and foreign policy was held not to be a matter in which 
public opinion ought to interest itself.9 The world of politics was in any case a 
restricted one. Although the Italian electorate had more than doubled in 1912 to 
24.5 per cent of the population (8,672,249 people), when it went to the polls in 
October 1913 more than a quarter did not vote. Collectively parliament, which 
could be and frequently was prorogued for months on end while the government 
ruled by decree, never exercised any real influence on the way the state conducted 
the war or the goals for which it was fought. Questions of high policy were con-
sidered and decisions made by three men – initially Sidney Sonnino, Antonio 
Salandra who served as prime minister from March 1914 until June 1916, and the 
king. The two politicians were died-in-the wool conservatives. Vittorio Emanu-
ele III, a figure of not inconsiderable power and importance in the parliamentary 
monarchy, seems in 1914 to have been preoccupied with a domestic crisis that left 
him depressed and uncertain. As his politicians began the process of feeling for a 
deal, he was worried lest either action or inaction might be damaging to the crown 
and was above all anxious that Italy should not end up on the defeated side in a 
great war. Once the war got under way his political support was of considerable 
importance in keeping Luigi Cadorna in post as generalissimo.
War aims were one thing, war objectives were another. In the kaleidoscopic 
world of Italian politics, different factions fought the war for different and some-
7 René Albrecht-Carrié: Italian Colonial Policy, 1914–1918. In: JModH 18 (1946) 2, pp. 123–147; 
Robert L. Hess: Italy and Africa. Colonial Ambitions in the First World War. In: JAfrH 4 
(1963) 1, pp. 105–126; Giovanni Buccianti: L’egemonia sull’Etiopia (1918–1923). Lo scontro di-
plomatico tra Italia, Francia e Inghilterra. Milan 1977, pp. 1–37.
8 Saverio Cilibrizzi: Storia parlamentari politica e diplomatica d’Italia. Da Novara a Vittorio Ve-
neto, vol. 6 (1916–1917). Naples 1950, p. 337.
9 Brunello Vigezzi: Politica estera e opinione pubblica in Italia dal 1870 al 1945. In: Nuova Rivi-
sta Storica 63 (1979) 5–6, pp. 548–569, here: pp. 551–555.
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times entirely contradictory reasons. Some wanted to preserve the old political 
system, others to change it, and yet others to pull it down altogether. On the 
Right, conservative liberals waged the war to preserve the existing system of tras-
formismo politics and to defend a monarchy tarnished by the financial scandals 
and military disasters that had been a feature of Umberto I’s reign (1878–1900). 
Although Vittorio Emanuele III appeared to be making some progress towards 
reviving the crown’s standing, rowdy scenes and the boycotting of the king’s 
speech to parliament in November 1913 were scarcely comforting. Salandra and 
Sonnino both believed that the monarchy would not survive if, by clinging to its 
neutrality, Italy made no political and territorial gains when peace came to Eu-
rope, and Giolitti thought the same.10 Nationalists who saw Austria and Greece 
as serious rivals for influence in the Balkans fought for territorial and prestige 
gains; but they were repelled by the “juridico-sentimental” democratic convic-
tions of the Allies and also fought for a new international order in which Italy, a 
“young proletarian nation”, would shake off both French and Austrian predomi-
nance.11
On the Left, the Italian Socialist Party tried to stay loyal to its pre-war doc-
trines of internationalism, which meant in practice adopting a neutralist stance 
that cut it off from all the other major socialist parties, while some local sections 
stayed true to the doctrine of social revolution, earning the scathing comment 
“revolutionary cretinism” from the French socialist Gustave Hervé. The official 
line né aderire né sabotare (“neither adhere [to government policy] nor sabotage 
[it]”) adopted in May 1915 opened the door to splits which deepened after the 
two Russian revolutions.12 Democrats and reformist socialists fought for domes-
tic and international ideals that had fired the Risorgimento and had been shattered 
with the German invasion of Belgium: calling for intervention in February 1915, 
the Socialist Ivanoe Bonomi wanted to “raise high the unforgettable words of 
Garibaldi and Mazzini”.13 The Liberal Left also fought the war to put an end to 
the corrupt manipulations of Giolittismo, and on its more extreme wings republi-
cans, anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists saw it as an extension of the social 
struggle they had waged – and lost – before the war. These deep ideological and 
programmatical divergences between the many political groupings had two very 
important consequences: they made it impossible to form a substantial neutralist 
10 Pietro Bertolini: Diario (agosto 1914–maggio 1915). In: Nuova Antologia 1221 (1923), pp. 214–
224, here: p. 217 (29. 10. 1914, 4. 12. 1914).
11 Alexander J. De Grand: The Italian Nationalist Association in the Period of Italian Neutrality, 
August 1914–May 1915. In: JModH 43 (1971) 3, pp. 394–412; Raffaele Molinelli: I nazionalisti 
italiani e il primo governo di guerra (maggio 1915–giugno 1916). In: Rassegna Storica del Risorgi-
mento 52 (1977) 3, pp. 449–469.
12 Carlo Pinzani: I socialisti italiani e francesi nel periodo della neutralità italiana (1914–1915). In: 
Studi Storici 2 (1974), pp. 364–399, here: p. 385; Luigi Cortesi: Il PSI dalla “settimana rossa” al 
congresso nazionale del 1918. In: Rivista Storica del Socialismo 32 (1967), pp. 1–44.
13 Adrian Lyttelton: Il linguaggio del conflitto politico nell’Italia pre-fascista. In: Problemi del 
socialismo 1 (1988), pp. 170–183, here: p. 172.
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bloc in 1914–1915, and they also made possible the continuation of the war. Thus, 
while the fall of the Salandra government on 10 June 1916 was occasioned by the 
external threat posed by the Austrian Strafexpedition, it was at bottom the work 
of a political combination of left and right interventionists who wanted a more 
energetic internal policy and a declaration of war on Germany.14
Italy’s three war-time administrations all held to the core of the war aims pro-
gramme, and with occasional local variations, to its wider ramifications too. Im-
portant in the political stratosphere, the government’s declared war aims were of 
considerably less importance to the soldiers and civilians at ground level. As an 
early and shrewd military commentator remarked, if after Caporetto officers had 
had to tell their men that they were fighting for Spalato and Jibuti they would first 
have shot at them and then abandoned the front.15 Accustomed to a world bound-
ed by the authority of the landlord, the mayor, the priest and the maresciallo dei 
Carabinieri, the rural peasantry obeyed the powers that be and fought their mas-
ters’ war against the Austrians and later the Germans, just as they would have done 
against the French if things had turned out differently. Practised at subordinating 
civil law to executive power, and accustomed to granting extraordinary powers to 
the military, the war-time state expanded the powers of the army both within the 
war zone and beyond it – as other combatant states did. Powerful tools were to 
hand to exercise surveillance and control everywhere: at the front the Carabinieri’s 
numbers tripled to 20,000 by November 1918, and in the interior they and the 
agents of the Pubblica Sicurezza policed the factories, inspected the brothels and 
collared anyone suspected of avoiding or trying to escape from military service.
Soldiers, Strategy and War-Fighting
Italy was a country highly conscious of the weight of the past, and the army went 
to war very well aware of the burden it carried. In the five decades that had passed 
since 1861 loyal establishment historians had air-brushed the military record and 
glossed over the monarchy’s many shortcomings, creating the legend of the Re 
galantuomo. The sacralisation of a supposedly glorious past reached its climax 
shortly before the world war broke out with a grand official ceremony at the os-
suary at San Martino (whose tower bore over its door the inscription “To Vittorio 
Emanuele II”) on 24 June 1909, followed two years later by the unveiling of the 
“Vittoriale” monument at the very epicentre of Rome’s historical empire.16 There 
14 Vittorio De Caprariis: Partiti politici ed opinione pubblica durante la grande guerra. Atti del 
XLI Congresso di Storia del Risorgimento Italiano. Rome 1965, p. 99, pp. 125–130. On the Straf-
expedition, see John Gooch: The Italian Army and the First World War. Cambridge 2014, 
pp. 155–161.
15 Novello Papafava: Appunti militari 1919–1921. Ferrara 1921, p. 29.
16 Piero Del Negro: Villafranca. La leggenda di un “Re nazionale”. In: Piero Del Negro (ed.): 
Esercito, stato, società. Bologna 1979, pp. 71–124; Jonathan Marwil: Visiting Modern War in Ri-
sorgimento Italy. New York 2010, pp. 192–210, pp. 213 f., pp. 217–220.
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was, however, a deep contradiction between memorialisation and reality. The 
wars of the Risorgimento had not gone well for the army which had been de-
feated by the Austrians at Custoza in 1849, had won only a single engagement 
in 1859, and had been defeated again at Custoza in 1866. The last time it had 
won a battle unaided, its critics reminded it, was at Legnago in 1176. Italy’s 
gains, Lombardy and Venetia, had been received from her Allies. The army had 
two humiliating defeats at Austrian hands to avenge, and in 1918 its determina-
tion not to repeat the experience of being handed the trophies of war by the 
French played no small part in the decision to fight the battle of Vittorio Ve-
neto.
As chief of the general staff between 1908 and 1914, general Alberto Pollio was 
a convinced triplicista who looked forward to going to war alongside Moltke and 
Conrad. However, war planning also involved sizing up the Austrians. The gen-
eral staff in Rome watched with mounting alarm as Austria modernised existing 
forts along the common frontier, built new ones, constructed field works, put in 
new roads, and extended railway lines. Staff rides compared Italian and Austrian 
communications, defences and logistical arrangements along the eastern frontier, 
and masses of data poured into headquarters as the staff tracked every alteration 
in Austrian manpower policy and analysed every tactical, operational and techni-
cal regulation it could lay its hands on. Simply counting the number of men the 
enemy could put into the field was far from straightforward, but however it was 
done the result was always the same: the Austrians were half as strong again as 
the Italians. In 1905 the Italian standing army numbered on average 207,000 men 
against the Austrians 371,000, and in 1914 a standing Austrian Army of six-
teen corps faced an Italian Army of twelve corps.17
As to what the enemy would do, the general staff in Rome first expected that 
the main Austrian attack would come from the Trentino but in 1910 they 
changed their minds and by 1913 they expected it to come on the Isonzo front, 
joining hands with a converging attack from Carinthia to confront an Italian 
Army that was only just completing its deployment on the Piave. If things went 
as the Austrians planned, their numerical superiority and the strategic situation 
“which is so unfavourable to us” would soon decide the war in their favour.18 
On the eve of the war the planners changed their minds yet again, forecasting 
that the Austrians would saturate the mountain zone with troops and launch a 
“spoiling attack” from the eastern face of the Trentino along one or more of five 
possible lines of advance. Even so, despite all the difficulties highlighted in previ-
17 Filippo Cappellano: L’Imperial regio Esercito austro-ungarico sul fronte italiano 1915–1918. 
Rovereto 2002, pp. 28–33, pp. 48 f., pp. 87 f.; Maurizio Ruffo: L’Italia nella Triplice Alleanza. I pia-
ni operativi dello Stato Maggiore verso l’Austria-Ungheria dal 1885 al 1915. Rome 1998, pp. 197–
214, pp. 236–254.
18 Studio sulla radunata delle truppe austro-ungariche alla nostra frontiera e sui concetti informa-
tori in presunto piano di operazioni. Deduzioni circa le modalità di attuazione in piano stesso, 
16. 9. 1913, Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito (AUSSME), F3 busta 
388.
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ous plans, the Italian general staff were confident that they could block the Aus-
trian advance “and with good luck, blow the enemy’s plans to the winds”.19
Pollio died unexpectedly on 1 July 1914 and was succeeded on 27 July by gen-
eral Luigi Cadorna. The strategic plan for war on the eastern frontier that he in-
herited in 1914, which envisaged pushing cavalry and one army corps forward 
into Friuli to allow the bulk of the Italian Army to move up to the Tagliamento 
and launch a counter-offensive, was based on the assumption that both sides 
would mobilise simultaneously. The government’s decision to opt initially for 
neutrality, while remaining determined to acquire the Trentino and Trieste, threw 
the military’s cards up in the air. Cadorna now had to devise an offensive that 
would unfold when the Austrians were already fully mobilised, giving them the 
opportunity to move already active troops swiftly across from the Russian and 
Serbian fronts as soon as war was declared and thus put the Italians at a disadvan-
tage from the outset. The outline plan was finished by the end of August 1914. 
The main Italian attack would drive east from the Tagliamento to the Isonzo and 
then along the Sava river towards Lubljana, while subsidiary attacks across the 
mountains opened the roads to Klagenfurt and Villach. In three bounds the army 
would reach its objective – Vienna. The new war plan was driven by Cadorna’s 
belief that confining wars to limited goals was a cardinal error. They were won by 
hitting the enemy in his vital centres. “Conquering ground means nothing if the 
enemy is left in a condition to re-attack and take revenge”, he told the newspaper 
editor Olindo Malagodi in December 1914.20
On the map it looked straightforward: the Italian armies would percolate a 
leaky mountain barrier like water flowing along the cracks in a pavement. In fact 
it was, as the colonial minister Ferdinando Martini put it, “heroic proof of fanta-
sy”. Although the army had assiduously studied mountain warfare in its pre-war 
staff rides, it severely underestimated the difficulties it would face. For example, 
the staff concluded confidently that the army had enough artillery to subdue the 
forts of Malborghetto, Hermann and Flitsch that protected Villach.21 Fort Her-
mann was smashed to pieces but the Italians never conquered Flitsch (Kluže), 
which stands intact at the entrance to the valley to this day.
Cadorna’s strategic plan has been seen by his critics as evidence of considerable 
obtuseness, though it is worth noting that on the eve of the Treaty of London the 
French 3ème Bureau thought that the Italian Army could push to Vienna and Bu-
dapest once it had penetrated the Laibach-Klagenfurt region.22 Why, then did Ca-
dorna not see what others saw then and have seen since? And why did he not do 
19 Studio circa occupazione avanzata austro-ungarica alla nostra frontiera, 1914, AUSSME, F3 
busta 388.
20 Ruffo: L’Italia (see note 17), pp. 161–167; Olindo Malagodi: Conversazioni della Guerra, vol. 1. 
Milan/Naples 1960, pp. 33 ff. (2. 12. 1914). 
21 Circa l’attacco degli sbarrimenti a. u. in caso di offensive nel settore orientale, n. d. [1914], 
AUSSME, E2 busta 131.
22 Résumé de la note relative à l’intervention de l’Italie, 11. 4. 1915: cit.: Paul G. Halpern: The 
Anglo-French Naval Convention of 1915. In: HJ 13 (1970) 1, pp. 106–129, here: p. 111.
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something different? The answers to these questions lie in the social and profes-
sional pre-conceptions that were part of his mentality. As Italy prepared for war 
the weaknesses in the fabric of Italian society were a matter for concern at the 
highest levels. The general staff believed that the country and the army needed an 
early success which, “given the characteristics of our race”, would have a decisive 
effect on the remainder of the campaign. Cadorna was sure that Italy needed a 
short war “not so much for reasons of economics […] but in view of the country’s 
morale and disciplinary condition, on which the outcome will largely depend”.23 
He was warned by his staff in December 1914 that if Italy entered the war she 
must be ready to sustain heavy sacrifices for a long time to achieve her ends – but 
took no notice. He planned to fight a short war because he believed that the coun-
try could not fight a long one.
Cadorna’s strategy depended upon an essential pre-requisite – energetic and 
successful action by his future Allies to draw down the strength of the Central 
Powers – which appeared probable and even likely at various moments during the 
winter and spring of 1914–1915 as the army readied itself for war. Unfortunately 
for Italy, in May 1915 the fates would decree otherwise. There was also evidence 
in the attachés’ reports from the fighting fronts to support Cadorna’s belief in the 
offensive. Much has been made of the fact that by May 1915 he had been well-
briefed by Italian observers with the French and German armies about the trench 
warfare that was emerging on both fronts and alerted to the strength of the defen-
sive. Cadorna was disclined to dismiss them, thinking them “impregnated” with 
germanofilia and austrofilia. In any case, minds attuned to the offensive could 
find grounds in their reports to believe that the offensive was not yet a busted 
flush. When colonel Bongiovanni toured the East Prussian and Polish fronts at 
the start of January 1915 the main tactical lesson he brought back from his visit 
was that, although modern weaponry had strengthened the power of the defen-
sive, manoeuvre was still possible and indeed necessary in order to win. After a 
trip to the German front at Lille in mid-February and using accounts of the 
French attack at Soissons the previous month, he told Rome that a well-prepared 
attack could get across the zona battuta (the area between the opposing lines 
beaten by enemy fire) without excessive loss.24
Yet despite appearances to the contrary, Cadorna was not entirely impervious 
to what was happening elsewhere in the war or to the difficulties he and his army 
were going to have to overcome, and shortly before the war began he modified 
his initial ideas. On 1 April 1915 his commanders were warned that revised mo-
bilisation arrangements meant that the army would arrive at the frontier in suc-
cessive waves, ruling out the offensive bounds that had been the cornerstone of 
his original design. The Central Powers now looked able to deploy forces strong 
23 Promemoria per S. E. il Capo di Stato Maggiore, 11. 10. 1914, AUSSME, F3 busta 85/6, p. 2; 
Cadorna to Zupelli, 26. 11. 1914, AUSSME, F3 busta 85/6, no. 8.
24 Note tattiche, 6. 2. 1915, AUSSME, G29 raccoglitore 13/4,5, no. 39, p. 1; Guerra di posizione, 
30. 3. 1915, AUSSME, G29 raccoglitore 13/4,5, no. 68, p. 8.
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enough to meet the Italian offensives. Finally, given the strength of the new Aus-
trian defensive works on the Carso and Friuli fronts it was possible that an Italian 
offensive in that direction might “run into tenacious resistance and remain para-
lysed in the same way as has happened in Flanders and in Poland”. New direc-
tives to his field commanders instructed them to conquer positions that would be 
used as starting points for a general offensive when all the troops had assembled. 
A lot now depended on Russia, with whom Cadorna signed a military agreement 
on 8/21 March 1915. Given the improvement in the Austrian frontier defences, he 
warned his new ally, “our first offensive leap will be slow, difficult [and] possible 
only if there is simultaneous and energetic pressure by the Russian army”.25 
Four days before the fighting started he warned the war minister, General Zupelli, 
that given the organisation, strength and moral solidity of Italy’s enemies (he in-
cluded Germany) the coming campaign was unlikely to be brief, and he asked for 
another 150,000 infantry and as many field guns as possible to be ready for use by 
April 1916.26
Cadorna’s strategy sentenced the Italian Army to three years of bloody stale-
mate; and his tactical doctrine made doubly sure that costs would be high. In his 
infamous “red pamphlet”, issued in February 1915, he shrugged off trench war-
fare (“this very unusual form of war”), entirely discounted the difficulties of ad-
vancing over open ground, and privileged “irresistible forward movement” as the 
principal way to demoralise the enemy and win victory. In May 1915 new and 
equally lethal regulations set out how the attack was to work: the forward threat-
ening movement of the Italian infantry, protected by field artillery, would force 
the enemy defenders to expose themselves so that they could then be destroyed 
by Italian artillery. This required levels of expertise and co-ordination that Cador-
na’s artillerymen never achieved. A pamphlet on French methods of frontal attack 
accompanied the new doctrine. Cadorna urged his subordinates to study it, but 
then added that it was “improbable that our troops will have to have recourse to 
such procedures, other than exceptionally on very limited portions of the front”. 
Stalemate was unthinkable and everyone had to believe that trench warfare could 
and must end. Guns were the key that would unlock the door, destroying organ-
ised enemy defences, hitting personnel, interdicting attacks, and firing on enemy 
trenches until the exact moment that the Italian infantry reached them. All this 
was of a piece with pre-war French artillery doctrine which was at that very mo-
ment piling up casualties in fruitless attacks at Artois, Champagne and St. Mihiel. 
Cadorna was about to start fighting his war using methods that Joffre was already 
employing in vain.27
25 Luigi Cadorna: La guerra sul fronte italiana. Milan 1934, pp. 77 f.; Capellano: L’Imperial (see 
note 17), pp. 75 f. (1. 4. 1915); Sonnino to Carlotti, enclosing Cadorna to Ropolo, 2. 5. 1915, 
D.D.I., 5th series, vol. 3. Rome 1985, no. 540, p. 427.
26 Cadorna to Zupelli, 21. 5. 1915, AUSSME, H5 busta 17/3, no. 2492.
27 Filippo Stefani: La storia della dottrina e degli ordinamenti dell’esercito italiano, vol. 1. Rome 
1984, pp. 506–510, p. 516; Robert A. Doughty: Pyrrhic Victory. French Strategy and Operations 
in the Great War. Harvard, MA 2005, pp. 26 f., pp. 141–152.
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Climate and terrain posed great obstacles to success but they were by no means 
the only ones confronting Cadorna’s soldiers. The Italians began the war short of 
almost everything except manpower. Partly this was a consequence of their hav-
ing failed to foresee and plan for the needs of modern combat – a failing shared in 
varying degrees by other armies to be sure. Partly it was the unavoidable conse-
quence of Italy’s weak industrial base and disorganised manufacturing power. The 
consequences were crippling – and lasting. Within weeks of the start of the war 
field howitzers were being limited to firing ten rounds a day, and as late as 
July 1918 medium calibre guns were rationed to two rounds a day and light calibre 
guns to four during pauses between major offensives. When the fighting began 
paper sacks were used for sandbags and the attacking infantry did not even have 
garden shears to cut the Austrian wire.
Before the war Cadorna, like many others, thought in terms derived from the 
Napoleonic paradigm in which successful strategy was a matter of imaginative 
brilliance combined with rapidity of manoeuvre. His initial strategy required his 
commanders to move fast in order to take possession of key entry points in the 
Austrian lines. It fitted poorly with a ponderous and inexperienced army whose 
commanders had succumbed to the comfortable bureaucratic routines of peace-
time, and within days the front had congealed along lines that stayed more or less 
the same for the next two and a half years. With the war less than a month old he 
advised his generals henceforth to avoid improvised attacks “which although they 
show the valour of our troops do not allow [us] to achieve results proportional to 
[our] losses”.28 The enemy’s positions would have to be tackled using “method 
and patience”. Operationally, “method” meant using the artillery to break down 
the enemy’s front-line defences and inflict heavy damage on his forces, thereby 
creating the necessary conditions for successful infantry attacks. Strategically, 
“method” meant intensifying the pressure on the Austrians along the Isonzo, le-
vering open a gap in the enemy’s defensive lines and thereby acquiring the free-
dom of movement and manoeuvre necessary to gain the immediate objectives – 
Gorizia, which was taken in August 1916, and Trieste, which was never captured. 
If it was ever going to succeed, Cadorna’s “method” required resources that Italy 
simply could not provide. In his defence, though, it can be said that he was seek-
ing to do exactly what Joffre and Haig were attempting on the western front – to 
exchange the unfamiliar contemporary realities of static warfare for a historically 
familiar and conceptually more agreeable world of manoeuvre warfare.
In the shaping and implementation of strategy the first charge on Cadorna was 
to achieve the government’s objectives, and although he may not have known its 
war aims in detail (the Treaty of London was only published by the Bolsheviks 
after the October Revolution, by which time he had been replaced) there was for 
two years no compelling reason for it to think that he could not fulfil them. The 
Austrian Army obviously had to be defeated and the field commander was clearly 
trying to do exactly that. The capture of Gorizia in August 1916, to vociferous 
28 Operation order no. 7, 11. 6. 1915; cit.: Gianni Rocca: Cadorna. Milan 2004, p. 82.
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nationalist delight, was a step towards Trieste and the achievement of an openly 
trumpeted war aim.
Cadorna had also to take into account the external strategic and political envi-
ronment. The actions of Italy as a member of a military alliance, he told his 
daughter in July 1915, had to be considered “not only for the effect they have on 
our theatre of war, but also and more particularly for their repercussions on the 
entire European theatre”.29 Aware of the desirability of co-ordinating Allied of-
fensives – as much in his own as in his Allies’ interests – he launched or advanced 
offensives in response to requests for co-operation or help. In the summer of 1916 
he told the foreign minister that he intended to press on with offensives and en-
gage all the enemy forces confronting him in order to prevent their transfer to the 
Russian front. In the autumn, saving Romania after her ill-timed entry into the 
war required detaining enemy forces on the Italian front. At the fourth Chantilly 
conference in November 1916 the Allies agreed to launch general Allied offen-
sives the following spring, and Cadorna acted in conformity with that agreement. 
In April 1917 Foch was assured that attacking Trieste meant threatening “the 
most sensitive point” of the Central Powers and one they would have to mass to 
defend – to the Entente’s advantage. After the tenth battle of the Isonzo in 
May 1917 the Allies wanted another one to wear down the Austrians, and the 
eleventh and last battle of the Isonzo in August 1917 was indeed designed partly 
to coincide with the Anglo-French offensive on the western front and partly to 
take pressure off the Russian front. In other words, Allied strategic politics gave 
Cadorna further reason to do what he was already doing. It also made it much 
more difficult to contemplate removing him: he could hardly be sacked for being 
a good ally! Ironically his successor, general Armando Diaz, made his reputation 
in part by resisting pressure to shape Italian strategy to meet the needs of Italy’s 
Allies.
For Cadorna’s “method” to have a chance of succeeding he needed more guns 
– in May 1915 he started the first battle of the Isonzo with 112 heavy field guns 
and by the time that the third battle ended in early November he had only 57 left. 
He also needed better guns – between June and December 1915 139 of his medi-
um field guns had exploded – and more ammunition than he was ever to receive. 
To get his offensives going at all he had perpetually to shuttle artillery up and 
down the 650-kilometre front. The Italian gunners, working to a complicated 
doctrine which in any case not all subordinate artillery commanders followed, 
were always under self-induced and external pressure to economise on ammuni-
tion.30 They proved not to be up to the job. Attack training for the infantry was 
more or less non-existent until the very last months of the war. Cadorna’s com-
mand style made a bad situation much worse. Isolated at his headquarters at 
Udine – known unflatteringly in the army as the Comandissimo – where a gang of 
29 Cadorna to Carla [Cadorna], 11. 7. 1915. In: Raffaele Cadorna (ed.): Lettere famigliari. Milan 
1967, p. 113.
30 Enrico Caviglia: La dodicesima battaglia [Caporetto]. Milan 1935, pp. 87–99.
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colonels ran departments with cross-cutting powers and roles, he terrorised divi-
sional and corps commanders with telephone calls known as “Cadorna’s torpe-
does” from which they often emerged weeping. Faced with the certainty of im-
mediate dismissal if their attacks failed for want of aggression, they in turn bullied 
their subordinates, launched offensives that were all too often ill-prepared and 
purposeless, massaged the results, and when failure could neither be concealed 
nor explained, they blamed their juniors and each another.31 As a military instru-
ment, the army was unprepared and unable to carry out Cadorna’s strategy. As a 
social construct, by the time of Caporetto it was fast becoming dysfunctional.
Strategy and Civil-Military Relations
From the start Cadorna was determined not to be shackled by politicians: in 
April 1915 he notified the war minister, general Zupelli, that the royal decree un-
der which he held office gave him the power in the king’s name to require every 
member of the government to inform him of any measures they intended to take 
which could directly or indirectly influence the development of military opera-
tions.32 In general, he was strategic master in his own house. There were occasion-
al skirmishes with war ministers over the numbers of troops being kept in Libya, 
but they were of no substantial importance. More importantly, civilians and mili-
tary differed over Greece: after the French landing at Salonika in February 1915 
the Italian government came under pressure to take a share in military operations 
there, but neither Salandra nor Sonnino was so inclined. (One of the Consulta’s 
aims was to see Greece reduced during or as a result of the war and Sonnino 
thought any kind of alliance with her undesirable.) Cadorna by contrast, was pre-
pared to put in 30,000 Italian troops, if only to draw off Austrian troops fighting 
on the Isonzo; and an Italian contingent would eventually appear in Greece – but 
not until August 1916.
Only Albania caused a really serious clash between the “frocks” and the 
“brasshats”, and Cadorna emerged from it in a virtually unassailable position. 
Whereas Salandra, Sonnino and the war minister General Zupelli all wanted to 
expand Italy’s foothold in Albania, Cadorna objected strongly to what he regard-
ed as a dangerous side-show. As a result, he was taken out of the chain of com-
mand and the venture went ahead under Zupelli, Valona being occupied on 
Christmas Day 1915. Cadorna, for his part, protested that there should be no 
penetration into the interior and warned that the military consequences of not 
heeding his advice would be dire. In very short order he was proved right. A po-
litically-inspired push from the Italian enclave at Valona to Durazzo turned into a 
31 The most egregious example of the latter was the ill-conceived attack on Mount Ortigara in 
June 1917; see: Alessandro Tortato: Ortigara. La verità negata. Le sconvolgenti rivelazioni di docu-
menti d’archivio che nessun italiano avrebbe mai voluto leggere. Valdagno 2003, p. 34 et passim.
32 Cadorna to Zupelli, 17. 4. 1915, AUSSME, F3 busta 85/4.
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tragi-comedy and by the end of February 1916 Italian troops were back at Valona, 
from where they would conduct what one historian of the Great War labelled “[a] 
little mountain war of no significance” until the Armistice arrived in 1918.33
Durazzo was a key ingredient in the only major crisis in wartime civil-military 
relations involving Cadorna, and it is instructive in showing where power lay in 
wartime Italy and how it was exercised. Perhaps emboldened by his (briefly) in-
dependent command, perhaps exasperated by a field commander with whom his 
relations were getting steadily worse, Zupelli chose at the start of January 1916 to 
contest Cadorna’s monopoly over military strategy. Pointing out that there was 
no evidence to suggest that future attacks on the Isonzo would do any better than 
they had in the past, Zupelli offered the cabinet a new strategic formula: a concen-
trated attack on a 12 kilometre front massing 500 guns to take Trieste. Sonnino, 
who wanted to get rid of Cadorna, tacked on a proposal for a war council com-
posed of the top military men and Salandra took both ideas to the king. Generals 
whom Cadorna had fired and others that he had promoted were all saying that 
the army was banging its head against a brick wall; could the government remain 
indifferent to what was “indubitably the spirit of the army and [one] with which 
the country is every day being infused”? Salandra asked Vittorio Emanuele. Zu-
pelli was sent to put his strategic alternative to Cadorna while the king’s aide-de-
camp, general Ugo Brusati, sounded out him out about the idea of a military 
council. Rightly scenting a plot to get rid of him, Cadorna was predictably furi-
ous and refused point-blank to share his military authority with anyone. A care-
fully orchestrated press campaign which contrasted the Olympian high command 
at Udine with the puny politicians in Rome got public opinion behind him; and 
the king told him not to worry: “If I had a bad opinion of you, I would not have 
defended you as I have – more than you can think.”34
Determined to make his military power unchallengeable, Cadorna now brought 
Durazzo into play. In taking off down a path to which he was absolutely op-
posed, the government had challenged his authority and rejected his judgement. 
On 27 February, six days after his reassuring audience with the king, Cadorna de-
manded Zupelli’s head. When Salandra brusquely reminded him that constitu-
tionally it was none of his business to tell an administration which ministers it 
could or could not have, he tendered his resignation. He could be sure that it 
would not be accepted, for he had in his pocket concrete evidence of the king’s 
support. On 29 February (the day before he offered his resignation) a royal decree 
gave him command of the entire army, removing the possibility of an independent 
strategy run by the government via the war ministry while confirming that politi-
cal directives about the conduct of the war were reserved for the administration. 
The king asked Cadorna to withdraw his resignation, which he did – characteris-
33 Charles R. M. F. Cruttwell: A History of the Great War 1914–1918. Oxford 1964, p. 236; [Ma-
rio Montanari]: Le truppe italiane in Albania (Anni 1914–1920 e 1939). Rome 1978, p. 36 et passim.
34 Piero Melograni: Storia politica della grande guerra 1915/1918, vol. 1. Bari 1977, pp. 173–177; 
Rocca: Cadorna (see note 28), p. 110.
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tically on his own terms: he would accept the revision of his powers only so long 
as the directives he was given could militarily be acted upon and the ends were 
proportionate to the means. His victory was sealed when, on 6 March, Zupelli 
resigned. (Fifteen months later, now a divisional commander, the one-time war 
minister was fired by Cadorna for “inefficiency”.)
Short of a disaster – and it would take a disaster of catastrophic proportions to 
unseat him – both Cadorna and his strategy were now immovable.
The unexpected and almost fatal Austrian Strafexpedition attack in May 1916 
posed just such a threat to his tenure. His administration tottering, Salandra 
thought seriously about replacing the field commander, and for the only time in 
the war the king indicated that he was prepared to change the chief of general 
staff. Cadorna was saved by the fighting power of his army, which held the Aus-
trians on the very edge of the Asiago plateau, and by his rapid and energetic or-
ganisation of a reserve army on the plain below. Reassured that there would be no 
humiliating retreat to the Piave, Salandra saw no reason to sack the field com-
mander. Cadorna’s position was secure, but Salandra’s was not. His administra-
tion was already on its last legs on the eve of the Austrian attacks with interven-
tionists demanding a wider based government of national unity. The Trentino was 
the occasion for a political crisis, not a military one: a moment when Giolittian 
ant-interventionists could combine with left and right interventionists, reformist 
and “maximalist” socialists, republicans, radicals and nationalists to unseat a pre-
mier who, for various reasons, they all wanted to get rid of. On 10 June Salandra’s 
administration fell. The capture of Gorizia two months later simply made Cador-
na even more untouchable.
The one-sided pattern of Italy’s wartime civil-military relations continued un-
der Salandra’s successor. Paolo Boselli tried to exert some control over Italy’s 
warlord by appointing the interventionist socialist Leonida Bissolati (who had 
won two silver medals for gallantry) as a minister without portfolio and liaison 
with the Comando supremo. Cadorna’s reaction was swift and uncompromising: 
all government missions to the war zone “with duties not exactly defined and no-
tified [in advance]” must cease. When Boselli at once agreed (his note, written in a 
trembling hand, was apparently scarcely legible) Cadorna issued an army order 
barring any visit by any minister to the war zone without his prior consent and 
forbidding Bissolati, whom he suspected of wanting to have him removed, from 
visiting under any circumstances. The row was patched up after the king interced-
ed on Bissolati’s behalf and the minister without portfolio assured Cadorna that 
he had never hesitated to express complete faith in him at critical moments, but 
Bissolati’s freedom to exercise his liaison function was severely restricted: he was 
not allowed to deal with subordinate commands, or assemble and speak to troops. 
Peace eventually broke out between the two, but only because of Bissolati’s com-
plete submission. As Vittorio Orlando, then the interior minister, remarked, Ca-
dorna continued to be the arbiter of everything.35
35 Melograni: Storia (see note 34), pp. 193–207.
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The character of Italian politics and the combination of intermittent success and 
the absence of outright failure on the military front do much to explain why Ca-
dorna kept command of the army and was allowed to fight the war as he chose for 
almost two and a half years. There are, however, other reasons that have to do 
with the particular Italian military-political milieu in which the war took place. 
Individual politicians might have their own favourite generals (though not many 
seem to have done so) but in Italy, unlike France, there was no tradition of “gen-
erals of the Left” and “generals of the Right”. There were thus no focuses for a 
“patriotic opposition” behind whom questions could be raised about how the war 
was being run. Nor were there any easily identifiable military alternatives, either 
doctrinally or personally. In France competing military doctrines of the offensive 
personified in Joffre and the defensive propounded by Pétain offered those at the 
political helm the chance to choose between alternative ways of fighting the war 
they wanted to pursue at the right moment. In Italy there was only one doctrine. 
Likewise, Italy had no Nivelle to offer the government a new formula with which 
to win the war at less cost and therefore more acceptably. Nor, finally, was there 
any obvious successor waiting in the wings. The only realistic rival for the top 
spot, general Luigi Capello, was a man whose star was still rising when at 
Caporetto it fell with the collapse of his 2nd Army.
Caporetto and the Risveglio Nazionale
During 1917 there were signs that a combination of unresolved pre-war structural 
inequalities, emerging political conflicts and wartime stresses and strains was creat-
ing a maturing social crisis. At Christmas 1916, encouraged by the German Peace 
Note, long processions of women wound through the lower Arno valley carrying 
banners bearing the word Pace; the prefect of Florence thought things might be on 
the point of explosion. Strike actions and demonstrations increased during the 
spring and early summer. In Rome a socialist conference in February 1917 called 
on its adherents to stop fighting the guerra dei signori and make a revolution in-
stead. Everywhere in northern Italy prefects saw the not-so-hidden hand of social-
ism at work. South of Rome demonstrations were fewer and were generally rec-
ognised to be economic in origin. Up and down Italy the authorities reported that 
socialists were reverting to pacifism and noted a revival of anarchism. One leading 
“minimalist” socialist shared the authorities’ concern: in May 1917 Filippo Turati 
thought that a rising by the countryside was not far off. On 30 June he inadver-
tently gave the “maximalist” socialists, who were lining up with Lenin and Trotsky, 
ammunition when he suggested in parliament that the government open peace ne-
gotiations. His declaration that “In the coming winter there must be no war” was 
converted by his fellow socialist, Claudio Treves, into something that sounded 
more like a firm statement of intent – “Next winter no longer in the trenches”.
By August 1917 challenges were being issued to the government to think seri-
ously about stopping the war. When a Russian mission arrived at the beginning of 
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August it was greeted with spontaneous cries of “Viva Lenin”; Giolitti emerged 
from a lengthy self-imposed silence and at a speech in Cuneo on 13 August called 
the war “the greatest catastrophe since the Great Flood”; and two days later Pope 
Benedict XV’s papal peace note condemned the “useless slaughter” of the war, 
adding to the authorities’ alarm. Then on 23 August a general strike broke out in 
Turin and over the next four days rebels and soldiers battled for control of the 
city. When the smoke finally cleared 41 people were dead, 193 were wounded, and 
a thousand had been arrested. The rallying cry during the Turin riots was “Let’s 
do like Russia”.36 At the front desertions increased and were running at 5,500 a 
month between June and September 1917. The ideals for which the war was being 
fought were no longer enough to banish the growing feeling of discouragement; 
believing in them after more than two years of war required, it has been well said, 
“a sufficient capacity for abstraction from the primary facts of existence”.37
Neither socialist defeatism nor Catholic condemnation of the war appear to 
have done much, if anything, to undermine the army in the run-up to Caporetto, 
though the military authorities were persuaded that socialist propaganda had 
sapped the army’s powers of resistance. Paradoxically – to judge by the way 
things were going in the months beforehand – defeat at Caporetto saved Italy 
from what would have been a steadily weakening home front and increasing dis-
sent from a demonstrably sterile strategy. The authorities would in all likelihood 
have been able to keep the lid on things – the repressive powers and proclivities of 
Liberal Italy should never be underestimated – and although Salandra’s successor 
Paolo Boselli was anything but a strong premier there is no reason to suppose that 
his administration would have revised Italy’s war aims or could have changed the 
strategy in the foreseeable future. As it was, both the premier and the chief of 
general staff fell from power. Vittorio Orlando, who replaced Boselli, was no 
Clemenceau but like the Frenchman he led a nation with its back to the wall. De-
fending the patria, recovering the invaded provinces and avenging a defeat that 
was a national humiliation were causes that everyone could understand.
Armando Diaz, who replaced Cadorna, rebuilt the army and re-made strategy, 
enabling Italy to keep fighting the war and keep believing that she might win it. 
Anxieties about the army’s reliability took some time to dissipate. In mid-No-
vember an entire brigade surrendered almost without fighting, and at the begin-
ning of December 25,000 mostly untested men surrendered on the altopiano. At 
the start of 1918 Orlando was afraid that the army might take to heart talk of 
Caporetto as a military strike or a politico-military revolt and do what it had not 
thought of doing on 24 October 1917. It was not until April 1918 that Diaz was 
finally assured by his chief of military intelligence that all was now indeed calm. 
Meanwhile, under his direction and with the assistance of one of his two deputy 
36 Alberto Monticone: Il socialismo torinese ed i fatti dell’agosto 1917. In: id. (ed.): Gli italiani in 
uniforme 1915/1918. Intellettuali, borghesi e disertori. Bari 1972, pp. 89–144; Cortesi: Il PSI (see 
note 12), pp. 30 f.
37 De Caprariis: Partiti (see note 14), pp. 130 f.
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chiefs of staff, general Pietro Badoglio, the army was reconstructed in what 
amounted to a revolution in Italian military culture. Trench tours were reorgan-
ised, leave was increased, pay and conditions were improved, leisure facilities and 
activities were provided, and although punishments were still harsh there were no 
more decimations and military judicial procedures were improved.
Taking motivational responsibilities out of the hands of under-trained junior 
officers, where Cadorna had left them for two and a half years, Diaz set up a so-
phisticated propaganda service – Servizio P – to educate and inform the troops 
about why they were fighting. Trench newspapers explained and justified the war 
in terms that ranged from the highly sophisticated argument that German-owned 
factories and banks had taken the fruit of the workers’ labours while their own 
money was paying for the guns that were killing them to the simplistic call to 
“Kill the damned race […] that wants to have your women, steal your crops and 
livestock […] kill the filthy violator of Italian women.”38 Italy was finally fighting 
a genuinely national war to which all could relate.
Diaz’s management of the final year of Italy’s war was sensibly cautious and 
from Italy’s point of view well advised, though it did nothing to improve his 
country’s standing in the eyes of its Allies. While the Allies thought that they had 
saved Italy by coming to her rescue, the Italians, having called up more than a 
quarter of a million men in December 1917, thought with some justice that they 
had saved themselves. On 21 January 1918 the Supreme War Council at Versailles 
invited them to develop plans for “the widest possible offensive” on their front. 
Uncertain as to whether the Allies were waiting for the Americans to arrive in 
force, Diaz saw his central strategic tasks that spring as ensuring the strongest 
possible defence, preparing counter-offensive operations in case of enemy attack, 
and being in a position to forestall the enemy if possible by means of offensive 
actions. Reeling from the Ludendorff offensive, the French pressed the Italians to 
turn words into action. Neither Diaz nor his deputies were prepared to be hustled 
into premature activity. It would be a gross error, Badoglio argued, to wear out 
the army when there was still a possibility that the Central Powers might take 
their revenge. It should only be employed at the moment of maximum effective-
ness: “We must hold all our cards in our hand and only play them on a sure 
thing.”39 Conscious that his army was still in a convalescent state, sceptical of the 
strategic worth of an offensive, and increasingly convinced that the Austrians 
were planning a major attack, Diaz temporised. On 12 June Foch urged him to 
put into effect a local offensive in the mountains, for which the French had been 
pressing since the spring, pointing out that the Austrian attack had not transpired. 
Two days later it came.
38 Mario Isnenghi: Giornali di trincea (1915–1918). Turin 1977, p. 165; see also: Mark Cornwall: 
The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds. London 2000, pp. 99–
104 et passim.
39 Rino Alessi: Dall’Isonzo al Piave. Lettere clandestine di un corrispondente di guerra. Milan 
1966, pp. 236 f. (7. 5. 1918).
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Yet even after he had beaten off the Austrian June offensive, and with only six 
complete divisions left, Diaz was facing renewed calls from Foch for a mountain 
offensive; and he was coming under increasing pressure from the prime minister 
who was worried about carrying Italy’s war aims at the forthcoming peace con-
ference. Badoglio brushed Orlando aside. “Give me a written order to attack”, he 
reportedly told the premier, “and I’ll tell you how many minutes later I’ll re-
sign.”40 Talking up the Italian theatre, which he claimed was assuming “a decisive 
character”, Diaz mounted what was in effect a challenge to Foch’s “Germany 
First” strategy and proposed that the Allies should instead aim at the outright de-
feat of Austria, thereby isolating Germany and bringing about her collapse. A 
campaign of the size he had in mind, which would exorcise the ghosts of 1866, 
needed Allied manpower and munitions and in Paris at the end of August he 
asked for 20–25 Allied divisions. Foch told him Austria-Hungary was weak, 
Pershing urged him to attack, and he was sent home empty-handed. Believing at 
this point that the war would last into 1919, Diaz was only prepared to undertake 
an offensive if there was either a decisive Allied victory in France, or serious up-
risings in enemy countries, or if he was given more Allied troops.41
The end came much sooner than anyone expected, the Bulgarian armistice on 
29 September signalling the start of the collapse of the Central Powers. With one 
of his three preconditions met, Diaz was ready to attack and finally to consum-
mate the much delayed union between strategy and policy. “To wait until a future 
armistice resulting primarily from the action of Allied arms gives us the possibili-
ty of attaining our desired goals without having worn ourselves down I don’t 
think [is] a desirable solution and not at all commensurate with our position and 
the scope (grandezza) of our aspirations”, he told Orlando.42 He had already 
shifted his ground. At the end of August Badoglio secretly initiated planning for 
what became the battle of Vittorio Veneto, and Diaz approved the operational 
design on 25 September. A month later, Italian armies routed their enemy and 
won an outright victory in the field – the only Allied power to do so.
Conclusion
In 1914 it was as obvious to Italians as to any other sentient observers that the 
war which began that August was going to change the balance of power. One or 
other of the two contending sides was going to emerge from it the loser, with its 
power and influence greatly diminished. Austria-Hungary’s disappearance would 
not be in Italy’s best interests and Sonnino for one never sought this, but any 
diminution in her power would be to Italy’s advantage in areas she deemed im-
40 Silvio Bertoldi: Badoglio. Il generale che prese il posto di Mussolini. Milan 1993, pp. 87 f.
41 Diaz to Orlando, 14. 9. 1918, AUSSME, H5 busta 10/5, T. 41P.
42 Diaz to Orlando, 14. 10. 1918; cit.: Luigi Grattan: Armando Diaz Duca della Vittoria. Foggia 
2001, p. 154.
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portant or even critical to her security and desirable for her future economic 
well-being. Italy went into the war as a regional power fighting what both sol-
diers and politicians initially expected would be a short war for limited ends. If 
there was a fatal miscalculation, this was it. No-one considered the alternative – a 
war of unforeseeable duration – and no major figure other than Giolitti believed 
that Italy could stay out of the war and still make tangible gains. To the men in 
charge of the state, there were more and more pressing reasons to fight than not 
to fight – a viewpoint shared by all the other combatants.
Once the fighting began Italy’s statesmen, like civilian leaders everywhere else, 
took a functional view of their military. Cadorna and Diaz were expected to find 
the key to defeating the Austro-Hungarian Army, thereby creating the circum-
stances in which aims could be achieved. To do this the soldiers had to translate 
war aims into objectives and then secure them. This was the point at which strate-
gy and war aims parted company. In only a few cases – Trieste for example – did a 
war aim and a strategic objective physically coincide. Writ large, Italy’s war was a 
va banque game: either the Austro-Hungarian armies would be defeated, in which 
case claiming her war aims would then become a task for her statesmen, or they 
would win, in which case war aims would be irrelevant. Once in it, leaving the 
war voluntarily was never a realistic option: doing so would have overturned the 
political card-table with incalculable consequences. What Italy did not foresee, 
understandably enough, in 1915 was that the war would change the rules of the 
international game, making it impossible for her to pocket some of the prizes she 
wanted – and had been promised.

Klaus Schwabe
President Wilson and the War Aims of the 
 United States
The Horrors of War
The strategy and war aims of the United States in the First World War were very 
much determined by one person: the American president, Woodrow Wilson. 
True, he was acting against the background of a lively debate at home over the 
aims of the United States in its war against the Central Powers; but as the Ameri-
can president he assumed for himself the prerogative of defining them while 
claiming at the same time the right to determine the broad outlines of military-po-
litical strategy for accomplishing them.1 The following analysis will focus on Wil-
son himself, therefore; and it is to him that the central questions of this volume 
will be addressed: was he aware of the horrors that this world conflict had con-
jured up? What objectives justified, in his view, America’s participation in this 
slaughter? Did his policy prolong or shorten the war? What was the impact of 
Wilson’s war aims programme on the Western military and naval strategy? What 
military outcome was he working for in order to realise America’s war aims? At 
the end of this analysis the programme and policy that president Wilson took to 
the Paris peace conference should become visible.
The first question is easily answered: as Wilson stated in his powerful peace 
message to Congress on 22 January 1917, he had seen in the First World War, even 
before America entered it, the great humanitarian catastrophe of subsequent his-
torical record.2 In his message of 2 April 1917, calling on Congress to declare war 
on the German Empire, he revealed his “profound sense of the solemn and even 
1 John A. Thompson: More Tactics than Strategy. Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1914–
1919. In: William N. Tilchin/Charles E. Neu (eds.): Artists of Power. Theodore Roosevelt, Wood-
row Wilson, and Their Enduring Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy. Westport 2006, pp. 95–116, here: 
p. 96. For contemporary reactions see: David Esposito: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson. Ameri-
can War Aims in World War I. Westport 1996, p. 120; see also: Lloyd E. Ambrosius: Wilsonian 
Statecraft. Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I. Wilmington 
1991, p. 16.
2 Wilson, Address to the Senate, 22. 1. 1917. In: Arthur S. Link et al. (eds.): The Papers of Wood-
row Wilson. 69 vols. Princeton, NJ 1966–1994 (cited: Link et al.: Wilson Papers), here: vol. 40, 
p. 534; see also: “This tragical and appalling outpouring of blood”, cited in: Wilson, Fourteen 
Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers, vol. 45, p. 535.
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tragical character of the step I am taking”. It was, he said, “a fearful thing to lead 
this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all 
wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance”.3 A particularly poignant as-
pect of what he meant by this tragedy was, as he disclosed to his friends in confi-
dence, that his decision amounted to a death sentence for thousands of young 
Americans.4
A New World Order
Wilson’s dismay at this catastrophe – and this brings us to our second question – 
lay at the root of his war aims programme, which caught the imagination of many 
of his contemporaries and which, at the same time, later analysts found so diffi-
cult to comprehend. It had both international-legal-moral as well as concrete ma-
terial aspects. His chief concern lay in the field of international law as the sole 
remedy to prevent a repetition of that disaster. Here, he saw himself as the em-
bodiment of a world-wide idealistic-progressive train of thought centred on the 
desire to ensure that this would be the last war. But the president was also aware 
that this global conflict heralded the end of America’s geographically guaranteed 
security both immediately and in the long term: he saw his country’s security di-
rectly threatened by the German proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare 
(1 February 1917), which not only threatened to paralyse America’s foreign trade, 
but also conjured up the spectre of a German victory that would destroy the bal-
ance of power in the world and ultimately threaten the security of the United 
States in the western hemisphere. For the first time Wilson thus invoked the prin-
ciple of the balance of power, a doctrine he had so often in the past condemned.5 
In the long term, there loomed also the danger that a victorious militaristic Ger-
many would force the United States to become a militarised state too, and, there-
by, to jettison its democratic institutions.6 By participating in the war, he demand-
ed therefore, America must seek to ensure that this would be a “war to end all 
wars”.7
This, Wilson’s first and overriding war aim, implied a far-reaching global re-
form of international relations. Old, discredited power-political traditions were to 
3 Wilson: War Message to Congress, 2. 4. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, 
p. 526; Wilson: Flag Day Address, 14. 6. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, 
p. 499.
4 Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, p. IX, p. 483, p. 541.
5 Ross Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson, World War I and an American Conception of National Se-
curity. In: Diplomatic History 25 (2001), pp. 1–32, here: pp. 3 f., p. 8, pp. 10 f., p. 13, p. 26, p. 30; 
Ross Kennedy: The Will to Believe. Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy for 
Peace and Security. Kent, OH 2009, p. 86, pp. 130 f.
6 Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson (see note 5), p. 14, p. 16, p. 30.
7 Wilson, Address to the Senate, 22. 1. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 40, 
p. 534; Thomas J. Knock: To End All Wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World 
Order. Princeton 1992, p. 163.
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be replaced by an “organised peace”.8 This was to be realised through a world-
wide peace organisation, a “League of Nations”. This international-legal institu-
tion was for Wilson the most important part of his programme, which he had 
conceived for the most part even before the United States had become belligerent, 
and which he held to, on the whole, for the entire period of American participa-
tion in the war. Hence, he declared in his war message to Congress that “the 
world must be made safe for democracy”9 – i.e. that the democracies, which in 
Wilson’s view were by nature pacific, should no longer be exposed to threats from 
any aggressor.10 At the same time, he made it clear what his programme was di-
rected against: “Against secret diplomacy, against the old system of power rival-
ries as practised at the Congress of Vienna, against ‘exclusive alliances’, against the 
principle of the balance of power, and against the pursuit of ‘selfish interests’ by 
individual nations”.11
In positive terms Wilson’s new world order and the League of Nations guaran-
teeing it were to consist of several elements: the basis was to consist of nations 
that were democratic, i.e. that enjoyed self-determination and equality of political 
and economic rights. In material terms this implied the freedom of the seas and of 
trade. The institutional framework was to be a world peace organisation to guar-
antee the independence and territorial integrity of every member state, whether 
large or small. The United States was to be an internationally responsible member 
of this world order. With this programme, Wilson had made himself the global 
spokesman for the pacifist longing for peace that characterised the moderate left, 
friend and foe alike, and not least in his own country.12 More precisely, this world 
order meant two things: in the first place, Wilson wanted to use it to exclude the 
factors of power and violence from international relations and to establish them 
on a basis of international law. “What we seek”, he declared on 4 July 1918 at 
Washington’s tomb, “is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed 
and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind”: violence was to be replaced 
by law.13 What he demanded ultimately amounted to no less than replacing tradi-
8 Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson (see note 5), p. 8, p. 10, pp. 28 ff.
9 Wilson, Address, 2. 4. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, p. 525.
10 Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson (see note 5), p. 16.
11 Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 198; Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 
8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 536; Wilson, Address to the U.S. 
Senate, 22. 1. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 40, p. 536, p. 539; also: Wilson, 
Address, 4. 12. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 198; Knock: End (see 
note 7), p. 97.
12 Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
pp. 538 f.; Wilson, Address, 2. 4. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, p. 524; 
Wilson, Reply to the Pope’s Peace Proposal, 27. 8. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 44, pp. 58 f.; Tony Smith: America’s Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle 
for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton 1994, p. 94; Knock: End (see note 7), p. 163; 
Arno Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin. Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917–1918. Cleveland 
1964, pp. 37 ff.; Kennedy: Will (see note 5), pp. 88 f., p. 131.
13 Wilson, Address, 4. 7. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 48, p. 517.
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tional international diplomacy and Realpolitik by global domestic politics (Welt-
innenpolitik). This was to have, as will be seen, significant consequences both for 
strategy, and for the way the war was to be brought to an end. In the second place, 
if peace-loving and internationally trustworthy democracies were to be the only 
guarantors of peace, the consequence would be that those states which, like the 
German Empire, not only lacked a democratic constitution but had also violated 
international law, would not be allowed to join the League of Nations. As will be 
seen, Wilson’s pronouncements on this point were not always consistent. At any 
event, by making the establishment of democratic institutions by the Germans a 
pre-condition for their admission into the new international order, Wilson clearly 
deviated from the peace programme he had presented in the United States before 
America entered the war. Once America was in the war, however, the president 
made absolutely clear which states he regarded as undemocratic and law-breaking 
– naturally the Central Powers, above all Germany, who had deceived the United 
States before the war and was now ruled, in Wilson’s view, by a warmongering 
autocracy that was pursuing its imperialistic expansionist aims regardless of the 
opinions of its subjects. This autocracy and its supporters must be removed by 
the war. This was, for Wilson, the foremost palpable objective of America’s partic-
ipation in the war against the Central Powers: from the start he made a distinction 
between the inherently peaceful masses on the enemy side and their autocratic 
rulers. The latter were to be discredited, both militarily and in terms of propagan-
da, and driven from power. At bottom, so he claimed, America was also fighting 
for the cause of the innocent and oppressed German people. Once the masses had 
come to power in the enemy states, therefore, he believed, the hour for reconcilia-
tion between friend and foe would have struck.14 Then, and only then, would the 
way be clear for the creation of a lasting international order that would guarantee 
peace and justice, the blessings of which were also to extend to a Germany freed 
from its autocrats.15
This may all sound somewhat naive; but Wilson was in deadly earnest about it. 
In fact, it secured for him a place in a long tradition in the making of American 
14 Wilson, Address, 2. 4. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, pp. 523 f.; Wil-
son, Address, Flag Day, 14. 6. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, pp. 500 f., 
p. 503. Already in the decisive Cabinet meeting of 20 March 1917, in which Wilson asked his ca-
binet for their opinions about a possible declaration of war on Germany, Secretary of State Ro-
bert Lansing urged that Wilson should stress the autocratic nature of the German Empire as a 
justification for declaring war on it: “I felt strongly that to go to war solely because American 
ships had been sunk [...] would cause debate, and that the sound basis was the duty of this and 
every other democratic nation to suppress an autocratic government like the German because of 
its atrocious character and because it was a menace to the national safety of this country and all 
other countries with liberal systems of government. Such an arraignment would appeal to every 
liberty loving man the world over”; cited in: Robert Lansing, Memorandum, 20. 3. 1917. In: Link 
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15 See i.e. Wilson, War Message to Congress, 2. 4. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
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foreign policy: the tradition of “regime change”, that in contrast to Old World no-
tions of sovereignty permeated Wilson’s programme, both as a political-psycho-
logical tool and as a war aim. It is a goal that can be observed– witness Iraq, Libya 
and Syria – in the conduct of American foreign policy up to the present-day.16 
Here the key question is one, as it was for Wilson and has remained ever since, of 
how regime change can be achieved. Openly stirring up a revolution within the 
enemy country was considered to be “politically incorrect” (as we should say to-
day), as Wilson’s closest adviser, Colonel E. House, admitted.17 Yet House himself 
was advising his president at the same time “to break down the German Govern-
ment by building a fire ‘back of it within Germany’”. The president, he added, 
“agreed to incorporate the thought that the United States would not be willing to 
join a league of peace with an autocracy as a member”.18 “Incitement” (or Auf-
wiegelung, as it was termed in contemporary German documents) or “subversion” 
(Zersetzung as it was later called under Hitler) of the enemy’s political structures, 
16 In the wake of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 the topic of regime-change has been the 
subject of a number of individual studies, none of which, however, mentions Wilson; see: Binoy 
Kampmark: No Peace with the Hohenzollerns. American Attitudes on Political Legitimacy to-
wards Hohenzollern Germany. In: Diplomatic History 34 (2010) 5, pp. 769–791, here: pp. 776 f.; 
Robert S. Litwak: Regime Change. Baltimore 2007; Stephen Kinzer: Overthrow. America’s Cen-
tury of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. New York 2006; more recently: John A. Thomp-
son: War Aims. 1917 to November 11, 1918. In: Ross A. Kennedy (ed.): A Companion to Wood-
row Wilson. Chichester 2013, pp. 367–385, here: p. 378, p. 381; for the Latin-American back-
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2004, pp. 52 ff., p. 58, p. 64, esp. p. 54: “The paradox of dictating democracy”.
17 Referring to the drafting of Wilson’s address to Congress, which demanded a declaration of 
war on Germany (2 April 1917), House noted in his diary: “The President read the address to me 
and I suggested his eliminating a phrase which read something like this: ‘until the German people 
have a government we can trust’. He was doubtful about this part of the sentence and I had no 
difficulty in persuading him to eliminate it. It looked too much like inciting revolution” (Italics 
Klaus Schwabe), cited in: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, p. 528. For Wilson’s view 
see: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 197, p. 536; recently: Daniel Larsen: Aban-
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18 Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 41, p. 498. For this see also the correspondence 
between House and Wilson on 30. 5. and 1. 6. 1917 respectively. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see 
note 2) vol. 41, p. 425, p. 433. House in his letter predicted that military set-backs would foster 
liberal currents in Germany: “If […] military reverses come, the Kaiser and his ministers will lean 
towards the liberals and give Germany a government responsive to the people. In the meantime, 
they will give no terms because they hope to hold what they have seized, and if their intentions 
were known, there would be near revolution in Germany because a majority of the people want 
peace even if it should be without conquest.” In a letter to the president he “cautioned” “against 
mentioning him [the Kaiser]. He is nearly as unimportant as the Tsar was before he was de-
throned – both merely representatives of systems. It will vastly accelerate liberalism in Germany to 
ignore the Kaiser, and let the German people work out their own details.” Meanwhile he – Wil-
son – should not discourage the consideration of Allied material war aims. See: House to Wilson, 
5. 6. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, p. 456. In another letter House had 
urged that “Imperial Germany should be broken down within as well as from without”; see: 
House to Wilson, 30. 7. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, p. 425.
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was, therefore, one of Wilson’s chief war aims and at the same time an instrument 
for winning the war – but still an aim which Wilson and those around him shrank 
from calling by its name.19 Instead, Wilson resorted to euphemisms, taking into 
consideration political developments inside the German Empire: on 14 June 1917, 
for example, he declared that in the event of the military defeat of the “masters” of 
Germany and the breakdown of their prestige, the German people would “thrust 
them aside”. A government responsible to the people would then be “set up” 
which would be able to join the world-wide union for peace.20
In his Fourteen Points speech of 8 January 1918, his most detailed pronounce-
ment regarding America’s war aims, as we will see, president Wilson declared that 
he would recognise the left-wing majority in the Reichstag that had voted for a 
peace resolution in July 1917 as a legitimate partner for negotiations – which 
would have amounted to the transformation of the German Empire into a Brit-
ish-style parliamentary monarchy or at least to far reaching changes in the per-
sonnel and policies of the German ruling elite.21 Finally, at the end of Septem-
ber 1918 the president reminded “the German people” yet again that America 
could not rely on the word of the German government and, therefore, could not 
consider reaching an understanding with it.22
The Fourteen Points
Concerning the material and territorial terms that would constitute a lasting peace 
Wilson initially denied that the United States was pursuing any “selfish” designs 
whatever.23 At a time when the U.S. was not yet a belligerent he had also given to 
understand that his government was prepared to discuss peace terms. By that he 
meant the war aims of the two war faring coalitions – aims he wanted to sort out 
and evaluate in order to prepare the material ground for a “just” peace meaning a 
19 Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
p. 539; see: Mezes: Inquiry Memorandum, 4. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 45, p. 467. I do not share Ross Kennedy’s view that Wilson was seeking a change of regime in 
Germany rather after a German defeat. For Wilson, regime change in Germany was just as much 
a political instrument designed immediately to accelerate an Allied victory as a long-term precon-
dition for getting rid of the autocracy in Prussia; see: Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson (see note 5), 
p. 16; see also note 17.
20 Wilson, Address, 14. 6. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, p. 502.
21 Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918, and 11. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see 
note 2), vol. 45, pp. 534 f., p. 539; Wilson, Address, 11. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see 
note 2), vol. 46, pp. 320 f.; John Milton Cooper: Woodrow Wilson. A Biography. New York 2009, 
p. 423, largely glosses over this aspect.
22 Wilson, Address, 27. 9. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 51, pp. 129 f. In 
speaking to the diplomatic corps on America’s Independence Day Wilson had declared that the 
autocrats of Central Europe were afraid of their subjects; Wilson, Address, 4. 7. 1918. In: Link et 
al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 48, p. 516.
23 I.e. Wiseman, Memorandum, 23. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, 
p. 88.
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peace of mutual understanding and accommodation inspired by the principles of 
his international-legal programme. During America’s neutrality he had only come 
out in favour of war aims that presumably were uncontroversial between both 
sides. He was prepared, though, to commit himself to creating the material and 
legal preconditions for a “just peace”, i.e. a peace based on compromise and un-
derstanding. Hence, in a speech of 22 January 1917 to Congress outlining his pro-
gramme he called on the belligerent parties to conclude a “peace without victory”, 
i.e. not a peace “forced upon the loser”, in which no peoples would be “handed 
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property”. In his view, that in-
cluded, especially, a free Poland with access to the sea, such as both the Central 
and the Western Powers had agreed to.24
Once America became a belligerent, Wilson’s war aims were determined increas-
ingly by the general evolution of the military and political situation. Initially the 
United States were fighting alongside the Triple Entente, which was pursuing 
far-reaching aims in Europe and even more in the Near East. These were in many 
respects imperialist objectives, which they could only hope to impose on the de-
feated Central Powers after a total victory. They stood, therefore, in diametrical 
opposition to Wilson’s concerns regarding a peace of accommodation. Still, ac-
cording to traditional international law the United States as the new ally of the 
Western Powers and Russia, was obliged to subscribe to their war aims. This was 
also what the British were hoping for when they sent their foreign secretary Ar-
thur J. Balfour in late April 1917 – i.e. less than three weeks after America’s enter-
ing the war – to Washington for talks about their shared war aims and, generally, 
the requirements of coalition warfare. These discussions alerted the president to 
the vast extent of the war aims of his new comrades in arms. Balfour informed him 
that not only Belgium, Serbia and France were to be “restored” (with France re-
covering Alsace-Lorraine), but also the new Poland was to be given access to the 
Baltic in the German speaking area of Danzig. The Habsburg Monarchy was to be 
reduced to its core territories of German Austria proper, Bohemia and Hungary, 
with the Adriatic coast being left to Italy. Finally Turkey (with which the United 
States were not even at war) was to be divided among the victorious powers and 
would suffer, as Balfour put it, “virtual destruction”. At the express request of the 
Wilson administration the texts of all the secret agreements between the Entente 
Powers dealing with territorial changes after the defeat of Germany were forward-
ed to the president.25 After taking note of the terms of these treaties Wilson arrived 
24 Wilson, Address, 22. 1. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 40, pp. 536 f.
25 Balfour to Wilson, 18. 5. 1917, enclosure. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, 
p. 332. After the Paris Peace Conference Wilson denied having had knowledge of these secret agree-
ments. The question whether this was true or not has triggered a lengthy scholarly controversy. 
Since Balfour’s negotiations in Washington in April–May 1917 have become known, historians, 
however, are agreed that Wilson, except for agreements with Japan, must at least have been aware 
of the broad outlines of the Allied war aims. See: House, Diary, 28., 30. 4. 1917. In: Link et al.: 
Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, pp. 155 f., p. 157, p. 172; Balfour to Wilson, 18. 5. 1917. In: 
Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, pp. 327 f., with attachment: Extract from the Pro-
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at the conclusion that “England and France have not the same views with regard to 
peace that we have by any means”. “When the war is over”, he said, “we can force 
them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will, among other things, 
be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them now, and any attempt to 
speak for them or to speak our common mind would bring on disagreements 
which would inevitably come to the surface in public […]. Our real peace terms, – 
those upon which we shall undoubtedly insist, – are not now acceptable to either 
France or Italy (leaving Great Britain for the moment out of consideration).” 26 In 
other words: while the war lasted, he felt it would be impossible to press the En-
tente Powers to adopt the American war aims programme without endangering 
the consensus within the Alliance fighting Germany. Only when the war was over, 
he decided, could America think using its clout by exploiting the financial depen-
dence of the Western European Powers on the United States. For the time being 
Wilson publicly voiced his reservations vis-à-vis the Allies’ war aims only by im-
plication. He wished to see the United States defined only as an “Associated Pow-
er” and not as an Ally of the Entente powers. Beyond that he refrained from pub-
licly committing himself to any specific war aims. Confidentially, he told Balfour 
that America did not feel bound by the Allied treaties.27
Much to the surprise of his contemporaries on 8 January 1918 Wilson pro-
claimed America’s complete war aims programme in his historic Fourteen Points 
message. What was behind his sudden change of mind? For the immediate occa-
sion one has to turn to conversations that were held in Paris at the end of 1917 
with Edward House, Wilson’s most intimate adviser, as the American representa-
tive. In these parleys House urged the Entente governments to commit themselves 
publicly to war aims that were compatible with the American programme. To no 
avail! The French and British governments refused to comply. Far more important 
for Wilson, however, was another event – the great change that had taken place in 
Eastern Europe with the Bolshevik October Revolution; for Lenin, the new Bol-
shevik leader, offered the belligerents an immediate ceasefire and called for open 
negotiations for a peace without annexations and indemnities – a platform which 
was, as it seemed, quite similar to Wilson’s idea of a “peace without victory”. Lenin 
also demanded that the right to self-determination should be implemented world-
wide, including the Third World. Finally, the new Bolshevik leader set the seal on 
his break with Europe’s imperialist past, by publishing the secret treaties conclud-
tocol of a Discussion of War Aims between the Imperial War Cabinet and Representatives of the 
Empire, 22. 3. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, pp. 329–342. See also p. 333 
of the protocol, which mentions an agreement for a cession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to 
Serbia and of Transylvania to Romania. Cf. also: Cooper: Woodrow Wilson (see note 21), p. 396; 
Thompson: War Aims (see note 16), p. 375.
26 Wilson to House, 21. 7. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 43, pp. 237 f.
27 Cited in: Knock: End (see note 7), pp. 138 f.; see: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 43, 
p. 238; Esposito: Legacy (see note 1), p. 107; see: Wilson to House, 15. 6. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wil-
son Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, p. 521. Allied treaties: Spring Rice to Lloyd George, 26. 4. 1917. 
In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, p. 140.
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ed between Tsarist Russia and the Anglo-French Entente over their common an-
nexationist aims, and by challenging the Entente statesmen to follow his example.28 
The Central Powers, in contrast to the Western Powers, reacted by declaring them-
selves ready to negotiate with the new Bolshevik regime on the basis of its pro-
gramme. As the result, on 22 December 1917 a peace conference duly assembled in 
Brest-Litovsk without participation of the Western powers.29
For Germany’s opponents this chain of events was nothing short of catastroph-
ic. Russia disappeared as an ally, the Central Powers had their backs free and cre-
ated the impression of favouring an early peace of compromise. This course of 
events dealt a devastating blow to the domestic morale in Great Britain and 
France: the Entente suffered its worst internal crisis of confidence since the start 
of the war, worsened by the public impact of its military defeats in Italy. At home, 
the Left, above all the Labour parties, were deeply impressed by the Bolshevik 
peace offer, and the broad masses, often socialist-inspired, both at home and at the 
front, began to question the purpose of the sacrifices their governments were de-
manding of them. In their despair they looked to the American president as the 
sole guide to a progressive “new diplomacy” and a lasting peace imbued with 
non-imperialist principles, above all, with the right to self-determination.30
In this crisis of confidence Wilson saw a singular opportunity – the opportunity 
for him to use his public response to the Bolshevik peace offer to commit the 
world to his own peace programme, and to claim for the United States global 
leadership in the war aims debate. The Western European Powers, hard pressed as 
they were, would, he expected, not dare to criticise his declaration. The German 
people, on the other hand, were to be persuaded that they had nothing to fear 
from their adversaries, as the Western powers pursued but moderate war aims not 
destroying their empire, and thus would be encouraged to resist to the plans of its 
annexationist rulers. The result, Wilson and his advisers hoped, would be a crisis 
of confidence within the Imperial Germany. To Wilson his intended declaration 
also presented the chance to denounce the peace terms Germany confronted the 
Bolsheviks with and, simultaneously, to distance himself from the Entente’s impe-
rialist designs. All this promised to stiffen the moral will-power of the Entente 
nations to fight on. Apparently, the president even harboured the illusion to be 
able to turn the tide in Russia. His message, he hoped, would help the Anti-Bol-
shevik forces to gain the upper hand in the evolving civil war in that war-torn 
country thus preparing Russia’s re-entry in the war against the Central Powers.31
28 Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), p. 260, pp. 262 f., pp. 264 f., pp. 296 f., pp. 306 f.
29 Wilson was informed about the “peace maneuver [sic]“ of the German government by Hugh 
Wilson, the American Minister in Switzerland: Hugh Robert Wilson to Robert Lansing, 
28. 12. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 384–387.
30 Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), p. 306, p. 311, pp. 314 ff.
31 According to the British ambassador in the U.S. Wilson told him that “he himself with the full 
consent of the American people and their express approval [sic!] had made an appeal to the Ger-
man people behind the back of the German government. The Bolsheviki in Russia were now adopt-
ing the same policy. They had issued an appeal to all the nations of the world, to the peoples and 
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At the end of 1917, immediately after House’s return from his abortive mission 
to Paris, the president made up his mind to respond to both the Bolshevik and the 
German challenges. To take that step he also had been encouraged by American 
representatives in Russia. With regard to controversial war aims he had received 
expert advice from a high level progressively inclined advisory group, called the 
“Inquiry”, of which the later famous Walter Lippmann was a member.32 On 
8 January 1918, finally, he appeared before the joint Congress to deliver his cru-
cial Fourteen Points address.33 That speech was expressly directed against the 
“imperialists”. Differently from his earlier pronouncements it encompassed not 
only general principles, but contained also specific material and territorial propo-
sitions. Some of its general points have already been mentioned: the establishment 
of a League of Nations (Point 14); public access to foreign policy (Point 1: “Open 
covenants of peace openly arrived at“ – this appeal borrowed from the Bolshe-
viks); the freedom of the seas (Point 2) and the lowering of trade barriers (Point 3). 
For Wilson these were the “essentially American” points, as he was to emphasise 
a few months later during the armistice negotiations.34 Added to this he demand-
ed general disarmament (Point 4).
In concrete terms the president insisted on the re-establishment of an indepen-
dent Belgium (for him a “must”, Point 7); the “restoration” of those areas in Bel-
gium and Northern France that had suffered destruction by the war; and the 
“righting” of the “wrong done do France by in 1871”, in plain terms: the return 
of Alsace-Lorraine to France (Point 8); free access to the sea for a newly indepen-
dent Poland and for Serbia (Points 11 and 13). In Point 5 he urged the colonial 
Powers to “adjust” their “colonial claims”, giving “equal weight” to the “interests 
of the [native] populations concerned“. Finally (Point 6), foreign troops were to 
leave Russia, which was to be welcomed as an internally and externally indepen-
not to the governments […]. There was evidence at hand that certainly in Italy and probably also 
in England and France the appeal had not been without its affect [sic]. In the United States active 
agitation was proceeding […]. If the appeal of the Bolsheviki was allowed to remain unan swered, 
if nothing were done to counteract it, the effect would be great and would increase”; see: Spring-
Rice to Balfour, 4. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 456. Two weeks 
later Wilson in a confidential conversation called the “conduct” of the Bolsheviki in “publishing 
the secret treaties” “outrageous”; see: Wiseman, Memorandum, 23. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson 
Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 88; House, Diary, 30. 12. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see 
note 2), vol. 45, p. 400; David Rowland Francis to Lansing, 31. 12. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson 
Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, pp. 411 ff.; Lansing to Wilson, 2. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers 
(see note 2), vol. 45, pp. 427 ff.; Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), pp. 330 ff., pp. 352 f.
32 Derek Heater: National Self-Determination. Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy. New York 
1994, pp. 36 ff.; House, Diary, 18. 12. 1917, 30. 12. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 45, p. 323, p. 400; Spring-Rice to Balfour, 4. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 45, p. 458; House to Balfour, 5. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
p. 486; see also: Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), pp. 338 f.
33 Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
pp. 534 ff. An explanatory comment is to be found in: Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), 
pp. 353 ff.
34 See Bullitt Lowry: Armistice 1918. Kent 1996, p. 125.
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dent nation into the community of free nations – a deliberately vague formulation 
that avoided any form of recognition of the Bolshevik regime while remaining 
perfectly friendly in tone, in order, as House put it, to “segregate” Russia from 
Germany, i.e. to win, if possible, all of Russia back to the Western alliance.35
There was much in this declaration that was remarkable and pointed the way 
ahead to Wilson’s war aims policy of the following months: in the first place, it 
was clearly aiming at a reduction of Germany’s power potential. It was that aspect 
that probably lay behind Wilson’s support, after initial doubts, for France’s desire 
to recover Alsace-Lorraine from Germany.36 The same may have been true of 
Wilson’s demand that Germany “restore” the war-damaged areas of Belgium and 
France. At the same time, he was keeping his options open: on the one hand, he 
avoided the term “contributions”, denounced as “imperialist” by the Bolsheviks, 
thereby implying the expectation that the reparation demands of the victorious 
Powers on Germany would be kept within bounds. On the other hand, he had 
already spoken in public about German “reparations” for the misdeeds of her rul-
ers, and thus provided a moral basis for the victors to make far-reaching demands 
for German reparations.37
The president also avoided literally committing himself to the Bolsheviks’ call 
for the self-determination of peoples, choosing to speak instead of “autonomy”. 
He did this for several reasons. On the one hand, he had reservations regarding 
that concept in principle – to him a disruptive precept leading, when applied, to a 
never ending atomisation of the existing states.38 In practical terms, he had no de-
sire to see Russia as a historically grown nation-state dismembered, regardless of 
the demand of the Central Powers to grant self-determination to the none-Rus-
sian nationalities within the former Tsarist Empire. Above all, however, he was 
motivated by prospects of a separate peace with the Habsburg Monarchy, which 
had just put out feelers to this end. Demanding national independence for the na-
tionalities of the Dual Monarchy would of course have once and for all killed 
such chances. But even with respect to the Ottoman Empire, Wilson spoke only 
35 “To segregate”: House in a conversation with Wilson; House, Diary, 9. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: 
Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 553.
36 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), pp. 133 f.
37 Ibid., p. 137; Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson (see note 5), p. 18. Wilson’s attitude regarding repa-
rations had been earlier transmitted by Balfour; see Balfour to Cecil, 23. 5. 1917. In: Link et al.: 
Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, p. 385. According to Balfour, Wilson in commenting on paci-
fist pronouncements against the transfer of territory and indemnities declared that the latter was 
“by no means his view. For example he would like to restore Poland & Alsace Lorraine, and to 
exact compensation for Belgium & Northern France”.
38 In a confidential talk, Wilson conceded that “in point of logic, of pure logic, this principle 
which was good in itself would lead to the complete independence of various small nationalities 
now forming part of various Empires. Pushed to the extreme the principle would mean the dis-
ruption of existing governments to an un-definable extent. Logic was good [...] but apart from 
existing circumstances might well lead to dangerous results.”; Spring-Rice to Balfour, 4. 1. 1918. 
In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 456; Heater: National Self-Determination 
(see note 32), pp. 43 f.
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of the “absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” of the 
nationalities inhabiting it (Point 12). He did not mention the pronouncement of 
the British Foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour of November 1917 in favour of a 
national home for Zionist Jews, and it was only in August 1918 that he expressed 
his moral support of the aims of the “Balfour Declaration”. At the same time, he 
admonished Italy and the South Slavs – to the great annoyance of both the gov-
ernment in Rome and the representatives of the South Slavs – to see to it that their 
frontiers were “adjusted” “along clearly recognizable lines of nationality” regard-
ing Italy (Point 9) or “along historically established lines of allegiance and nation-
ality” regarding the Balkans (Point 11).39 The contrast with the war aims of the 
European “Associates” was apparent. Even so, the Entente governments, for fear 
of left-wing public protest, did not risk exposing Wilson’s speech and the Four-
teen Points to open criticism, but preferred to limit their comments to vacuous 
praise of the president.40
Then on 11 February 1918, in another speech to Congress, Wilson changed the 
framework of his war aims concept, now expressly endorsing the self-determina-
tion of peoples as an American war aim.41 This was the result of tactical consider-
ations. On the one hand, he may have been moved by a renewed vague hope that 
a call for self-determination might win over the peoples, and, by indirect pressure, 
the new government of Russia to the cause of the Western Powers. Even more 
important to him, however, was the news that was coming out of the German 
Empire. There, in late January 1918, workers’ strikes had broken out, an event 
that gave reason to hope for a regime change in Berlin. Well-informed observers 
in Wilson’s entourage were even talking of an impending revolution in the Central 
Powers.42 Significantly, the implementation of the peoples’ right to self-determi-
39 Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 554 and vol. 46, pp. 86 f., pp. 96 f. Wilson qua-
lified his praise for the Zionist aspirations by reserving the need, “that nothing would be done to 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish people of Palestine”; Wilson to Wise, 
31. 8. 1918. In: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 49, p. 403. For the importance of history as a na-
tion forming factor in Wilsons’s eyes cf. Lloyd E. Ambrosius: Dilemmas of National Self-Deter-
mination. Woodrow Wilson’s Legacy. In: Lloyd E. Ambrosius: Wilsonianism. Woodrow Wilson 
and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York 2002, p. 127, p. 130.
40 Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), p. 384; Drummond to Spring-Rice, 12. 1. 1918. In: Link 
et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, pp. 577 f.; Memorandum Wiseman, 23. 1. 1918. In: Link 
et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, pp. 86 f.
41 Wilson said: “National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and 
governed only by their own consent. ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative 
principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril”; Wilson, Address, 
11. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 321; see: Betty Unterberger: The 
United States, Revolutionary Russia and the Rise of Czechoslovakia. Chapel Hill 1989, pp. 88 ff., 
p. 105; Klaus Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson. Revolutionary Germany and Peacemaking. Missionary 
Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Chapel Hill 1985, pp. 18 f.; Michla Pomerance: The United 
States and Self-Determination. Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception. In: American Journal 
of International Law 70 (1976), pp. 1–27, here: pp. 2 f.
42 “These risings of the proletariat in Berlin and Vienna [...] are the final proof that the war has 
entered the era in which it is no longer a war of rival States, but a world-wide social and political 
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nation figured prominently among the demands of the German Socialists.43 Wil-
son was anxious to take up this call, so that the German Left might recognise in it 
its own programme and stiffen its opposition to the military party.44 In view of 
the Vienna government’s peace feelers Wilson’s speech of 11 February had been 
especially moderate in tone, while in regard to Germany it stressed the gulf that 
divided the Left from the “small” military and annexationist party as well as from 
the German government, whose war aims it castigated as dishonest.45
In the course of the summer of 1918 Wilson substantially altered the terms of 
his material peace proposals. On 27 June he announced that the United States 
government supported the liberation of all branches of the Slav “race” – by which 
he meant above all the South Slavs, Czechs and Slovaks – from German and Aus-
trian rule. This reflected, on the one hand, the failure of all the Austro-American 
soundings for a separate peace, and on the other the desire to win over the former 
Czech prisoners of war fighting in the Russian civil war to participate in the war 
effort of the Western Powers. Wilson took this position, although he harboured 
some doubts whether these new multinational entities in the long run could be 
held together.46 On 2 September 1918 the American government once more dis-
carding all ideas of a separate peace with Vienna recognised the Czech National 
Council in Paris as the provisional government of a Czechoslovakian state. In 
revolution. The President can lead that revolution [...]. The Liberals and Socialists in Germany 
and Austria [...] are prepared to follow the President into a new world of international order and 
social justice”; quoted from: W. Bullitt, Memorandum, 31. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers 
(see note 2), vol. 46, pp. 184 f.; see also: W. Bullitt, Memorandum, 3. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson 
Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 229; Hugh Wilson to Lansing, 5. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Pa-
pers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 253. In his speech Wilson again denied intending a regime change: 
“The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European 
territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of an internal weakness or disorder to 
impose her own will upon another people.” Wilson, Address, 11. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson 
Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, p. 321.
43 W. Bullitt, Memorandum, 31. 1 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 185; 
W. Bullitt, Memorandum, 3. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 227.
44 With his appeal to the Left in Germany Wilson was also seeking to distance himself from the 
violently propagandist response of the Entente to Berlin’s and Vienna’s replies to the Fourteen 
Points; House to Wilson, 3. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 221; W. 
Bullitt, Memorandum, 3. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 227, p. 229; 
Wilson to Lansing, 4. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 233.
45 Wilson expressed regret that the “military and annexationist party” in Germany, due to “tragi-
cal circumstance” was “able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world 
now sees to be just”; Wilson, Address, 11. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 47, p. 323; see also: House, Diary, 10. 2. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 46, p. 317; Lansing to Wilson, 27. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, 
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Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 48, p. 435, p. 437, p. 464, note 2. Wilson was also aware 
of Italian reservations regarding the borders of a future Yugoslav federation, which like Czecho-
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mid-September and again four weeks afterwards there followed Wilson’s refusals 
to consider peace parleys with the Habsburg Empire, regardless how its structure 
was to be transformed. This meant that he disqualified the Vienna government 
from representing the interests of the Slav areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
let alone from conducting peace negotiations in the name of the Monarchy as a 
whole. In early October he reaffirmed his resolution that the Dual Monarchy had 
to be broken up because of America’s commitment to its “suppressed nationalities”. 
Personally for the president, this obligation had developed deep emotional roots.47
What also changed was the background against which he put forward his peace 
programme. In the first months of the war he had based his condemnation of the 
German military party on its imperialist designs for a German Empire stretching 
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf with tentacles reaching as far as India. In the 
spring and summer of 1918, under the impression of the occupation by German 
troops of large parts of Western Russia, he warned of the political dangers that 
would arise from German control of Eastern Europe and Russia.48 An additional 
condition for Wilson’s negotiating with Germany was, therefore, an assurance 
that the Germans would withdraw from all territory they had conquered in Rus-
sia. Here, Wilson was conjuring up a spectre that was to haunt America’s German 
policy well into the rest of the twentieth century – the nightmare of a combination 
of Russia’s gigantic resources and German technical know-how – a nightmare for 
which rumours according to which the Bolsheviks were German hired agents 
provided further nourishment.49
As it turned out, Wilson’s hopes of bringing the German Empire by political 
pressure to sue for peace, be it by concluding a separate peace with the Dual Mon-
archy or be it by stirring up the German Left, remained unfulfilled. On the Ger-
man Left, the president’s speech of 11 February had not made the impression he 
had hoped for. On the contrary, after the Central Powers concluded what was re-
garded as the draconian peace of Brest-Litovsk with Russia on 3 March 1918, the 
Social Democrats in the Reichstag did not vote against it, but only abstained. Soon 
afterwards the Germans launched their great initially successful spring offensive on 
the Western front. Wilson, in this situation, did in no way resign. On the contrary, 
there could be no longer a question of his showing any kind of moderation to-
wards the German enemy that could easily have been interpreted as weakness.
Instead, Wilson did all he could to preserve the moral resolution of his associ-
ates to carry on the war until its successful conclusion. On 6 April 1918, in what 
was a highly critical military situation for the Western powers, he concluded a 
47 Unterberger: United States (see note 41), pp. 315 f.; Heater: National Self-Determination (see 
note 32), p. 52.
48 Wilson, Flag Day Address, 14. 6. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 42, 
p. 501; Wilson, Address, 6. 4. 1918, 18. 5. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, 
pp. 269 f. and vol. 47, p. 54.
49 Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson (see note 41), p. 26, p. 46, p. 119; Klaus Schwabe: Weltmacht und 
Weltordnung. Amerikanische Außenpolitik von 1898 bis zur Gegenwart. Paderborn 2011, p. 64, 
p. 68, p. 415.
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speech, which endorsed a third “Liberty Loan”, by appealing to the Western 
powers to use “Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righ-
teous and triumphant Force which will make Right the law of the world and cast 
every selfish dominion down in the dust”. In this speech as well as others he still 
continued to distinguish between the German people, for whom he claimed to 
seek justice, and the military leaders of the empire who despised his ideals and 
whom he wanted to see stripped of their power.50
War Aims and Strategy
Our analysis thus has reached its third question: was Wilson’s programme intend-
ed to be, and was it in actuality, an appropriate way of accelerating the end of the 
war on the basis of a stalemate, or did its realisation depend on the Western Pow-
ers’ achieving total victory? From a German point of view, the difference was one 
between a negotiated peace of compromise, and a peace imposed by the victors. 
Wilson’s own pronouncements on these alternatives are somewhat ambivalent. He 
always claimed that his ultimate long term objective was a peace based on recon-
ciliation that the Germans too would recognise as just. In this respect, he hoped 
that the war aims laid down in the Fourteen Points would be indeed acceptable to 
the Germans.51 He constantly emphasised that he did not wish to infringe on 
Germany’s position as one great power among others.52 In this connection Wilson 
raised a question that could be regarded as a litmus test for his intentions in deal-
ing with Germany – the question of whether Germany was to be admitted as a 
member, of equal rights, of the League of Nations once peace was made. Taking a 
stand in this question the president could reveal how serious he was about his vi-
sion of an early all-embracing non-discriminatory peace. Wilson’s view regarding 
a German membership of the League of Nations would also determine the chanc-
es for negotiating with pacifically inclined moderate elements in Germany for a 
peace that renounced total victory. Unfortunately, once again Wilson’s pro-
nouncements on this issue were contradictory and understandably reflected his 
view of the military situation. In principle, the president conceived of his League 
of Nations as a world-wide organisation, not simply a continuation of the war-
time alliances, with a democratic Germany as one of its initial members.53 In fact, 
50 Wilson, Address, 6. 4. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, pp. 268–270.
51 Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
p. 538; Wilson, Address, 27. 9. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 51, pp. 129 f.; 
recently: Kennedy: Will (see note 5), p. 139, p. 153.
52 I.e. Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
p. 538. Alongside these conciliatory statements, however, stand his repeated declarations of his de-
termination to end the war with a “decisive victory”. See note 66 and Kennedy: Will (see note 5), 
pp. 137–139; Wilson, Address, 6. 4. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, p. 270.
53 See Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 45, pp. 538 f.; see also: Wilson, Annual Message to Congress, 4. 12. 1917. In: Link et al.: Wil-
son Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, p. 198; Kennedy: Woodrow Wilson (see note 5), p. 16, p. 19.
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Wilson gave to understand that a German regime that had freed itself from its 
military autocrats and that genuinely represented the wishes of the German peo-
ple did have a claim to membership of the world organisation. To be sure, the 
world had to see to it that such a Germany would continue to display a peaceful 
and democratic attitude.54
In the spring of 1918 two events brought Wilson to modify his position on this: 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the initial success of the German spring offensive 
on the Western front. Both demonstrated to Wilson that the Germans remained 
more inclined to stand by their military rulers than he had assumed.55 From this, 
he drew several conclusions: in the first place, as we have seen, he urged that the 
Western Powers must intensify their military efforts in order to convince the Ger-
mans of the hopelessness of the war their military was waging.56 Only then would 
an appeal to the German democrats to overthrow their military leaders have any 
chance whatever of success.57 As an alternative Wilson had to get used to the idea 
that his psychological-tactical calculations aiming at an overthrow of the German 
“autocracy” might miscarry and that at the end of the war the Western victors 
would after all have to deal with the traditional ruling German elites.58 Secondly, 
banking on the military defeat by the Western powers of an unreformed Germa-
ny, he made a curious about-turn over the question of Germany’s League mem-
bership: for the time being, i.e. until the outbreak of the November revolution he 
dropped his “democratic pre-condition” for a German seat, and recommended a 
defeated Germany’s admission without reservations. That way the League would 
become, as regards Germany, exactly what Wilson had always intended – an inter-
national body supervising the peaceful behaviour of its members and internation-
ally guaranteeing their integrity.59 According to Wilson, while this position im-
plied a “decisive” military victory,60 it also confirmed the continued existence of 
the German Empire, whether reformed or not: the destruction of the German na-
54 Wiseman to Reading, 16. 8. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 49, p. 273. For 
the following see also: Klaus Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson and Germany’s Membership in the 
League of Nations, 1918–1919. In: Central European History 8 (1975), pp. 3–10.
55 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), pp. 136 ff.; cf. Wiseman to Foreign Office, 28. 2. 1918. In: Link et 
al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, p. 184; Wilson, Remarks to Foreign Correspondents. In: 
Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, p. 288.
56 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), p. 139; Wiseman to Drummond, 30. 5. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson 
Papers (see note 2), vol. 48, p. 202.
57 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), pp. 138 f.; W. H. Taft, Memorandum, 14. 3. 1918. In: Link et al.: 
Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, p. 202.
58 Wiseman, Memorandum, 16. 8. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 49, p. 274; 
W. H. Taft, Memorandum, 14. 3. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 47, p. 202; 
Wiseman to Murray, 30. 8. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 49, p. 399; Wilson, 
Address, Metropolitan Opera House, 27. 9. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 49, p. 130.
59 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), p. 139; Wiseman to Murray, 14. 9. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Pa-
pers (see note 2), vol. 51, p. 8; Wilson, Address at Metropolitan Opera House, 27. 9. 1918. In: Link 
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tional state never was one of the president’s war aims.61 Of course, the Wilson’s 
modification of his view regarding Germany’s League membership was not 
known to the public at that time, and thus could not have exercised any influence 
in Germany. In German eyes the material peace programme he had enunciated 
demanded substantial sacrifices on Germany’s part. So he could not really be sur-
prised that the German Empire, whether democratic or not, would fail to discern 
a step towards reconciliation in a peace that would impose on it – for example 
with the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, not to speak of his further reaching de-
mands – a drastic reduction of its power?62
Actually, Wilson was only falling back on a train of thought that all the time 
had determined his attitude towards the empire – the idea that if the Germans 
“democrats” wished to be trustworthy negotiating partners for the coming peace 
congress, they had to be two things: both democratic pacifists, and, above all, mil-
itarily impotent.63 It never occurred to him just how German democrats who 
publicly acknowledged Germany’s total defeat and, thus, admitted the pointless-
ness of a four-years’ war effort, would survive domestically, nor was he able to 
imagine that the German concept of what was a just peace might differ from his 
own. All along, he clung to his aim of regime change both as a political device to 
weaken the enemy and as an alternative to total military victory throughout the 
months when the United States was engaged in the war, even if with the German 
victories in the spring campaign of 1918 that concept became for a short time a 
second choice.64 Simultaneously, he continued to hope for the substitution of the 
“military party” and the politicians attached to it (the Pan Germans, for example) 
by a government of German “democrats” – by which he meant primarily the 
German workers’ parties and the bourgeois Progressives. Such a change of regime 
promised to send to the peace negotiations trustworthy German representatives 
who would share his progressive political ideology. As to the form that such a 
change of regime would take – revolution, constitutional reform, or a change of 
ministers – Wilson never made his views clear.65 Nor did he really wish to, for a 
degree of uncertainty regarding his intentions promised to make his German op-
ponents feel more insecure and to promote the ultimate tactical objective behind 
his policy of regime change: the undermining of the Germans’ fighting morale 
and their will to hold out against all odds up to the bitter end.
Actually, to judge from remarks Wilson made to foreign journalists in 
April 1918, he was not even really clear in his own mind as to the nature and even 
61 Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, 8. 1. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 45, 
p. 538. “We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she 
is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants 
of justice and law and fair dealing” (Italics Klaus Schwabe); see: Kennedy: Will (see note 5), 
pp. 139 ff.; Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson (see note 41), pp. 27 f.
62 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), pp. 132 f., p. 153.
63 Kennedy: Will (see note 5), pp. 138 f.
64 Thompson: More Tactics (see note 1), pp. 109 f.
65 See Mayer: Wilson vs. Lenin (see note 12), p. 378.
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the desirability of a regime change in Germany. In response to a question that he 
had himself raised regarding the characteristics of a free government he cited Ed-
mund Burke: “‘A government which those living under it will guard’ [...] The 
fundamental and essential element of it [a free government]”, he continued, “is 
that the people like it and believe in it. The amazing thing to my mind is that a lot 
of German people that I know like the government they have been living under. It 
took me a long time to believe it; I thought they were bluffing. But I found some 
Germans whom I had to believe who really liked it and thought all nations ought 
to live under that kind of government. Now, there isn’t any one kind of govern-
ment under which all nations ought to live. There isn’t any one kind of govern-
ment which we have the right to impose upon on any nation. So that I am not 
fighting for democracy except for the peoples that want democracy. If they want 
it, I am ready to fight until they get it. If they don’t want it, that is none of my 
business.” In this issue he professed to follow the English Bill of Rights which 
accorded to every people the right “to make any government it pleases and change 
the government it makes in any way it pleases”.66 There can be no doubt that the 
realistic relativism Wilson at that occasion subscribed to in defining a self-deter-
mined democracy represents an unmistakable contradiction to the universal-
ist-idealist creed, which inspired his previous statements extolling the global hu-
man striving for democracy. There are two explanations for this discrepancy. On 
the one hand, his just quoted remarks mirrored his disillusionment about the ap-
parent unwillingness of the German people to espouse his ideal of western de-
mocracy; on the other, he revealed that his own concept of what, in the case of 
Germany, democracy and self-determination really would mean, was still some-
what hazy.67
In the following months, when the military situation of the Western Powers 
had improved, Wilson stood by his aims: no compromises with the military auto-
crats in Berlin, but their “destruction”, or at least their “reduction to virtual im-
potence”; a peace concluded on the basis of the right to self-determination; a 
peace-organisation in which the combined power of the free nations must stand 
up to all aggression. At the same time, he dismissed confidential peace feelers the 
Berlin government was extending to him. In his last speech a week before the 
German request for an armistice he repeated his conviction that for a peace to last 
there could be “no arrangement or compromise” and that “unity of council” was 
necessary until a “complete victory” was assured. The answer to question three 
raised at the beginning of this paper viz of whether Wilson, once America was in 
the war, ever considered peace negotiations with the German Empire on the basis 
of a military stalemate must therefore be a clear “No”. Hence, not unlike the West 
European Allies, and the right wing leaders of the German Empire, he both re-
jected and prevented what he regarded as a “premature” end of the war, and, as a 
66 Wilson, Remarks to Foreign Correspondents, 8. 4. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see 
note 2), vol. 47, p. 288.
67 See also Kampmark: No Peace (see note 16), p. 785.
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consequence, prolonged it. His major aims – a clear victory and a regime change 
within the enemy – called for no less.68
What was the impact of Wilson’s war aims programme on the military and na-
val strategy of the United States and the European Allies? In order to find an ade-
quate answer to our fourth question one must point out beforehand that Wilson, 
as an academic, was ill equipped to give advice regarding the military strategy and 
the war plans of the Allies. But he overcame this handicap; and it was largely due 
to him that America’s contribution to the victory of the Western Powers over 
Germany was in the end decisive. Immediately after the outbreak of war, he had 
decided upon a massive commitment of American land forces in France. He 
launched a comprehensive shipbuilding programme to counter the U-boat threat, 
introduced general conscription, and created the foundations for the army of two 
millions that in the autumn of 1918 brought victory for the Allied armies. Togeth-
er with his generals he managed to ensure that the American troops were not sim-
ply integrated into the French and British armies, only to be employed, when 
necessary, at critical places in the front. Instead, he insisted on the creation of an 
independent united American expeditionary force. This was for him not simply a 
question of national prestige, but one of Realpolitik , i.e. the political and material 
precondition for implementing his programme in the peace negotiations.69 More 
than that, he believed that America’s clout during the expected peace conference 
depended on the way he defined the desirable way to bring the war to an end by 
making the choice between the alternative of negotiating an armistice or forcing 
unconditional surrender on the German enemy. This issue gained highest rele-
vance at the moment the Berlin government took the decisive step of applying for 
an armistice. This article thus addresses its fifth and final question regarding the 
peace programme that Wilson took to Paris.
The Final Test: Armistice, War Aims, and Regime Change
On 3 October 1918 the German government under its new Chancellor Max von 
Baden had a note sent to the American government asking Wilson to “take in 
hand” the mediation of an armistice between the belligerents and the “establish-
ment of peace” on the basis of the Fourteen Points and the later war aims declara-
tions of the president.70 This demarche at a moment, when Germany’s military 
68 Wilson, Address, 4. 7. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 48, p. 516; Wilson, 
Address, 27. 9. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 51, p. 128, p. 132; Klaus 
Schwabe: Die amerikanische und die deutsche Geheimdiplomatie und das Problem eines Verstän-
digungsfriedens im Jahre 1918. In: VfZ 19 (1971), pp. 1–32.
69 Esposito: Legacy (see note 1), p. 98, p. 122, p. 124, p. 129, p. 137; Robert H. Ferrell: Woodrow 
Wilson and World War I, 1917–1921. New York 1985, pp. 37 ff., pp. 52 f., pp. 122 f.
70 German Note to U.S. government, 3. 10. 1918, cited in: Klaus Schwabe/Tilman Stieve/Albert 
Diegmann (eds.): Quellen zum Friedensschluß von Versailles (= Ausgewählte Quellen zur deut-
schen Geschichte der Neuzeit, vol. 30). Darmstadt 1997, p. 54.
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situation was becoming desperate, was a rather astute gambit that had been con-
ceived in the German Foreign Office, until general Ludendorff of the German 
high command gave order to execute it: it promised to avoid total defeat and to 
secure Germany a relatively favourable contractual basis for a future peace con-
ference as well as terms that would at least not be as severe as those of the Euro-
pean Allies. In the event, the fact that the actual terms of peace turned out not to 
correspond to the Fourteen Points meant that appeals to the latter were to lend 
additional credibility to German demands for the revision of the peace treaty.71
What the new leaders of Germany had not foreseen was Wilson’s ambivalence 
regarding the character of any kind of a German democracy, his deep seated dis-
trust of everything that was happening inside Germany, and his commitment to a 
decisive victory over the Central Powers. In view of the bellicose language the 
president resorted to in his speeches during most of 1918 one would have expect-
ed his outright rejection of the German request. While the Germans aimed at a 
cease-fire that spared them a total defeat, Wilson had insisted on the latter. (He 
had also refused to consider a similar Austrian proposal.) Above all, however, 
turning down the German initiative fitted perfectly into Wilson’s conception of 
reformed international politics – the transformation of diplomacy into global 
 domestic politics (Weltinnenpolitik). If this concept prevailed, as Wilson hoped it 
would, no longer would individual states, but only the League of Nations collec-
tively become the instance that was authorised by international law to monopo-
lise the use of force, in order to uphold peace anywhere in the world. If nonethe-
less individual nations resorted to arms to settle their conflicts by themselves, 
they would be violating the new international law, just as contending factions 
within a nation-state, which resorted to military force to settle their differences, 
violated the state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Gewaltmonopol), 
and the result was bound to be civil war. Now, if the League of Nations were to 
replace the nation-states as the sole instance entitled to use military means in or-
der to enforce peace, wars between individual states would acquire the nature of a 
civil war, and – as history shows – civil wars historically last long and in most 
cases are ended not by way of accommodation, but by the total military victory 
of one side. In fact, in civil wars – see Syria today – both parties tend to insist on 
an unconditional surrender of their opponent; because in a civil war the aims of 
warring parties are usually value-related and mutually exclusive (for instance the 
ideological base of a constitution). Again historical experience demonstrates that 
it is much more difficult to mediate between ideological objectives than between 
competing but negotiable material goals, and in the end, unconditional surrender 
usually proves to be the only way of ending a civil war. In terms of wars between 
states, this means that the enemy state is not only rendered militarily prostrate, 
but that its internal structure and even its political identity may be fundamentally 
71 Klaus Schwabe: Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden. Die amerikanische und deutsche 
Friedensstrategie zwischen Ideologie und Machtpolitik. Düsseldorf 1971, pp. 88 ff., see also: 
note 41.
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altered at the victors’ discretion. This problem had to be discussed at some length, 
in order to show what was at stake regarding Wilson’s policy in ending the war.72 
American history provided an example, which Wilson had witnessed as a young 
boy: the American Civil War, which culminated in the demand of the North that 
the South “surrender” “unconditionally”.73
Wilson, however, failed to adopt that “logic”: he did not ignore the German re-
quest, but decided to respond to it. He opened just a crack of the door that might 
lead to some compromise. He thus exposed himself to the public rebuke that he 
agreed to play the German game having not absolutely ruled out negotiations 
with Germany for an armistice, even though up to the end of October 1918 he 
could not be sure whether or not Germany was really beaten. Indeed, he express-
ly took issue with the vociferous demands for the enemy’s “unconditional surren-
der” coming from militant patriots at home such as former President Theodore 
Roosevelt, from the supreme commander of the American expeditionary force in 
France, General Pershing, or from Franklin D. Roosevelt who anticipated the po-
sition he would take in the Second World War.74 Spokesmen of the militant Right 
bluntly demanded that the order of the day was not diplomatic exchanges but a 
march to Berlin followed by Germany’s unconditional surrender.75 Wilson thus 
was face to face with the basic issue regarding the conclusion of the war – the al-
ternative: armistice versus surrender, accommodation versus submission. The in-
triguing question is: why did he not opt for unconditional surrender? Why did he 
ultimate agree to an armistice with a Germany that was still monarchic?76
The attempt to interpret the president’s conduct during the negotiations that 
led to the conclusion of an armistice poses a major challenge to the historian and 
requires a close re-examination of the essential core of Wilson’s war policy. First 
of all, one should take a closer look at the phrasing of Wilson’s answer to the Ger-
man request for an armistice. In his note the president after inquiring about the 
exact meaning of Germany’s commitment to the Fourteen Points confronted the 
Germans pointedly with the inquiry whether the “Imperial Chancellor“ was 
“speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far 
conducted the war”.77 Asking this question Wilson broadly hinted that he doubted 
72 Cooper: Woodrow Wilson (see note 21), pp. 17 f.
73 Kampmark: No Peace (see note 16), p. 774.
74 Lowry: Armistice (see note 34), p. 96.
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the democratic legitimacy of the new German government and thus revived the 
topic of “regime change”. Resuming his policy aimed at a regime change the pres-
ident in his subsequent exchange of notes with Germany left no doubt that he 
 refused to recognise the government of Max of Baden as a “democratic” and trust-
worthy negotiating partner, regardless of the fact that it rested on the left wing 
majority in the Reichstag which frantically was hastening to enact reforms, in or-
der to meet the president’s wish for a change of regime. In his last note to Berlin 
before the conclusion of the armistice the president demanded on 23 October 1918 
that the hitherto all-powerful “King of Prussia” (for reasons he knew only him-
self, he did not say “Emperor”) be replaced by “veritable” “representatives of the 
German people, who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as 
the real rulers of Germany […]: If it [the U.S. government] must deal with the 
military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany […] it must demand, 
not peace negotiations, but surrender.”78 In other words: according to what Wil-
son declared, a genuine as well as sustainable regime change in Germany remained 
both a decisive point of his policy and the most important precondition for con-
cluding a peace, which would also be “just” for the loser. The alternative was a 
military “diktat” imposed on a totally defeated Germany.79
Wilson’s renewed demand for a regime change in Germany provides one an-
swer as to why he agreed to an exchange of views with the German government 
regarding an armistice. Apparently, he perceived the German request as an oppor-
tunity to dangle prospects of peace before the eyes of the German people includ-
ing its armed forces and thus to step up his psychological warfare against the ene-
my. He thus hoped to weaken the latter’s determination to resist the military pres-
sure of the Western powers and to speed up their victory over the latter. News he 
received from Germany in late September was encouraging in this respect. An 
outright rejection of Germany’s request “slamming the door on peace”, as Wilson 
put it, would have deprived the president of this instrument of warfare. It might 
also have revived the determination of the German soldiers to continue fighting.80
78 U.S. note to the German government: Wilson to Lansing (to be forwarded), 23. 10. 1918, re-
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Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 51, pp. 417 f.; Schwabe: Deutsche Revolution (see note 71), 
pp. 114 ff. English translation: Klaus Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson (see note 41), pp. 35 ff.
79 The term “just” was for Wilson extremely wide-ranging: Directly, it involved the adoption of 
his ideologically-based war aims programme. By extension, it meant a settlement that would foster 
a system of international relations that was grounded in international law. See i.e.: Link et al.: Wil-
son Papers (see note 2), vol. 46, p. 320, p. 323 and vol. 47, p. 47, p. 268, p. 287 and vol. 51, p. 130.
80 About ten days before the arrival of the German armistice request in Washington House, in a 
private talk with the president, reminded him about the “necessity of fighting Germany from 
within as well as from without; that it was as much part of military tactics to do this as it was to 
handle the armies in the field“. The military situation in Germany, he pointed out, „was not so 
bad, but [...] the situation was much worse behind the lines and our every efforts should be to aid 
our armies by diplomacy“. House, Diary, 24. 9. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), 
vol. 51, pp. 105 f.; see also: Wiseman, Memorandum, ca. 16. 10. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers 
(see note 2), vol. 51, p. 347.
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But there were other reasons which explain Wilson’s acceptance of the German 
request. For one thing, it is important to stress that in his second and third notes 
to the German government the president once more insisted on concluding an 
“armistice” that would sanction the definite military superiority of the victorious 
Powers: that is to say he stood firm by his objective of a clear military victory for 
the Western Powers. The associated European Powers who then were negotiat-
ing the armistice terms in Paris were all too ready to comply with this demand.81 
Secondly and even more importantly – with the German request for an armistice 
Wilson’s war aims programme acquired a new dimension. The Fourteen Points 
became internationally official, and the Entente Powers could not avoid defining 
their own position in regard to them, especially regarding those points about 
which they did not agree with the United States. By way of this clarification the 
U.S. government had the chance to pin them down to its programme. Aware of 
this, especially the British government was anxious to clarify its position. In or-
der to know Wilson’s understanding of his Fourteen Points, it sent Sir William 
Wiseman, the representative of its secret service in Washington and one of Wil-
son’s closest confidants, to the president. During their momentous conversation 
on 16 October 1918, it turned out that most controversial of all were Wilson’s 
ideas concerning the freedom of the seas and the future of the German colonies. 
The freedom of the seas as the Americans conceived of it would have put in 
question Great Britain’s naval supremacy, not least the right to impose block-
ades. After an ensuing violent row with the British Wilson ended up urging them 
to place their naval supremacy in the service of the future League of Nations. For 
taking over the German colonies, he recommended an administration “in trust” 
for the League of Nations.
The German government, on the other hand, had complied with Wilson’s wish 
that victors and vanquished should recognise Wilson’s programme as the basis for 
the peace negotiations. It had become in fact a secret “partner” of the American 
president, and it would have been foolish for him to discourage them too much, 
standing, as he would, to lose them in the event of a radical upheaval in Germany 
as a result of extended warfare and unconditional surrender. This was a third 
 reason for his apparent moderation. Fourthly, Wilson actually wanted to use the 
 remaining weight of his secret German “partner” to bring some pressure on his 
European “associates”. To this end, he instructed Colonel House, his plenipoten-
tiary in the Paris armistice negotiations at the end of October, not to yield too 
much to Allied demands for more stringent military and political armistice terms. 
Too many supplementary military and political conditions, he warned, might give 
the European “Allies” “too much success or security”, an effect, as he put it, that 
“will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult if not impossible”.82 
Wilson, in other words, wanted the remaining German Empire to act as a certain 
81 Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson (see note 41), pp. 86 ff.
82 Wilson to House, 28. 10. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 51, p. 473: “Too 
much success and security on the part of the Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceed-
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counterweight to the Western Allies – a situation that would enhance his position 
as a mediator. Once more, Wilson’s concern about the balance of power, a princi-
ple he always had condemned in theory, came to the fore. A final consideration on 
Wilson’s part had again to do with the situation in Germany. An unconditional 
surrender, resulting in the removal of the German government, he feared, might 
not only eliminate his secret German “partner”, but might lead also to two unde-
sirable political consequences inside Germany: firstly, the discrediting of the mod-
erate elements that were eager to open peace talks and the strengthening of their 
die-hard opponents on the Right, who stood for fighting on the war. The second 
possible effect of an uncompromising insistence on total victory seemed even 
more alarming – the possibility that the continuation of the war would lend sup-
port to those forces in Berlin which were preparing a radical, Russian-style, 
change of regime from which the Bolsheviks would emerge as the victors. In that 
case Germany would have totally detached itself from American influences. Faced 
with this eventuality, the victorious Powers would have been helpless, as the expe-
rience of their vain attempts to cope with Bolshevik Russia had shown. The only 
option for the victors in that case would have been to occupy the whole of Ger-
many and govern it for a long time – a costly prospect all of the Allies shrunk 
back from. Furthermore, with a Bolshevik Germany a “just” peace such as Wilson 
desired – indeed, any peace –, would have become impossible. No wonder then, 
that at the conclusion of the armistice negotiations and during the Paris Peace 
Conference the spectre of a Bolshevik Germany was often to prove a useful trump 
card for the German side.83 All Wilson’s arguments for opposing an unconditional 
surrender indicate that he was aware of the limits even to America’s power: at the 
end of the First World War radical regime change and “nation-building” in Germa-
ny of the kind that were to follow the Second World War was simply not feasible, 
and Wilson knew that.84
Conclusion: A Moderate in Disguise
Wilson had good reason, therefore, for his relatively moderate stance in the clos-
ing stages of the First World War: i.e. for granting an armistice to the Germans, 
ingly difficult if not impossible.”; see Kennedy: Will (see note 5), p. 152; Lowry: Armistice (see 
note 34), p. 80, pp. 39 f., p. 96.
83 Wiseman, Memorandum, Interview with Wilson, 16. 10. 1918. In: Link et al.: Wilson Papers 
(see note 2), vol. 51, pp. 347 f. According to Wiseman, Wilson declared that: “We should consider 
too the condition of Germany. If we humiliate the German people and drive them too far, we 
shall destroy all form of government, and Bolshevism will take its place. We ought not ground 
them to powder or there will be nothing to build up from.” See: Schwabe: Woodrow Wilson (see 
note 41), pp. 42 ff., p. 46, p. 67; Wiseman, Memorandum, Interview with Wilson, 16. 10. 1918. In: 
Link et al.: Wilson Papers (see note 2), vol. 51, p. 347.
84 Wilson dismissed the setting up of a new German government by the victorious Powers as 
“unthinkable”; Kampmark: No Peace (see note 16), p. 784, p. 786.
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regardless of their form of government, rather than demanding their uncondition-
al surrender. Indeed, according to the information available to the president and 
to the Allies when they signed the armistice treaty, no radical change of regime 
had yet occurred in Germany, and, as far as they knew, the Western powers were 
still negotiating an armistice with representatives of Imperial Germany. They were 
as yet unaware of the German November Revolution;85 and when Wilson did 
learn of it, he refused to recognise the new German republic as a political system 
embodying his ideas of democracy and lawful government – even though the new 
regime invoked Wilson’s principles and appealed for his support.86
To be sure, his refraining from insisting on total victory over Germany and his 
and his Allies’ acquiescence in what they regarded as inadequate German moves 
towards democracy were not without consequences inside Germany: both lent 
credibility to the illusion that the returning German troops had remained “un-
beaten in the field” – a notion that the Right seized on for its “stab-in-the-back” 
propaganda.87 At the same time, however, the terms of the armistice did not en-
dear the fledgling German republic to its citizens. Wilson has indeed been criti-
cised for having prolonged the war by rejecting a compromise peace until Germa-
ny formally requested an armistice. Judged from today’s perspective, however, his 
most questionable objective – regime change, be it by military or non-military 
means – has become an acceptable objective in many quarters, especially in the 
West, in today’s interconnected world in which a global responsibility for main-
taining peace within every single country is often taken for granted.
Viewed from the American and the Allied point of view Wilson’s achievements 
remain undisputable: he provided the decisive military-political and, indeed, mor-
al support for the ultimately successful continuation of the war. At the moment of 
the signing of the armistice, Wilson’s own as well as America’s prestige had 
reached its peak. It was, as a historian called it, “America’s moment”.88 To explain, 
why Wilson in 1919 ultimately failed is beyond the scope of this paper; but that 
failure does not detract from his fundamental qualities as a political leader and his 
ability to comprehend the conundrums of modern political and military warfare, 
to recognise the limitations of power every victor in a military conflict has to face, 
and to act accordingly. Despite his weaknesses as a sometimes wily, occasionally 
disingenuous politician he was a statesman, a unique combination of oratorical 
85 See the recent article by Wolfram Pyta: Die Kunst des rechtzeitigen Thronverzichts. Neue 
Einsichten zur Überlebenschance der parlamentarischen Monarchie in Deutschland im 
Herbst 1918. In: Patrick Merziger et. al. (eds.): Geschichte, Öffentlichkeit, Kommunikation. 
Festschrift für Bernd Sösemann zum 65. Geburtstag. Stuttgart 2010, pp. 363–381, here: p. 365, 
p. 372.
86 Kampmark: No Peace (see note 16), pp. 787 f.; Larsen: Abandoning Democracy (see note 17), 
p. 492.
87 See now: Klaus Schwabe: World War I and the Rise of Hitler. In: Diplomatic History 38 (2014), 
pp. 864–870.
88 Arthur Walworth: America’s Moment 1918. American Diplomacy at the End of World War I. 
New York 1977.
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brilliance, moral strength, and a powerful vision of human progress together with 
responsible and realistic political judgement. Endowed with these qualities he at-
tempted to lay the foundations of a foreign policy that was committed to securing 
in the long-term a world order founded on justice and the principle human dignity.
Conclusion

Holger Afflerbach
“… eine Internationale der Kriegsverschärfung 
und der Kriegsverlängerung …” 
War Aims and the Chances for a Compromise Peace 
during the First World War
The German foreign minister Richard von Kühlmann exclaimed in the Reichstag 
on 28 September 1917: “Europe! It sounds like a fairy tale from times long gone 
[…]. For none of the states of the old Europe were the political conditions of the 
last forty years so intolerable that they had to go to war to change them at the risk 
of self-annihilation. Perhaps it is even today a common interest of all the great 
powers to ensure that Europe does not perish. A final breakdown will leave every 
single state, regardless of which side they stand on, weaker and without much of a 
future, and some will be completely broken and without hope.”1
Kühlmann’s invocation of Europe, of a common bond between the European 
states who were now fighting each other, was all very well; but he was describing 
a hope, not the realities of the situation. In fact, the belligerent Powers had no 
“systemic approach”, as political scientists would say, embracing the entire politi-
cal system of Europe, but only a “unit level” approach:2 every state was fighting 
for its own aims – even those that pretended not to be doing so. In the event, the 
war continued until the total defeat of the Central Powers, and with total disre-
gard for the collateral damage that the struggle for victory was inflicting on the 
European states system. The war left Europe devastated: Germany was humiliat-
ed, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire dissolved, Russia suffering under a 
monstrous dictatorship and fighting a civil war, France and Italy completely ex-
hausted and Great Britain burdened with massive debts, facing countless interna-
1 Wolfgang Steglich: Die Friedensversuche der kriegführenden Mächte im Sommer und 
Herbst 1917. Stuttgart 1984, front page.
2 Concerning “system level” and “unit level” approach: Paul W. Schroeder: The Transformation 
of European Politics 1763–1848. Oxford 1994, introduction; see also the contributions in The In-
ternational History Review 16 (1994) 4, esp. H. M. Scott: Paul W. Schroeder’s International Sys-
tem. The View from Vienna, pp. 663–680; Charles Ingrao: Paul W. Schroeder’s Balance of Power. 
Stability or Anarchy?, pp. 681–700; T. C. W. Blanning: Paul W. Schroeder’s Concert of Europe, 
pp. 701–714; Jack S. Levy: The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder’s International Sys-
tem, pp. 715–744; Paul W. Schroeder: Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium. A Response, 
pp. 745–754.
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tional problems and, Keith Jeffrey argues, already in the initial stages of its impe-
rial and national disintegration.3 Even the gains of some smaller participants, like 
Serbia, proved to be a very mixed blessing in the long run and had been bought at 
the price of horrendous losses which were proportionally higher than those of the 
other powers.4 The only winners, in terms of power politics, were the USA and 
Japan – the two great powers of the day who had not participated fully in the 
conflict. Many in Europe had suspected that only non-European powers would 
benefit from a Great War. To cite one example, in September 1912 Erich 
von Falkenhayn, later Chief of the German General Staff, had written about the 
“supremacy which the USA and Japan will easily gain from a Great European 
War”5 – an opinion shared once the war had broken out by nearly everyone in the 
German leadership. That the results of the war were, on a unit level, a disaster, 
was immediately clear. On the systemic level it was even worse; for the deficien-
cies at unit level meant that the international system could not work, as the inter-
war period and the Second World War were to demonstrate.
Why the decision-makers of Europe had let the war happen is not the issue 
here.6 The purpose of this volume is rather to consider why, once involved in it, 
the belligerent states pursued their respective war aims so ferociously and tena-
ciously, and with so little regard for the danger of destroying both themselves and 
that “world of yesterday”7 that was so soon to appear to so many nostalgic Euro-
peans as a kind of lost paradise. The answer has something to do with the nature 
of the First World War.8
World War I as a Political Crisis Without a Solution
Once the war had broken out, it was very difficult to imagine a peace settlement 
based on compromise solution. At least this was Lloyd George’s opinion after 
1919.9 There was perhaps simply no solution for the problems which the war cre-
ated both in internal and international politics. The enormous human, economic 
and financial losses only made things worse by the day. Statesmen and political 
leaders found their room for manoeuvre limited by a number of factors. In the 
first place, they all felt obliged to devise war aims that would provide political 
3 See the chapter on Britain by Keith Jeffrey in this volume.
4 See the chapter on Serbia by Dušan T. Bataković in this volume.
5 Translated by Holger Afflerbach. The original text: Falkenhayn, 30. 9. 1912: “des Übergewichts, 
das Amerika und Japan durch einen großen europäischen Krieg mühelos zufallen muß”. In: Hol-
ger Afflerbach: Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. München 1994, 
p. 100; see also Mensdorff’s comments here below, p. 248.
6 Christopher Clark: The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914. London 2012.
7 Stefan Zweig: Die Welt von Gestern. Erinnerungen eines Europäers. Stockholm 1944.
8 David Stevenson: The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917. In: HJ 34 (1991) 1, pp. 65–86, 
esp. pp. 85 f.
9 David Lloyd George: Mein Anteil am Weltkrieg. Kriegsmemoiren, vol. 3. Berlin 1936, pp. 576–
585.
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justification for the sacrifices they were demanding of their citizens; and in the 
second, they felt anyway that to settle for a compromise would mean condemning 
themselves – or the next generation – to fighting the same war over again.10
Another very important factor was perhaps inherent in the very nature of alli-
ance warfare. Alliance considerations, which had played such a decisive part in the 
July crisis, remained important after the war had broken out. Indeed, it was so 
difficult to harmonise the various aims of the alliance partners that it must have 
seemed at times politically easier to conclude a separate peace. In all cases, howev-
er, governments decided against it, being motivated by a sense of honour not to 
leave the partners alone, and perhaps even more by fear of isolation.
Certainly, both sides found it difficult to devise a programme of common war 
aims within the own alliance – witness the dissention between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary over the “Polish question” from 1916 until the end of the war;11 
or the reluctance of Britain until 1917 to guarantee to France the recovery of Al-
sace-Lorraine.12 It was difficult to agree on war aims with partners and seemed 
virtually impossible to reach compromise agreements on them with the enemy – 
all the more so as agreements within alliances, like for example the Doumergue 
agreement of 1917 on Russian and French war aims at Germany’s expense,13 often 
entailed a maximisation of mutual gains that made any future agreement with the 
other side all the more difficult.14
The situation became more complex and the problems insolvable. New Allies 
could only be won with large promises, mostly at the expense of the enemy – wit-
ness the negotiations with Italy in 191515 and with Romania in 1916 – and this 
rendered a political solution of the war short of complete defeat of one side ever 
more unlikely.
In short, as David Stevenson has observed, on all sides the obstacles to peace 
“were real and deep”.16 For too long, all sides preferred to fight on rather than 
compromise, perhaps because for too long all sides hoped to win. And even when 
10 George H. Cassar: Lloyd George at War 1916–1918. London 2009, p. 162: Lloyd George say-
ing that the Pope’s peace proposal would be “a slightly more lasting peace of Amiens”; Milner 
saying in late 1917 that there would be another conflict in ten years time, if Germany were not 
beaten now, p. 165.
11 Werner Conze: Polnische Nation und Deutsche Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg. Köln/Graz 1958; 
Heinz Lemke: Allianz und Rivalität. Die Mittelmächte und Polen im ersten Weltkrieg (bis zur 
Februarrevolution) (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 18). Berlin 1977.
12 Stevenson: Failure of Peace (see note 8), p. 83; Gerhard Ritter: Staatskunst und Kriegshand-
werk, vol. 4. München 1968, p. 89.
13 David Stevenson: Cataclysm. The First World War as Political Tragedy. New York 2004, 
p. 114.
14 Wolfgang Steglich: Bündnissicherung oder Verständnisfrieden. Göttingen 1958, p. 177: Scave-
nius thought that the Entente note to Wilson on 12. 1. 1917 was so boundless because the Entente 
had integrated all maximum demands to avoid discord among the Allies.
15 Holger Afflerbach: Der Dreibund. Europäische Großmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ers-
ten Weltkrieg. Wien 2002, pp. 849–874; Johannes Hürter/Gian Enrico Rusconi (eds.): Der Kriegs-
eintritt Italiens im Mai 1915 (= Schriftenreihe der VfZ). München 2007.
16 Stevenson: Failure of Peace (see note 8), p. 85.
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victory arrived it was to prove difficult to find any common ground, as the Ver-
sailles peace conference was to demonstrate in 1919.17
The hope that a final victory might prove a panacea for their countless prob-
lems caused all participants to pursue a very shortsighted kind of action which 
may be called “hand to mouth”. It was one of the central laws of decision making 
during the war and made things constantly worse. One example might be the fi-
nancial side of the war, with the constant reliance on stopgaps18 in the hope of 
presenting the bill later to the vanquished or at least of postponing the problem to 
the future; another, the political promises made to neutral countries to bring them 
into the war – promises which would never have been made in peacetime. Finally, 
there was the German plan for Mitteleuropa – a very popular proposal in certain 
circles in 1915, but one which, as Soutou has convincingly demonstrated, was det-
rimental to German economic interests: the very idea of such a central European 
economic bloc horrified German industrialists, whose main markets lay outside 
of it, mainly in Western Europe.19
Armies and Populations
Here two questions arise: first, if the politicians were fighting for victory because 
they did not see any other way out, did the military planners support them or did 
they try to rein them in and limit the damage and, secondly, what did the popula-
tions, the societies who had to bear the weight and the misery of the war, have to say?
The military planners were generally very supportive of fighting until victory. 
They were not holding the politicians back and not asking any limitation of war 
aims – on the contrary. In their view, the enemy had to be defeated, and they felt 
able to provide victory. There were two exceptions to this rule. The first was Erich 
von Falkenhayn, who advised Bethmann Hollweg in November 1914 that a mili-
tary victory was unattainable and that the politicians should look for a political 
way out of the war. The second was Ludendorff, who forced the politicians to ask 
for an immediate armistice in late September 1918. There are very few other cases 
where military leaders tried to moderate the politicians; in most cases it was the 
other way around. In the German case the military leaders pressed the politicians 
to pursue victory, at least in the period of the 3rd OHL. In some cases military 
leaders went too far and overstretched the endurance of their armies, as was shown 
by the Russian and French mutinies in 1917 and the disintegration of the German 
and Austro-Hungarian Armies in 1918.
17 Gerd Krumeich/Silke Fehlemann (eds.): Versailles 1919. Ziele – Wirkung – Wahrnehmung. Es-
sen 2001; very thought-provoking: Adam Tooze: The Deluge. The Great War and the Remaking 
of Global Order, 1916–1931. London 2014.
18 The British example: On war financing see David French: The Strategy of the Lloyd George 
Coalition1916–1918. Oxford 1995, p. 42 (British credit in the U.S., finances in general).
19 Georges-Henri Soutou: L’or et le sang. Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre 
mondiale. Paris 1989, esp. pp. 847 f.
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As for relations between ruling elites and populations, how far were the mass of 
soldiers and citizens fighting to achieve their governments’ war aims? This ques-
tion is very difficult to answer. It seems that both civilian populations and soldiers 
were, at least in the later part of the war, increasingly war-weary and mainly inter-
ested in ending the war as soon as possible if the terms were half way acceptable.20 
It was mostly the ruling elites, not the broad masses of soldiers and civilians, who 
desired substantial gains. Sometimes political leaders were afraid that the popula-
tions growing desire for peace would undermine their hopes of continuing the 
war until victory.21
On the other hand, it would be wrong to underestimate the strength of nation-
alistic feelings “from below”. Headlines like that in the “Morning Post” of 10 Sep-
tember 1917 could be found at all times in all belligerent countries: “The business 
of our statesmen and of the nation is to see that the blood of our soldiers is not 
wasted nor their courage betrayed.”22 There were “patriotic” movements like the 
Vaterlandspartei in Germany or the Irredentists in Italy who fought openly for 
expansionist aims;23 and even if these pressure groups appealed only to sections of 
the population, they remained influential.
It was difficult for all governments to manoeuvre between being accused by a 
part of their own society of betraying the war effort and losing their nerve, and 
holding out for too long and straining the patriotic consensus to the breaking 
point. It was Ludendorff’s claim to keep going “for ten minutes longer”24 that 
brought Germany to defeat on the battlefield, whatever the purveyors of the stab-
in-the-back legend might have claimed later.25 Another example is the Russian 
case, where the inability or unwillingness of the government to bring the war to 
an end caused the revolution and the complete breakdown of the existing political 
order;26 and by late 1918 the Central Powers were in a very similar situation to 
Russia: continuing the war could mean revolution. The French mutinies in 1917 
showed that the Western powers too were not immune to the danger of over-
stretching the goodwill of their soldiers – a danger of which all the belligerent 
governments were aware from quite early on.27
20 Roger Chickering: Freiburg im Ersten Weltkrieg. Totaler Krieg und städtischer Alltag 1914–
1918. Paderborn u. a. 2009; Belinda J. Davis: Home Fires Burning. Food, Politics, and Everyday 
Life in World War I Berlin. Chapel Hill/London 2000; Maureen Healy: Vienna and the Fall of 
the Habsburg Empire. Total War and Everyday Life in World War I (= Studies in the Social and 
Cultural History of Modern Warfare Series, vol. 17). Cambridge 2004.
21 Stevenson: Failure of Peace (see note 8), p. 83, with the example of Painleve.
22 Cassar: Lloyd George (see note 10), pp. 167 f.
23 Heinz Hagenlücke: Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. Die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaiser-
reichs. Düsseldorf 1997.
24 Stevenson: Failure of Peace (see note 8), p. 85.
25 See Boris Barth: Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration. Das Trauma der deutschen 
Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1914–1933. Düsseldorf 2003.
26 See the contribution of Boris Kolonitskii in this volume; also: Horst Günther Linke: Das zari-
sche Russland und der Erste Weltkrieg. Diplomatie und Kriegsziele 1914–1917. München 1982.
27 Falkenhayn, 28. 8. 1916. In: Nicolai papers, Special Archive Moscow, 1414-1-13.
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Even so, it is clear, from a historical perspective, that the limits of endurance 
and the solidity of the national consensus among the belligerent peoples of Eu-
rope were enormous and perhaps a good deal stronger than many contemporaries 
thought. Refusals to fight and revolution only came at the end, after years of 
fighting and suffering. At the beginning every belligerent nation exhibited a fierce 
resolution to fight for its national defence. This consensus was stronger than in-
ternationalism, socialism, or pacifism; and it held for a remarkably long time, de-
spite all hardships borne by soldiers and civilians.
It would, of course, be a romantic idea to think that the “masses” were 
peace-loving and in favour of ending of the war regardless of the result. Many 
families had made enormous sacrifices in the national cause. To cite a German ex-
ample: the Chief of the Imperial Military Cabinet, Moriz von Lyncker, had lost 
two of his sons, and so had the Social Democratic leader Friedrich Ebert. Such 
people could hardly have been indifferent to the outcome of a war which had de-
stroyed their private happiness forever. The same is true on the Allied side: to 
mention only one of many examples, Bonar Law lost a son in 1917.28 They all 
wanted the war to stop soon, but they also wanted the war to end with a good 
result for their respective countries – in short, “peace with honour”, and a peace 
which left state and society intact. Few wanted peace at any price; and even politi-
cians on the political left favoured realistically obtainable gains and advantages for 
their countries. A good example is the mood in the Italian people immediately af-
ter the war, when President Wilson appealed to them to forego the gains of the 
Treaty of London and to fight at Versailles for the higher causes of humanity; and 
when the handful of Italian politicians like Bissolati, who tried to advocate this 
kind of policy, were quite unable to stand against the tide.29
The Development of War Aims During the War
For all of these reasons, the actual outcome of the war was the most likely one: 
the belligerents fought it out until one party was defeated. Not without reason 
some contemporaries, like the German field marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht, 
used the metaphor of sitting in a boat with nobody at the helm.30 Nevertheless, 
war aims were never independent from the military situation, with which all the 
belligerents were consequently much preoccupied. This did not mean, of course, 
that they did not repeatedly commit very serious errors of judgment in assessing 
the strategic possibilities.
28 French: Strategy (see note 18), p. 293.
29 Holger Afflerbach: “... nearly a case of Italy contra mundum”? Italien als Siegermacht in Ver-
sailles 1919. In: Krumeich/Fehlemann (eds.): Versailles 1919 (see note 17), pp. 159–173, pp. 166 f.
30 “Mir kommt es so vor, als wäre ich in einem Boote, das steuerlos in einem reißenden Strom 
zwischen Klippen hindurchtreibt.” Quoted in: Dieter Weiß: Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern. 
Eine politische Biographie. Regensburg 2007, p. 144.
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To consider the major belligerents only, several different “phases” of war aims 
may be distinguished:
Phase 1 – The establishment of war aims: This phase starts with the outbreak 
of the war, which actually surprised and shocked all the parties involved in the 
July crisis.31 War aims were not inscribed on any hidden agenda prepared before-
hand, even if some had been inclined to speculate about what might be achieved 
in a possible future war (as Georges-Henri Soutou shows in the case of the Fran-
co-Russian alliance).32 The attempts of historians to prove a strong link between 
pre-war ambitions, the July crisis and war aims, have proved in the long run un-
convincing. The most famous example is Fritz Fischer’s “War of Illusions”, 
which attempts to demonstrate that the war had been plotted and prepared by 
the German leadership ever since the Kriegsrat of 8 December 1912.33 This is to-
day a minority position among historians; for the claim that the war aims of the 
First World War can be found in events before July 1914 is hardly substantiated 
by the evidence. In reality, the appetite came with eating: after – or maybe be-
cause of – the shock caused by the outbreak of a continental war, all sides very 
quickly developed the most extravagant war aims. The most famous of these de-
signs is the German September Programme,34 but the Russian, French and Aus-
tro-Hungarian designs for postwar territorial gains were equally extreme.35
Phase 2 – Growing realism: While military developments compelled both 
sides to modify their initial extravagant schemes, they did not abandon them al-
together.
The above-mentioned meeting between the German chief of staff, Falkenhayn, 
with Bethmann Hollweg on 18 November 1914 was particularly important.36 
The general’s demand for a political solution of the war because a military victo-
ry was unattainable marked a turning point: henceforth the political leaders of 
the Central Powers began to admit that unlimited gains were not possible and 
that they had to look for compromise. This culminated in their agreement in 
March 1917 (Minimalprogramm) to fight for the status quo ante.37 On the En-
tente side the nadir came in late 1917, when Russia left the coalition.38 Public 
opinion in Great Britain and France was divided, but the two governments held 
firm to their decision to fight on until victory and prevailed over their critics. 
31 Dušan T. Bataković showed this for Serbia, see his contribution in this volume.
32 See the contribution of Georges-Henri Soutou in this volume.
33 Fritz Fischer: Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik 1911–1914. Düsseldorf 21969; John 
C. G. Röhl: “An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg. Eine Dokumentation über den ‘Kriegsrat’ vom 
8. Dezember 1912”. In: MGM 21 (1977), pp. 77–134.
34 Fritz Fischer: Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 
1914–1918. Düsseldorf 1961, pp. 113–119.
35 See the contributions of Marvin Fried, Georges-Henri Soutou and Boris Kolonitskii in this 
volume.
36 See the contribution of Roger Chickering in this volume.
37 See the contribution of Lothar Höbelt in this volume.
38 V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914–1918. Oxford 1971, pp. 96–
142.
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After all, as neither government was prepared to settle for a return to the status 
quo ante, the minimum condition of the Central Powers could not be met.
Phase 3 – Growing despair: From 1916 onwards all European belligerents were 
in varying degrees of despair. Some, like Austria-Hungary or Russia in 1917, were 
ready to compromise on war aims, even if they were ultimately held back by their 
respective alliance partners. Opinion in Germany was divided, at all levels, as to 
whether to compromise or to fight on. The government therefore gave out signals 
in both directions, but its numerous, and somewhat clumsy attempts to find a 
political way out of the war were systematically ignored and ridiculed in Paris 
and London.
States Who Entered the Conflict Later in the War
States which entered the war after August 1914 were in a different position con-
cerning war aims, which were for them not something which was devised after the 
event, but the actual reason for going to war.
1. The Ottoman Empire entered the war in November 1914 for essentially defen-
sive reasons, without getting many promises or even a guarantee of its territori-
al integrity. Its decision for war in this moment, and on such uncertain terms, 
was surprising, but is less mysterious than it looks at first sight.39 The Otto-
mans felt themselves victims of an international system, some of whose mem-
bers had decided to divide them up; they wanted an alliance for protection 
against this fate; and if the price for such an alliance was entry into war, they 
were ready to pay it. Later in the war, of course, the Ottoman government was 
to develop its own extravagant war aims.
2. The Italian government entered the war to acquire the territories promised in 
the Treaty of London of 1915 and was not ready to abandon any of these ambi-
tions, regardless of the costs.40 The decision for war was made, according to 
Salandra, by two people only: himself and the foreign minister Sydney Sonni-
no.41 This meant that they had assumed an extraordinary personal responsibili-
ty, not only for the war but for its outcome; and it was not surprising that 
whenever peace was at issue, either a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, or 
even in Versailles 191942 – Sonnino always insisted that Italy’s sacrifices on the 
battlefield had to be honored.
3. The attitudes of Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the war in 1915 and 1916 
respectively, were much the same as in the Italian case.
39 See the contribution of Mesut Uyar in this volume; see also Mustafa Aksakal: The Ottoman 
Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman Empire and the First World War. Cambridge 2008; Hew 
Strachan: To Arms. Oxford 2001, pp. 644–693.
40 See the contribution of John Gooch in this volume.
41 Denis Mack Smith: I Savoia Re d’Italia. Milano 1993, p. 270.
42 Afflerbach: Italien (see note 29).
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4. The United States, by contrast, who entered the war in April 1917, were not 
fighting at all for territorial gains, but to change the system of international re-
lations.43
Three Different Categories of War Aims
War aims can be divided into at least three categories. “Nationalistic” (or, less po-
lemically, “realist”) war aims, reflected prototypical “unit level” attitudes and 
were concerned with gains and “securities” for existing national states, on the as-
sumption that the world would be the same that it was before the war. In this 
category fall also certain economic plans for the post war period, designed to cre-
ate a new economic order to suit particular political and security interests – in the 
German case, for example, the idea of Mitteleuropa.44
A second type of war aim, or better, response to the war, was the one Lenin and 
his followers wanted to pursue: world revolution. It would never do to end the 
war by a diplomatic deal; rather, the entire social structures of the imperialist bel-
ligerent societies must be changed – not only a desirable objective in itself, but the 
only remedy against a repetition of such a disaster. If this, in contrast to the “unit 
level” approach of the “realists”, constituted a “systemic level” approach, so did the 
third category of war aims, a liberal or “idealist” answer in the tradition of Euro-
pean pacifism and Kant, in terms of a new international order, with the nationality 
principle, international arbitration, a league of nations, freedom of trade and free-
dom of the seas as its key points.
Nationalistic War Aims
First should be mentioned nationalistic war aims, which proved increasingly diffi-
cult to justify the longer the war lasted. In fact, some territorial demands were from 
the start so far reaching that they were incompatible with any political compromise 
and could only be realised by victory. Here, three examples spring to mind:
1. France insisted on the “desannexion” of Alsace-Lorraine, while Germany insist-
ed that there was no “Alsace-Lorraine-question in an international sense” (Kühl-
mann 1917, Hertling 1918). Whereas the French government never wavered con-
cerning Alsace-Lorraine (with only the socialists in 1917 talking of a plebiscite) 
everyone in Germany – the government, the military, all parties in the Reichstag, 
even the SPD – agreed that it was out of the question to hand over these territo-
ries to France. This question alone, therefore, ruled out any political compromise.
2. Although by 1917 some members of the Ottoman government were prepared 
to conclude a separate peace, the demands of the Entente – that the Ottomans 
43 See the contribution of Klaus Schwabe in this volume; for a wider context: Tooze: Deluge (see 
note 17).
44 Soutou: L’or (see note 19), passim.
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cede all their non-Turkish provinces – were so exorbitant that they felt they had 
no choice but to fight on.
3. In Austria-Hungary the Emperor Charles and his foreign minister Ottokar 
Count Czernin were by 1917–1918 so desperate to find an honorable way out 
of the war that they were prepared to cede Galicia to a newly erected Poland 
and to hand both over to Germany to persuade Berlin to cede Alsace-Lorraine 
to France to facilitate a political compromise to end the war. But even they 
were not prepared to comply with the Treaty of London and cede, not only the 
Trentino, but the port of Trieste and German-speaking territories, such as Süd-
tirol, to Italy. The Western powers were very unhappy about Italy’s stubborn 
refusal to compromise, but as they felt obliged to honour their promises to 
their ally the negotiations came to nothing.
Communist War Aims
For many people today, the communist war aims have been discredited by the 
knowledge of what seventy years of communist dictatorship meant for the people 
subjugated to it. In 1918, however, things looked very different. Obstinate gov-
ernments were keeping whole societies fighting, millions were dead or wounded, 
and Europe was plagued by famine, disease and mass poverty. The general misery 
combined with the apparent ruthlessness of the belligerent governments made the 
communists’ insistence that the social order must be overthrown sound increas-
ingly plausible. The governments, for their part, were aware and afraid of the 
Revolution, which Ludendorff feared even more than defeat. Once the war was 
over, however, only a small minority of Europeans favored the communist exper-
iment. The “world revolution” proved to be a pipe dream and the big majorities 
in Europe, including the Social democrats, preferred reforms of the existing order 
by far to radical experiments; and the vast majority agreed with Friedrich Ebert, 
who hated the social revolution “like sin”.45
Western and Liberal War Aims
The third group, the “idealists”, advocated a different international system, with a 
league of nations and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. For 
some, therefore, they seemed to move on a higher ethical plane than the national-
ists – at least Woodrow Wilson thought so. But in fact all governments, except the 
USA, were bound to both groups: the British, for example, wanted not only terri-
torial gains for themselves and for the dominions, but also a new and better inter-
national system.46 France wanted not only Alsace-Lorraine, and perhaps the 
Rhineland but also a league of nations. In fact, by the end of the war nearly every-
45 Max von Baden: Erinnerungen und Dokumente. Ed. by Golo Mann und Andreas Burckhardt. 
Stuttgart 1968, p. 600.
46 See the contribution of Keith Jeffery in this volume.
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body was in favor of some form of war-preventing international organisation 
(provided, of course, that it did not hinder their own territorial aspirations).
On the other hand, it might be argued that the high-minded “idealists” did 
much harm with their inflexible approach towards an enemy they demonised. 
There was no inevitable or logical connection between liberalism and a Manichae-
an view of good and evil; but they proved in practice to be closely linked.47 The 
Germans had done much to create the image of a brutal military machine: they 
had invaded Belgium, the chancellor had called the guarantee of Belgian neutrality 
by the European Great Powers “a scrap of paper”; they had committed “Belgian 
atrocities”, such as killing civilians and burning down historic buildings; their in-
tellectuals had written pamphlets defending “militarism”; their submarines had 
torpedoed passenger liners with women and children on board. All this, including 
the person of Wilhelm II and his son, had contributed to the image of a ruthless 
military autocracy fighting for “world power” and hegemony in Europe. It was 
not surprising, therefore, that Allied propaganda against Germany was interna-
tionally quite effective.
It must be said, however, that it proved to be yet another hindrance to compro-
mise – indeed, to any sensible communication – with an enemy who had been 
branded as a pirate and a murderer.48 After all, whatever the war aim was, if the 
war was to be stopped before one side had been completely defeated it would be 
necessary to talk; and to talk on an equal footing. As things stood, however, there 
was little readiness to do so – for reasons that went back to the outbreak of war in 
1914 and conflicting interpretations of its causes.
For the German people, persuaded that they had been attacked by Russia and 
her Entente partners, the war was a defensive one – despite the fact that German 
armies were fighting everywhere on enemy soil. The political elites in Berlin and 
Vienna admitted amongst themselves that they bore some of the responsibility for 
the outbreak of war. German propaganda was defensive in tone from the start and 
as the Kaiser declared: “We are not driven by any desire for conquest.” The same 
is true of the various pamphlets in which German intellectuals sought to refute 
Allied accusations of barbarism and militarism.
The Allied powers felt free of guilt, despite the fact that their attitudes and be-
haviour before and during the July crisis had not been above reproach.49 For 
them, the war was simply a German attempt to conquer Europe; and as they all 
had reason to fear German domination of the continent, it became an Allied war 
aim to destroy “Prussian militarism”. This implied, in modern terms, something 
like “regime change” in Germany;50 and of course it presupposed a decisive victory 
47 Detlef Junker: Die manichäische Falle. Das Deutsche Reich im Urteil der USA, 1871–1945. In: 
Klaus Hildebrand (ed.): Das Deutsche Reich im Urteil der Großen Mächte und europäischen 
Nachbarn (1871–1945), München 1995, pp. 141–158.
48 Ritter: Staatskunst, vol. 4 (see note 12), p. 240.
49 See the latest critical evaluation of Allied politics before and during the July crisis: Clark: 
Sleepwalkers (see note 6).
50 See the contribution of Klaus Schwabe in this volume.
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over the German aggressor.51 Precisely how “Prussian militarism” was to be de-
stroyed remained unclear. Perhaps the only effective way would have been to 
implement one of the French plans for partitioning Germany. Although the Brit-
ish never went that far, their ill-defined language in this direction was the despair 
of Austrian diplomats desperate to conclude a compromise peace. At the end of 
1917 for example Count Mensdorff, former Austro-Hungarian ambassador in 
London, had met General Smuts in Switzerland in 1917 to discuss peace terms 
in secret talks. According to Lloyd George’s later account, Mensdorff had ex-
claimed that “Europe [...] was dying at the centre, America was becoming the 
 financial and economic centre of the world, while Japan at the other end was 
gathering to herself immense power and resources and the whole trade of Asia. 
Why,” he asked, “were we [the British] going on fighting?” He went on to warn 
his interlocutors that, even though Lloyd George might talk of victory and 
 Asquith of the need to crush Prussian militarism, after “another year of this de-
struction [...] the position of Europe and civilisation, already so pitiable, would 
indeed be beyond repair. What”, he asked, “was the sort of victory we had in 
view? How would we know it and when would we consider it to be achieved? 
Did we want the Hohenzollerns to go? Surely, that was not likely to happen 
during the War, and would in any case not justify the practical destruction of 
European civilisation.” To all this Smuts could only reply that the British people 
were afraid that if Germany was not beaten, it would be “a kind of military dic-
tator” of Europe.52
According to Mensdorff’s chief, Count Czernin, Germany was in British eyes 
“the exact reincarnation of France under Bonaparte, but Napoleon was replaced 
by a monster with several heads such as the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Hinden-
burg, Ludendorff”;53 and the British felt it essential to destroy the monster before 
they could even contemplate making peace.
Certainly, Lloyd George said in October 1917 that Britain had to “wear [Ger-
many] down”. “That is what the Allies did to Napoleon, and that is what we must 
do to the Germans.”54 Compromising with them would be as futile as it had been 
with Napoleon; they had to be defeated. Any compromise peace with Germany 
would be a repetition of the peace of Amiens: a truce, not a real peace. Mean-
while, as Woodrow Wilson’s reply to the Pope’s peace proposal of August 1917 
showed, decisive military victory had now been adopted as a war aim even by the 
president, who as a neutral had spoken up for “peace without victory”.55 Perhaps 
Germany had never a real chance of negotiating a compromise peace. This does 
51 Kurt Riezler: Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente (= Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 
20. Jahrhunderts, vol. 48). Ed. by Karl-Dietrich Erdmann. Göttingen 1972. Diary entry of 
12. 1. 1917, p. 398.
52 David Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vol. 5. Boston 1936, p. 30.
53 Ottokar Czernin: Im Weltkriege. Berlin/Wien 1919, p. 227.
54 French: Strategy (see note 18), p. 294.
55 Stevenson: Failure of Peace (see note 8), p. 84.
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not excuse the clumsiness with which the Germans had pursued it, however; nor 
the inefficiency and lack of imagination they displayed when it came to fighting 
the worldwide battle for hearts and minds.56
Entente versus Central Powers
The Entente Powers pursued war aims whose realisation needed complete mili-
tary victory, to an extent that military victory itself became their central war aim; 
and given their structural superiority the outcome showed that they could afford 
to do so. Whether their military victory did not come at too high a price however, 
is another question. It unhinged the European states system in two respects: by 
destroying Russia and by rendering the European Powers dependent on the USA. 
The Allies’ “stubborn, immovable” determination to destroy German militarism 
amounted, to a policy of fiat justitia, et pereat mundus (Let there be justice, 
though the world perish). British politics were, Kurt Riezler complained, – “admi-
rable in all details, absolutely stupid in the overall design“.57
Perhaps even more stupid however, was the clumsiness of the Central Powers 
in their attempts to force their opponents and potential opponents to compromise 
– witness the Zimmermann telegram.58 Clearly, the Central Powers were having 
difficulties in devising a strategy in accordance with the realities of the military 
situation, perhaps the worst of their miscalculations being the declaration of un-
limited submarine warfare which brought the USA into the war. On the other 
hand, there was never any easy way out for the Central Powers. To accept defeat 
while the military situation was not utterly hopeless would have been politically 
unacceptable, (even dangerous, as the stab-in-the-back legend was later to show);59 
and there was really nothing much short of surrender on offer to them. Lloyd 
George’s Caxton Hall speech of 5 January 1918,60 for example, was regarded in 
Germany and Austria-Hungary as a slap in the face. As Gerhard Ritter summed 
56 A good example for that: Otto Hintze et al.: Deutschland und der Weltkrieg. Leipzig/Berlin 
1915. The most renowned historians produced this book for neutral countries. The essays tried to 
explain the German point of view, but did that in a remarkably inefficient way; even more strik-
ing because of the intellectual quality of its contributors. See also the complaints of Max von 
Baden on the German attempts to deal with foreign public opinion, in: Max von Baden: Erin-
nerungen und Dokumente (see note 45), passim.
57 Riezler: Tagebücher (see note 51), 10. 1. 1917, p. 396: “Die englische Politik bewundernswert in 
allen Kleinigkeiten, im grossen saudumm. Stur, unbeweglich.”
58 Barbara W. Tuchman: The Zimmermann Telegram. New York 1958; very informative on the 
background, esp. Zimmermann’s motivation: Thomas Boghardt: The Zimmermann Telegram. In-
telligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I. Annapolis, MD 2012.
59 See Barth: Dolchstoßlegenden (see note 25).
60 Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vol. 5 (see note 52), pp. 39–42; David Woodward: The Origins 
and Intent of David Lloyd George’s January 5 War Aims Speech. In: The Historian 34 (1971), 
pp. 22–39; the text of the speech is available online: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Prime_
Minister_Lloyd_George_on_the_British_War_Aims (accessed on 20. 4. 2015).
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up the situation: the Western powers were ready to enter negotiations only if the 
Germans “surrendered voluntarily to their enemies” beforehand.61
Certainly, the Central Powers might be acting out of egotistical motives; but 
they tried in fact very hard to stop the war. From, at the latest, March 1917 on-
wards, Berlin and Vienna were ready to conclude peace on the basis of status quo 
ante,62 but this was not acceptable to the Entente Powers, who rejected no fewer 
than three direct peace offers from the Central Powers (in December 1916, 
July 1917, December 1917), while Hertling’s offer to discuss Wilson’s Four-
teen Points further went unanswered.63 By 1918 the Germans were becoming in-
creasingly exasperated – as Hertling lamented at length in the Reichstag: “If we 
talk of our peaceful disposition, and our readiness for peace, some of our enemies 
interpret this as a sign of our weakness, of our impending collapse, others see it as 
a deceitful trap. When we spoke of our unshakable will to defend ourselves against 
a criminal war of conquest forced upon us, then they heard the rattle of Luden-
dorff’s sword, and they said: this is the voice of Prussian militarism, to which the 
leading statesmen also have to defer, whether they want to or not.”64
The failure to achieve a compromise was, to some extent, the result of the ab-
sence of respect and trust: the two sides had no effective means of communication 
that would enable one to hear, understand, and take seriously what the other had 
to say. The chief obstacle was, however, simply the incompatibility of war aims. 
As Georges-Henri Soutou has pointed out: „From the very start of the war, the 
Allied Powers were, much more determined than they admitted for a long time, 
to drastically reduce the political, military and economic power of Germany.”65 
In fact, the Allied claims to be “moderate” were quite astonishing, in view of their 
expansionist plans at the expense of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, the 
details of which were published by the Bolshevik government at the end of 1917. 
Less astonishing was the German reaction of – albeit impotent – outrage.66 As an 
61 Gerhard Ritter: Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des “Militarismus” in 
Deutschland. 4 vols. München 1954–1968, see: vol. 4, pp. 86 f.
62 Ibid., here: vol. 3, p. 478 and vol. 4, p. 207.
63 Hertling, RT 180. Sitzung, 25. 6. 1918, 5640. See this and all subsequent quotes from Reichtstag 
speeches online: www.reichstagsprotokolle.de (accessed on 20. 4. 2015).
64 Hertling, RT 180. Sitzung, 25. 6. 1918, 5640. “Sprechen wir von unserer friedfertigen Gesin-
nung, von unsrer Friedensbereitschaft, so wurde das von den einen als Symptom unserer Schwä-
che, unseres unmittelbar bevorstehenden Zusammenbruchs aufgefaßt und von den anderen als 
eine hinterlistig aufgestellte Falle gedeutet. Sprachen wir dagegen von unserem unerschütterli-
chen Willen, den uns frevelhaft aufgedrungenen Eroberungskrieg abzuwehren, so ‘hörte man den 
Säbel Ludendorffs klirren’; so hieß es: das ist die Stimme des preußischen Militarismus, dem auch 
die leitenden Staatsmänner sich wohl oder übel fügen müssen.”
65 Georges-Henri Soutou: Die Kriegsziele des Deutschen Reiches, Frankreichs, Großbritanniens 
und der Vereinigten Staaten während des Ersten Weltkrieges: ein Vergleich. In: Wolfgang Michal-
ka (ed.): Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse. Weyarn 1997, pp. 28–53, here: 
p. 33: “Die Alliierten waren vom Beginn des Krieges an wesentlich entschlossener, als lange Zeit 
zugegeben worden ist, die politische, militärische und wirtschaftliche Macht Deutschlands dras-
tisch zu reduzieren.”
66 French: Strategy (see note 18), p. 43.
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indignant Hertling exclaimed in the Reichstag on 25 February 1918, “despite their 
politics which are through and through aggressive and expansionist, the statesmen 
of the Entente dare to criticise us, militarist, imperialist autocratic Germany, as 
the troublemaker who has to be contained, if not eliminated, in the interest of 
world peace.”67
The interpretation of World War I as Germany’s Griff nach der Weltmacht or, 
rather, the story of Allied Powers fighting to frustrate a Germany “grasping for 
world power”, is perhaps something of a distortion, despite Fritz Fischer’s skill 
and accuracy in describing all Germany’s expansionist designs. For these have to 
be put in perspective, notably, in the context of the – in some respects even more 
ambitious – war aims of the other side.
The Weakness of Compromisers
In practice, of course, all too often both sides found themselves entangled in an 
impenetrable combination of internal and alliance politics that vitiated their ef-
forts to end the war by compromise. It caused problems for example, for Ger-
man advocates of a compromise peace based on understanding (Verständigungs-
frieden), as even they thought in terms of making gains, if strategically possible. 
It always came down to the same argument: only victory seemed to offer a 
chance – a questionable chance – of finding an acceptable way out. Yet for all the 
belligerents the pressure of internal and external events standing in the way of a 
solution often seemed so overwhelming that Bethmann Hollweg’s feeling of be-
ing carried away by “a fate, bigger than human power”68 is understandable. 
Whether this fatalistic, helpless attitude was not as detrimental to the cause of 
peace as his opponents’ stubborn insistence on imperialist goals is an open ques-
tion: perhaps a more cynical, “realist” approach would have served the Central 
Powers better than either the unimaginative “annexionism” of the OHL and the 
Vaterlandspartei or the well-meaning attempts of the compromisers in the 
Reichs tag. There might have been at least a possibility of trading off losses 
against gains, giving up Belgium, for example, (as the Wilhelmstraße planned to 
do anyway) and Alsace-Lorraine in the West, splitting the Entente and getting 
out of the war with much bigger gains at Russia’s expense.69 The de facto control 
of Eastern Europe would have left the position of the Central Powers far stron-
ger than in 1914. However, as David Stevenson observes, it would have taken a 
67 Hertling, RT 133. Sitzung, 25. 2. 1918, 4142: “Und angesichts dieser durch und durch aggressi-
ven, auf Aneignung fremder Gebiete gerichteten Politik wagen es die Staatsmänner der Entente 
noch immer das militaristische, imperialistische, autokratische Deutschland als den Störenfried 
hinzustellen, der im Interesse des Weltfriedens in die engsten Schranken verwiesen, wenn nicht 
vernichtet werden müsse.”
68 Riezler: Tagebücher (see note 51), 27. 7. 1914, p. 192.
69 See the contribution of Lothar Höbelt in this volume.
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politician of “Bismarck’s or Lenin’s bravura” to have carried through such a pol-
icy against the massive opposition of Right and Left alike.70
Britain, France and a Compromise Peace
The German government was prepared to attempt a compromise, albeit in a 
ham-fisted, often counter-productive, fashion; while the French government 
was insisting on terms that were only obtainable by outright victory. That the 
British in this situation failed to use their room for manoeuvre to work for a 
political solution gave them, in the eyes of some, a significant responsibility for 
the prolongation of the war. The German denunciations of Great Britain as the 
driving force in the enemy coalition created the groundswell of feeling in Ger-
many that enabled, if it did not compel, Berlin to embark on the implementa-
tion of the fatal unlimited submarine warfare in 1917. There is no doubt that 
peace might have come sooner if Britain had been prepared for a compromise 
short of military victory. Lloyd George had moments in late 1917 when he 
considered such a solution, even if the cabinet and the Foreign office were op-
posed to this idea;71 and Lord Lansdowne was inspired not so much by nostal-
gic sentiment as by a realist understanding of Great Britain’s self-interest, when 
he warned in his famous “peace letter” of 29 November 1917 to the “Daily 
Telegraph” that the “wanton prolongation [of the war] would be a crime dif-
fering only in degree from that of the criminals who provoked it”.72 At the 
same time, Austrian diplomats eager for peace, suggested to pinning the Ger-
mans down with their own statements of moderation and the Reichstag’s peace 
declaration of July 1917. This last was, in the eyes of the Allies, quite meaning-
less because the power in Germany was the military autocracy, not the Reichs-
tag. In fact, those very autocrats found the Reichstag peace declaration a real 
nuisance – certainly, in so far as it was regarded as politically binding it re-
stricted their options. Meanwhile, the OHL, the political right and the Vater-
landspartei favored large “annexationist” designs in both Eastern and Western 
Europe. But who spoke for Germany? Lansdowne, at least, urged giving the 
friends of peace a chance by destroying the eternal argument of the hardliners 
that the fight had to go on because the enemy was not offering an understand-
ing on equal terms.
70 David Stevenson: With Our Backs to the Wall. Victory and Defeat in 1918. London 2011, 
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71 Cassar: Lloyd George (see note 10), p. 167.
72 Douglas Newton: The Lansdowne “Peace Letter” of 1917 and the Prospect of Peace by Nego-
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“… eine Internationale der Kriegsverschärfung und der Kriegs-
verlängerung …”: the Interdependence of the Hardliners on Both Sides
According to Philipp Scheidemann the rejection of the peace offer of the Central 
Powers by the Entente was followed by a radicalisation of warfare.73 In one re-
spect, at least, the hardliners on both sides were now keeping each other in power 
and suppressing the forces of moderation. Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Lu-
dendorff needed each other, both to pursue their external goals and to keep the 
opposition in check at home. Indeed, individuals as different as Ludendorff and 
Lloyd George agreed that this war could only end with the defeat of one side.74 
Germany has been the subject of particular scrutiny from historians who have 
emphasised the constant interventions of Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Bauer and 
others in the long debate over war aims, but in fact the 3rd OHL owed its power 
to the continuing war that made it seem essential to concentrate all the nation’s 
efforts on the struggle against an uncompromising foe. As Ludendorff put it in 
July 1917: “The Field Marshall [Hindenburg] and I myself are aware of the diffi-
cult situation […]. But I believe that if we proclaim our modesty, we will only in-
vite the immodesty of our enemies. We will get peace only if we appear outwardly 
strong or if we declare ourselves beaten. As we cannot do the latter, therefore we 
have to do the first. The middle way has not so far brought any results, although 
we have been trying it for nearly a year.”75
The power of this argument would have crumbled the moment any negotia-
tions on a basis of equality had started. Lansdowne had recommended helping the 
supporters of a moderate peace to get the upper hand in Germany, and it is per-
haps a pity that such a strategy was never put to the test.76 Certainly, millions of 
lives might have been saved, but nobody can say for certain whether Europe 
would have been a better place if the two sides had compromised over their war 
aims and found a political settlement instead of fighting it out. We return to Kühl-
mann: whether the international system before 1914 was so intolerable that it had 
to be destroyed depends on an evaluation of that system and this is, fundamental-
ly, still a controversial question even today. If the pre-1914 system was basically 
73 Speech of Scheidemann at the Reichstag, 27. 2. 1917: “Es gibt eben heute auch eine Internatio-
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76 Newton: Lansdowne “Peace Letter” (see note 72), passim.
Holger Afflerbach254
sound and the war an accident – an interpretation today associated, ironically, 
with the name of Lloyd George – then it ought to have been possible to end the 
war by reaching an understanding on a basis of equality. Obviously, the sooner 
the war had ended, the less would have been the material, political and emotional 
damage; and in this respect perhaps Wilson’s idea of “peace without victory” 
might have offered the best solution. That would have implied, of course, that 
neither side would have been able to achieve its war aims in full; and, given the 
inordinate character of some of these aims, that might not have been a bad thing. 
As it turned out, the Entente’s victorious peace was, despite all the mitigating ef-
forts of the Americans, a disaster for Europe, and the realisation of the war aims 
of victorious German super-patriots would have been even worse.
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